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The associational sector has gained recent prominence, and scholars increasingly 
recognize the dualistic potential of civil society and social capital to promote either 
peace or violence. However, research to date gives little attention to the large 
proportion of associations that influence conflict unintentionally, as an externality 
produced during the pursuit of other goals. This emergent cluster of theory, which 
centers on the work of Robert Putnam and Ashutosh Varshney, tends to generalize 
the nature and causes of such externalities in ways that overlook associational 
complexity and dynamism. Therefore this thesis explores the applicability of conflict 
sensitivity, an organizational planning approach that originated in the humanitarian 
aid sector, for understanding and improving the social impact of religious 
associations in conflict-vulnerable multifaith societies. The author undertook action 
research with two local interfaith associations in Mindanao and Singapore to test the 
usage of the ‘Do No Harm’ conflict sensitivity framework among religious audiences 
in settings of ethno-religious conflict. More than 160 Protestant, Roman Catholic and 
Muslim leaders contributed empirically through participatory social analysis, 
surveys and interviews. The study finds that ‘Do No Harm’ holds relevance and 
usefulness for religious associations, yet it requires conceptual and practical 
adaptation of its impact analysis components.  Further, while the data support the 
importance in existing theory of bridging or intercommunal associational structures, 
there is strong evidence that individual mindsets and intentional human agency are 
equally central in shaping associational impact. Further, the public prominence of 
religion in Southeast Asia contrasts with Western-influenced liberal democratic 
assumptions, exposing a ‘religion gap’ in existing associational theory. Religious 
culture is shown to be a major influence shaping the formation and incipient change 
of group identities through associational life. Thus it is argued that wherever religion 
plays a public role, it should be consistently integrated into studies of associational 
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In this thesis, I explore how religious organizations, as part of the 
associational sector, interact with the dynamics of socio-political conflict, and how 
the social impact of those organizations might be improved. Such questions were 
unfashionable in Western circles during the era of secularization theory (Durkheim 
1915, Weber 1930), yet never lost their significance in settings where religion plays a 
vital role in the public sphere. The current scholarly and public discourse reveals a 
growing unease about “uncivil society” (Keane 1998, Kopecký and Mudde 2003, 
Boyd 2004, Beittinger-Lee 2009) in general, and the divisive aspects of religion in 
particular. Alagappa, writing on civil society in Asia, has stated that “the rise of 
religious fundamentalism is of grave political concern” (2004a: 7).  At the same time, 
there is compelling evidence of constructive contributions by religious actors towards 
peace (Appleby 2000, Abu-Nimer 2003, Coward and Smith 2004). The critical 
dilemma, then, is how associational theory and practice might be developed in ways 
that minimize the former, while encouraging the latter.  
This thesis responds to that dilemma by empirically probing the potential 
applicability of conflict sensitivity theory and practice to the work of religious 
associations. The concept finds its genesis in my own practitioner experience in South 
and Southeast Asia, during which I observed that ad-hoc experiments in introducing 
religious actors to conflict sensitivity, an organizational planning approach 
originating in the humanitarian and development assistance sector, appeared to be 




other religious groups. I therefore hypothesized that conflict sensitivity might be 
relevant and useful for improving the social impact of religious associations in multi-
faith conflict-vulnerable settings, and I set out to rigorously field-test that possibility 
through action research in collaboration with practitioners in Mindanao, Philippines 
and in Singapore. 
Further, because conflict sensitivity practice is centered on practitioners’ own 
analysis of the socio-political context and their influence within it, I applied the data 
generated through conflict sensitivity testing to expand the theoretical understanding 
of how religion works within the associational sector to influence the dynamics of 
conflict and peace.  The accounts of participating religious actors emphasize personal 
growth and change, striking a somewhat different tone than the heavy emphasis on 
organizational structure that characterizes much of current associational theory 
(Putnam 2000, Varshney 2002). This study therefore juxtaposes associational 
structure with other nonstructural variables, including religious cultures, to examine 
the relative weight of their influence in determining associational social impact, and 
the mechanisms of their mutual interaction.  The aim is to contribute towards the 
expansion of existing theory, so that it explains not only what kind of associational 
structures promote socio-political cohesion, but also how those structures come into 
being and produce desirable effects, and how human actors may play a role in 
cultivating such outcomes. The focus of the thesis is not on application, but the 
project is intended to produce findings that are applicable, both to the creation of 
new practitioner approaches, and to the development of theory that offers sound 





Religion, Conflict and the Associational Sector 
This inquiry is situated at the nexus of three key theoretical strands on 
religion, conflict and the associational sector. In the post-Cold War era, the public 
expression of religion is increasingly recognized as an important element of national 
and human security (Wellman Jr. 2007b, James 2007a, Juergensmeyer 2009). The 
growing attention paid to “ethno-national” (Connor 1994) civil wars has revealed the 
prominence of religion as a contributing factor in many such conflicts (Kaldor 1999: 
76-86, Harff and Gurr 2004: 31-2, Fox 2004). Further, religion has returned to the 
Western public sphere in the form of the global debate over terrorism and counter-
terrorism, often perceived as an enduring conflict between cultural “civilizations” 
that are framed primarily around their adherence to either Islamic or Judeo-Christian 
faiths (Huntington 1996). Such trends have led to numerous calls for greater 
incorporation of religion in the study of international relations and the practice of 
diplomacy (Johnston and Sampson 1994, Johnston 2003, Seiple and Hoover 2004, Fox 
and Sandler 2004). 
During the same era, there has been an unprecedented increase in the 
influence of civil society, which is generally understood as a realm or sector of 
associational citizen action falling outside of the household and the state, and usually 
also outside the market  (Morris 2000, Kocka 2004: 69, Edwards 2009: 20). Western-
style liberal democratization emphasizes civil society as an efficient provider of 
public services, an influence on the formation of participating individuals, and a 
vehicle for engaging citizens on policy issues (Fung 2003), often as a counterweight to 




describes as a “global associational revolution,” indicating a proliferation of civil 
society organizations and networks at local, national and international levels. 
Nonetheless, efforts to apply the civil society concept in non-Western settings 
indicate that local civic associations pre-date current democratization patterns, and 
are not necessarily liberal or modern in orientation (Hann 1996, Kasfir 1998, Orvis 
2001, Kaviraj 2001).  This study therefore adopts the broader and less normative term 
“associations” (Rossteutscher 2005a) to describe a cluster of closely related concepts 
including civil society, social capital as the relational networks and norms (Putnam 
2000: 19) that indwell civil society, and the “family resemblance” (Muukkonen 2009) 
that unites them. 
The trends described above have converged to produce a pivotal interplay 
between the associational sector, religion and conflict.  The contribution of non-state 
actors, including religious actors, to conflict prevention has become a prominent 
theme of peace research and activism (Gidron et al. 2002c, Rasmussen 2003, Kaldor 
2007, Brewer 2010). At the same time, it is increasingly recognized that social 
mobilization is not necessarily an inherent ‘good.’ There is a growing body of 
literature that explores the dual nature of the associational sector as a force that can 
either promote or retard liberal democratic norms in general (Ndegwa 1996, 
Rossteutscher 2005a, Anderson 2010) and the prevention of conflict and violence in 
particular (Colletta and Cullen 2000, Putnam 2000, Varshney 2002, Cox 2009). 
Nevertheless religion has until very recently been excluded or neglected in 
associational theory (Juergensmeyer 2005, James 2007a, Muukkonen 2009), a trend 
attributable in large part to Westernized paradigms that frame religion as a private 




understanding of how faith influences the dualistic potential of associational social 
impacts remains underdeveloped in comparison to religion’s importance.  
These challenges are global in nature, yet particularly prominent in Southeast 
Asia, where ethnic conflict is widespread, and major world religions including 
Buddhism, Islam and Christianity form a vital aspect of civic and political life.  The 
region’s extensive ethnic diversity is often highly politicized, because colonial and 
post-colonial state formation processes have established multiethnic polities whose 
centralized nature strains majority-minority relations. Transmigration policies have 
relocated members of majority groups into minority-held zones, while development 
policies have often left minority zones exploited of natural resources and 
marginalized from economic and political power  (Kingsbury 2005, Duncan 2008). 
Importantly, such ethno-political tensions often take on a religious tone, due to a 
strong demographic correlation between ethnicity and religion (Goh 2005: 13, Kumar 
and Siddique 2008).  These dynamics typify an ‘ethnic conflict’ as one in which the 
lines of division are based on variables that are identity-based, such as race, religion, 
language, or other distinguishing characteristics (Horowitz 2000, Kanbur et al. 2010). 
I therefore use the terms ‘ethnic conflict’ and ‘identity-based conflict’ 
interchangeably, and I apply the term ‘ethno-religious’ where appropriate to 
emphasize the religious aspects of ethnic identity. Nonetheless, ethnic identity itself 
is not necessarily the primary point of contention. Southeast Asian ethnic conflicts are 
typically rooted in the political and economic struggles described above, which may 
in fact influence how identity is perceived and developed (Brown 1994).  
Civic associations have long been active in Southeast Asia, although the 




(Lee 2004: 10, Hasan et al. 2008).  Civil society’s overt involvement in formal politics 
is generally increasing, linked to regional trends towards democratization (Alagappa 
2004c), yet the nature of political involvement varies widely and remains fragile 
where governments retain strong central control. In contrast to Western-influenced 
secular expectations, the religious sector forms a very prominent sub-category of the 
Southeast Asian associational realm. Associations are often structured along ethno-
religious lines (Lee 2004: 11, Mulder 1996: 192, Alagappa 2004b: 465), which tends to 
politicize civic activity even in the absence of formal political engagement (Orjuela 
2003). Actors in ethno-political conflict naturally seek out religious associations as a 
vehicle of support for their aims (Hadiwinata 2007), and religious associations in turn 
influence the ideology and actions of the conflicting parties.  These regional 
dynamics, in place for at least half a century, have been further strained by global 
tensions in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent 
framing of Southeast Asia as a “second front” in the “Global War on Terror” 
(Gershman 2002). 
Even a cursory review of regional current events serves to colorfully illustrate 
the linkages between religion, conflict and peace in Southeast Asia. Buddhist monks 
played a prominent role in the most recent citizen uprising against the government of 
Myanmar/Burma (Vatikiotis 2007). During 2010, Indonesian authorities continued 
their anti-terrorism campaign through a series of high-profile arrests including the 
prominent Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (Vaswani 2010).  Some of Thailand’s anti-
government protestors quietly incorporated spiritualized blood rituals into their 




considered whether Roman Catholics should be allowed to use the word ‘Allah,’ due 
to concerns that such verbiage might be motivated by a proselytizing intent to 
convert Muslims (BBC News 2010).  Finally, the ongoing prominence of the interfaith 
Bishops-Ulama Conference in the Mindanao peace process was evidenced by their 
organization of a mass consultation of citizens, seeking grassroots opinions in order 
to inform negotiations between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (Mindanews 2010a).  Much of this religio-political activity takes place within 
and around the associational realm.  
 
Areas of Inquiry 
Associational practitioners are keenly aware of the local expressions of these 
regional trends, and many are concerned about how to equip religious associations to 
pursue their various mandates in ways that promote, or at least do not damage, 
intergroup cohesion. Humanitarian and development assistance workers have 
quietly but persistently suggested a partial solution in the ‘conflict sensitivity’ 
approach (Anderson 1999, International Alert et al. 2004a, Paffenholz and Reychler 
2007, Bush 2009). Conflict sensitivity, an organizational planning approach originally 
developed in the aid sector, posits that every action an organization takes, even in 
seemingly unrelated pursuits such as relief distribution, health care or economic 
development, can have an impact on the surrounding climate of conflict and peace.  
This impact may be either positive (promoting peace) or negative (exacerbating 
conflict). Conflict sensitivity uses an array of context analysis methodologies and 




Additionally, a number of practitioners, including my former colleagues in the non-
governmental organization World Vision International, have found that conflict 
sensitivity sometimes promotes significant changes in the values and behaviors of 
participating individuals (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2001, Barbolet et al. 
2005b, Garred 2006a). 
For World Vision in South and Southeast Asia, many of those individual 
changes were related to how religiously-motivated local actors interpreted and 
publicly acted upon their Christian and Muslim faith (Riak 2006, Sihotang and 
Silalahi 2006). Further, in a regional series of conflict sensitivity workshops,1 
participating Christian aid workers often suggested that the same training should be 
provided to nearby churches. Both World Vision Development Foundation 
Philippines (Presbitero-Carrillo 2004) and World Vision Indonesia2 have begun de 
facto experiments with conflict sensitivity training for religious leaders.  Religious 
organizations often choose to engage in disaster response (Özerdem and Jacoby 
2006), so several other faith-based humanitarian agencies have also inquired about 
how conflict sensitivity training might be made available to their partners in local 
religious service organizations and communities of worship.3  This appeared to be a 
reasonable course of action, because conflict sensitivity had already proven adaptable 
across both emergency response and community development programs, in settings 
of both manifest and latent conflict (Mitchell 1981: 49-51, Bush 1998, Garred 2006a). 
Further, conflict sensitivity had also been expanded with some success to the 
                                                 
1 I facilitated numerous workshops in the Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia, India, Sri Lanka 
and Nepal, from 2002 to 2006.  
2 Terry Silalahi, phone interview by author, Jakarta, Indonesia, 28 Nov. 2008. 
3 Marshall Wallace, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, e-mail message to author, 24 Oct. 




international business sector (Williams 2008, Hettiarachchi et al. 2009, Zandvliet and 
Anderson 2009).  Thus the idea of introducing conflict sensitivity to the religious 
sector appeared to hold potential for improving the social impact of religious 
programs and services.  
This study’s first level of inquiry sets out to explore, in a much more extensive 
and rigorous manner, the possibility of conflict sensitivity usage within the religious 
sector. Applicability is defined as a function of both relevance and usefulness. This 
applicability was field-tested in collaboration with two local agencies, the Davao 
Ministerial Interfaith of Mindanao, Philippines, and the Harmony Centre at An-
Nahdhah of Singapore. Critical scrutiny was directed at the conflict sensitivity 
approach itself, not at the participating associational actors, who were partners in the 
testing effort. Together we provided conflict sensitivity training for religious actors, 
using a particularly influential framework known as ‘Do No Harm’ (DNH; Anderson 
1999), and then collected and analyzed data on the participants’ DNH usage and 
uptake over time. The Mindanao project was significantly larger in scope, due to the 
greater DNH experience and interest of the partner agency. The Singapore project 
provided a valuable point of comparison and contrast, because both contexts are 
affected by similar patterns of ethno-religious relations that are common to the 
region, yet there are significant differences in their levels of physical violence and 
economic development, and in the roles and functions of their respective 
associational sectors. Both sites featured significant numbers of Christian (Roman 
Catholic and Protestant) and Muslim participants, illuminating the experiences of 
those groups in relation to prominent regional issues such as religious exclusivism 




sensitivity’s usefulness among religious actors, particularly for purposes of 
individual growth that influences collective behavior. There is a need to adapt DNH 
impact analysis patterns to better reflect the uniqueness of the religious sector and to 
elicit themes of latent tension and structural violence (Galtung 1969), meaning forms 
of ‘violence’ that result not from physical attack but from systemic inequality and 
marginalization. The data collected during conflict sensitivity testing have become a 
rich source to inform this project’s second level of inquiry.  
The second level of inquiry addresses certain imbalances, tensions and gaps 
in existing associational theory by exploring the relationship between the conflict 
sensitivity testing project and the relevant academic literature. In other words, how 
does the localized conflict sensitivity research inform our broader understanding of 
associational social impact? In building from the first level of inquiry toward the 
second, I not only employ the same data set derived from the contributions of 
Mindanowan and Singaporean religious actors, but I also carry forward the 
conceptual underpinnings of conflict sensitivity itself as a form of social theory. 
Conflict sensitivity arose from practitioner experience and field-based data, so its 
explanations of how associations interact with the dynamics of conflict and peace 
come forth in the spirit of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Conflict 
sensitivity theory can be usefully juxtaposed against the theory developed in more 
academic settings. I draw primarily on the interdisciplinary social sciences, 
particularly political science and sociology due to their strong interest in associational 
studies. Importantly, while there is a substantial body of literature on associations 
and social conflict (Gidron et al. 2002a, Rasmussen 2003, Kaldor 2007, Brewer 2010), 




associations whose primary mandate lies in areas such as peacebuilding, conflict 
resolution, and reconciliation. Gidron et al. (2002a: 3) have usefully termed such 
entities as “peace and conflict resolution organizations” or “PCROs.”  
Against this backdrop, the introduction of conflict sensitivity theory refocuses 
the conceptual lens by pointing to associations whose primary mandate is not 
conflict-related. Such associations are focused on innumerable other purposes, with 
their range limited only by the human imagination. Their impact on peace and 
conflict is not central to their mission; rather, it is an “externality” (Morris 2000: 27-8). 
Conflict sensitivity theory posits that regardless of the nature of an association’s 
mandate, the central issue is how its decisions and actions interact with the 
surrounding context. If that context is characterized by socio-political conflict, then 
associational activities will interact with conflict dynamics in either positive or 
negative ways. A classic example, surprising in its time but now widely 
acknowledged, was the effect of post-genocide humanitarian aid to Rwanda in 
exacerbating and prolonging violence, both internally and across the border with 
Zaire (now Congo) (Eriksson 1997, Baaré et al. 1999). Conflict sensitivity’s viewpoint 
holds great significance for Peace Studies, because it brings into view a very wide 
swathe of the associational sector. Students of peace can no longer limit their 
attention to PCROs, but must now consider the influence of all types of associational 
entities on the trajectory of social conflict.   
Adapting the terminology of Gidron et al. (2002a) I refer to these non-conflict-
focused associations as ‘non-Peace and Conflict Resolution Organizations’ or, for the 
sake of brevity, ‘nPCROs.’ This term serves as apt description of the study’s unique, 




sector. Nonetheless, it must be recognized that the distinction between PCROs and 
nPCROs cannot be drawn in absolute terms. There is a zone of overlap representing 
organizations which have a secondary, and sometimes implicit, focus on 
peacebuilding. Their primary focus lies elsewhere, perhaps in community 
development or education, even as they bring conflicting groups together or promote 
peaceful values during the process of implementation.  Some authors (e.g. Cochrane 
and Dunn 2002b) consider such organizations to be PCROs. I categorize such 
organizations as nPCROs, in order to maintain alignment with, and maximize the 
usefulness of, conflict sensitivity as a conceptual viewpoint.  When analyzing this 
type of nPCRO, the level of intentionality with which they pursue their secondary 
focus on peace becomes a very significant issue, apparent even in the development of 
this study’s two partner agencies over time.  
Along with PCROs, I also exclude from my analysis any associations that 
intentionally pursue physical violence.  White supremacist organizations in the West 
are a case in point, as are Indonesia’s Islam-based Laskar Jihad (Hadiwinata 2007) 
and Christian-based Ambonese militias (Adam et al. 2007).  Admittedly there are 
‘gray areas’ here, because violence is sometimes deployed in the pursuit of justice, 
and the distinctions between justice and injustice, or between justified and unjustified 
violence, may depend greatly on the observer’s social positioning. Even so, the point 
is that conflict sensitivity, while not intended to dampen the pursuit of justice, is 
designed to address organizations that have either good or neutral intentions with 
regard to social cohesion. The mobilization of citizens for purposes that are 




Upon using conflict sensitivity theory to refocus the analytical lens from 
PCROs to nPCROs, one finds that the existing pool of relevant theory shrinks 
considerably. Academic works that address the influence of nPCROs on intergroup 
conflict, comprising this project’s ‘core literature,’ pursue a relatively new line of 
inquiry and are few in number. The central reference points of this body of literature 
are found in selected works of Robert Putnam (2000, 2002, Putnam and Feldstein 
2003) and Ashutosh Varshney (2001, 2002). Putnam’s research on social capital in the 
United States and other industrialized democracies popularized an influential 
distinction between “bridging” and “bonding” social capital.  Civic groups whose 
membership aligns with major social cleavages are said to bond members of the same 
identity group together. On the other hand, groups whose membership includes 
people on both sides of the divide are said to have a desirable bridging effect.  
Varshney developed similar themes in his research on Hindu-Muslim relations in 
India, concluding that civic linkages that are “intercommunal” (i.e. including both 
Hindus and Muslims) are key in withstanding provocations that could otherwise 
lead to violence.   
Putnam and Varshney portray a strong optimism about the potential of 
bridging or intercommunal associations to enhance social cohesion.  Such optimism 
is challenged in more skeptical works by authors Uvin (1998) and Cochrane (2005), 
who argue that in some cases, the contextual pressures of deeply divided societies are 
likely to produce associational sectors that are divisive rather than intercommunal.   
Another cluster of works occupies a sort of middle ground by exploring the nuances 
of the dualistic associational potential for both positive and negative impacts, and 




include writings by Pickering (2006, 2007), Weisinger and Salipante (2005, 2007), Jha 
(2009), MacLean (2004), Molenaers (2003, 2005, 2006), Karner and Parker (2008), 
Titeca and Vervisch (2008) and Pinchotti and Verwimp (2007). Despite the growing 
number of moderate works, the writings of Putnam and Varshney retain the greatest 
influence, and the body of literature on the conflict impacts of nPCROs is still framed 
and dominated by their concepts of bridging and intercommunality.   
Certain exceptions notwithstanding, the core literature as a body leans toward 
generalizing the nature of conflict impact as either predominantly good or bad on a 
sector-wide basis, and the causes of conflict impact as attributable to associational 
structure. In contrast, conflict sensitivity’s complex view of causation calls for 
analytical balance, because it emphasizes the interaction of multiple determinants of 
impact, both organizational and contextual in origin, resulting in mixed positive and 
negative outcomes. Further, the existing academic theory often portrays associational 
structures as static, and leaves unaddressed the question of how social impact might 
be improved, whereas conflict sensitivity emphasizes the possibility of human action 
leading to change. In contrast, while the current study does find strong empirical 
support for the significance of intercommunal associational structures, the data also 
reveal an equally important emphasis on ‘mindsets,’ meaning the perceptions, 
values, beliefs, and attitudes of individual associational participants and members.  
This emphasis on the role of the individual foregrounds the issue of human 
agency, particularly the intentionality of purpose and human capacity that is 
required for individuals, working together, to transcend divisive contextual 
pressures in order to establish intercommunal forms of association. In deeply divided 




people’s mindsets. This study’s findings indicate that individual mindsets and 
associational structures influence each other in mutual ways over time, lending 
themselves to the use of cyclical or spiraling model to depict the multicausal 
determinants of associational conflict impacts. In this way, the study contributes to 
associational theory a significantly more complex and dynamic understanding of 
how associational impacts on peace and conflict come about, and how they might be 
improved. 
Finally, once factors other than associational structure are squarely in view, it 
becomes apparent that religion, so prominent in the Southeast Asian public sphere, is 
surprisingly absent from the bulk of the literature on the conflict impacts of nPCROs. 
The Southeast Asian setting demonstrates the limitations of secular assumptions by 
illuminating not only the public role of religious institutions, but also the oft-
neglected intangible realm of religious culture (Wood 1999). In this context, religion 
is a powerful shaper of mindsets and a motivator towards agency, due in large part 
to its ambivalent potential for promoting either peace or violence (Appleby 2000), 
and its influence on the development of ethno-religious group identity (Tajfel and 
Turner 1986) as shaped and constructed by common people (Karner 2007). 
Importantly, the social science-based core literature on nPCROs cannot explain the 
religious content of these empirical findings, drawing attention to the ‘religion gap’ at 
the heart of the existing associational theory. There are indications of relevant theory 
in the work of theologians (Volf 1996, Katongole 2005), suggesting the desirability of 





Action Research Approach 
The methodological approach of this study must be established at the outset, 
for its uniqueness has shaped both the fieldwork and the structure of the thesis. This 
chapter has already made it clear that the study finds its origins in practitioner 
experience. It must also be stated that the study’s purpose is to contribute to the 
development of theory that is applicable to addressing human needs.  It is often 
assumed in the social sciences that the overriding purpose of research is to “explain 
social phenomena” (Little 1991: 8). In contrast, I argue that while explanation is 
indeed necessary, it is not an adequate response to a world affected with high levels 
of human suffering, often due to human-made causes.   The notion of ‘knowledge for 
knowledge’s sake’ should give way to the application of knowledge for the pursuit of 
improved human well-being. Where the phenomena being addressed represent real-
world problems, my research stance is not one of scientific detachment, but rather 
one of exploring knowledge that has the potential to contribute to constructive 
change.  
This study’s practice-based origins and change-oriented objectives make 
action research a natural methodological choice.  Action research, though rarely 
employed in the field of Peace Studies (Reychler 2006: 9-10), is intended to 
encompass concerns of both theory and practice, engaging both the researcher and 
the affected populations directly in the midst of the phenomena being studied. The 






Action research aims to contribute both to the practical concerns of people in 
an immediate problematic situation and to the goals of social science by joint 
collaboration within a mutually accepted ethical framework. To the aims of 
contributing to the practice concerns of people and to the goals of social 
science, we add a third aim, to develop the self-help competencies of people 
facing problems (1970: 499).  
 
While accurate, such foundational definitions do not fully convey the increasingly 
broad and rapidly evolving range of approaches involved in action research.  Within 
that range of approaches, it is necessary to clarify the nature of the action research 
employed in this study, and its implications for the research design. First and 
foremost, at the epistemological level, it is necessary to engage the question of 
whether action research is simply a methodology for implementing applied research 
(as argued in Spjelkavik 1999), or whether it is a distinctive paradigm requiring the 
development of its own underlying philosophy.  Minimalist approaches to action 
research can involve legitimately employing action as a data collection technique 
within a more traditional research paradigm. However, I hold that when fully 
developed and followed to its logical conclusion, an action research project operates 
on the basis of a unique and distinctive epistemology (de Cock 1994, Schön 1995, 
Chaudhary 1997, Greenwood and Levin 2007). This represents a departure from the 
academic mainstream, so I detail here the philosophical foundations of the full-
fledged research approach.  
The ontological underpinnings of action research embrace a concept of reality 
that is notably broad, contrasting with positivism in that it encompasses both the 
tangible and the intangible (Blum 1955: 311) in a holistic and integrated manner akin 
to general systems theory (Greenwood and Levin 2007: 57-9). Action research 




complex causation of social phenomena (Aguinis 1993: 354), giving it some natural 
affinity to critical realism (Sayer 2000, Burgoyne 2009).  Correspondingly, in terms of 
epistemology, the range of concepts and methods used to gain knowledge about 
reality is broad and diverse. Action research is interdisciplinary in nature and, while 
it emphasizes the use of a multiplicity of qualitative methods, some quantitative 
techniques are also employed where appropriate.   
In seeking to gain knowledge about reality, action research rejects the 
rationalist distinction between thought and action, implying a linkage to the 
pragmatist philosophy of John Dewey (Greenwood and Levin 2007: 59-62).  The 
thought-action linkage also traces back to social psychologist Kurt Lewin, an 
originator of the twentieth century industrial democracy movement, who is often 
popularly quoted as saying that “the best way to understand something is to try to 
change it” (in Greenwood and Levin 2007: 18, see also Rebach and Bruhn 2001: ix). In 
action research, thought and action are inextricably linked together in the same 
moment of time, marking an arguable distinction from the traditional notion of 
applied research, in which thought is understood to precede action. Because of this 
unity of thought and action, action research is multiphase in nature, built around 
integrated cycles of data gathering, reflection and action.  The findings of each phase 
inform the design of the next phase, such that research design becomes an evolving 
process, rather than a one-time event (Stringer 1999: 17-20, Susman and Evered 1978, 
Aguinis 1993: 361).  This experience has been provocatively described as “designing 
the plane while flying it” (Herr and Anderson 2005: 69).  
In addition to unifying thought and action, action research also rejects the 




the research purpose and the research process. In terms of purpose, action research 
emphasizes meeting human needs, and thus it is “consciously directed toward the 
implementation of certain values” (Blum 1955: 310), and is often oriented toward the 
future (Susman and Evered 1978, de Cock 1994: 372). With regard to process, there is 
a distinctive emphasis on the participation of the people within the research context 
in the act of research itself (de Cock 1994, Schön 1995, Fals Borda 2001, Greenwood 
and Levin 2007). While the types and levels of participation vary widely, action 
research nonetheless features a discernible unifying emphasis on furthering some 
form of empowerment.  Foundational thinker Fals Borda states: “It is obvious that 
these aims go beyond the academic traditions which have emphasised value 
neutrality and a positivist objectivity as prerequisites for ‘serious science’” (1987: 35).  
Due to the distinctive epistemology of action research, there is a lively debate 
around how this approach relates to the traditional scientific method. Authors such 
as Greenwood and Levin (2007) argue that action research closely embodies the 
scientific method, because it values the empirical and is quasi-experimental in nature.  
Other authors view action research as a sharp critique of the shortcomings of 
positivism (Susman and Evered 1978) . My own stance aligns with that of Schön 
(1995), who is critical of the idea that scientists must choose between rigor and 
relevance, arguing instead that the academic concept of rigor itself needs to be 
redefined. While action research is commonly used to test theory and hypotheses, 
Schön (1995: 382-7) goes one step further by arguing that action research generates 
new knowledge that should be recognized within academic practice.    
The use of a full-fledged action research approach implies certain distinctives 




validity the challenge that findings must be “worth believing enough to act on” 
(Greenwood and Levin 2007: 67). The fieldwork was highly participatory and 
multiphase in nature, beginning with pilot phase interviews designed to elicit the 
input of Southeast Asian practitioners, and to support the selection of research sites 
and partners for conflict sensitivity testing. The Mindanao partnership, being larger 
in scope and length, included significantly more action research cycles than the 
Singapore effort. Even so, the core research questions and data-collection methods 
were consistent across both locations. I facilitated the process of action research 
design and implementation, ensuring that my need for thesis-related data was met, 
while the overlapping practitioner objectives of the project were defined primarily by 
the local partners. The thesis and the practitioner aims were treated as two separate 
and parallel projects, both drawing on the same pools of data (Zuber-Skerritt and 
Perry 2002, Davis 2004).  
This thesis document itself also differs from tradition in several important 
ways. First, to a large extent, the structure of the thesis reflects the chronology of 
what actually took place in the action research process (Davis 2004, Fisher and Phelps 
2006). For example, contextual background on the Philippines and Singapore does 
not appear until Chapter Four, which describes when and how those sites were 
selected as part of the action research methodology. Further, my consideration of the 
relevant literature is concentrated but not confined in the early chapters (Davis 2004, 
Fisher and Phelps 2006). For example, in Chapter Six, my assessment of conflict 
sensitivity’s overall applicability is influenced by emergent conflict sensitivity 
literature that was not available at the time of project design (as reflected in Chapter 




sources briefly introduced in Chapter Three, as I consider how to address the 
religion-related gap made apparent in existing associational theory by the action 
research findings. This illustrates action research’s iterative use and development of 
existing theory as “data driven and responsive” (Dick 2002a: 167).  Finally, I have 
written myself and my partners into the narrative, reflecting the fact that we were 
central actors in an active research process (Fisher and Phelps 2006). I use first and 
third person verbs where appropriate, seeking to honestly disclose our responsibility 
for the interventions undertaken, without unduly overstating our influence.  
 
Thesis Overview 
The chapters of the thesis are chiastic or concentric in arrangement, with the 
action research fieldwork at the pivotal center. As such, Chapters Two and Three 
precede the fieldwork by reviewing the relevant conceptual debates and establishing 
conceptual frames4 to guide the inquiry. Chapter Two addresses the study’s first-
level inquiry on the applicability (relevance and usefulness) of conflict sensitivity in 
the religious sector, establishing the central research questions as follows: Is there a 
need for conflict sensitivity? To what extent, and in what ways, is conflict sensitivity 
being used, or not used, and why? What are the implications for enhancing 
practitioner capacity?  
Chapter Three addresses the study’s second level of inquiry, considering the 
dissonance between existing civil society theory and the realities of ethno-political 
conflict and associational dynamics in Southeast Asia, and substantiating the decision 
                                                 
4 Throughout the thesis, I use the term ‘frame’ when referring to conceptual matters, to 




to use broad, inclusive associational terminology. Next, the chapter analyzes the 
imbalances, tensions and gaps in the emergent body of theory that comprises this 
project’s core literature on the nature and determinants of conflict impact among 
nPCROs. The second-level research questions are established as follows: Are the 
conflict impacts of associational activity attributable to associational structural or to 
non-structural factors, and what is the relationship between the two? Does the socio-
political context shape the association, or can the association also influence its 
context? Among the potential non-structural factors, what is the role of religion in 
shaping an association’s social impact? 
Chapter Four addresses the action research fieldwork carried out to 
investigate both levels of research inquiry. I begin by clarifying my own approach to 
‘collaborative action research,’ and by establishing the standard of validity as 
‘credibility with a purpose’ (Greenwood and Levin 2007: 67), since these represent 
contested areas in the methodological literature. I then describe the action research 
process undertaken in Mindanao and Singapore, emphasizing the multiphase nature 
of the process, and the ways in which the preliminary findings of each phase 
contributed to the design of the next. I give particular attention to questions of 
participation as they influence insider and outsider roles in both conflict sensitivity 
and action research practice, establishing this as a central theme of researcher 
reflexivity.  
Chapters Five and Six together respond to the first-level research inquiry on 
the applicability of conflict sensitivity to religious audiences. Chapter Five describes 
the DNH usage and uptake patterns found in the data, built around a tri-fold frame 




(CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2001). This chapter represents a preliminary 
analysis carried out jointly with partner agencies, within the structure of the original 
research design. Chapter Six builds on that analysis to develop my own overall 
assessment of conflict sensitivity’s applicability to the religious sector, based 
primarily on the empirical data, but also informed by emergent developments in 
interagency conflict sensitivity practice, which were not available at the time of 
Chapter Two’s project design. The empirical findings presented in Chapters Five and 
Six, in addition to addressing the applicability of conflict sensitivity, also provide a 
window into religious associational life in Southeast Asia to fuel the analysis of the 
subsequent chapters.   
Chapters Seven and Eight respond to the second-level research inquiry on the 
implications of the current study for existing associational theory, with particular 
attention to the nature and determinants of conflict impact among nPCROs. Chapter 
Seven applies the empirical findings to illuminate the importance of individual 
human mindsets and intentional human agency, and the ways in which they interact 
cyclically with associational structure to either enable or limit the promotion of peace 
through intercommunality. Chapter Eight focuses on religion as one very important 
mindset factor that is neglected in the literature, yet particularly prominent in 
shaping associational conflict impacts in Mindanao and Singapore. I explore religious 
culture as a central source of identity in ethno-religious conflict, and as subject to 
gradual change based on the choices made by religious actors. A deeper 
consideration of selected Christian theological literature explains and illuminates the 




demonstrating the depth of the ‘religion gap’ caused by Westernized secularist 
assumptions.  
Chapter Nine concludes the thesis with a synthesis of the study’s findings and 
their generalizability, and a reflective assessment of insider and outsider roles 
throughout the action research process. This conclusion also highlights several 
common threads that run throughout the thesis as arguments towards theoretical 
integration, including the consistent, interdisciplinary inclusion of religious matters 
in studies of the associational sector, the framing of civil society in terms that are 
trans-cultural rather than Western, and the linkage of thought with action as pursued 
in this project’s two-level action research inquiry.  
Pertaining to the distinction between the first level of inquiry (on conflict 
sensitivity) and the second (on associational theory), it is tempting to label the former 
as practice and the latter as theory. Indeed, it is true that the content of the former 
originates with practitioners, while the latter originates in the academy. Nonetheless, 
I will argue that theory is present at both levels, because both practitioners and 
academics use theory. While practitioners seldom discuss theory, their efforts are 
almost always guided by implicit theories of social change, or theories-in-use 
(Argyris and Schön 1996: 13). In the case of conflict sensitivity, experience-based 
theory has been rendered explicit. By juxtaposing academic theory with practitioner 
theory, both are challenged and enriched, leading to conceptual developments that 







CONFLICT SENSITIVITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
No people do so much harm as those who go about doing good.  
- Rev. Mandell Creighton (1913: 501) 
 
This chapter elaborates the conceptual underpinnings of the current study’s 
first level of inquiry, which focuses on exploring the applicability of the conflict 
sensitivity approach to the religious associational sector. Conflict sensitivity is born 
and grounded in practitioner experience, so I draw on International Alert et al. for 
their influential definition as follows: 
 
This means the ability of your organisation to: understand the context in 
which you operate; understand the interaction between your intervention and 
the context; and act upon the understanding of this interaction, in order to 
avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts (2004c: 1). 
 
Conflict sensitivity comes in many forms, but it consistently emphasizes 
context analysis followed by recommendations for organizational planning on the 
basis of that analysis. This approach is practiced in settings of both manifest and 
latent conflict. The analysis can be conducted before, during or after the program in 
question takes place, and is intended to be repeated in order to capture ongoing 
changes in the operating context.  
Within this chapter, the first section considers the history of conflict 
sensitivity as a practitioner phenomenon, but one that features significant theoretical 
content.  The next section deepens the analysis by considering the academic critiques 
of conflict sensitivity, together with their implications for the current project.  Finally, 




the conceptual frame to be used in testing the applicability of conflict sensitivity to 
religious associations. Throughout the chapter, a broad view of the conflict sensitivity 
field is punctuated by specific references to Do No Harm (DNH), as the tool selected 
for use in the current project.   
 
A History of Conflict Sensitivity  
The history of conflict sensitivity is a complex one, because it originated in 
three parallel streams, representing the emergency relief branch of the aid industry, 
the development assistance branch of the aid industry, and the emerging 
peacebuilding sector. Each stream was spearheaded by scholar-practitioners in North 
America and Europe, who surfaced initial conceptual publications in the late 1990s, 
followed by refinement and testing of analytical tools. It was not until 1999-2000 that 
these streams began to publicly converge, and not until 2003-2004 that it became 
increasingly commonplace to refer to them under the collective term ‘conflict 
sensitivity.’ For the sake of clarity, this thesis will use the term ‘conflict sensitivity’ to 
refer to both early and recent developments that describe the field as a whole.   
The emergency relief stream: Do No Harm.5 The relief stream of conflict 
sensitivity was spearheaded by Mary B. Anderson of the CDA Collaborative 
Learning Projects,6 based in Cambridge, USA. This was a collective process, and 
Anderson’s facilitative role reflected the broad-based concern that had emerged 
among humanitarian actors over the changing relationships between aid and conflict 
in the ‘new wars’ of the early 1990s. Early efforts by Minear and Weiss (1993: 290), as 
                                                 
5 ‘Do No Harm’ is alternatively called ‘Local Capacities for Peace.’ I prefer ‘Do No Harm’ as 
the current interagency standard, but I defer where necessary to participant usage. 




well as the World Conference on Religion and Peace’s Mohonk Criteria for 
Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies (Ebersole 1995), framed the issues 
in terms of moral ambiguity, with particular reference to conflicts in sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Balkans.  They sought to develop general guiding principles that 
included, but were not conceptually based on, analysis of the local context.  
This simmering concern was brought to a crisis by the experiences of 
humanitarian agencies during the 1994 Rwandan genocide.  Despite meeting service 
delivery goals, aid directly exacerbated conflict when refugee camps were used by 
the perpetrators of genocide as a base for “overt rearming and reorganization” 
(Eriksson 1997: 8, Baaré et al. 1999, Fox 2001). Further, the entire humanitarian aid 
operation was seen as a cover for the lack of timely intervention by the international 
community.  “In effect, humanitarian action substituted for political action” (Eriksson 
1997: 8, see also Terry 2002). Subsequent research also pointed out that pre-genocide 
development aid had been instrumental in reinforcing social cleavages (Uvin 1998).  
Yet it was the genocidaires in the refugee camps that captured the public attention, and 
this helped galvanize humanitarian practitioners toward action.    
Post-Rwanda publications reveal a conceptual shift, as authors moved beyond 
the concept of moral ambiguity, becoming insistent that aid can directly impact the 
dynamics of conflict, in negative ways and possibly also in positive ways.  
Prendergast observed that: "Aid sustains conflict in three major ways: aid can be used 
directly as an instrument of war; aid can be indirectly integrated into the dynamics of 
conflict; and aid can exacerbate the root causes of war and insecurity" (1996: 17). 




uncover how such impacts manifested themselves in field operations, and what 
patterns might be discerned.  
Anderson’s Do No Harm Project, a collaborative effort of NGOs and 
government donors, began with fifteen case studies, documenting preliminary 
lessons in the booklet Do No Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace Through Aid 
(1996). The second phase involved twenty-three feedback workshops, in which aid 
workers responded to the preliminary lessons in order to refine them.  This led to the 
finalization of a DNH analytical framework7 as documented in the book Do No Harm: 
How Aid Can Support Peace – or War (1999). The third phase focused on 
implementation, with 12 organizations integrating DNH into selected site operations, 
resulting in a users’ manual called Options for Aid in Conflict: Lessons from Field 
Experience (2000). A DNH mainstreaming phase began in 2001, marked by extensive 
use and innovation in NGO field operations. In 2006, CDA commenced a series of 
reflective case studies to draw on NGO experience, consolidating emerging learnings 
in order to fuel ongoing deliberation amongst practitioners (e.g. CDA Collaborative 
Learning Projects 2009a, Goddard 2009, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2010).  
The major contribution of the DNH Project has been to crystallize the notion 
of recognizing and taking responsibility for unintended negative impacts.  That is, a 
project that succeeds in delivering emergency relief might nonetheless have a 
significant negative affect in terms of exacerbating conflict. Thus the DNH Project 
makes reference to the medical Hippocratic Oath in promoting the concept of ‘do no 
harm.’ The DNH process first features context analysis, followed by project impact 
analysis.  The context analysis identifies both dividing and connecting factors, across 
                                                 




five broad categories.  The project impact analysis then considers how the project 
affects those Dividers and Connectors, through the twin mechanisms of Resource 
Transfers (referring to the provision of goods and services) and Implicit Ethical 
Messages (referring to the ethos communicated by project implementers).  If the 
project strengthens Dividers or weakens Connectors, this is considered negative 
impact.  Equally important though less emphasized, if the project strengthens 
Connectors or weakens Dividers, this is considered positive impact.  
The development assistance stream: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment 
(PCIA). Parallel to the DNH Project, Kenneth Bush was simultaneously spearheading 
a similar effort within the development aid sector, initially under the auspices of 
Canada’s International Development Research Centre. While there is no ‘master 
narrative’ comparable to that of the Rwanda genocide, the community development 
sector followed a similar trajectory. Bush’s A Measure of Peace (1998) was exploratory 
in nature, setting out a rationale for PCIA, and describing a range of issues to be 
considered in development of a PCIA tool.  His subsequent Hands-On PCIA (2003) 
proposed the tool itself, concurrent with testing taking place in Mindanao through 
the Canada-Philippines Local Government Support Programme. Most recently, Aid 
for Peace (2009) has updated PCIA for use in the EU Programme for Peace and 
Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland.  
Bush’s PCIA work contributed to thinking in the field by emphasizing that 
peacebuilding is an impact, rather than an activity. This implies that any 
development project, e.g. health, education, etc., can be planned and implemented in 
such a way that it promotes peace. Bush’s PCIA process begins with a risk and 




implementation of the project, followed by an assessment of how the project may 
impact the context in the areas of conflict management capabilities, militarized 
violence and human security, political structures and processes, economic structures 
and processes, and social empowerment. Throughout the process, Bush foregrounds 
the role of communities and grassroots actors, and strongly advocates empowerment. 
The development stream has been further influenced by analysts such as Gaigals 
(2001) and Leonhardt (2002).  
The peacebuilding stream: Conflict Impact Assessment System (CIAS).  As 
the peacebuilding sector expanded and professionalized in the early 1990s, 
practitioners became increasingly aware that not all peacebuilding initiatives met 
their stated objectives, and many observers began to advocate the evaluation of 
peacebuilding programs. Additionally, awareness of unintended negative impacts 
began to surface, possibly influenced by the early work of Anderson (1996). Luc 
Reychler was one of the first to raise this issue among peace scholars and 
practitioners, via an exploratory conference paper (1996).  This was followed by a 
progression of methodology development efforts, with the Conflict Impact 
Assessment System first presented in 1998 (Reychler 1998), and in ongoing 
development through 2003 (Reychler 2003).  
Reychler’s work was significantly different from the work of Anderson and 
Bush. CIAS is an ambitious comprehensive methodology, containing multiple tools, 
and it is the first such effort aimed to addressing the program, sector and policy 
levels. While all conflict sensitivity tools contain theory, CIAS is distinctively theory-
driven, with theoretical constructs derived from peace and conflict research 




PCIA, it assumes that the primary analysts will be peace and conflict specialists 
(Reychler 2003: 30), rather than aid generalists with some peace-related training. In 
subsequent developments, Reychler partnered with Thania Paffenholz, and CIAS 
became a foundation for their Aid for Peace Approach (2007).  
Figure 2.1 highlights the important distinctions between early conflict 
sensitivity work in the emergency relief, community development and peacebuilding 
streams. Certain characteristics such as specificity of purpose, and level of analysis, 
are highly relevant in terms of distinguishing between the broader range of conflict 
sensitivity methodologies and tools that have now become available.   Such factors 
must be considered when selecting or adapting a conflict sensitivity tool for a given 





Figure 2.1: Early Conflict Sensitivity Streams - Points of Comparison8 
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Convergence and proliferation. In approximately 2000, there was a 
discernible shift as both practitioners and academics began to view the three formerly 
distinct conflict sensitivity streams as a closely related group (see for example 
Leonhardt 2000).  This was due in part to conceptual convergences in the interagency 
operating context, as intentional linkages between relief, development and 
peacebuilding were considered increasingly desirable under the concept of 
‘developmental relief’ (Mancino et al. 2001, Campanaro et al. 2002).  The 
developmental relief concept was driven primarily by the perceptions of practitioners 
on how to develop more effective programs.  Secondarily, however, a concurrent 
decrease in funding levels, and shift from development to relief funding, may have 
encouraged development practitioners to rethink their roles in relief contexts 
(Leonhardt 2000: 5). ‘PCIA’ came to be used as an umbrella term referring to most or 
all of the related methodologies.  Interestingly, DNH was often included in the PCIA 
umbrella group when it was perceived as a tool capable of promoting active 
peacebuilding (e.g. Leonhardt 2000: 16), yet excluded when it was perceived as a 
minimalist approach useful only for ‘doing no harm.’ 
Despite the fact that conflict sensitivity methodologies converged during this 
phase, they did not integrate with each other, but rather proliferated widely. The 
existing conflict sensitivity methodologies were further developed, with Bush’s PCIA 
and Reychler’s CIAS undergoing some field-testing and refinement, and Anderson’s 
DNH completing extensive testing and entering a mainstreaming phase. Many 
additional methodologies and tools were developed to suit agency-specific needs, 
often borrowing and adapting heavily from DNH (Leonhardt 2003: 55), as seen in the 




methodologies often held differing purposes and underlying assumptions, and the 
terminology in use did not distinguish between them, resulting in a conceptual 
fuzziness that has not yet been overcome.  
During this phase, the donor and multilateral discussions that had started in 
the late 1990s began to result in macro-level guidelines (OECD 2001, Humphreys and 
Varshney 2004) and assessment methodologies (USAID by Samarasinghe et al. 1999, 
DFID-UK by Goodhand et al. 2002, World Bank 2005).  There was increased 
discussion of mainstreaming conflict sensitivity, by applying it throughout all project 
phases from planning through evaluation, and by broadening its influence over all of 
an agency’s activities in conflict-vulnerable zones. Nonetheless, rhetoric did not 
always match reality, and the operational aspects of mainstreaming progressed 
slowly. Some NGO reports indicate a loss of momentum in applying conflict 
sensitivity to relief programming, even as they gained momentum in applying 
conflict sensitivity to community development (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 
2004a, Garred 2007). Other agencies demonstrated fatigue as they sought to integrate 
not only conflict sensitivity, but also gender sensitivity, environmental impact, etc, 
into their ongoing practices.  
Towards conflict sensitivity. In approximately 2003 a second shift took place 
(Paffenholz 2005), as practitioners sought to consolidate the developments of the 
previous phases. The Forum on Early Warning and Early Response facilitated a six-
member consortium that surveyed existing conflict sensitivity practices, tested new 
approaches and disseminated the combined findings for capacity building purposes. 
Their effort began with a newsletter (2002), and culminated in the publication of a 




process was noteworthy for its harmonization of conflict sensitivity practices across 
the relief, development and peacebuilding streams, and for its development of North-
South partnerships.  
This six-member interagency consortium was responsible for proposing an 
important change in terminology, replacing ‘PCIA’ as an umbrella term with the 
newer ‘conflict sensitivity.’ Proponents of the change argued that ‘PCIA’ was 
increasingly perceived as just a set of tools and activities, and that the shift to ‘conflict 
sensitivity’ would help to cultivate a more holistic, process-based approach, 
undergirded by an emphasis on organizational capacity (de la Haye and Moyroud 
2003, Barbolet et al. 2005a). The term ‘conflict sensitivity’ has since been adopted by 
many practitioners. However the debate continues, with some including Bush (2005) 
dismissing such re-naming efforts as market-oriented “branding” rather than 
substantive change. As of 2009, the earlier interagency consortium had been 
subsumed by a new Conflict Sensitivity Consortium comprised of 10 UK-based 
international NGOs, and funded by the UK government’s Department for 
International Development (CARE International UK 2009). 
Current practitioner debates. The central issues of the current phase are 
identified in two written debates organized by the Berghof Research Center for 
Constructive Conflict Management (Austin et al. 2003, Bloomfield et al. 2005). The 
two publications indicate an increased emphasis on linking peace program 
evaluation to the conflict impact assessment of aid programs. Such impact is 
increasingly framed at the macro level, raising questions around how localized 
activities can impact “peace writ large” (Anderson and Olson 2003). This has led to 




(Church and Shouldice 2003), as well as elevating planning and impact evaluation to 
the strategic, interagency level (Smith 2004). These worthy but ambitious goals often 
run counter to organizational reality, with many NGOs being demonstrably slow to 
mainstream conflict sensitivity in field operations (Lange 2004), even as their 
grassroots partners become increasingly active in using simple conflict sensitivity 
tools. "Many practitioners have found the academically- or conceptually-laden 
assessment methodologies impractically complicated and too burdensome to 
implement given shortages of staff, time and money” (Schmelzle 2005: 8).  
Issues of politics and power disparity are very much present, and the debates 
have grown increasingly heated. To bring clarity, it is necessary to distinguish 
between the politics that exist in the operating context, and the politics that exist 
within the aid industry itself (Schmelzle 2005: 7).  In the operating context, 
conducting a conflict sensitivity analysis does require analyzing politics at various 
levels, both formal and informal. Practitioners increasingly recognize that aid is 
political, in the sense that it influences and alters power relationships. Thus conflict 
sensitivity does not imply avoiding conflict or change, but rather understanding the 
likely impact of one’s actions, and making responsible, ethical choices. For the same 
reasons, most practitioners agree on the need to ‘triangulate’ conflict sensitivity 
analysis by including a diversity of relevant opinions and sources, representing all 
perspectives on a given situation.   
Regarding politics in the aid industry, Bush argues strongly that conflict 
sensitivity should emphasize processes that empower communities vis-à-vis the 
more powerful aid industry actors.  Drawing significantly on work done in 




grassroots actors: “The central – and fundamentally political – questions here are: 
Useful for whom? Useful for what? Whose interests are being served (or not)?” (Bush 
2005: 4).  Indeed, conflict sensitivity practice should be decisively centered around 
the practical needs of the user, with a special emphasis on the user who holds limited 
power within the aid system. Nonetheless, the need for empowerment in aid goes 
well beyond the practice of conflict sensitivity, and must be addressed at the 
industry-wide level. "Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment, as a set of tools and a 
space for reflective encounter, will be overburdened by the demand that it should act 
as catalyst for such deep social change" (Schmelzle 2005: 6).  
Problematic power disparities in aid are further exposed in the practitioner 
debates on the extent to which conflict sensitivity should be tool-driven and 
standardized. The history of conflict sensitivity’s development is often, as in this 
thesis, framed around the development and refinement of analytical, technical ‘tools.’  
Frameworks dominate, yet Neufeldt (2007) argues regarding peacebuilding project 
design and impact assessment that not all users are natural “logical frameworkers”  
who appreciate linear thinking, causes and effects. Some, by nature of personality or 
culture, work more effectively as “complex circlers,” focusing on relationships, 
processes and responsiveness to opportunity. Neufeldt parallels this distinction to 
the difference between positivism and interpretivism, and cautions that ‘circlers’ 
approach offers valuable insights that should be preserved. Operationally, this 
distinction highlights the risk that Westernized NGO culture tends to privilege 
‘frameworker’ thinking, while local partners may be silenced as ‘circlers.’   
Some technically-oriented analysts decry the proliferation of conflict 




Hoffman, for example, advocates the interagency adoption of a set of broadly 
applicable indicators, drawn from both theory and practice (Hoffman 2003). While 
parsimonious, these standardized approaches ignore the extent to which operating 
contexts are dynamic and unique, and organizational actors differ in their mandates, 
objectives and capacities. Bush links standardized indicators to disempowerment, 
stating that they reinforce “the asymmetrical power relationships between Northern-
driven initiatives and evaluations on the one hand, and those Southern communities 
on which they are ‘implemented’” (Bush 2005: 2). Indeed, the utility of the user may 
be better served by letting “a thousand flowers bloom” (Barbolet et al. 2005b: 2).  
The use of DNH in this study.  Among the many conflict sensitivity tools 
available, DNH has been selected for this project because it is the tool that has been 
most widely tested, used and adapted (Leonhardt 2003: 55), having proven adaptable 
across a very broad range of organizational and operational contexts, and 
particularly amenable to uptake at local levels (International Alert et al. 2004b: 28, 
Garred 2006b).  DNH as a minimalist approach which emphasizes ‘doing no harm’ 
may be well suited to religious associations which are under no normative obligation 
to expand their work into active peacebuilding. At the same time, all tools have 
limitations and it is important to highlight those most relevant to this project.  
De la Haye and Denayer, while affirming DNH’s field-based origins, accuse 
DNH of lacking “a fully developed theoretical framework” (2003: 51). Their criticism 
is not elaborated, but it likely points to the simplicity of the DNH framework’s 
context analysis elements. First, DNH’s identification of Dividers and Connectors, 
and their analysis across five categories, can be shallow if done with haste or limited 




justice issues. Perceptions of injustice are often identified during the analysis of 
Dividers, particularly in latent conflict contexts (Garred 2006a). However, justice is 
not explicitly mentioned in the DNH framework, so facilitators are obliged to clarify 
that DNH is not meant to promote peace at the expense of justice, but rather to 
promote a just peace. In terms of human rights, Anderson acknowledges that while 
DNH can facilitate a preliminary identification of human rights issues, “there are 
other, better, tools” for deepening human rights analysis (Anderson n.d.).   
Second, DNH context analysis is considered to be particularly locally-focused, 
making its best contribution at the micro level. Many practitioners restrict DNH to 
usage at the program level (Leonhardt 2003, Lowrey 2006), rather than using it to 
analyze sector-wide or interagency impact. Anderson herself has only occasionally 
sought to apply DNH at the national level, and acknowledges that DNH has not been 
applied to the international context, or “the ways international assistance can and 
does directly interact with these macrolevel forces” (Anderson 1999: 146). This 
contributes to the charge that DNH has failed “to develop a broader political 
perspective” (Leonhardt 2002: 41). 
Nonetheless, the simplicity of DNH’s context analysis elements is a double-
edged sword. It is the simplicity of the Dividers and Connectors concepts that make 
them very amenable to grassroots uptake. Dividers and Connectors are also 
influential in terms of personal transformation, contributing to what local-level 
practitioners have called a “new mindset,” “new worldview” or “paradigm shift” 
(Garred 2006a: 23). Further, there are situations, such as the first phase of a rapid-




what generalist practitioners need. In limited-capacity environments, a context 
analysis framework must be light and user-friendly if it is to have any practical value.   
At the same time, a DNH context assessment conducted by a skilled analyst 
can become relatively sophisticated. Dividers become an entry point for 
incorporating virtually any external body of theory on the causes of conflict, while 
Connectors serve as an entry point for considering theory on sources of peace. CDA 
training practices also make provision for deepening the Dividers and Connectors 
analysis through secondary characteristics, such as internally- versus externally-
influenced, broad versus narrow, and new versus old (CDA Collaborative Learning 
Projects n.d.-b).  As a result, even local analyses should in principle be able to detect 
small-scale issues that reflect and are linked to broader international and global 
trends. Such approaches can significantly broaden the DNH frame of context 
analysis, but they require additional skill on the part of the facilitator or analyst.  
While DNH has theoretical limitations in terms of context analysis, it is 
relatively rich in the theory of project impact, or how aid interventions impact 
conflict. The core impact mechanisms are identified as Resource Transfers and 
Implicit Ethical Messages, and further elaborated through the recognition of five and 
seven patterns, respectively.9 Nevertheless this contribution often goes unrecognized 
as form of theory. Conflict sensitivity renders explicit a complex set of practitioner 
theories-in-use (Argyris and Schön 1996: 13). As such, the different conflict sensitivity 
approaches put forth theoretical content which is generated and tested in practitioner 
experience, and which therefore resonates in interesting ways with the collaborative 
action research methodology used in the current study (Fischer and Wils 2003: 7). In 
                                                 




DNH, the field-based nature of Anderson’s theory development process is 
particularly striking, bringing forth learnings in the spirit of grounded theory (Glaser 
and Strauss 1967). Some observers may wish to see academic peace theory 
deductively applied to practice, but Donald Schön argues that this kind of thinking 
“needs to be turned on its head. We should think about practice as a setting not only 
for the application of knowledge but for its generation” (1995: 382). 
 
Academic Criticism of Conflict Sensitivity 
The self-reflections of conflict sensitivity practitioners have been highlighted 
above in the form of ongoing debates within the field.  In contrast, this section 
addresses criticism from an academic perspective, 10 including Professor Mark 
Duffield and Joanna Macrae of the Overseas Development Institute as the most 
influential voices.  Such criticism relates primarily to the emergency relief stream of 
conflict sensitivity, and follows that relief stream through its various stages of 
evolution, with particular emphasis on its convergence with the community 
development and peacebuilding streams. In early stages, the views of academics and 
practitioners were comparable, yet they become increasingly polarized over time, 
with little evidence of dialog or agreement, at least until after the US invasion of Iraq.  
Assessing such academic criticisms, together with the countervailing arguments of 
conflict sensitivity practitioners, assists in laying bare some of the theoretical 
assumptions underlying conflict sensitivity, and in identifying implications for the 
current action research project.  
                                                 
10 The terms ‘practitioner’ and ‘academic’ are imperfect, because there is a significant overlap 
of roles among key conflict sensitivity figures. Nonetheless the terms do convey the essence of 




The Evolution of Conflict Sensitivity Criticism. In the early 1990s, 
academics responded to concerns about the interaction between emergency relief and 
‘new wars’ in nearly the same way practitioners did. They highlighted the 
proposition that aid could exacerbate conflict, and called for a re-examination of aid 
program planning.  Duffield, Macrae and Zwi (1994: 231) even recommended a form 
of conflict impact assessment: “Greater emphasis must be placed on developing tools 
to monitor and evaluate the impact of relief assistance on the evolution of conflict.” 
Similar recommendations were reprised in later publications (Macrae 2001: 171, 
Duffield 2001b: 259-62). However even in early stages, academic commentary placed 
slightly more emphasis on macro-level and social justice issues than did the work of 
practitioners. Central themes included the need for international attention to human 
rights violations, and concern over the emerging politicization of aid as a tool of the 
powerful donor states (Duffield et al. 1994, Duffield and Prendergast 1994). The 
Rwanda genocide became a pivotal turning point, given the widespread consensus 
that aid had substituted for political action (Eriksson 1997, Terry 2002). Criticism 
increased, with Macrae calling for a return to traditional humanitarian principles  
(Macrae 1998), and Duffield directly questioning the ability of NGOs to right 
themselves (Duffield 1997). 
Beginning in approximately 2000, the academic criticisms escalated again, as 
analysts perceived a change in the strategy of donor states following the 
‘humanitarian interventions’ in Kosovo (1999) and Afghanistan (both before and after 
the 2001 US invasion). The donors’ emerging ‘coherence policy’ demanded a growing 
alignment between political and humanitarian objectives such that, according to 




action, rather than merely a substitute for it" (2001: 290).  Meanwhile the concept of 
developmental-relief had evolved into the ‘new humanitarianism,’ which 
incorporated not only peacebuilding, but also human rights and a range of other non-
traditional sectors. Such expanded relief programs were criticized as ill-suited to the 
contextual constraints of complex political emergencies (Macrae 2001).  
Perhaps more seriously, NGOs under the new humanitarianism were accused 
of being co-opted by donor governments into a political project of globalizing liberal 
governance, while using aid as one mechanism to control and compensate the 
impoverished peripheral zones that were increasingly perceived as security risks. 
Related concerns included social impact assessments as a step towards aid 
conditionality, and the blurring of the civilian/military interface (Duffield 2001a, 
Duffield 2001b, Duffield et al. 2001). David Rieff raised the stakes by bringing similar 
issues to the attention of the general public with A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism 
in Crisis (2002). Thomas Weiss (2000) was a quieter dissenting voice, arguing that the 
trend toward humanitarian intervention indicated that humanitarian concepts had 
successfully influenced state policy toward positive ends, rather than state policy co-
opting humanitarianism.  
The concerns over humanitarian intervention took on a new aspect, and 
reached a new level, with the escalation of the US Global War on Terror, particularly 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq. To the extent that NGOs responded to humanitarian needs 
created by the military invasion of donor governments, it appeared that co-optation 
had reached an unprecedented level. Practitioners and academics began to recover 
some common ground, as scholar-practitioners argued that humanitarianism had 




al. 2004). Anderson raised the subject of government donor policy in Iraq at an 
interagency DNH consultation in November 2004, but the participating NGO 
representatives arrived at no agreed course of action (CDA Collaborative Learning 
Projects 2004a). Just a few weeks later, the Indian Ocean tsunami catapulted the 
major NGOs into their largest emergency response in history, which sidelined their 
introspection regarding Iraq (Garred 2007), with the tsunami response itself 
becoming a major focus of conflict sensitivity scrutiny (de Silva 2009, Waizenegger 
and Hyndman 2010). The co-optation discussion currently persists unresolved as the 
Global War on Terror continues (Zwitter 2008), and academic interest in conflict 
sensitivity issues continues apace (Clarke 2006, Goodhand 2006, Hoffman and Weiss 
2006, de Waal 2010).   
Criticism focused on DNH.  In the work of authors such as Duffield and 
Macrae, the general criticism of conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding in aid contexts 
is very often illustrated with specific references to DNH and Anderson, because 
DNH is the form of conflict sensitivity considered “extremely influential” (Duffield 
2001b: 128) within the relief stream. When Duffield and Macrae criticize DNH, they 
criticize it as linked to and representative of the growth of the developmental relief 
and new humanitarianism agendas. This notion refers to an expanded interpretation 
of DNH, in which an aid project can actively help to promote peace.  However, 
Duffield and Macrae generally do not criticize the minimalist interpretation of DNH, 
which aims only to prevent an aid project from exacerbating existing conflict. The 
authors themselves have occasionally clarified their criticism.  Duffield has drawn a 
distinction between what he calls the “minimalist” and “maximalist” positions in 




position (Duffield 2001b: 94, see also Weiss 1999: 3). Macrae acknowledges that the 
trend toward conflict impact assessment of aid programs, and the trend toward 
integration of development concepts into aid programs, were originally two separate 
and distinct strands, which later became “entwined” (Macrae and Leader 2001: 295). 
The minimalist interpretation of DNH corresponds to what Macrae has elsewhere 
accepted as a “conflict-neutral” approach (Macrae 1998: 13). 
As a practitioner, Anderson makes it clear that both the minimalist and 
expanded interpretations are an intentional part of DNH, as evident in the title of the 
core publication (Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – Or War, 1999), and in the 
dual name of the tool (‘Do No Harm’ / ‘Local Capacities for Peace’). Additionally, 
other projects by Anderson and her staff demonstrate a leaning toward relief-
development linkages (Anderson and Woodrow 1989) and towards active 
peacebuilding (Anderson and Olson 2003, Goddard 2009). Nonetheless Anderson 
herself has clarified that she views the minimalist interpretation of DNH as the 
primary purpose of the tool. As a case in point, the interagency effort that was 
previously called the ‘Local Capacities for Peace Project’ (see for example Anderson 
2000) is now called the ‘Do No Harm Project’ (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 
n.d.-a). 
Such terminology differences may appear small, but the distinction between 
avoiding the exacerbation of conflict and actively contributing to its resolution has 
pivotal implications for the type of contribution that conflict sensitivity claims to 
make, and for the operational planning of the agencies involved. NGOs often 
highlight this distinction by framing their efforts as either a minimalist “working in 




Advocates of the expanded position may criticize DNH for its minimalist approach, 
stating that aid must make a positive contribution toward peace (Weiss 1999, Uvin 
2002). Despite these important distinctions, practitioners indicate that the minimalist 
and expanded approaches are closely linked. DNH has often been used as a 
foundational entry-point into peacebuilding, particularly at the local level (Ruth-
Heffelbower 2002, Garred 2006a, Goddard 2009). With regard to the current project, 
the aim is a minimalist one, seeking primarily to minimize unintended negative 
impacts, rather than to pursue active peacebuilding. Even so, some spontaneous 
expressions of peacebuilding may emerge, and they will not be actively discouraged.  
The core issue: social justice.  The academic debate on conflict sensitivity is a 
highly complex one, marked by the tension between micro- and macro-level 
perspectives. The overarching concern of academic critics is the macro-level trend in 
humanitarian action and its relationship to politics. Sørensen (2006)  points out that 
Duffield and other critics, while advancing a wide array of arguments, are all writing 
in essence about the potentially negative effects, particularly for the poor, of the 
globalization of the liberal agenda and the role of humanitarian aid within that 
system. The critics point out that conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding practitioners 
tend to locate the causes of conflict within a state, while ignoring and thus 
perpetuating the external macro-structural causes, some of which are rooted in the 
international aid system itself (Duffield 2001b).  In principle, this systemic bias could 
be addressed by applying conflict sensitivity at the macro level, analyzing the “aid 
system as a whole” (Leonhardt 2002: 41). Indeed, the recent emphasis on conflict-




broadened the scope of analysis, but it has not yet resulted in any systemic attempt to 
grapple with the negative impacts of the global aid architecture.  
The academic criticisms of conflict sensitivity advance an essential concern on 
behalf of the disempowered, yet it must be pointed out that such criticism originates 
far away from the operationally-focused perspective of many conflict sensitivity 
users. Among large NGOs, many practitioners persist in using conflict sensitivity at 
the micro level, not necessarily because they are ignorant of macro-politics, or captive 
to the inertia of the humanitarian aid system, but also because they implicitly value 
the local as profoundly unique and worthy of analysis. Among community-based 
organizations, grassroots participants may share Duffield’s concern for the question 
of justice, without sharing his enthusiasm for macro-analysis (see for example Bush 
2009). With this in mind, micro- and macro-analyses can be seen as complementary. 
Local dynamics should not be subsumed in the discussion of global meta-narratives, 
but micro-analysis should be informed by an understanding of the macro, and a 
willingness to question one’s own alignment with the prevailing structures of power. 
Ultimately, agencies must have the freedom to conduct analysis at a level that is 
relevant to the scope their operational influence, in order to exercise responsibility for 
their own impacts at that level.  
Further, while the academic criticisms reflect very justifiable concerns about 
the aid sector, the terms of that debate do not necessarily apply to other sectors. The 
current project aims to move conflict sensitivity into the religious sector, so the 
shortcomings of the aid system itself are not of immediate concern. Nonetheless, it is 
essential to hold open the questions of social justice at every level, including the 




relates to the forces of globalization.  The religious sector may also feature macro-
level dynamics that take on disempowering manifestations at the local level. With 
specific regard to DNH, a concern for social justice raises again the limitations of this 
particular tool. The simplicity of DNH’s context analysis elements, while making the 
tool easily usable at the grassroots level, may simultaneously dispose the tool to 
analytical gaps. The lack of any explicit mention of injustice in the identification of 
Dividers, and the localized focus of analysis, may result in overlooking questions of 
structural violence (Galtung 1969).  These DNH limitations are often overcome in the 
hands of skilled facilitators, but they may pose a daunting challenge to the novice. 
Thus the treatment of social justice issues will require vigilance throughout the 
course of the project.  
 
Conflict Sensitivity Adaptations 
Conflict sensitivity’s influence has expanded rapidly in its first decade of 
existence, and practices have been extensively adapted both inside and outside the 
humanitarian aid sector. It is instructive to survey the important adaptations, in 
terms of both content and process, and to consider their implications for the current 
project’s effort to introduce conflict sensitivity to new audiences in the religious 
associational sector. 
Adaptations within the humanitarian aid sector. Within the aid sector, DNH 
has been the most widely adapted tool. Numerous aid agencies have adapted DNH 
concepts to their own institutional contexts.  Additionally, DNH usage has expanded 




of NGOs experiencing this shift.  World Vision International has tested and 
documented how the basic DNH analytical framework proves equally useful in 
community development contexts (Garred 2006b), with adaptations as follows. 
When shifting from a relief to a development context, the DNH framework’s 
context analysis elements, consisting of Dividers and Connectors across a range of 
sub-categories, remain very consistent. The breadth and simplicity of these concepts 
makes them highly adaptable. However, these same elements must often be 
presented and perceived in a fresh light, because community development contexts 
are likely to feature latent conflict, in which relationships appear “smooth on the 
surface but in turmoil beneath” (Tolibas-Nuñez 1997: 84). DNH trainers must often 
increase explanatory discussion and reflection time to help development practitioners 
recognize that conflict is present in their context, even in the absence of physical 
violence (Garred 2006a).  
In contrast to the context analysis elements, the DNH framework’s project 
impact analysis elements change more substantively when shifting from relief to 
development. Resource Transfers and Implicit Ethical Messages remain the two 
primary mechanisms through which aid impacts conflict, but there are changes in 
emphasis and expression. In Resource Transfers, the sub-categories manifest 
themselves in different ways. For example, the theft of resources for war-making 
purposes is common in relief projects, but in development projects it is more 
common to see diversion of aid through corruption or politicization to benefit 
members of favored groups. Unequal distribution of material resources may 
exacerbate tensions in relief projects, but in development projects the contested 




making power. When considering Implicit Ethical Messages, the ‘intangibles’ are 
more readily acknowledged as a core project component in development than in 
relief.  DNH relief literature discusses only negative Implicit Ethical Messages, 
whereas development workers often point out that such messages can also impact in 
positive ways (Garred 2006a).  
The shift towards using DNH in development contexts can also bring a 
greater emphasis on participation of local-level actors. While DNH was originally 
used in relief contexts by staff of large NGOs, development that is truly participatory 
requires the active involvement of community members and local partners in DNH. 
Participatory learning and action methods have been used to gather community 
member input in context analysis.  Community-based organizations, who are often 
the primary program planners and implementers, have proven adept at using the 
core concepts of DNH to influence program design and implementation (Garred 
2006a).  Conflict sensitivity work at the grassroots level is gradually increasing, and 
some expressions of conflict sensitivity have emphasized the importance of Southern 
participation and ownership (see for example Bush 2005, International Alert et al. 
2004a). 
In addition to the shift of DNH from relief to development, there is also a 
broader ongoing expansion of conflict sensitivity practice to various specialized sub-
sectors within the humanitarian aid community. Sectoral and integrated interagency 
conflict sensitivity analyses are becoming more common given the increasing 
emphasis on the macro level. The International Development Research Centre has 
published a book on conflict sensitivity concepts pertaining to natural resource 




sensitivity to programs on democratization and on disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants, which are intended to build peace, but can 
unintentionally exacerbate conflict (2005a). Simon Mason advocates for conflict-
sensitive research methodology, particularly in the form of “explorative expert 
interviews” (2003). 
Adaptations in the business sector. While adaptations within the 
humanitarian aid sector have been significant, the most unexpected expansion has 
come in the form of conflict sensitivity uptake within the business sector. This 
movement began in the 1990s with rising concern over the relationship of business 
interests to the ‘new wars,’ particularly in transnational resource extraction 
industries. Prominent conflict sensitivity practitioners have sought to marry the 
growing awareness of business impacts with conflict sensitivity learnings from the 
humanitarian aid sector. CDA Collaborative Learning Projects launched a ‘Corporate 
Engagement Project’ (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2008b, Zandvliet and 
Anderson 2009).  International Alert advocates for conflict sensitivity uptake, and 
provides business actors with tools, resources and capacity building (International 
Alert 2005, Hettiarachchi et al. 2009). The UN Global Compact, which presents itself 
as a voluntary international corporate social responsibility initiative, has adopted 
conflict prevention as one of its issues (Williams 2008, Rasche and Kell 2010) and 
produced its own guide to conflict impact assessment and risk management (Gossen 
et al. 2002). Each of these efforts follows the basic conflict sensitivity model of 
conducting context analysis, and then developing recommendations for 





Despite the similarities, the argument supporting conflict sensitivity in the 
corporate sector follows a different line of reasoning than in the humanitarian aid 
sector, reflecting the differing reasons for their existence.  In approaching the 
humanitarian community, a conflict sensitivity advocate moves directly to point out 
the possibility of doing unintentional harm to a community, which, if true, would 
counteract the humanitarian’s primary purpose. However the same argument is 
unlikely to persuade many in the corporate sector.  As Zandvliet observes: “It is 
unlikely that many corporate managers would read a chapter titled The Role of 
Business in Conflict Transformation” (2005: 1). Thus a conflict sensitivity advocate tends 
to approach the business community first by recognizing the high cost of conflict to 
business operations, since conflict detracts from the profit-making mission.  
Subsequently, the advocate then raises the issue of how business practices can 
unintentionally exacerbate conflict. Unlike DNH, nearly all conflict analysis 
methodologies in the corporate sector emphasize two-way impacts, from context to 
project, and from project to context.   
Conflict sensitivity in the corporate sector involves compliance issues which 
are not currently present to any significant extent in the humanitarian aid sector.  For 
humanitarian organizations the minimalist approach is to ‘do no harm,’ but 
corporations have an even more foundational starting point, which is compliance 
with the applicable legal requirements at local, national and international levels 
(International Alert 2005: 10). Thus advocates of conflict sensitivity appeal not only to 
the corporations themselves, but also to policy-making and regulatory bodies. 
International Alert has presented the case to Northern governments both directly 




Conflict, Peace and Development Co-Operation Network (International  Alert 2004). 
The UN Global Compact, approaching the same issue from a corporate perspective, 
commissioned a review of how public policy actors might support the private 
sector’s conflict sensitivity efforts, and this also turns to compliance themes in 
decrying the lack of “clear and enforceable rules of the game” (Ballentine and Haufler 
2005: 53). 
Conflict sensitivity’s context analysis in the corporate sector is similar in 
methodology to that of the humanitarian aid sector, but it is less intensively 
emphasized.  Conflict risk and impact assessments are of course recommended, but 
they are also supplemented by other efforts such as stakeholder engagement 
strategies, revenue transparency and commodity certification initiatives (Ballentine 
and Haufler 2005: 23). There is less tendency to insist on context-specific strategies, 
and more readiness to propose broadly applicable patterns and recommendations 
(International Alert 2005, Zandvliet and Anderson 2009). Further, there is less 
emphasis on internal organizational capacity building, and a greater reliance on 
using external analysts. Presumably the corporate audience has less patience for 
social analysis than does the humanitarian community, and a greater demand for 
fixed solutions, but there is no hard evidence to indicate how this preference impacts 
conflict sensitivity effectiveness.  
Project impact analysis patterns are subject to more substantive changes than 
context analysis patterns when shifting from the humanitarian to the corporate 
sector. The conflict impacts of corporate social investment projects may be similar to 
those of aid projects, but otherwise the divergent organizational purposes and 




consistently troublesome issues include recruitment, selection and compensation of 
staff, compensation of residents affected by business operations, security 
enforcement, human rights, corruption, and relations with indigenous people groups 
(International Alert 2005, Zandvliet and Anderson 2009). 
Implications for the current project. This brief review of previous conflict 
sensitivity adaptations within and outside of the humanitarian aid sector suggests 
several factors that may become relevant in the current effort to introduce conflict 
sensitivity to religious associations. First, it is possible to modify the point of entry in 
advocating conflict sensitivity, or to adjust the relative emphasis placed on the 
various conflict sensitivity elements, in order to appeal to the special interests of a 
given practitioner audience. Second, the level of complexity and sophistication in 
conflict sensitivity analysis must be adjusted to fit the available capacity of a given 
practitioner audience, particularly if the goal is for the practitioners themselves to 
give sustainable leadership to conflict sensitivity efforts. Finally, project impact 
analysis patterns and elements are likely to require contextualization or adaptation 
when conflict sensitivity applied to new types of organizations. In contrast, the 
context analysis patterns and elements are more likely to remain constant.  
 
Assessing the Applicability of Conflict Sensitivity to Religious 
Associations 
In order to determine whether conflict sensitivity is applicable to religious 
associations, and if so to what extent, it is necessary to establish at the outset a 




learning cycles that take place during an action research process, and flexible enough 
to respond to the innovations of practitioner partners. This study seeks to examine 
both the relevance and the usefulness of conflict sensitivity to religious associations, 
through examination of the following questions.  
Is there a need for conflict sensitivity?  This pertains to relevance. 
Throughout its brief history, conflict sensitivity has been taken up in response to the 
problem of well-meaning activities that generate unintended negative impacts on a 
context of conflict. To determine whether there is a need for conflict sensitivity as a 
partial solution, it is necessary to first establish the existence of a problem.  Key 
questions include the following: Is there a social conflict, whether manifest of latent? 
Does the intervention in question sometimes exacerbate this social conflict? If so, is 
such negative impact significant enough, at least at the local level, to merit 
practitioner attention?   
These questions must be asked from the perspective of both insiders and 
outsiders, because most negative impacts are unintentional, which renders them 
difficult for insiders to see.  Thus it is possible that conflict sensitivity may be very 
much needed in a given situation, but not acknowledged or utilized by insiders, if 
awareness levels are low.  It is equally possible that insiders might already recognize 
and manage conflict sensitivity issues in ways that go unrecognized by outsiders.  
To what extent, and in what ways, is conflict sensitivity being used? Or not 
used? Why? One indication of both relevance and usefulness is the actual uptake of 
conflict sensitivity by religious associational actors.  The interagency DNH Project, in 
its mainstreaming phase, determined that there are three interrelated elements 




(CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2001). International Alert further breaks 
mainstreaming processes into five components: commitment and motivation, 
organizational culture, capacity building, accountability, and external relationships 
(Lange 2004).  
Both evaluative frames are normally used to inform and assess the 
effectiveness of an organization’s conflict sensitivity efforts. The DNH Project’s frame 
is more amenable to adjustment for the current purpose of assessing the applicability 
of the conflict sensitivity approach itself. This requires asking not only to what extent 
conflict sensitivity is being taken up, but perhaps more importantly, in what ways 
conflict sensitivity is being taken up, or not taken up, and why? Additionally, the 
DNH Project’s frame elements of conceptualization, personalization and 
operationalization are meaningful to practitioner partners, and can potentially be 
used as ‘hooks’ on which other research questions might hang. Thus the DNH 
Project’s approach will be adopted for use in the current project.  
Conceptualization takes place at the individual level, through the recognition 
that well-meaning activities may have unintended negative impacts in a conflicted 
context. This awareness may first appear in a sudden flash of recognition, but 
individuals typically need repeated exposure to conflict sensitivity concepts in order 
to fully develop this awareness as a paradigm or lens for project planning (Garred 
2006a). Within a group, awareness typically increases over time, such that there may 
be no awareness at the time conflict sensitivity is introduced, followed by 
progressively increasing levels of awareness as the process continues.  
Personalization also takes place at the individual level, through the 




unintentionally exacerbating conflict. DNH has been found to contribute to 
individual change, with some participants adopting a more inclusive viewpoint (Riak 
2006, Sihotang and Silalahi 2006) and spontaneously applying DNH insights not only 
to their own role in the organization, but also to their interpersonal and familial 
relationships (Garred 2006a). Other conflict sensitivity tools have the potential for a 
similar affect. Barbolet et al. report that community members trained in conflict 
sensitivity often react 
 
first, with dismay at their own role in perpetuating violence through 
inadvertently supporting the structures of violence. Second, with excitement 
and empowerment as they understand that changing their own behaviour, 
and encouraging their friends and neighbours to do the same, will support 
peace and undermine violence (2005a: 5).  
 
Operationalization takes place at the organizational level, when conflict sensitivity 
insights are applied to project operations, or to the broader development of 
organizational policy and ethos. Organizational application is the ultimate goal of 
conflict sensitivity, yet this does not take place until a significant number of 
individuals within the organization have experienced conceptualization and 
personalization. Allen Harder (2006) invokes here the concept of “critical mass” in 
applying Everett Rogers’ (1995) innovation diffusion theory to conflict sensitivity 
uptake. Additionally, the speed of uptake depends on a variety of other factors, such 
as the disposition of leadership towards conflict sensitivity, the nature of 
organizational decision-making structures and processes, and the complexity of the 
operating environment.  
Conflict sensitivity requires time and effort, so practitioners generally 




to do their job better or meet their goals. Therefore if conflict sensitivity is 
consistently used by religious associations, this likely indicates that it is both relevant 
and useful.  Lack of uptake may imply that conflict sensitivity is not useful in its 
current form, but does not necessarily imply that it is not relevant, due to the 
potential awareness gap described above. Further, even if conflict sensitivity is 
viewed by many as useful in its current form, it may not be operationalized if 
organizational leaders, operating systems or incentive structures do not support it. 
Thus, while operationalization is the ultimate goal of conflict sensitivity, 
conceptualization and personalization can also be taken as interim indications of 
relevance and usefulness, as they are precursors to operationalization, and all three 
elements are mutually reinforcing.  
In all aspects of DNH uptake – conceptualization, personalization and 
operationalization – this study requires an analysis of the types of situations in which 
conflict sensitivity is applied. This will illuminate the contexts in which conflict 
sensitivity is seen as relevant and useful, and provide a greater understanding of 
both the organizations and their operating environments.  Thus it will be of interest 
to identify the realms in which religious practitioners most often apply conflict 
sensitivity, whether it be to their own life, their community of worship within church, 
mosque or temple, or to the broader community at large. Also significant is the 
question of whether religious actors adopt the minimalist interpretation of conflict 
sensitivity, with its emphasis on ‘doing no harm’ while implementing nPCRO 
projects, or whether they also demonstrate an interest in expanding into active 
peacebuilding. Finally, it will be important to note whether the project participants 




tangible resources, or whether there is also a significant emphasis on intangible 
impacts.  
What are the implications for enhancing practitioner capacity? This analysis 
of conflict sensitivity’s applicability in the religious sector should naturally help to 
inform future capacity building efforts. Such practically-oriented conclusions are a 
major focus of the practitioner aspect of the action research effort, while receiving 
much briefer treatment in the academic thesis. Nonetheless, it will be important to 
identify which specific aspects of conflict sensitivity prove to be most relevant and 
useful, and which least. Accordingly, certain aspects might be expanded, modified or 
discarded. Further, it will be essential to try to distinguish which of these findings are 
true of conflict sensitivity in general, and which are specific only to the DNH tool. If 
certain limitations make the DNH tool unsuitable, then it could be adapted or 
replaced based on the complementary strengths available in other conflict sensitivity 
tools. Finally, applicability to the religious sector in one or two locations does not 
necessarily imply applicability to the religious sector everywhere. One must assess 
the extent to which these findings are generalizable across contexts, as a guide to 
potential future capacity building efforts in other locations.  
 
Conclusion: Evaluative Stance 
The current project seeks to address the social impacts of religious 
associations operating in multifaith conflict-vulnerable contexts through field-testing 
the conflict sensitivity approach. The focus is on a minimalist form of conflict 




existing communal tensions, in order to mitigate any unintended negative impacts. 
This project draws on the history of previous conflict sensitivity adaptations in the 
humanitarian aid and business sectors, and selects the DNH framework as the 
particular conflict sensitivity tool to be tested. The relevance and usefulness of 
conflict sensitivity within the religious sector will be examined through a focus on 
how religious actors conceptualize, personalize and operationalize the DNH tool.  
An operational experiment of this type naturally requires a critical evaluative 
stance, and it is necessary to be clear about what is being evaluated. This project 
focuses on assessing the applicability of the conflict sensitivity approach itself to a 
new audience, not on judging the efforts or effectiveness of the participating 
practitioners and agencies. Further, the project requires a form of evaluation that is 
utilization-focused, with an emphasis on exploring innovative forms of conflict 
sensitivity that may be of near-term use to religious actors (Patton 1997). 
Correspondingly, this form of evaluation is highly participatory, as befitting the 
collaborative action research approach detailed in Chapter Four.  Before proceeding 
to methodology, however, the next chapter must address the essential question of 
how conflict sensitivity testing can inform not only practitioner usage, but also the 
development of academic theory on religious associations and the various factors 








RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS  
IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN CONTEXT   
 
Can we, I asked, do a social science of the pain, suffering, 
loss and death experienced in ethnic or communal conflict? 
- Ashutosh Varshney (2002, xiv) 
 
This chapter provides the conceptual backdrop for the study’s second level of 
inquiry, that which considers how the data collected during conflict sensitivity 
testing serve to inform existing associational theory. Recent theoretical developments 
reveal a post-Cold War surge of optimism regarding the liberal democratizing role of 
the associational sector, in its various forms including civil society and social capital 
(for example, Putnam 1993, Gellner 1994, Salamon 1994, Keane 2003). However, on 
the heels of such enthusiasm has come a wave of disenchantment, with numerous 
analysts observing that associational impacts are not uniformly positive (Ndegwa 
1996, Portes 1998, Halpern 2005: 22-25, Rossteutscher 2005b, Field 2008: 79-100, 
Warren 2008, Ghosh 2009, Graeff 2009). It is increasingly recognized that social 
mobilization can either promote or retard liberal democracy, depending on the 
prevailing social conditions and the nature of the association. The increasingly shrill 
criticisms of humanitarian aid NGOs, as discussed in the previous chapter, provide 
an example of how this wave of disenchantment has manifested itself in a particular 
sub-sector of the associational realm (Duffield 1997, Maren 1997, Rieff 2002).  
Recent democratization theory has also included an explicit emphasis on 
peace (Rasmussen 2003), thus giving rise to a cluster of literature that focused on the 
relationship between the associational sector, conflict and peace (Gidron et al. 2002b, 




that intentionally set out to promote peace or, less commonly, those that intentionally 
set out to pursue goals that lead to violence. However, the sub-cluster of theory that 
addresses unintentional associational impacts is smaller still, and emergent in nature. 
My thesis informs that sub-cluster by examining the conflict impacts of non-peace 
and conflict resolution organizations, or nPCROs, as associations whose primary 
mandate lies in areas other than peace and conflict resolution, such that their 
influence on peace or conflict can be considered an “externality” (Morris 2000: 27-8, 
Putnam and Feldstein 2003: 269, Curini 2007).  In contexts vulnerable to tensions 
between identity groups, such externalities may produce either positive or negative 
impact on the prevailing climate of conflict and peace (Colletta and Cullen 2000, Cox 
2009).  
The work of Robert Putnam (2000) on bridging and bonding social capital, 
and Ashutosh Varshney (2002) on intercommunal linkages in civil society, serve as 
central theoretical points of reference. The core body of research available to date, 
contributed by Putnam, Varshney and other researchers commenting on the issues 
they raise (including Uvin 1998, Weisinger and Salipante 2005, Cochrane 2005, 
Pickering 2006), has surfaced important insights yet it generalizes the nature and 
causes of associational conflict impact in ways that overlook the complexity and 
dynamism of the associational sector. This debate often presents itself as a 
disagreement on the extent to which associational impact can be considered broadly 
positive, or broadly negative. Structural determinants of impact are heavily 
emphasized, particularly the question of whether or not an association’s membership 
composition is homogenous or heterogeneous in relation to the major identity group 




important, the emphasis on associational structure can lead to overlooking important 
non-structural determinants of impact. Further, a number of related questions require 
exploration, including the degree to which associational actors can transcend the 
contextual pressures of a deeply divided society in order to become agents of change, 
and the role of religion in shaping associational conflict impacts.  
Before further engaging Putnam, Varshney and their interlocutors on 
associational conflict impacts, this chapter first locates the study in the Southeast 
Asian socio-political context, which features several critical regional trends that must 
be clarified in contrast to Western-influenced concepts of democratization. Next, I 
examine the theories of Putnam, Varshney and others on the nature and causes of 
associational conflict impact by nPCROs. I critically engage the arguments found 
within this emergent literary sub-cluster by comparing them to conflict sensitivity 
theory as an alternative approach to social impact analysis.  Finally, with a view to 
addressing the imbalances, tensions and gaps found in the current body of theory, I 
identify the key research questions that guide my empirical efforts in Mindanao and 
Singapore. Throughout the chapter, I maintain that view the theory building should 
result in theory that is credible enough to influence practitioner action in policy and 
practice. Application is not the purpose of this chapter but good theory, when 
applied should lead logically to sound and effective decision-making. 
 
Ethno-politics, Religion and the Associational Sector in Southeast Asia  
This section provides a brief and selective framing of ethno-politics, religion 




Southeast Asia unique. In Southeast Asia, the prominence of religion in the public 
sphere, the prevalence of ethnicity- and religion-based associations, and the wide 
range of associational stances vis-à-vis the state, all challenge the Westernized 
assumptions that underlay much of the current theory on associational conflict 
impacts. Both concepts and terminology must be broadened in order to adequately 
grasp the dynamics of associational conflict impacts in Southeast Asia. 
Southeast Asia as a region. At the outset, the location of the current study 
within Southeast Asia requires critical conceptual framing. Southeast Asia is 
generally considered to be the region that lies between India and China, and has been 
heavily influenced by both of those civilizations. The region is commonly described 
as containing ten states: Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR; Laos), Cambodia, 
Thailand, Viet Nam (Vietnam), Myanmar (Burma), Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines.  The inclusion of the eleventh state of Timor 
Leste (East Timor), which became independent in 2002, is surprisingly inconsistent 
(e.g. King 2008: xvii includes Timor Leste, but Kumar and Siddique 2008: 9 do not). 
The definition of the region’s boundaries has also been erratic: Sri Lanka was 
sporadically included in decades past (Anderson 1998: 6), and the Philippines was 
questioned until the 1960s (Osborne 2010: 5). The current regional configuration of 




Figure 3.1: Map of Contemporary Southeast Asia 
Source: Perry-Castañeda Map Collection, University of Texas Libraries, 2003 
 
Map notwithstanding, the very designation of Southeast Asia as a region is a 
recent concept that originated largely in the West. The area was vaguely referred to 
as “further India” or “Indo-China” (Reid 1993: 3) until World War II, when the Allies 
created a South-east Asia Command in opposition to the Japanese (Leifer 1998: 227). 
Scholars therefore recognize Southeast Asia as an “imagined reality” (Anderson 1998: 




argue that the diverse societies of Southeast Asia share important elements of culture 
(e.g. Wolters 1999) and history (e.g. Reid 1993: 3-6, Reid 1999). Modern 
manifestations of that shared history include colonization by the Spanish, British, 
Dutch, French, Portuguese and Americans;  Japanese occupation during World War 
II; intense communist and anti-communist activity plus great power interest during 
the Cold War; and a post-Cold War emphasis on economic development, which was 
hampered by the Asian financial crisis of 1997. 11 The regional concept has been taken 
up by the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, 
formed in 1967). In fact, Acharya (2009: 29-30) argues that the formation of ASEAN 
has played a major role in the development of regional consciousness, and ASEAN 
itself has articulated strategic objectives aimed at “building ASEAN identity” 
(ASEAN 2009: 20-23). 
The current project does not focus on Southeast Asian Studies per se, but it 
does seek to locate itself with reference to certain regional trends on religion, conflict 
and the associational sector. Therefore the lingering tensions in this academic field 
must be taken into account. Southeast Asian Studies still tend to be dominated by 
Western voices (Heryanto 2007) and perspectives (Lieberman 2003: 9). Historical 
research in the region has leaned heavily towards rulers and their polities, giving less 
attention to agency among peripheral communities (Chutintharānon and Baker 2002). 
In contrast, this project’s critical examination of Westernized associational theory, 
together with its foregrounding of local perspectives through action research, makes 
a modest contribution towards understanding the region on its own terms.   
                                                 
11 Thailand is the only Southeast Asian state that was not colonized by European powers, nor 




Ethnicity, Religion and Conflict. The challenges of identity-based ethno-
political conflict are global in nature, yet particularly prominent in Southeast Asia. 
Furnivall (1956) originally coined the notion of “plural society” within this region, 
and Kumar and Siddique (2008: 7) describe the region’s states as “defined by their 
constant imperative to cope with diversity.” This imperative involves addressing 
varying types and degrees of intergroup conflict, including a number of civil wars 
that rank among “the most intractable in the world” (Derouen et al. 2009).  Such 
dynamics are rooted in the post-colonial governance trends that brought multiple 
ethnic groups together under the modern sovereign state. The state borders defined 
through colonial competition were mismatched to the traditional geographic 
distribution of ethnic groups, yet those borders were reified at the time of 
independence. As a result, all Southeast Asian states are multiethnic, and many 
ethnic groups in the region now find themselves divided by one or more interstate 
borders. The sheer number of ethnic groups, and the complex relations between 
them, lend a horizontal dimension to ethno-political conflict in the region.  
At the same time, state-society relations are highly ethnicized, bringing a 
vertical element to the analysis. In the pre-colonial era, rugged geographic barriers 
kept the centers of political influence relatively small and fractured (Hefner 2007), 
and a ruler’s authority dissipated towards loose territorial edges. Wolters (1999) 
notably compares this early political formation to a mandala. In contrast, authority in 
the newly independent states was assumed to be uniform throughout their territory, 
thus creating tension between the center and the periphery (Kingsbury 2005). Center 
and periphery very often represented different ethnicities, with ruling elites hailing 




geographic and political margins (Duncan 2008). Thus the political realm is 
dominated by an ongoing effort to define relations between the “majority” and the 
“minorities” (Pfaff-Czarnecka and Rajasingham-Senanayake 1999). Economic 
development policies have often benefited the majority at the expense of minorities, 
through resource extraction, land use legislation, and/or transmigration of majority 
populations into peripheral minority-held zones (Kingsbury 2005, Duncan 2008). 
States are often ambiguous in their projection of the ‘nation,’ framing it sometimes on 
the basis of inclusive citizenship, and other times on shared ethnicity and culture 
(Brown 1994: 261). As a result, secessionist movements dot the region, and ethnic 
mobilization is consistently viewed by ruling majorities as a threat to the integrity of 
states (Snitwongse and Thompson 2005). Autonomy proposals in various forms are a 
frequent focus of policy discussion (Ferrer 2001). 
Importantly, these ethno-political tensions frequently take on a religious tone. 
The root causes of conflict are often political and economic, but religion overlays 
them as a highly secondary influential factor (Mulder 2003: 220, Fox 2004, Cady and 
Simon 2007: 16). This linkage stems from the strong demographic correlation between 
ethnicity and religion throughout the region (Goh 2005: 13, Kumar and Siddique 
2008), which takes on added salience when ethnicity and religion are conflated in the 
public imagination.  At the time of independence, governing regimes were often tied 
to a particular ethno-religious group, making the relationship between government 
and religion one of the most hotly debated policy issues (Kumar and Siddique 2008: 
15-6). Buddhism is statistically prevalent among majority groups in mainland 
Southeast Asia (including Myanmar, Thailand, Viet Nam, Lao PDR and Cambodia) 




archipelagic states (Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam, Timor Leste and the 
Philippines). Minority groups are often affiliated with the other major world religions 
including Hinduism, or with local indigenous beliefs. As a result, relationships 
between ethno-religious groups are frequently marked by stark “horizontal 
inequalities” (Humphreys and Varshney 2004: 13, Stewart 2008). Religion may be 
more easily radicalized where religious differences overlap with socio-economic gaps 
(Adam et al. 2007: 979), and more likely exclusivist where followers have internalized 
a minority consciousness (Eck 1993: 176). 
At this juncture, a half-century after independence, the expectations of the 
secularization thesis (Durkheim 1915, Weber 1930) have not come to pass (Norris and 
Inglehart 2004). Casanova’s (1994) analysis indicates that while modernization does 
indeed result in religion becoming structurally differentiated from society’s other 
political and cultural spheres, religion does not necessarily decline in influence or 
become private. In Southeast Asia, religion is neither private nor apolitical, and 
“Western secularism has not been a viable option” (Kumar and Siddique 2008: 16). 
Further, religious relations in Southeast Asia are currently in a state of flux. The 
regional religious culture has historically been tolerant of differing beliefs, absorbing 
Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity in successive waves, and placing a 
priority on communal harmony (McCloud 1995, Mulder 1996: 7-15). Nevertheless, 
Southeast Asia has been deeply impacted by the global post-Cold War trend towards 
increased identity-based conflict, and the region has seen a revival and expansion of 
religious activity (Mulder 2003: 165-74, Kumar and Siddique 2008: 7-37). The attacks 
of September 11, 2001, and the Western framing of Southeast Asia as a “second front” 




have further intensified local intergroup tensions as well as anti-American sentiment 
(Kumar and Siddique 2008: 27). Within Islam, there is a vigorous intrafaith debate 
over how that faith’s teachings relate to the modern nation-state (Hefner 2007, Kadir 
2007, Alagappa 2004a). Some local associational activists warn against adopting a 
“clash of civilizations” paradigm (Huntington 1996), fearing that an otherwise 
avoidable ‘clash’ may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.12 
Southeast Asia’s ethno-political cleavages and their religious implications are 
very present in the associational realm, which often organizes itself along ethnic and 
religious lines (Lee 2004: 11, Mulder 1996: 192, Alagappa 2004b: 465).  In the global 
literature, this phenomenon is known as “homophily” (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954), 
affirming the popular observation that “birds of a feather flock together” (de Souza 
Briggs 2003: 4, Putnam and Feldstein 2003: 3).  While the term ‘homophily’ refers 
primarily to relational networks (e.g. McPherson et al. 2001, Lin 2002: 29-40), it also 
has powerful implications for the influence of relational networks in associational 
development (e.g. Weare et al. 2009). Where ethno-religious divisions are highly 
politicized, homophily can lead to the politicization of associational activity, even in 
the absence of formal political engagement (Orjuela 2003).  The literature on 
associational homophily and ethno-politicization in Africa is expansive (e.g. Ndegwa 
1996, Kasfir 1998, Uvin 1998: 173-79, Orvis 2001, Longman 2009), and despite local 
uniqueness many of those insights are relevant to Southeast Asia.  Further, in 
Southeast Asia the religious sector itself represents a prominent sub-category of the 
associational realm, with Mulder going so far as to state that “the most lively scene of 
                                                 
12 Informal discussion during ‘Moving Forward: Building an ASEAN People's Agenda; Third 





association is the religious field” (2003: 232). Religion often exerts a powerful 
influence over public opinion, and conflict actors may seek out religious associations 
as a vehicle of support for their aims (Hadiwinata 2007).  In this sense, “everyday” 
ethnicity and religion is political (Karner 2007), because it enables the groups to 
“cohere sufficiently … to participate in struggles for resources” (Clarke 1998: 6).  
The Nature of Civil Society. The Southeast Asian associational sector 
described above does not fit neatly with current ‘civil society’ theory, much of which 
has been heavily influenced by Western thought (Hann and Dunn 1996, Kaviraj and 
Khilnani 2001). If civil society is viewed simply as the realm of interpersonal 
association falling outside of the household and the state, and usually also falling 
outside the market realm  (Morris 2000, Kocka 2004: 69), then civil society has existed 
in Southeast Asia since pre-modern times (Lee 2004: 10, Hasan et al. 2008).  However, 
with reference to post-Cold War thought, "if one equates civil society with the 
prevailing Western form, then one will conclude that it largely does not exist outside 
of the Western world" (Lee 2004: 8).   Prominent differences in Southeast Asia include 
the place of ethnicity- and religion-based associations, and the relationship of civil 
society to the state.  
First, the prominence of ethnicity and religion in associational life is met with 
several obstacles in current civil society theory. The Western emphasis on citizen 
agency leads to a focus on “some meaningful degree of voluntary participation, 
either in the operation or management of the organization’s affairs" (Salamon and 
Anheier 1997: 34). In contrast, ethnicity is often ‘ascriptive,’ so belonging to a local 
ethnic association may be viewed as automatic than voluntary. Religion, too, may be 




al. 2010). It is questionable whether Asian ethnicity and religion are completely non-
voluntary (Varshney 2002: 42), as evidenced by the prominence of religious 
conversion issues in the region (Jones 2009), yet ascription does hold importance. 
Further, associations formed on the basis of ethnicity are often informally structured, 
whereas Western-influenced theorists often insist on some form of institutional 
existence (Cohen and Arato 1992: x, Anheier and Salamon 1998: 20). Ethnic- and 
religious-based associations may focus narrowly on the wellbeing of their own 
members, contradicting the expectation of Cohen and Arato that “modern civil 
society is based on egalitarian principles and universal inclusion” (1992: 19).  
Westernized theory has also been deeply influenced by the notion that civil society 
should be secular, which I examine later in this chapter. 
Second, current democratization theory often emphasizes a primary function 
of civil society as working as a counterbalance or oppositional force toward the state 
(Tocqueville 1966, Edwards 2009: 15). Theorists of this persuasion often argue that 
associations that do not challenge the state do not constitute a true civil society.  In its 
benign form, this line of reasoning leads simply to a normative questioning of the 
motivation or effectiveness of associations that do not challenge the state 
(e.g.Ndegwa 1996). In its more problematic form, such reasoning leads to the 
exclusion of non-confirming associations from the analysis of civil society. For 
example, in examining churches in Rwanda and Burundi, Timothy Longman 
considers churches as part of civil society only when they or their members challenge 
the state in areas of democratization, human rights, and intergroup tolerance 
(Longman 2005: 95). In contrast, theorists adopting a more contextually relative 




directly challenge the state, it may engage in subtle contestation and passive 
resistance (Chong 2005), and it can significantly influence public discourse (Lyons 
and Gomez 2005). Further, some analysts do acknowledge that consistently opposing 
the state is not the only role for civil society. Social capital development can be a valid 
contribution to democratization (Putnam 1993: 93, Varshney 2002: xi, Pekkanen 2004), 
as can issue-based advocacy (Clarke 1998: 49-50) and the facilitation of public action 
(Jobert and Kohler-Koch 2008). 
In Southeast Asia, associational activity has long focused on service provision, 
but associations have not often formally challenged the state (Lee 2004). Civil 
society’s involvement in politics is generally increasing, but the nature of political 
involvement varies widely, and it remains fragile where governments retain strong 
central control. Critics often point to an empty symbolism of democratic institutions, 
which they call “procedural democracy” (Mulder 1996: 187) or “gestural politics” 
(Lee 2005), while decrying the absence of an underlying ethos of citizen participation 
and responsive government.  Such differences are often traced to a divergence in 
worldviews, with pro-Western voices contending that Asian cultures lack a 
fundamental respect for individual equality and human rights (Mulder 1996). Asian 
authorities counter by arguing that “Asian values” emphasize collective harmony 
over individual freedom, leading to forms of democracy that are unique yet 
appropriate for the region (Lee 2004, Alagappa 2004a).  Such trends are generally 
regional in nature, yet the availability of ‘political space’ does vary, with Singapore 
among the most restricted, and the Philippines exhibiting a relatively high degree of 




The obvious difficulty with these contested terms is that when civil society 
theories are driven by a normative emphasis on democratization, they may 
encourage observers to see only what they want to see, and to overlook empirical 
evidence that points in other directions. This modern, Westernized bias toward 
associations that are voluntary, secular, and challenge the state serves to exclude 
much of the activity that is actually taking place in the associational realm, 
particularly in non-Western settings (Ndegwa 1996, Hann 1996, Kasfir 1998, Morris 
2000, Orvis 2001, Varshney 2002, Lee 2004).  In approaching Southeast Asia, I argue 
with Kasfir that it is necessary "to open up the notion of civil society by not insisting 
that it explain democratic reform and instead using civil society to gain a wider 
understanding of particular societies and their relationship to their states" (1998: 3).   
Religious Associations, Broadly Defined. I began the current study by using 
‘civil society’ terminology. I sought to avoid the Westernized biases described above 
by defining civil society in a broad, inclusive manner that was descriptive rather than 
normative.  This approach was reasonably effective in academic circles, but it failed 
to facilitate accurate communication with practitioners ‘on the ground’ in Singapore 
and Mindanao. After consulting colleagues in both locations, and re-considering the 
literature, I later changed the terminology to reflect the broader and less value-laden 
language of ‘religious associations’ or ‘religious organizations.’ The action research 
process of exploring these definitional issues has revealed key insights about the 
nature of religious associations in the region, as briefly described below.   
In Singapore, several of my pilot phase interviews and participant 
observation discussions began awkwardly, because I asked about ‘religious civil 




indicating that they doubted the existence of any significant civil society in 
Singapore, because the relevant organizations were not politically engaged. In one 
case, when I mentioned civil society in Singapore, a young Muslim interfaith activist 
bluntly replied: “What ‘civil society’?”13 The literature, similarly, reflects Singapore as 
a strong state that exercises active management of the public space, based on the 
rhetoric of concern for the tiny country’s economic and political survival. It is widely 
believed that “Singapore does not have that crucial space necessary for free debate 
and discussion” (Singh 2007: 117). Thus citizen groupings are strongly discouraged 
from addressing politics, and broaching a subject that is ‘out of bounds’ may result in 
legal action.  ‘Out of bounds’ refers to topics that are sensitive enough to disrupt 
public peace and order, yet the boundaries are notably ambiguous, and subject to 
interpretation by the long-time ruling People’s Action Party (Lyons 2005: 214). Even 
so, it is clear that the ‘out of bounds’ markers preclude publicly addressing any issues 
that might inflame religious tensions, with their close links to interethnic politics 
(Parliament of Singapore 1990, Tan 2008, Tham 2008b).  
The past decade has seen increasing talk of liberalization in the Singaporean 
public sphere, yet critics argue that these changes are more symbolic than substantive 
(Lee 2005). The term ‘civil society’ is gradually inching its way into public dialog (see 
for example Tham 2008a, Straits Times 2008), but it is still rare and likely to be 
understood as implying risky political engagement. During the pilot interviews, an 
Anglican theology professor advised me that, “’civil society’ sounds like it refers to 
                                                 
13 Informal discussion during ‘Islam and the Arts’ event, held at the Singapore Arab 
Association, organized by the Department of Malay Studies, National University of 




politics,” so it is better to say “community service organizations.”14 If I had continued 
to use the term ‘civil society’ in the Singaporean context, the assumption of political 
engagement would have undermined local understanding of the very conflict 
sensitivity concept that I was seeking to test: namely, that religious associations can 
impact conflict even in the absence of direct political engagement. Thus ‘community 
service organizations’ became my usual terminology in Singapore. 
In the Philippines, ‘civil society’ terminology is more commonly used among 
academics and some activists (e.g. Ferrer 2005b) so the wording of my pilot interview 
questions did not provoke any immediate problem. However, after encountering the 
terminology difficulties in Singapore, I began to inquire also in the Philippines. It 
became clear that local opinions among project participants are very mixed on 
whether the term ‘civil society’ applies to churches and mosques. One participant 
stated a clear yes,15 and another a clear no.16 Four religious leaders indicated that they 
were not clear on the meaning of the term ‘civil society,’17 and one religious 
humanitarian aid worker remarked that the term was most commonly used in the 
faraway capital city of Manila.18 Several participants indicated a revealing link 
between the definition of civil society and an organization’s stance toward politics. 
“If you use a strict definition, the church is part of civil society, but the common 
person does not see it that way” . . . the term ‘civil society’ carries “the idea of battling 
                                                 
14 Prt. S #3, pilot interview by author, Singapore, 9 Apr. 2007. 
15 Prt. MI #57, field notes, Davao City, Philippines, 9 July 2008. (Note: All subsequent 
footnoted references to Davao City, Philippines, are abbreviated as ‘Davao.’) 
16 Prt. MI #2, field notes, Davao, 28 Aug. 2008.  
17 Prt. MI #28, field notes, Davao, 11 Sep. 2008. Prt. MI # 106, field notes, Davao, 17 Sep. 2008. 
Prt. MI #85, field notes, Davao, 17 Sep. 2008. Prt. MI #77, field notes, Davao, 28 Aug. 2008.  




the government.”19 Given this obvious lack of shared meaning, using the term ‘civil 
society’ is not conducive to clear communication in the Mindanao religious sector, 
nor is it conducive to the action research ethic of grounding theoretical concepts in 
the lived experience of participants (Bradbury and Reason 2001: 451).  
In seeking to resolve what constitutes ‘civil society’ as opposed to other types 
of citizen bodies, Muukkonen (2009) points out that attempts at categorization tend to 
become value-laden and culture-bound. Rather than categorizing, Muukkonen 
borrows from Wittgenstein (1953) to advocate the simple recognition that citizen 
bodies which are similar in many, but not all, of their characteristics do share a 
“family resemblance.” The notion of ‘associations’ can be used as a broad term 
encompassing the various concepts (Rossteutscher 2005a) that fall within this family. 
Further, ‘associations’ is sometimes used almost interchangeably with civil society 
(Kaufman 1999, Özerdem and Jacoby 2006, Edwards 2009), yet it is usefully less 
normative and more inclusive. Associational terminology helps to avoid Western-
influenced assumptions such as organizational opposition to the state and participant 
voluntarism. Thus from the pilot phase onward, I used the broader term ‘religious 
associations,’ which I converted in the field to ‘religious organizations.’ 
While I use the term ‘associations’ to refer to the entire family of concepts in 
question, I give more emphasis to some than others. Civil society and social capital 
are at the center of this analysis. Their theoretical influence is expansive, and it is 
pivotal to the debate of the conflict impacts of nPCROs (Putnam 2000, Varshney 
2002). I also draw accordingly on works that address the closely related nonprofit, 
voluntary, nongovernmental or third sector, and social network theory to the extent 
                                                 




that it intersects with the study of social capital in associational life. I give 
significantly less attention to communitarianism (Bellah et al. 1986) and associative 
democracy (Hirst and Bader 2001), as normative expressions of how some influential 
thinkers would like the associational sector to present itself in particular contexts. 
Thus the next section on associational conflict impacts examines the relevant 
literature primarily through the contributions of civil society and social capital 
theorists.   
 
The Nature and Determinants of Associational Conflict Impacts 
Having established several relevant uniquenesses of the Southeast Asia 
region, this section now returns to Putnam, Varshney, and the cluster of other works 
that address the nature and determinants of conflict impacts by associational 
nPCROs in settings of intergroup conflict. This cluster comprises the project’s ‘core 
literature,’ which ranges widely in terms of discipline, methodology, and level of 
influence, but is united by its substantive contribution to the theme in question, and 
its tendency to draw on Putnam and/or Varshney. I define this ‘core’ in terms of 
works rather than authors, focusing primarily on those works that address the theme 
in question, and drawing selectively on other works by the same authors to aid 
interpretation and analysis. I survey the range of arguments within this small and 
emerging body of theory, and then examine these arguments by comparing them to 
the conflict sensitivity theory as an alternative frame for social impact analysis.  
Based on this critique, I identify the central research questions that guide my 




The Centrality of Putnam and Varshney. Robert Putnam (1993, 2000, 2002, 
Putnam and Feldstein 2003) focuses on social capital, positioning it as essential to 
liberal democratic culture and governance, and arguing that its decline is a matter for 
serious concern. Social capital is defined as a cumulative pattern of linkages between 
individuals, i.e. “social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness 
that arise from them" (2000: 19). Putnam often emphasizes social capital as a 
characteristic of a community, which is a departure from the definitions advanced by 
sociologists Bourdieu (1986) and Coleman (1988), who see social capital as the 
capacity of individuals to secure resources within a social network (Portes 1998, see 
also Esser 2008, Weber 2009). Social capital’s emphasis on relational 
interconnectedness distinguishes it from civil society’s more formally defined, 
activity-oriented groups. Social capital is arguably broader than civil society, and 
more likely to include references to workplaces and political parties. Nonetheless 
there is much conceptual overlap, with civil society often implied to produce social 
capital (Putnam 2000).  In earlier years, Putnam was sometimes accused of conflating 
the sources of social capital with its outcomes (Portes 1998), but in more recent work 
he has distanced himself from such circular reasoning (Putnam 2004a: 668).  
The relationship between social capital and identity-based conflict is one of 
several important sub-themes in Putnam’s work, never receiving the primary 
emphasis, but progressing notably from one work to the next. In Bowling Alone (2000), 
a macro-statistical analysis of social capital trends in the USA, Putnam popularized 
the concepts of bridging and bonding social capital, originally credited to Gittell and 
Vidal (1998).  Citizen networks whose membership includes people on both sides of a 




hand, networks whose membership aligns with such social cleavages are said to 
bond members of the same identity group together, which may have an adverse 
exclusionary effect towards outsiders. Social capital interacts with various forms of 
group identity (e.g. race, religion, gender, class), so a given associational activity may 
bridge along some aspects of identity and bond along others. Bowling Alone gives 
particular attention to black-white race relations in the USA, while the organizational 
case studies in Better Together (Putnam and Feldstein 2003) broaden the purview to 
consider other US-based aspects of race, national origin and religion. Democracies in 
Flux (2002) considers the trajectory of social capital in industrial democracies over the 
past fifty years, surfacing a central concern for the unequal distribution of social 
capital resources. Very recently, American Grace (Putnam and Campbell 2010) and The 
Age of Obama (Clark et al. 2010) have included some analysis of social capital in their 
issue-focused analyses of religion in the United States, and race in the United States 
and Britain, respectively.  
Pertinent to bridging and bonding, political scientist Ashutosh Varshney 
(2001, 2002) has developed similar themes in greater focus and depth in his research 
on Hindu-Muslim relations in India. Varshney’s work is less broadly influential than 
Putnam’s, but is seminal due to its conceptual depth and empirical rigor. His 
extensive research effort featured both quantitative and qualitative components, 
structured around innovative paired comparisons between cities/towns that are riot-
prone, and those that are not. In Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life (2002), Varshney 
concludes that civic linkages that are intercommunal (i.e. crossing identity lines to 
include both Hindus and Muslims) are key in withstanding the “exogenous shocks” 




include, but are not limited to, the politically-motivated manipulation of identity by 
politicians and supporting parties.  Informal relational linkages serve this purpose 
effectively in rural areas, but urban contexts requires formal organization in order to 
solidify relationships, and to clearly express a resolve towards unity during times of 
communal tension. Varshney rests this analysis upon a broad concept of civil society, 
which includes the market sector, and avoids Westernized restrictions by including 
associations that are informal, formed on the basis of ascriptive identity and not 
necessarily opposed to the state (2002: 296).  
Importantly, these works of Putnam and Varshney are limited in their 
generalizability across contexts. Putnam’s works on social capital are limited to 
industrial democracies, primarily in the USA and Europe. While he assumes broad 
relevance, he makes no serious claims to universality. Varshney examines riots to the 
exclusion of other forms of conflict and violence, inviting the possibility that 
considering a broader range of conflict behavior might result in different findings.  
More importantly, Varshney acknowledges that intercommunal associational 
linkages may be difficult to form in the absence of pre-existing interaction between 
identity groups. He briefly speculates that his findings may not apply to contexts 
where the civic sphere has long been segregated, such as black-white relations in the 
USA (2001: 393), and even caste conflict within India itself (2002: 300). Varshney 
obviously sees caste conflict as significant, for he concludes that its preeminence is a 
key factor limiting Hindu-Muslim violence in the city of Calicut (2002: 122).  
However, Varshney’s overall work on ethnic conflict tends to de-emphasize caste 
conflict, perhaps because he has reasoned that religious nationalist conflict is a 




responsiveness of caste conflict to Varshney’s intercommunal associational ‘cure’ 
serves to underscore the limitations of Varshney’s argument.  
Despite the fact that Putnam’s and Varshney’s arguments are rooted in 
particular contexts, other authors do make extensive international application of their 
findings, as elaborated in the sections that follow. I, too, make consistent use of their 
terms ‘intercommunal’ (Varshney) and ‘bridging’ (Putnam) to describe associational 
structures that are heterogeneous in relation to the major identity-based cleavages in 
a particular context. While there are other related terms used in the literature, 
‘intercommunal’ and ‘bridging’ are particularly useful because they accurately reflect 
the influence of Varshney and Putnam, and they are relatively self-evident in 
meaning. I minimize use of the terms ‘heterogeneous,’ which lacks a clear reference 
to identity-based social cleavages, and ‘interethnic,’ which can be easily, 
misinterpreted in narrow, racial terms that overlook religion, language, etc. as other 
relevant aspects of identity.  
A Spark for Broader Debate. Varshney and Putnam are known for their 
optimism about the beneficial effects of intercommunal or bridging associational 
forms in divided societies. The possibility of negative effects is not denied, but it is 
consistently de-emphasized. For example, Varshney does acknowledge at the outset 
that not all manifestations of civil society foster peace, since Indian civil society 
includes some politically-linked ethno-religious extremist organizations (2002: x). He 
also briefly mentions that intracommunal engagement, which brings together people 
of the same identity groups, carries the potential to contribute to violence (2002: 12). 
Nonetheless, the rest of the book is devoted to considering the peace-promoting 




Varshney does not consider in any depth the possibility of negative externalities 
created by associations that are otherwise well-intentioned.  
Putnam’s optimism is characteristic, yet it does appear to have been tempered 
somewhat over time. An early work, Making Democracy Work (Putnam 1993), 
“virtually ignores the possibility that social capital might have adverse effects on 
society” (McLean et al. 2002: 7), and is accused of advancing a concept of civil society 
that neglects constructive political conflict (Mouritsen 2003). In the subsequent 
Bowling Alone (2000: 350-366), Putnam did acknowledge the potential exclusionary 
effects of bonding social capital towards outsiders, which he refers to as “the dark 
side of social capital.” However, despite devoting one full chapter to this theme, such 
divisive side-effects receive little attention in the book’s broader argument and 
recommendations. Putnam (2000: 23-4) attributes this gap to a dearth of data capable 
of distinguishing bridging from bonding social capital (a challenge addressed by 
Coffé and Geys 2007), but it is also plausible that Putnam’s urgent concern for re-
invigorating social capital has relegated negative externalities to a lower priority 
concern. Critics of Bowling Alone have argued that the exclusionary aspects of 
bonding social capital are more pernicious than Putnam admits (Leonard 2004), and 
that his analysis of social capital minimizes the need for justice and equality among 
disadvantaged groups (Snyder 2002, Arneil 2006, Hero 2007). Three years later, Better 
Together gave further attention to the exclusionary aspects of bonding social capital, 
and also considered the complexities of building social capital in order to empower 
disadvantaged groups (Putnam and Feldstein 2003: 206-24, 241-68). The authors state: 
“In short, the concept of social capital is not treacly sweet but has a certain tartness” 




Putnam’s subsequent papers (e.g. 2004b, 2007) give little attention to social capital’s 
divisive side effects.  
The optimistic thrust of theorists such as Putnam and Varshney has prompted 
a lively response among other scholars who address the conflict impacts of nPCROs. 
Uvin (1998: 163-79) and Cochrane (2005), writing on civil society in pre-genocide 
Rwanda and in Northern Ireland, respectively, make a major contribution to the 
debate by arguing against excessive optimism. Both argue that in divided societies, 
the associational realm is itself highly divisive, because it reflects the socio-political 
cleavages of the surrounding environment. These particular works are intended as 
context-specific arguments against unbounded optimism, so they do not necessarily 
reflect the tone of the authors’ broader bodies of work. In fact, Uvin’s other writings 
portray a more balanced consideration of the associational potential for both positive 
and negative impact (Uvin 1999a, Unsworth and Uvin 2002, Uvin 2002). Cochrane 
has written in other works of the neutral and even positive contributions of Northern 
Irish PCROs, if not nPCROs, to peacebuilding (Cochrane and Dunn 2002a, Cochrane 
and Dunn 2002b). Nonetheless, those more skeptical works do elaborate an important 
argument, in that they hold out little hope for overcoming exclusionary side-effects in 
deeply divided societies. The problem is not that intercommunal associations are not 
pivotal, but rather that they are unlikely to exist in any significant form, because the 
probability of their existence is a function of the level of identity group polarization 
in the surrounding socio-political context. Interestingly, Varshney might agree with 
this analysis, for deeply polarized societies constitute the exception to his otherwise 




Between the optimistic and the skeptical works there is a cluster of moderate 
works whose position on the nature of conflict impacts might be characterized as: “It 
depends.” Pickering on Bosnia (2006, 2007), and Weisinger and Salipante on the USA 
(2005, 2007), both adopt a positive-leaning stance, in that they emphasize the 
development of bridging social capital to counteract social divisions. These works 
acknowledge the exclusionary side-effects of bonding social capital, but they do not 
consider how to avoid them, focusing instead on the development of social capital of 
a more beneficial form. Among those devoting more attention to negative impacts are 
Jha (2009) on community organizing in India, MacLean (2004) on associational life in 
West Africa, Molenaers (2003, 2005, 2006) on associations and social networks in 
Nicaragua, and Pinchotti and Verwimp (2007) on social capital in Rwanda. All four of 
these works caution against the strong optimism of theorists such as Putnam and 
Varshney. However, rather than simply shifting to a negative stance, they give 
balanced attention to both overcoming exclusionary side-effects and developing 
beneficial ones.  Giving roughly equal attention to the positive and the negative are 
Titeca and Vervisch (2008) on community-based associations in Uganda, and Karner 
and Parker (2008) on social capital among ethno-religious minorities in urban 
Birmingham. Moderate works that position associations as capable of dualistic 
impact are more likely to assess impact at the organizational level, avoiding the 
sector-wide generalizations found in the writings of Varshney (2002), Uvin (1998) and 
Cochrane (2005). 
In this debate on the nature of conflict impacts among nPCROs, the moderate 
works move beyond optimism and skepticism into nuance, demonstrating that 




subject to change.  However, it is the simplified extremes of the argument that garner 
more attention among both academics and practitioners, and generate more 
responses in the ongoing debate. In bibliographic research, the number of citations to 
the optimistic works of Putnam and Varshney effectively dwarf the number of 
references accorded to other authors. Thus the current understanding and usage of 
this body of theory remains somewhat unbalanced, and continues to generalize the 
nature of conflict impacts in ways that overlook the complexity and dynamism of 
associational realm. With this in mind, the following section probes more deeply 
three pivotal questions arising from the current body of theory. I adopt as a critical 
lens the conflict sensitivity approach elaborated in the previous chapter, specifically 
its causation analysis elements, as a unifying meta-theory which has potential to lend 
greater complexity and balance to social impact analysis.  
Determinants of Impact: Structural and Non-Structural. In the debate on the 
conflict impacts of nPCROs, both the optimistic and the skeptical works tend to 
emphasize a single determinant of impact, namely the structure of the association or 
associational sector. The key question is the degree to which membership and 
participation are heterogeneous, or intercommunal, in relation to the major identity-
based social cleavages in a particular setting. For example, Cochrane’s skeptical work 
(2005) acknowledges non-structural psychological factors when he argues that the 
primary driver of mono-communal civil society structure is the prevailing shared 
definition of the concept of “community.” Nevertheless, he positions intercommunal 
structure (or lack thereof) as the most immediate, and therefore the most prominent, 
determinant of associational impact on intergroup relations.  Likewise Putnam in his 




definition of social capital (2000: 19), but he does not link such ‘soft factors’ to his 
exploration of bridging and bonding. Putnam even writes briefly about the 
bridging/bonding distinction in relation to group identify formation, but he positions 
associational structure as cause, and group identity formation as effect (2000: 23), in a 
causal analysis directly criticized by Cote and Erickson (2009: 1665).  
Also leaning toward the optimistic, Varshney’s position on this issue is 
focused on associational structure, yet complex in that he positions associational 
structure as proximate while exploring underlying causes that are less structural in 
nature.  In Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, Varshney includes an analysis of the 
competing “master narratives” that inform Indian identity, shape mass politics, and 
thereby determine the structure of the associational sector. Secular nationalism and 
religious nationalism are particularly influential, with caste concerns also playing a 
localized role (2002: 55-86). Varshney argues that the structure of the associational 
sector was established in the 1920s when Gandhi first mobilized citizens into mass 
politics, an effort shaped by pre-existing patterns of ascriptive identity. Varshney 
describes the origins of those pre-existing cleavages as “political.” In fact, his analysis 
encompasses population demography, politics and economics, yet it leans 
consistently towards the structural, with limited reference to any ‘soft factors’ such as 
culture or psychology (2002: 119-148).  
Secondary analysis notwithstanding, in relation to his argument on civil 
society’s conflict impacts, Varshney consistently places his primary emphasis on 





In this book, I seek to establish an integral link between the structure of civil 
society on one hand and ethnic, or communal, violence on the other. To be 
more precise, the focus is on the intercommunal, not intracommunal, 
networks of civic life, which bring different communities together (2002:3). 
 
The main thrust of his argument follows the structural thread, with nonstructural 
factors positioned as a supporting theme. Importantly, when other authors cite and 
respond to Varshney, they refer overwhelmingly to his findings on intercommunal 
associational structures. His insights on nonstructural determinants of impact are not 
reflected in the broader debate, contributing to imbalance in the literature.   
In contrast, the authors whose works fall into the moderate category tend to 
affirm the importance of intercommunal associational structure, but go well beyond 
it by elaborating other, non-structural determinants of impact.  Molenaers states 
forthrightly that “both attitudes and structures thus form the two main components 
within the social capital debate” (2005: 153), which aligns with the emerging 
consensus in the broader social capital literature (e.g. Adler and Kwon 2002: 23). All 
of the moderate works move in some way beyond the structure and quantity of 
intergroup linkages, and point also to the quality of intergroup linkages. Values and 
norms are emphasized, including tolerance and pluralism (Jha 2009), trust, equality, 
and reciprocity (Molenaers 2005), and cooperation and interdependence (Pickering 
2006). Also important are the characteristics of the participating individuals, with 
Weisinger and Salipante (2005) foregrounding motivation and cross-cultural skills, 
and Jha (2009) highlighting the need for ongoing critical self-reflection by the 
organizers on issues of identity and power.  
Importantly, MacLean (2004: 594) positions organizational functioning as a 




such variables as the association’s size, goals, effectiveness, and decision-making 
processes. In emphasizing the nature of organizational participation, she contrasts 
her own findings with Varshney’s as follows: 
 
While also emphasizing the preventive role of civic networks in mitigating 
communal violence, Varshney highlights the heterogeneity of associational 
membership in stimulating cross-cutting social ties across Hindu and Muslim 
communities. In contrast, this research reveals that a heterogeneous 
membership does not guarantee a growth in cross-group understanding or 
cooperation; instead, it is the parameters of participation encouraged within 
the association and corresponding community political institutions that 
matter most critically. Essentially, while Varshney emphasizes the interaction 
of different identities, this study problematizes the nature of the interaction 
itself (2004: 591). 
 
Further, intercommunality as advocated by Varshney and in the earlier works 
of Putnam  (2000) is primarily a characteristic of horizontal intergroup linkages, but a 
number of the moderate works bring vertical elements into the analysis. Pinchotti 
and Verwimp (2007) draw on Woolcock’s (1998)20 identification of state-society 
relations as a form of social capital to argue that in Rwanda, the bridging networks 
between Hutu and Tutsi were unable to withstand the bonding networks among the 
Hutu, because of the latter’s powerful internal hierarchy. Similarly, MacLean (2004) 
and Molenaers (2005) build on horizontal structural analysis to probe how an 
association and its members are vertically linked into structures of patron-client 
relations at the macro level.  MacLean provides a particularly troubling account of 
intercommunal cocoa producer networks in Côte d'Ivoire which are ethnically 
heterogeneous in horizontal membership, yet nonetheless contribute to ethnic 
                                                 
20 Woolcock (1998) uses the term ‘linking’ to describe vertical social capital, and his 
terminology has been influential. However I avoid the term ‘linking’ in this thesis, due to the 




polarization because they reinforce vertical patronage networks that are built on 
narrow ethnic identities. Titeca and Vervisch (2008) contribute a similar analysis 
focused on the role of ‘gatekeepers’ within community-based organizations in 
Uganda, but they conclude that in-country vertical linkages are not uniformly 
negative; they may positively impact associational operations, intergroup relations 
and democracy if balanced with horizontal forms of social capital.   
Finally, Pickering (2006, 2007) adopts a unique approach to analyzing the 
architecture of intercommunal structures, echoing Granovetter’s (1973) influential 
distinction between “strong” and “weak ties” to argue that social networks that foster 
acquaintance-based weak ties are surprisingly more effective in improving 
intergroup relations than networks that emphasize deeper relationships. Pickering’s 
use of social network theory often gives her works a unique positioning in relation to 
others in this project’s core literature. Associations are not her primary focus, but 
rather one among many possible expressions of social network development. She 
places significant emphasis on individuals as actors, including such elements as 
identity formation and personal choice to benefit personal interests.  
If viewed as a group, the moderate works imply that intercommunal 
associational structure is often a necessary condition for positive impact on 
intergroup relations, but it is rarely sufficient. Despite the fact that the moderates 
consider a broad range of determinants, including non-structural causes, they are still 
limited to considering a limited number of variables in any given analysis, and such 
variables are limited in their generalizability across contexts.  The moderates’ 
contributions remain a fragmented collection of disparate insights, which has thus far 




the crux of the debate away from the structure-centered extremes. As a result, within 
the emerging debate on the conflict impacts of nPCROs, the over-emphasis on 
structure risks distorting the understanding of how associations actually function. 
When applied to policy and practice, this line of reasoning becomes problematic, 
because it leads one to assume that the way to improve associational impact is to 
simply change associational structure.  
The inadequacy of this notion is underscored through comparison to a 
seminal theory emerging from a distinct but related stream of research. Gordon 
Allport’s classic work The Nature of Prejudice (Allport [1954] 1979) speaks to group 
identity formation, and the mindsets that define in- and out-groups, themes also 
addressed by Varshney (2002: 60-72), Putnam (2000: 23), Pickering (2007: 51-74), 
Cochrane (2005) and Jha (2009).  Allport originated the ‘contact hypothesis,’ arguing 
that interpersonal contact between members of estranged ethnic groups could alter 
the mindsets that lead to social conflict in the form of prejudice and discrimination. 
The logic appears structural on its surface, yet Allport painstakingly surveys the non-
structural conditions under which such contact is beneficial in the American context 
of his time, noting that some forms of contact may in fact increase prejudice if not 
wisely designed. His conclusions lack parsimony, but their nuanced complexity rings 
true to the real world:  
 
Prejudice . . .  may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and 
minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly 
enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e. by law, 
custom, or local atmosphere), and provided it is of a sort that leads to the 
perception of common interests and common humanity between members of 





A comparison to conflict sensitivity theory further highlights the inadequacy 
of the search for single determinants of impact within the debate on associational 
conflict impacts.  Conflict sensitivity’s dual emphasis on context analysis and 
organizational project analysis establishes, by definition, a paradigm that embraces 
multiple causes, both structural and non-structural in nature, and prompts an 
examination of the relationships between them. Further, conflict sensitivity does not 
limit the number of variables that an analyst may consider, but instead establishes an 
analysis process that consistently raises the question of which contextual or 
organizational factors most influence impact on intergroup relations in any given 
place and time. Any number of theories on the causes of intergroup conflict may be 
used within this broader analytical frame, making conflict sensitivity a form of meta-
theory.  
It is necessary, then, to move beyond the search for single determinants of 
associational conflict impact.  In this debate, the moderates are no doubt correct in 
identifying both structural and non-structural determinants of impact. Yet there is a 
need to probe more deeply the dynamics of how structural and non-structural 
determinants interrelate with each other, and whether one might predominate in 
influencing the other in a particular place and time.  If one’s goal is to promote 
intercommunal associational structure, does one begin by directly manipulating the 
structure itself, or by addressing the non-structural factors which shape that structure 
and give it power?  Do group identity mindsets determine associational structure, or 
does associational structure influence group identity?  A more nuanced 
understanding of these dynamics is required if theory is to become sound enough to 




Determinants of Impact: Context and Agency.  Implicit in these deliberations 
on the determents of associational conflict impacts lays the question of how much 
power associational actors have to shape their own social impact.  This debate 
follows similar contours as the above-described distinction between optimism and 
skepticism. However opinions are more tempered, as even the optimists 
acknowledge the challenges associated with achieving associational 
intercommunality in highly polarized contexts. To a certain extent, this debate 
addresses the distinction between micro- and macro-level influences, and the 
interaction between them (Woolcock 1998, Szreter and Woolcock 2004). Thus works 
that emphasize associational determinants of impact are likely to analyze micro-level 
organizational case studies, while those who emphasize the surrounding social 
context often examine macro-level politics.  This breadth of perspective is welcome in 
social conflict analysis, a field which often overlooks the micro-foundations of macro-
level conflict (Varshney 2003, Verwimp et al. 2009, Justino 2009). However, at a more 
fundamental level, this debate is about context and agency. The key question is 
whether an association can have the internal intentionality and capacity to chart its 
own intercommunal course, or inevitably conforms to external pressures to mirror 
local socio-political cleavages.  
Among the optimists, Putnam’s early work in Bowling Alone (2000) appears 
confident about the formation of effective intercommunal associational structures, 
and he therefore gives very little attention to the conditions required to bring such 
progressive organizations into being. His substantive policy recommendations on the 
development of social capital imply an assumption that human agency can influence 




structures, Bowling Alone acknowledges only that “to build bridging social capital 
requires that we transcend our social and political and professional identities to 
connect with people unlike ourselves” (2000: 411)  However, in the subsequent Better 
Together, Putnam’s confidence appears somewhat tempered, as he points out that 
bridging social capital is harder to develop, and therefore requires special attention. 
He establishes the development of bridging social capital as one of the book’s loose 
themes, concluding that promising practices include an intentional focus on 
secondary identity elements that bond, and a focus on arts and story-telling (Putnam 
and Feldstein 2003: 280-3). In the end, Putnam implies that developing 
intercommunal associational structures is possible, but it is not easy.  
Similarly, Varshney’s emphasis on the positive impacts of intercommunal 
linkages implies confidence in the power of associational agency. Nonetheless his 
views are more nuanced than they initially appear, and his confidence is perhaps 
even more tempered than Putnam’s. Secondary to his immediate emphasis on 
associational structure, Varshney also explores the ways in which contextual political 
dynamics shape identity group cleavages, and states that where such cleavages run 
deeper, intercommunal associations are more difficult to form (2002: 17). He 
describes a feedback loop in which associational structure and political structure 
mutually influence each other. For example, he concludes his paired comparison of 
Calicut and Aligargh by stating that: “Civic life and electoral politics have fed into 
each other in both cities, in a violent direction in Aligargh, and toward peace in 
Calicut” (2002: 150). Further, Varshney’s distinction between contexts that are 
moderately polarized and contexts that have been deeply polarized over the long 




influence of contextual pressures. In these ways, Varshney interrogates his own 
implied belief in associational agency, but then comes full circle to affirm it, stating 
that “small acts of human agency have a role of their own in the creation of 
integrative civic links” (2002: 295). 
In contrast, the more skeptical works of Cochrane (2005) and Uvin (1998: 161-
79) firmly position the surrounding socio-political context as the determining factor, 
arguing that a divided society will almost automatically produce a divisive 
associational realm. In this view, the associational sector is a product of its own 
environment, mirroring local socio-political cleavages, and then forming 
monocommunal structures that in turn further reinforce such cleavages.  Cochrane 
describes a Northern Ireland in which civil society development within the 
Nationalist (predominantly Catholic) community arose to meet needs neglected by 
the UK state, with which the community was in conflict. Civil society later expanded 
in the Unionist (predominantly Protestant) community, but along a structurally 
separate path, such that “in political, social and cultural terms, there are two 
communities rather than one” (Cochrane 2005: 52). Civil society actors work to serve 
‘the community,’ but the implicit definition of community is a narrow one, including 
only the members of one’s own identity group. Cochrane briefly acknowledges some 
factors that make some associations more prone to contextual pressures than others 
(e.g. micro-level community orientation, state funding, membership or staff 
containing paramilitary veterans) (2005: 53), but he does not consider any conditions 
that might enable associations to transcend divisive social pressures.  
Similarly, Uvin describes how Rwanda’s Hutu-Tutsi divisions and systemic 




the years preceding the genocide. Uvin does allow that NGOs might “promote 
pluralism and tolerance” if they intentionally seek to do so, and are granted sufficient 
“political space” by the government, but these conditions did not obtain in pre-
genocide Rwanda (1998: 168). A few NGOs did begin to challenge political space 
constraints shortly before the genocide, but these efforts proved too little, too late 
(1998: 176). Importantly, neither Cochrane nor Uvin claim that intercommunal 
associational forms are impossible, but they do imply that the key variable in 
determining this possibility is the degree of polarization in the surrounding socio-
political context. The sobering implication is that the societies with the greatest need 
for intercommunal associational links are the least likely to have them, regardless of 
the efforts of associational actors.   
Again, the moderate works occupy a sort of middle ground in this debate. 
Several acknowledge the considerable challenges to forming intercommunal 
associational structures in polarized contexts, yet they do not rule out agency. Titeca 
and Vervisch analyze case studies that include subtle examples of agency, yet they 
ultimately lean towards the power of context, pointing out that “the larger context in 
which CBOs operate has a profound impact on their internal dynamics. This stands 
in stark contrast with much of the reasoning of the social capital literature, which 
seems to assume that CBOs operate within a vacuum” (2008: 2217). Further, a 
subsequent article by Vervisch and Titeca (2010) links the power of context directly to 
the difficulties of developing bridging social capital. Pinchotti and Verwimp lament 
the polarizing influence of vertical Hutu networks in Rwanda as a “co-optation” of 
social capital (2007: 13), but they do not claim this to be a generalizable trend. 




ethnic, but they were also connected at the macro level to extreme nationalist parties 
which actively worked against local efforts at inclusion (2006: 84). MacLean (2004, see 
also 2010) highlights the ways in which local associations in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire 
both reflect and reinforce broader patterns of state-society relations. Even so, both 
Pickering and MacLean seek to identify the characteristics that position associations 
for intercommunal linkage, implying a clear belief in the possibility of organizational 
agency.  
In other moderate core works, after acknowledging the challenges of 
contextual pressures, the authors go on to explicitly argue that agency can make a 
difference under certain conditions. They examine in detail the nature of those 
conditions required for associations to transcend the divisions in the surrounding 
socio-political context, or to overcome homophily, and how those conditions might 
be achieved. Weisinger and Salipante find that intercommunal structure alone may 
not be sufficient to improve and sustain intergroup relationships if the participants 
lack motivation and ability, or “cross-cultural competence and shared destiny 
experiences” (2005: 45), so they recommend interim skill building based on 
monocommunal cells, linked together in a diverse federation (see also Putnam and 
Feldstein 2003: 275-9). In their focus on individual motivation and ability, Weisinger 
and Salipante clearly imply an emphasis on change, particularly individual change as 
a prerequisite to change the organizational level. ‘Motivation’ implies intentionality 
of purpose in bridging intergroup divisions, and ‘ability’ comprises the capacity of an 
individual or organization to bring this to pass. Jha argues not only for enhancing the 
intentionality and capacity of associational actors through contextual awareness 




identify and support peace-promoting agents of change among members of the local 
community (2009: 314).   
The context-agency debate is not limited to this project’s core literature on the 
conflict impacts of nPCROs, but rather it is an important theme of the broader 
literature on democratization and associations.  Fennema and Tillie assert the power 
of context, stating that "civic engagement is not in itself democratic but within 
democratic governance it tends to become so" (2005: 223).  Similarly Rossteutscher 
(2002) and Korkut (2005) position association as a reflection of the surrounding 
political culture, rather than being one of its sources.  In contrast, Wollebaek and Per 
Selle (2005: 197) maintain that even in the face of contextual pressures, voluntary 
organizations retain some capacity to catalyze social change. Similarly Bellah et al. 
focus their seminal analysis on nonstructural factors such as human culture and 
mores, in order to illuminate the possibility of agency and change:  
It makes sense to study the mores not because they are powerful - in the short 
run, at least, power belongs to the political and economic structures - but for 
two other reasons. A study of the mores gives us insight into the state of 
society, its coherence, and its long-term viability. Secondly, it is in the sphere 
of the mores, and the climates of opinion they express, that we are apt to 
discern incipient changes of vision - those new flights of the social 
imagination that may indicate where society is heading (1986: 275). 
 
These literary debates reveal that the context-agency debate is too often 
framed in unnecessarily dichotomous terms. Conflict sensitivity theory is helpful in 
this regard, because its emphasis on multiple causality implies that impact is not 
usually caused by either one variable or the other, but by complex combinations of 
variables in a given place and time. Specifically, conflict sensitivity insists on a two-




context), and the characteristics and activities of associational actors (pointing to 
agency). Neither context nor agency alone can cause impact; rather, impact is caused 
by the dynamic interaction between the two forces.  Nonetheless, the role of 
associational factors is foregrounded because the conflict sensitivity paradigm is 
designed for their use, to inform their planning and their actions.  
The context-agency debate can be further informed by comparing certain 
constructivist views of ethnicity with essentialism and instrumentalism. 
Constructivist theories posit the engagement of human society in defining the 
meaning of ethnic categories and the boundaries and interactions between them. 
While some constructivist approaches emphasize the role of external powers such as 
colonial rulers, other varieties position the role of ethnic group members themselves 
as equally central in shaping identity (e.g. Barth 1969). As Karner (2007: 22) points 
out, the latter approach emphasizes agency and change among common people. Such 
approaches are also compatible with social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986), 
which views group categorization as a necessary cognitive process that people use in 
order to position themselves in a complex world. The potential for conflict arises 
when the mental act of categorizing produces bias toward out-groups. Further, if 
dissatisfied with the self-image provide by one’s in-group, a person may seek to join 
a different group, or to “make their existing group more positively distinct” (Tajfel 
and Turner 1986: 16) through social competition.  
On the other hand, essentialism holds that ascribed identity is either defined 
or experienced as primordial and unchanging (a view often attributed to Geertz 1973, 
van den Berghe 1979). Instrumentalism foregrounds the use or manipulation of 




Both essentialism and instrumentalism position the power to shape ethnic identity as 
lying within the context, but beyond the reach the ethnic group members themselves. 
Though essentialism is currently out of vogue, each of these theoretical positions can 
hold complementary explanatory value in addressing different aspects of ethnicity 
and intergroup relations (Varshney 2002: 27-39, Karner 2007: 23). Without limiting 
myself to one position, I would argue that the adoption of a constructivist lens 
emphasizing the agency of common people holds significant potential for enriching 
the theoretical content of the core literature on the conflict impacts of nPCROs.  
Unfortunately, within this core literature, the tension between context and 
agency remains largely implicit.  While many researchers wrestle indirectly with 
these issues in their analysis of a particular associational sector, the unintentional 
nature of such impacts appears to prevent most authors from raising the question 
explicitly. Only Varshney explicitly analyzes, albeit briefly, the question of agency in 
a way that hints at broader theoretical implications (2002: 295).  It is necessary to 
probe more deeply the interaction between associational agency and divisive 
pressures in the surrounding social context, and to consider the conditions under 
which an association might successfully transcend homophily to become an 
influential agent of change and unity.  
Determinants of Impact: The Role of Religion. Among the non-structural 
factors de-emphasized in the emergent literature on the conflict impacts of nPCROs, 
there is a notable lack of attention to the religious themes so prominent in Southeast 
Asia, particularly the intangible aspects of religion. In approaching religious themes, 
the previous distinction between optimistic, skeptical and moderate positions no 




literature varies along a spectrum, with only one work (Karner and Parker 2008) 
addressing religious intangibles in a direct and substantive manner.   
Beginning where religion is de-emphasized, Molenaers on Nicaragua (2005) 
and Pinchotti and Verwimp on Rwanda (2007) do not mention religion as having any 
contemporary relevance to conflict dynamics in the contexts they study.  Conflict 
sensitivity theory challenges such notions by urging a deep context-based analysis of 
the factors affecting intergroup relations in a particular place and time. Indeed, other 
analyses of the Rwandan context in particular surface the prominent role of the 
Catholic Church in local civil society and in the dynamics of genocide (Uvin 1998, 
Colletta and Cullen 2000, Katongole 2005, Longman 2009).  
Among the core works giving more consideration to religion, Uvin (1998: 163-
79), Cochrane (2005), MacLean (2004), Weisinger and Salipante (2005) all mention 
Christian churches as having significant influence on intergroup relations in the 
contexts that they study. However, their accounts address primarily the institutional 
aspects of churches, and do not consider the intangible beliefs, values and behaviors 
that such churches foster (Wood 1999). For example, Uvin positions the Catholic 
church as the largest non-state actor in Rwandan (Uvin 1998: 166), and describes how 
it failed to transcend the socio-political cleavages leading to genocide. He elaborates 
this by focusing on the church’s ethnicized staffing patterns and faltering peace 
advocacy efforts (Uvin 1998: 173). However the psychological analysis found in 
Uvin’s other works on Rwandan violence (Uvin 1997, Uvin 1999b) is not extended to 
the realm of religion, and he makes no mention of how religious teachings addressed, 
or failed to address, the growing ethnic divide. Importantly, all of these works lean 




churches as a source of identity reinforcement or bonding social capital within a 
particular identity group. Nevertheless, Cochrane does credit churches with 
advocating for peace processes in the form of Northern Ireland’s Good Friday 
Agreement (2005: 55).  
Several of the core works give useful attention to religious intangibles, but 
with only limited linkage to questions of associational conflict impact. For example, 
Pickering (2007: 144-5) considers briefly the divisive rhetoric being taught by the 
Serbian Orthodox Church to have significant influence on majority Serbs, but she 
does not relate this directly to her primary minority-focused analysis or her 
consideration of associational life. Jha (2009) laments the expansion of Hindu 
nationalist ideologies in India, but does not explicitly consider how religious beliefs 
affect the efforts of community organizers to develop plurality in public space. Titeca 
and Vervisch foreground religious actors in two of their three case studies and, while 
they do offer the important conclusion that the “religious role acts as a strong basis of 
power and legitimacy” (2008: 2217) reinforcing unequal distributions of power within 
associations, they do not comment on how such power dynamics influence 
associational intercommunality.  
Perhaps most surprising is that Varshney, while addressing both religion’s 
institutional and its intangible aspects, positions their influence on associational 
structure and conflict impact as far from central. This is striking given his focus on 
Indian sub-groups that are identified primarily in religious terms, i.e. ‘Hindus’ and 
‘Muslims.’ Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life (2002) positions political discourse, not 
religiously-influenced thought, as the key factor shaping associational structure and 




underlay socio-political cleavages, he assigns religion a very minimal role in shaping 
Hindu and Muslim identities. He describes Hindu nationalism as “religious 
nationalism, not religious fundamentalism” (2002: 70).  In other works on the sub-
continental region, Varshney similarly treats religion-based “master narratives” as 
less influential than their politically-defined counterparts (Herwitz and Varshney 
2008: 68), and religious identities as ascriptive (Varshney 1991, Varshney 1993b, 
Varshney 1993a). Varshney does acknowledge that “religious and ethnic associations 
combine ascription and choice” (2002: 42), yet he chooses to emphasize the ascriptive 
aspects, positioning religion primarily as an identity maker, rather than a source of 
relevant public values.  
Varshney appears to lean toward the normative, seeing the idealized Indian 
public sphere as secular in keeping with the Indian constitution, and perhaps 
implicitly in contrast to the religiously-oriented ideology of Hindu nationalism 
(Stuligross and Varshney 2002). Yet Varshney’s own work contains numerous 
indications of important religious influences on politics and associational life. He 
acknowledges that Indian Islam (2002: 67, 134) and Hinduism (2002: 70) contain 
various differing sub-strains, motivating religious leaders and believers towards very 
different political stances.  He describes how Mahatma Gandhi once attempted to use 
a religious interfaith approach to mobilize Indians for nonviolent resistance, and how 
this effort later backfired, leading to Hindu-Muslim violence (2002: 134-5). Varshney 
states repeatedly that aggressive proselytism was an important feature of intergroup 
conflict in some of his city-based case studies (2002: 5, 7).  Further, events ‘on the 
ground’ show that serious violence is not limited to Hindus and Muslims; violence 




conflict (Sengupta 2008). Thus it is questionable whether religion should be 
overlooked as an influential force within Indian ethno-politics. 
Varshney’s de-emphasis of religion does not extend throughout his entire 
body of work, as evidenced by an article (2003) on the micro-foundations of identity-
based nationalistic conflict. In that writing, Varshney argues that the willingness of 
individuals to incur the risk and costs of joining nationalistic resistance movements 
cannot be explained on the basis of rational choice alone unless, drawing on Weber 
(1978), rationality is conceived to include both instrumentality and values-driven 
behavior. He positions religion as the traditional source of human ideas about right 
and wrong, with culture substituting this role in agnostic families or societies.  This 
article succeeds Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life (2002), so the reader might posit a 
progression of thought, with the article analyzing the microfoundations of the 
broader civil society patterns described in the book. However, Varshney himself 
draws no explicit connection between the two concepts. Further, Varshney’s most 
recent publications on collective violence in Indonesia (Varshney et al. 2004, 
Varshney 2008, Varshney 2010) evidence a return to a macro-statistical approach that 
positions religion primarily as an identity marker. Christian-Muslim violence is noted 
as a primary pattern, but there is no consideration of the religious content of the 
conflict, other than brief references to the changing relationship between the 
government and the institutions of Islam. 
Putnam, too, has downplayed until very recently the influence of religion in 
relation to intergroup bridging and bonding. Bowling Alone analyzed the American 
context as a highly religious one, stating that "America is one of the most religiously 




communities in which people worship together are arguably the single most 
important repository of social capital in America" (2000: 68). Putnam does highlight 
an important duality in the impact of American churches, positioning churches as 
major contributors to social movements that advanced intergroup equality (2000: 408-
10), yet also claiming that “proselytizing religions are better at creating bonding 
social capital than bridging social capital” (2000: 410). Nonetheless Smidt (2003) 
criticized Bowling Alone specifically for its lack of depth on religious matters. Not 
until 2010 did Putnam further explore religion’s dualistic potential in American Grace, 
positioning faith as a factor that can bond across troublesome ethnic divides, yet 
evidences increasing polarization between the religious and the secularly inclined. In 
this work, Putnam acknowledges both the institutional and intangible aspects of 
religion’s relationship to politics, describing in detail how church sermons influence 
values on public policy issues, and how church members self-select into certain 
congregations on the basis of such values such that their internal discussion becomes 
a self-reinforcing “echo chamber” (Putnam and Campbell 2010: 419-42). 
Among this project’s core literature, Karner and Parker stand out as focusing 
on religion in a particularly direct and substantive manner. Studying social capital in 
a predominantly Muslim community in the U.K. they conclude that “religiously 
grounded social capital” (2008: 519) is a defining feature of local society. Religion 
plays a pivotal role in both facilitating the development of social networks, which can 
be considered an institutional function, and in providing motivation and meaning for 
community activists, a clear example of religion’s intangibles. Though not exclusively 
focused on intercommunal engagement, bridging is clearly in view, between Muslim 




and Christian immigrants. The work of Karner and Parker is linked to an increasing 
focus in the literature on social capital among migrants (Sanders 2002, Putnam 2009, 
Coole 2009), some of which draws attention to the resulting increase in religious 
diversity in Europe and the USA (Furbey et al. 2006, Allen 2010). Even so, the faith 
focus remains relatively rare, so Karner and Parker position their religiously-oriented 
findings as an exception within the field of social capital and community cohesion, 
calling for increased research to reflect the contemporary importance of such themes 
(2008: 520). 
Importantly, the significant ‘religion gap’ seen in this project’s core literature 
is not necessarily representative of the broader literature on associations and 
democratization. In that literature, the treatment of religion has been inconsistent due 
to the influence of secularization theory (Durkheim 1915, Weber 1930). Despite 
evidence in Western European history that early civil society concepts were informed 
by religion (Trentmann 2004, Weber 2009, Muukkonen 2009), civil society’s twentieth 
century return to prominence was linked solidly to the liberal democratic paradigm 
with its secularist assumptions. Religion was normatively understood as a private 
matter, with its influence removed not only from the state, but from the other public 
spheres of market and associational sector (Marty 1997). The resulting neglect of 
religion has led Muukkonen to claim that "the relation of civil society to religions is 
almost terra incognita in civil society studies" (2009: 689).  
Even where the omission of religion has not been complete, theory has been 
irresolute. In some cases the inclusion of religious institutions has been conditional, 
as seen in the reasoning of Sirat and Abdullah (2008) that urban mosques in Malaysia 




society, only when they practice inclusion and provide a broad platform for civic 
engagement that reaches beyond their own members. Other scholars have appeared 
to waver. For example, Salamon and Anheier at one point (1995: 14-15) included 
religious service organizations, but excluded communities of worship, in their 
analysis of the nonprofit sector. Three years later (Anheier and Salamon 1998), 
religion in both forms was squarely included in their analysis; churches are also 
present in the more recent work of Anheier (2005). Clarke excludes religious groups 
from his definition of NGOs in the Philippines (1998: 3), but later goes on to 
emphasize the strong influence of religion in the NGO sector (1998: 193-4).  
Despite such inconsistencies, there are authors who do not hesitate to 
recognize religious associations in contexts where faith plays an important role in 
public life (Wuthnow 1999, Özerdem and Jacoby 2006, Hasan et al. 2008, Martin 2008, 
Jeong 2010). Significantly, there is an increasing number of works that explicitly 
interrogate the scholarly marginalization of religion, and argue for the consideration 
of religion in associational studies.  Some of these works come from fields pertaining 
to religious studies (Simpson 2002, Smidt 2003, Fergusson 2004, Biggar and Hogan 
2009). Yet similar arguments are also emerging from within the social and policy 
sciences, intentionally including religion in relation to civil society (Juergensmeyer 
2005, James 2007a, Bush 2007, Dinham 2009, Dinham et al. 2009), social capital 
(Candland 2001, Furbey et al. 2006, Maloney and Rossteutscher 2007, Magee 2008) 
and voluntary associations (de Hart and Dekker 2005). Helen James (2007b: 3) sees 
this change as affecting not only the positioning of religion, but also the other non-
Western associational forms discussed earlier in this chapter: “Increasingly, the 




groups, communities of interest derived from ethnicity or shared religious cultures 
are seen to have valid roles in constituting ‘civil society.’” 
This increasing attention to religion also includes a growing consideration of 
religious culture.  Some studies encompass both the institutional and intangible 
aspects of religion. For example, Lockhart (2005), writing on community-based 
poverty reduction programs in America, concludes that faith-based programs 
contribute to social capital in distinctive ways through both their church-structured 
support for social linkages, and their use of religious values to emphasize 
relationship and bridge divisions of race and class. Others writing on such themes 
de-emphasize institutional aspects to focus directly on religion’s culture. Wood, 
writing on faith-based political organizing in impoverished American communities, 
positions cultural strategy as neglected but central, arguing that "religious culture 
matters because it is taken seriously by large numbers of people - and thus orients 
their lives either toward or away from political engagement and the habits of the 
heart than can sustain it" (1999: 329, see also Wood 2002). A classic Filipino example 
of this phenomenon is Ileto’s identification of the pasyon, or localized versions of 
Roman Catholic Holy Week readings and rituals, as a key source of ideas fueling 
nineteenth century revolutionary movements (1979). Importantly, Candland (2001: 
129) and Blanchard et al. (2008) remark that researchers’ neglect of religion has been 
particularly notable in the area of religious beliefs and motivations. Wood’s use of the 
term ‘religious culture’ is fitting, if culture is taken to refer to the learned, shared 
patterns of beliefs, values and behaviors within a particular group (Bennett 1998: 3), 
including those interactively defined elements of “group style” that influence social 




Looking beyond the writings on democratization and associations, there is 
also a substantial cluster of works that explore the interaction of religion and conflict, 
with little or no direct reference to the associational sector. A number of influential 
works probe the relationships between religion and violence (Juergensmeyer 2000, 
Wellman Jr. 2007b), and argue for greater recognition of the importance of religion in 
international affairs, including policy formation and diplomacy, particularly on the 
part of the USA (Johnston and Sampson 1994, Huntington 1996, Johnston 2003, Seiple 
and Hoover 2004, Fox and Sandler 2004). Other works probe the subtleties of how 
different religious expressions influence believers’ views on intergroup relations 
(Bradley 2009, Yukich 2010) and on politics (Funk 2007, Wald et al. 2005, Brown 
2009). Scholar-practitioners writing from within the major world religions have 
identified numerous concepts and values within those traditions that support 
peacebuilding (for example, on Islam Abu-Nimer 2003, on Christianity Lederach 
1999, on Buddhism Thich Nhat Hanh 2003, on Judaism Gopin 2004).  
Perhaps most relevant to the current inquiry are writings that explore the 
dualistic potential of religion as force for either violence or peace, and the factors that 
make a difference in determining religion’s impact. Appleby (2000) calls religion 
“ambivalent,” arguing that both violence and peacemaking are equally valid 
expressions, from a religious standpoint, of how people respond to the sacred, and 
that all world religions are subject to internal contestation among their adherents. 
Other authors cast religion’s dualistic potential in a more normative light, framing 
positive impact on intergroup relations as an expression of religion’s highest 
potential (e.g. Cox and Ikeda 2009), and negative impact as a result of religion’s 




(1996) and Katongole (2005) propose that a pivotal determinant of impact in settings 
of identity-based conflict is Christianity’s influence, or lack thereof, over how people 
perceive their own identity and the identities of others. Importantly, both Volf and 
Katongole are claiming a religious influence that has not necessarily been tested and 
proven to the satisfaction of social science. Glock (2009), for example, states that 
sociologists of religion have yet to determine the generalizable role of religion in 
influencing prejudice. Nonetheless, this literature from the field of religious studies 
does speak directly to the issue of unintended social impacts among religious 
associations.  
Unfortunately, the associational and religious literatures run parallel to each 
other, with the linkages being inconsistent at best, and lacking particularly within 
this project’s core literature on the conflict impacts of nPCROs. Following the urging 
of conflict sensitivity theory to examine the local context on its own terms, and 
returning to the Southeast Asian dynamics explored earlier in this chapter, it becomes 
clear that the conceptual separation of religion from the associational sector is 
particularly inadequate when applied to this socio-cultural region. The role of 
Southeast Asian religion is neither private nor apolitical, and it cannot be well 
understood using theoretical models that keep matters of faith artificially separated 
from the functioning of the associational sector. Indeed, "in social contexts steeped in 
religious faith and practice - and the global trend in this regard is up, not down - 
social theory can only illuminate democratic life if it understands the complex 





Conclusion: Emergent Research Questions and Directions 
The small, emergent body of theory on the peace and conflict impacts of 
nPCROs tends to generalize the nature and determinants of social impact in ways 
that overlook the complexity and dynamism of the associational sector. In this 
literary sub-cluster, the current state of knowledge stands in contrast to the axiom 
widely accredited to action research pioneer Kurt Lewin: “Nothing is as practical as a 
good theory” (Greenwood and Levin 2007: 18, see also Maibach and Parrott 1995: 
vii). Generalizable theory is essential, yet generalizations are of questionable value 
when they logically lead to poor decision making in policy and practice. Following 
the optimistic works of Putnam and Varshney contributes to the assumption that 
intercommunal associational structure is a cure for all identity-based social conflict, 
and that associations should simply be ‘made intercommunal’ regardless of other 
variables. Following the skeptical path evident in certain works of Uvin and 
Cochrane, leads to overlooking the possibility of positive impact, and to inaction 
within the associational sector. Further, there is nothing in this theoretical sub-cluster 
that creates space for understanding the political importance of public religion in a 
context such as Southeast Asia.  
The current study aims to contribute to the development of theory that is 
sound enough to be applicable in policy and practice. In considering the 
determinants of conflict impact among nPCROs, the current theoretical 
generalizations need to be probed for accuracy, and for enhanced understanding of 
the conditions under which they are applicable, or even potentially changeable. Thus 




religious actors in Southeast Asia can be further examined to inform associational 
theory in accordance with three key questions. First, are the conflict impacts of 
associational activity attributable to structural or non-structural determinants? What 
is the relationship between the two? Second, does the socio-political context shape 
the association, or can the association influence its context? What conditions, if any, 
might allow an association to transcend divisive social pressures in order to become 
an agent of unity? Third, among the potential non-structural factors, what is the role 
of religion in shaping an association’s social impact? These three research questions 
are closely interrelated, because the literature’s marginalization of religion reflects the 
overall emphasis on structural determinants of impact, and contributes to 
overlooking those cultural aspects of religion which shape individuals as bearers of 
group identity and potential agents of change.  
Further, these research questions both reflect and inform the use of the 
conflict sensitivity paradigm as a meta-theory for approaching applicable social 
impact analysis. Conflict sensitivity theory was developed through the grounded 
experience of practitioners, yet its approach to causation supports a much improved 
understanding of the complexities of the associational sector.  Conflict sensitivity 
theory embraces the dualistic potential of associational social impacts, and embraces 
multiple causation, recognizing both tangible and intangible factors, holding context 
in tension with agency, and examining the fluid interaction between those forces. In 
epistemological terms, conflict sensitivity theory is very compatible with the critical 
realist paradigm, which eschews constant conjunction between variables, and aims 
instead to identify causal mechanisms, along with the contextual conditions and 




events is not fixed and “the same mechanism can produce different outcomes 
according to context” (Sayer 2000: 15). These ‘mechanisms’ may represent human 
activities and interventions, thus suggesting an actor-centered approach, and 







METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN  
 
For the scientific method can teach us nothing beyond how facts are related to, 
and conditioned by, each other…Yet it is equally clear that knowledge of what 
is does not open the door directly to what should be… 
- Albert Einstein ([1954] 1994: 45) 
 
An action research approach is particularly appropriate for the practitioner-
centered task of exploring the applicability of conflict sensitivity in the religious 
sector. I argued in Chapter One that true action research is distinct from the more 
common positivist, interpretivist and emancipatory approaches, requiring the 
articulation of a unique epistemology (de Cock 1994, Schön 1995, Chaudhary 1997). 
Action research epistemology affirms the inseparability of thought and action (de 
Cock 1994, Greenwood and Levin 2007: 18), and the compatibility of facts with 
future-oriented values (Blum 1955: 310, Susman and Evered 1978: 328). The process is 
emergent and multiphase in nature, built around cycles of data gathering, reflection 
and action, with the intention of periodically questioning one’s underlying 
conceptual assumptions as the research progresses (Aguinis 1993: 361, Stringer 1999: 
17-20). Finally, action research is eclectic, drawing on a wide variety of disciplines, 
and accepting both qualitative and quantitative methods, in hopes of rendering a 
holistic picture of reality.   
Given such a departure from tradition, this chapter requires significant detail 
to put forth the action research methodology that was used to test conflict sensitivity 
in partnership with religious associations in Mindanao and Singapore between 2007 
and 2009. In both sites, I provided DNH training to religious actors, encouraged 




participatory analysis workshops, surveys, semi-structured interviews, and 
participant observation, followed by analysis through modified forms of coding. In 
addition to informing an assessment of conflict sensitivity’s applicability in the 
religious sector, these same data are used to inform associational theory on the 
conflict impacts of nPCROs, organizations whose primary aims focus on areas other 
than peace and conflict resolution. 
In this chapter, I first discuss the particular type of action research 
methodology used in this project, along with criteria for assessing its validity. I then 
narrate the data collection and analysis processes undertaken in the field, beginning 
with the pilot phase and site selection, and continuing to the data collection efforts in 
Mindanao and Singapore. Throughout the chapter, conceptual concerns are linked to 
practitioner action, because both are central to the significance of the findings. I write 
in the first person where appropriate to disclose the interventionist nature of the 
research effort (Fisher and Phelps 2006).  The focus here is on methodology, yet 
selected findings are previewed where necessary to describe the rationale for the 
decisions shaping subsequent action research cycles (Dick 2000). 
 
‘Collaborative Action Research’ and its Validity 
At the outset, it must be stated that my action research effort encompassed 
two closely interrelated projects. I have intentionally distinguished between the 
thesis project and the practitioner project (Zuber-Skerritt and Perry 2002, Davis 2004). 
The two projects had different outcomes, with the thesis project aiming at academic 




developing tools for other religious practitioners. Both projects shared the same 
research questions on the applicability of conflict sensitivity (Chapter  
Two), but only the thesis project built on this to consider theoretical applications on 
the nature of religious associations in Southeast Asia (Chapter Three).  
Action Research as ‘Collaborative.’ The literature reveals a complex debate 
around how action research should be named and practiced. I would argue with 
Greenwood and Levin (2007: 13-34) that the fundamental distinction arises from the 
differences between the Northern Action Research tradition and the Southern 
Participatory Action Research tradition. Northern Action Research evolved out of the 
twentieth century’s industrial democracy movement, as influenced by Kurt Lewin 
(1946).  The Northern approach centered around management-led problem solving, 
including theories of organizational change, as typified by ‘action science’ (Argyris et 
al. 1985) and ‘organizational learning’ (Argyris and Schön 1996). In contrast, Southern 
Participatory Action Research has used community-based research with the 
emancipatory aim of changing socio-political power structures (Tandon 2005: 222). 
The 1970s brought Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed ([1970] 1990), plus other 
social experiments in Latin America and India. Subsequent developments included 
the launch of the International Council for Adult Education, and the uptake of 
participatory practice by development actors. In sum, the key word describing the 
Northern tradition is ‘action,’ while the key word for its Southern counterpart is 
‘participatory’ (Fals Borda 2001).  
In the early 1990s, the Northern and Southern traditions began to cross-
fertilize, leading to an enriching interpenetration of concepts, but not to definitional 




institutions, whereas Southern writers use to term to point to a broader level of socio-
political liberation (Bray et al. 2000). In some cases, Northern writers use 
participatory language but feature content that is only minimally participatory by 
Southern standards (for example Whyte 1991). Thus questions of participation 
remain fundamental in determining the nature of any action research effort. Brown 
(2005) argues that both Northern and Southern action research are legitimately 
useful, and that researchers should select between them in light of the research 
context.  
Extending Brown’s logic, I clarify the nature of my action research project by 
examining the purpose and level of participation. In the thesis project participation is 
primarily a means to an end, but in the practitioner project participation becomes an 
end in itself. Robust participation implies participation in all research phases, from 
conceptualization of the research through dissemination (McTaggart 1997: 28, 
Tandon 1988), but my study began with limited participation during the conceptual 
stage. Adopting Herr and Anderson’s “continuum of positionality” (2005: 31), I have 
continually shifted the locus of decision-making as the project progressed, from 
shifting along the spectrum towards shared control, and in certain instances insider-
control. Thus in order to highlight my priority on participation, but without 
undermining the Southern tradition through overuse of the term ‘participatory,’ I opt 
to call my approach ‘collaborative action research.’ 
Validity as ‘Credibility with a Purpose.’ If action research is built upon a 
unique epistemology, this implies that some aspects of validity will also be distinct, 
because "researchers cannot use positivist methods for assessing the scientific merits 




“rigor” and “relevance” is a false dichotomy, and that rigor itself must be redefined 
to include practical social relevance.  Bradbury and Reason similarly argue for 
“broadening the bandwidth of validity” in action research (2001). Nonetheless, there 
is no set of criteria broadly accepted for assessing action research validity, so I draw 
here on selected influential works as they pertain to my own collaborative action 
research approach.  
Greenwood and Levin provide an overarching standard of validity in their 
notion of credibility with a purpose.  The central question in action research is: Is it 
believable enough to act upon?  “Only knowledge generated and tested in practice” 
is considered to meet this standard (Greenwood and Levin 2007: 67). Credibility has 
both “internal” and “external” audiences. Internal credibility21 refers to believability 
among the research participants themselves, as assessed on their own terms, making 
participant concerns central to validity rather than consigning them to the realm of 
ethics.  External credibility refers to people who did not participate in the research 
process, including the academy and the general public. Building on the standard of 
credibility with a purpose, multiple dimensions of validity raised by other authors 
can contribute towards criteria development. I synthesize such criteria below, along 
with brief comments on how such matters are addressed within my own project.  
Appropriate theories and concepts.  Bradbury and Reason emphasize the 
“integrity” of the conceptual frame undergirding the research effort (2001: 451).  This 
includes some traditional notions of construct validity, such as appropriate selection 
and application of theory. In action research, Bradbury and Reason urge that the 
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standard be expanded to promote the integration of theory and practice, in ways that 
reflect the lived experience of the research participants.  As described in the previous 
chapters, my project actively tests conflict sensitivity theory to determine whether or 
not it is relevant to religious audiences, and my exploration of the Western-
influenced concepts of associational theory is significantly modified by the socio-
political realities of Southeast Asia.  Further, because the study of Southeast Asia as a 
region has often been conceptualized and dominated by Westerners (Heryanto 2007), 
I make a strong effort to incorporate Asian theorists. 
Appropriate process design. Process design can refer to basic “methodological 
appropriateness,” including the question of whether the data-gathering techniques 
align with the research questions and the context (Bradbury and Reason 2001: 452).  
This dimension also refers to the emergent nature of action research, which as 
innovated by Lewin should emphasize "a spiral of steps, each of which is composed 
of a cycle of planning, action and fact-finding about the result of the action" (1946: 
206). Wherever possible this should result in “double loop learning” (Argyris et al. 
1985) in which findings spiral back to revisit the underlying assumptions of the 
conceptual frame. My project is built on cycles of training, application, and analysis 
which, at the Mindanao site, this did result in a significant questioning of 
assumptions, as elaborated in Chapters Five and Six.  
Believable data. This dimension refers to the question of whether the data 
gathered are both consistent and convincing, relating closely to the traditional issue 
of reliability. However action researchers also propose some alternative means of 
verifying the data. For example, Stringer (1999: 176-7) advocates the use of  “member 




maintenance of an explicit “audit trail” which allows the external audience to trace 
out the path of data collection and analysis, even referring where appropriate to the 
raw data. My project emphasizes triangulation of both sources (ethnically and 
religiously diverse participants representing various agencies and locations, many of 
whom were tracked over time) and methods (including surveys, interviews and 
participatory social analysis). I have also used different forms of member checking, as 
appropriate to local conditions at each site.  
Believable conclusions. All research paradigms require the researcher to provide 
adequate evidence to support his or her conclusions.  Some forms of action research 
place a major emphasis on the logic chain between data and conclusions (e.g. Argyris 
et al. 1985: 57, Greenwood and Levin 2007: 68).  My own project uses a coding 
approach, modified for structured use by a participatory group, in order to identify 
common themes and patterns. I conducted the first level of analysis with practitioner 
partners in the field during each research cycle. I later critically re-examined our 
shared conclusions before building on them for my own theoretical applications. 
However, in considering the applicability of conflict sensitivity, I do not substitute 
my own opinion for that of the insiders. This stance echoes McTaggart, who argues 
that in participatory action research, academic partners may develop knowledge, yet 
“the practical decisions about what counts as a sustainable move toward 
improvement must always belong to the workers" (1997: 36). 
Minimized bias.  Bias can negatively affect all three of the above dimensions of 
validity.  Action research does not assume researcher objectivity, because it promotes 
values relating to human empowerment.  The typical approach to managing bias is to 




reflexivity into the research process” (Herr and Anderson 2005: 61). The use of a 
research team can help to identify sources of individual bias, as can regular input 
from an external “critical friend” (Herr and Anderson 2005: 60-61). I minimize bias 
primarily through use of a local research team, and secondarily through periodic 
consultations with knowledgeable outsiders, and personal reflexivity as documented 
in field notes. I also compare my findings with the emergent experiences of 
humanitarian aid workers worldwide and Christian leaders using DNH in Indonesia, 
to further sharpen the development of findings.  
Useful local outcomes. Given the emphasis of action research on meeting 
human needs, one important criterion of validity is: Did the project in fact meet the 
local need that it set out to address? This criteria has been variously termed “outcome 
validity” (Herr and Anderson 2005: 55), ”workability” (Greenwood and Levin 2007: 
68), and “reflexive-practical outcome” (Bradbury and Reason 2001: 451). If the project 
outcome is not useful locally, then it cannot be legitimately abstracted or applied to 
other contexts.  In my own project, local outcomes cannot be assumed, because the 
applicability of conflict sensitivity is in fact the proposition being tested. However, 
the project’s practitioner-oriented objectives were designed to meet the goals of the 
partner agency in each location. During the project, I transferred knowledge and skill 
through training at both sites, and through support for the local publication of the 
partner agency’s lessons learned in Mindanao. The project also gave considerable 
attention to avoiding harmful outcomes, through exercising caution in raising and 
discussing sensitive socio-political issues.   
Transformative significance. The question here is: Will the project result in any 




call this “quality as engaging in significant work” (2001: 452), and highlight the 
potential for participants to move beyond problem-solving towards questions of a 
deeper or more emancipatory nature. The extension of DNH to religious actors is, if it 
proves successful, emancipatory in nature in that it helps practitioners overcome 
socially destructive beliefs and practices (Bhaskar 1986: 169-211). Numerous 
researchers emphasize the potential for transformation of not only the participants 
but also the researchers (McTaggart 1997: 40, Herr and Anderson 2005: 56). Though 
my own transformation lies beyond the scope of this thesis, I did experience 
significant growth and change researcher committed to collaboration, and as an 
American Caucasian Protestant engaging sensitive issues of religion and social 
conflict in Southeast Asia.   
Collaborative process. Traditional research paradigms include ethical norms 
that warn against the researcher using his or her power in ways that exploit the 
participants. Action research affirms this norm, and goes further by emphasizing the 
participation and empowerment of research participants in the act of research itself, 
as elaborated above. Bradbury and Reason call this “quality as relational praxis” 
(2001: 451), posing questions such as: Was participation maximized to the highest 
degree possible and appropriate in this project? If empowerment was minimal at the 
beginning, did it increase throughout the project?  Herr and Anderson call this 
“democratic validity” (2005: 56), and consider it a fundamental social justice 
requirement. My own project has moved as far along the “continuum of 
positionality” (Herr and Anderson 2005: 31) as local conditions permit, without 
claiming to reach the highest levels of participation in the Southern tradition of 




mutually negotiated and, at the Mindanao site, documented in a formal 
memorandum.  
 
Pilot Phase Consultations and Site Selection 
This section describes the pilot phase inquiry undertaken to shape the action 
research design. The pilot consisted of nineteen semi-structured consultative 
interviews of over sixty associational leaders, supplemented by participant 
observation, between February and May of 2007.  At the conceptual level, this pilot 
inquiry was driven by two questions: Is the conflict sensitivity concept relevant, from 
both ‘outsider’ and ‘insider’ perspectives? How should conflict sensitivity be 
presented and tested within the religious associational sector in Southeast Asia? In 
terms of the operational arrangements required to support the conceptual inquiry, 
the pilot phase also had the objective of identifying appropriate sites and partner 
agencies for action research. 
I sought two testing sites, with certain key differences between them, in order 
to ensure that the findings on conflict sensitivity’s applicability to religious 
associations would provide a preliminary indication of generalizability. The original 
DNH Project set a high standard by grounding its research in numerous locations 
around the world, and then comparing multi-site findings over time in order to 
identify aid-conflict interaction patterns that transcend local history and culture 
(CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2004b). Fuller-Rowell (2009: 376) similarly 
affirms that the comparisons made possible by multi-site inquiry can enhance action 




inquiry would have exceeded the scope of my thesis project. Additionally, it was 
preferable that one of those research locations feature latent conflict. Aid sector 
findings demonstrate that practitioners are often slower to recognize the relevance of 
DNH where conflict is latent rather than manifest (Garred 2006a: 16-17), particularly 
if they also perceive that the society in question has achieved a significant level of 
economic and social ‘development.’ If the same pattern held true in the religious 
sector, this would have important implications for conflict sensitivity usage and 
adaptations.  
The partner agencies that I sought should ideally be religious associations 
with minimal linkages to humanitarian aid or peacebuilding, thus ensuring that they 
represented the religious sector in which conflict sensitivity was to be tested. 
Multifaith networks would provide access to a variety of faith traditions, and ensure 
project momentum even if one partner dropped out.  However, these ideal 
preferences were not the only factors influencing partner selection; the project was 
also confronted with pivotal questions of research access. There were multiple factors 
that might discourage potential partners from participating, including the likelihood 
that DNH testing would raise issues that are ethnically, religiously and politically 
sensitive (see Hyland 2009), and the fact that practitioners who are new to DNH often 
do not see its relevance until after they have experienced it in a workshop or project 
application setting (Garred 2006a: 31).   
Moreover, access in the Southeast Asian cultural context was mediated 
through relationships, reputation and trust. Partner contacts could be formed only 
through professional networking and face-to-face communication (see Cunningham 




Language would be a related barrier in this linguistically diverse region, because 
collaborative research on complex socio-political issues requires highly nuanced 
communication. If language was not shared, then translators would need to be 
widely available, highly skilled and equipped with a basic understanding of the 
conflict sensitivity subject matter. In action research, such access considerations 
demand a degree of flexibility and creativity, which must be exercised within the 
boundaries permitted by the conceptual goals and parameters of the project.  
At the outset of the pilot phase, I sought advice at the regional level from four 
senior humanitarian aid practitioners experienced in conflict sensitivity practice 
involving religious issues, three of whom were Asians.  I began by identifying four 
countries that featured strong multifaith involvement in the associational sector, and 
in which I had strong contacts: the Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia and Singapore. 
I started with university contacts in Singapore, and with faith-based humanitarian 
aid workers elsewhere, using a snowballing process (e.g. Kahan and Al-Tamimi 2009, 
Sulaiman-Hill and Thompson 2011) to target multifaith associational leaders and 
clergy. Phone interviews proved useful only in cases of previously established 
relationships. Indonesia posed logistical challenges given its tight visa restrictions. 
The interviewees and potential partners were most responsive in Mindanao and 
Singapore which, perhaps unsurprisingly, were the locations in which I possessed the 
strongest networks of professional relationships with English-speaking practitioners.  
At the same time, the emergent pilot phase data made it clear that Mindanao 
and Singapore offered a particularly rich conceptual pairing. Mindanao is better 
known as a conflict ‘hot spot,’ but Singapore makes a compelling comparator because 




envisioned as occupying opposing ends of a metaphorical Southeast Asian spectrum 
on the key variables of importance to this project. Mindanao is a physically violent 
civil war zone, while Singapore features subtle but significant intergroup tensions 
(Chua 2003, Narayanan 2004). Singapore is an ‘Asian tiger’ economy with a 2010 
Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.846, compared to the Philippines’ 0.638 
(UNDP 2011), a composite score which obscures significant variations within that 
large country. In 2009, seven out of the ten lowest scoring Philippine provinces were 
found in the southern region of Mindanao; the lowest HDI was 0.301 in Sulu, off the 
southwestern cost of Mindanao island (UNDP Philippines 2009). This juxtaposition 
ensures the desired comparison between manifest versus latent conflict settings, and 
societies perceived as ‘developing’ versus ‘developed,’ for the conflict sensitivity 
testing purposes described above.  
Further, the associational sector of the Philippines is unusually strong and 
influential by Southeast Asian standards (Lee 2004: 21), while its Singaporean 
counterpart is known for being nascent and heavily regulated, an ideal case for 
exploring how civil society exercises influence in ways other than directly 
confronting the state (Chong 2005, Lyons and Gomez 2005). In this comparison, the 
shared regional phenomenon of public religion as an overlay upon colonially-shaped 
ethno-political conflict is refracted through two very different associational 
experiences, thus broadening the understanding of how religion functions as a force 
within the Southeast Asian associational sector. For these reasons I narrowed my 
focus as the pilot phase progressed, with the result that eleven interviews were 
conducted on site in Mindanao, five on site in Singapore, and only three by phone or 




Mindanao pilot findings. In Mindanao, local culture makes it common for 
interviewees to appear in groups, so only four interviews were conducted 
individually, plus seven in pairs or groups. The participants included religious 
leaders and influential religious peace practitioners, hailing from Davao City (the 
primary island hub), as well as North Cotabato, South Cotabato, Sarangani and 
Zamboanga Provinces.  I intentionally sought to meet with the Davao Ministerial 
Interfaith, Inc., as the only known interfaith group consistently using DNH, and I 
attended their 2007 regional conference in Zamboanga City. Throughout the 
Mindanao pilot phase, only four of the participants were Muslims, due to limitations 
in accessibility and scheduling. The other participants were split approximately 
evenly between Catholics and Protestants (Evangelicals).22 
In the pilot phase findings, three broad themes emerged in Mindanao. First, 
among religious associations, one frequent determinant of impact is the level of 
inclusivity or exclusivity in the selection of participants and beneficiaries. For 
example, in relief operations for conflict evacuees, many churches object to assisting 
Muslims, in effect saying, “Why help those people? They created their own 
problem.”23 Thus a key question is whether the organization exists only to serve its 
own identity group, or to serve all. Exclusivity tends to exacerbate tensions between 
ethnic and religious groups, while inclusive selection tends to break down social 
barriers. As a second theme, there is great sensitivity around proselytism, and the 
suspicion that service agencies, particularly Evangelical agencies, intend to use social 
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prefer to be called ‘Evangelicals.’ I use the terms interchangeably only when referencing 
Mindanao. 




action as a means of conversion. Thus even if an organization is inclusive in its 
beneficiary selection, community members may wonder what is its underlying 
motivation. The perceived or actual existence of a conversion motive, particularly if 
not disclosed, again tends to exacerbate tensions.  
The exclusion and proselytism themes make conflict sensitivity relevant from 
the outsider perspective, and they echo important themes found in the regional 
academic (Lee 2004, Goh 2005) and aid sector literature (Garred 2006b). Tension and 
exclusivism between religious groups is also apparent in the literature on the 
Philippines as a whole. Owing to the Spanish colonialism of the sixteenth to 
nineteenth centuries, the Philippines is over eighty percent Roman Catholic 
(Yamamoto 2007: 204), unique in a region where the only other majority Christian 
country is Timor Leste. In recent decades, triggered to some extent by American 
colonialism between 1898 and 1946,24 the conversion-oriented growth of Protestant 
Evangelicalism has resulted in significant Catholic-Protestant tension, even as related 
renewal movements challenge the Catholic Church from within (Suico 2004, Kessler 
and Rüland 2006, Barry 2006: 172). For the most part, the national Protestant-Catholic 
cleavage lacks any significant overlap with ethnicity. On the other hand, in the 
Mindanao region, where the Philippines’ four percent Muslim minority (Yamamoto 
2007: 204)25 is concentrated, those Catholic-Protestant tensions are often 
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Spaniards, the American colonialists held neutral policies towards religious conversion. In 
relation to the Bangsamoro, American policy was assimiliationist in nature, yet tolerant 
towards Islam (Amoroso, 2003, 142).  
25 Current demographic breakdown by religion is not prominent among government-




overshadowed by Muslim-Christian conflict and issues pertaining to Lumads 
(indigenous peoples), with those cleavages running along predictable ethnic lines.   
In a third pilot phase theme, arising from the insider perspective, many 
interviewees in Mindanao recognized how humanitarian aid can unintentionally 
exacerbate conflict, and they observed that the same phenomenon can occur in 
church activities. They often mentioned that when negative impact does occur, it is 
usually unintentional.  Participants familiar with conflict sensitivity directly affirmed 
its usefulness in meeting such challenges. Participants unfamiliar with conflict 
sensitivity consistently pointed out that a lack of understanding of social context, 
particularly as perceived by ethnic and religious groups other than one’s own, can 
lead to mistakes that worsen the existing conflict. Thus from an insider perspective, 
conflict sensitivity’s emphasis on context analysis could help to meet a perceived 
need. Interestingly, both media (Arevalo 2007, Mindanews 2010b) and academic 
sources (Soriano 2006, Lee 2008) indicate a high citizen awareness in Mindanao of 
themes relating to conflict sensitivity, even where people do not recall having been 
explicitly informed about formal conflict sensitivity frameworks.  
This local recognition of conflict sensitivity as relevant is likely bolstered by 
the obvious nature of social conflict in Mindanao.26 The territorial inclusion of 
Mindanao in the Philippines polity has long been contested (Amoroso 2003, Mastura 
2006). Government resettlement schemes in the 1920s and 1950s moved settlers from 
the northern and central Philippines into the south, making the migrants 
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(predominantly Christian) numerically, politically and economically dominant over 
the local Bangsamoro27 (predominantly Muslim) and Lumads (who practice indigenous 
beliefs or Christianity). Armed conflict escalated under Marcos in the late 1960s, 
including the recruitment of citizen paramilitaries organized along ethno-religious 
lines (Gomez Jr. 2000: 156-74), and then peaked in the 1970s. A 1996 peace agreement 
between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) is now 
faltering in its implementation via the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. 
Negotiations are ongoing with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, foundering often 
over the coverage and governance mechanisms for expanded autonomy (Ferrer 1999, 
Santos 2005: 23). The peace talks are facilitated by Malaysia, reflecting the extent to 
which regional trends are intertwined with events in Mindanao (Tan 2003b, Wadi 
2003). The presence of US troops in support of the government’s anti-insurgency 
campaigns, is highly controversial (Jubair 2007: 67-9). Other complicating factors 
include clan conflict (Concepcion et al. 2003) and nationwide communist insurgency. 
The most recent flare-up left nearly one million people internally displaced in 
Mindanao in August 2008 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2009: 4), leaving 
the population in no doubt about the relevance of mitigating violent conflict.  
At the same time, with regard to action research process, pilot phase 
interviewees cautioned that the religious associational sector in Mindanao is large 
and highly capable. Peace tools are widely available, and the role of Americans is 
often suspect. Thus action research efforts should be conducted in collaboration with 
a team of local resource people, interfaith in composition, who would guide and 
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represent the local aspects of the project. The project should have the support of 
central religious hierarchies, yet seek to go beyond the usual circle of religious peace 
workshop participants, in order to reach religious leaders who have not yet been 
exposed. Likewise, conflict sensitivity testing should emphasize the ‘do no harm’ 
aspect of the tool, which distinguishes it from the other peace tools in order to meet a 
unique need. Finally, as practitioners, several interviewees expressed their 
expectation to receive the project results in a usable form. In the words of one activist: 
“We need this, because we don’t have time to write.”28 
The literature similarly affirms Filipino civil society as uniquely large and 
strong, and as having made significant contributions to democratization (Lee 2004: 
21) through expanded political participation (Clarke 1998: 206). Some speculate that 
Filipino civil society derives vibrancy from American colonial encouragement (Clarke 
1998: 193) and from a cultural emphasis on active citizenship (Mulder 2003: 82, 191, 
204) that is less prominent elsewhere in the region.  In terms of historical forces, the 
current civil society sector emerged from the protest movements of the Marcos era 
(Franco 2004, Sobritchea 2004), a turning point in the personal stories of several 
Mindanowan pilot interviewees. Religion played a central role, as seen in the 
influence of Roman Catholic institutions (Carroll 2004) and theology (Astorga 2006) 
in galvanizing the ‘People Power’ ouster of Marcos. Nonetheless, the dynamism of 
Filipino civil society does not necessarily imply effectiveness in the eyes of all 
observers. Though generally left-leaning (Ferrer 1997: 1), Filipino civil society shows 
evidence of internal class conflict (Franco 2004: 127) and ideological cleavage vis-à-vis 
the communist insurgency (Bück 2007: 106-10). Lee (2004: 21) highlights a lack of 
                                                 




impact on economic disparities and corrupt governance. Civil society activity is less 
prominent in Bangsamoro communities (Bück 2007: 116), and does not necessarily 
resonate with Bangsamoro perceptions of citizenship in a contested state (Guialal 
1997, Mastura 2001). Rood (2004: 23) characterizes the overall state of the civil society 
sector as “much energy and intelligence in the context of disappointing macro-level 
results.”  
As a result of the Mindanao pilot consultations, I formed a partnership with 
the Davao Ministerial Interfaith Inc. (DMI) of Davao City. DMI is comprised of 
approximately fifty religious leaders from the Roman Catholic, Evangelical 
Protestant and Muslim communities who collaborate on a voluntary basis to support 
community-based social action. The organization meeting in 2002, aiming to provide 
the faith-related component of a holistic development program managed by the local 
people’s organization Unity for Progress,29 and funded by the international NGO 
World Vision. In early days, DMI’s priorities were defined by its partners, with a goal 
of integrating multifaith spiritual nurture and life skills into community development 
programming. There was also an equally important goal of fostering collaboration 
between religious leaders of different faiths.  Currently, DMI continues to work with 
its original partners, but it has also taken on more autonomy in planning its projects, 
and in establishing its own sustainable organizational systems. DMI mentors sister 
interfaith groups in nearby Sarangani, Zamboanga, Agusan del Sur and South 
Cotabato Provinces. 
World Vision began providing DMI with DNH training and mentoring in 
2003. DMI has been using DNH consistently since that time, making the organization 
                                                 




a pioneer of DNH uptake by religious leaders,30 and giving them a natural interest in 
the action research project. Importantly, DMI’s mandate as described above is not 
fully separate from humanitarian aid and peacebuilding.   Nevertheless, DMI is a 
secondary network for religious leaders whose primary commitment is to their own 
churches and mosques, thus tapping into large pools of practitioners and projects 
whose objectives are primarily religious, and largely unrelated to humanitarian aid 
and peacebuilding. Thus while DMI itself may not be a ‘pure’ nPCRO (non-peace and 
conflict resolution organization), it provides a substantial window into the world of 
religious nPCROs in the Mindanao context.  DMI was accustomed to calling Do No 
Harm by its alternate title of Local Capacities for Peace (LCP), so I too was obliged to 
adopt the LCP terminology for local use, despite some loss of the conceptual 
uniqueness of avoiding harm. 
Singapore pilot findings. These seven individual interviews included 
academics and religious leaders active in interfaith affairs, including three Muslims 
(ethnically Malay), two Catholics and two Protestants (all ethnically Chinese). 
Supplementary participant observation events included two interfaith events hosted 
by Muslims and one by Buddhists, in addition to numerous events within my own 
Anglican church. The dearth of Buddhist/Taoists (largely from the majority Chinese 
ethnic group) and ethnic Indians (which include Hindus and Christians among other 
minority faiths) was a significant gap, because my initial access was via contact 
persons concerned with the prominent issue of relations between Malay Muslims and 
Chinese Christians.  
                                                 




As in Mindanao, the themes of exclusion and proselytism were prominent in 
the Singapore associational sector. Membership is often separated by race and 
religion, resulting in organizations that are largely mono-faith and mono-ethnic. 
However, there has been a trend towards increased interfaith activity since the 
attacks of 11 September 2001, due to the government’s anti-terrorism efforts which 
rely in part on community-based resilience strategies. In terms of beneficiary 
selection, most religious associations serve adherents of their own faiths, with some 
well-known exceptions in the Buddhist and Christian communities. The Asian 
tsunami marked a significant point of change, because it provoked an interfaith 
response in which funds were raised for beneficiaries regardless of their ethnic or 
religious background. The promotion of religious conversion and the suspicion of a 
conversion agenda are prominent sources of tension in community service.  
Protestants are most frequently associated with proselytism, as an outgrowth in part 
of Singapore’s history of Christian engagement in the social service sectors. However, 
the Muslim community also has within it elements that promote conversion.  
Again, these pilot phase findings on exclusion and proselytism were reflective 
of themes encountered in the literature.  The overlap and conflation between 
ethnicity and religion remains strong, with only Christianity having an extensive 
reach into more than one ethnic group (Chinese and Indians) (Tong 2008, Tham 
2008b). Most authors laud Singapore’s high levels of public tolerance between 
Chinese, Malay, Indian and other ethnic groups, yet some also point to a lack of 
meaningful interaction and deeper integration between them (e.g. Singh 2007).  
Among religious-based associations, the emergence of unconditional service across 




Christian community service agencies present themselves in largely secular terms, 
yet retain a strong, underlying evangelism motive in their service to people of other 
faiths (Mathews 2008). Mansor and Ibrahim (2008) argue that Muslim service 
organizations are surprisingly open to serving beneficiaries of other faiths, yet their 
supporting data undercut somewhat their claims. They cite two organizations that 
serve between thirty and forty percent non-Muslim beneficiaries, and another that 
reserves ten percent of its budget for non-Muslims – yet the overall Singaporean 
population is up to eighty-five percent non-Muslim (Tong 2008: 37). Importantly, 
these trends in the religious community service sector make conflict sensitivity 
decidedly relevant from the perspective of an outside observer.   
Nonetheless, from an insider perspective, many Singaporean pilot phase 
participants did not see a clear and immediate relevance in conflict sensitivity, owing 
to their different views on the nature of social conflict and the role of the associational 
sector. Most citizens have no perception of ‘conflict’ in Singapore, because conflict is 
seen as being associated with violence. In the words of one pilot interview 
participant: “social cohesion is an unchallenged supposition.”31 Even so, a few 
participating leaders in interfaith activity did acknowledge the existence of 
intergroup tensions, and all pilot participants spoke of the importance of preserving 
and promoting “social harmony.” Further, the use of ‘civil society’ terminology 
confused the participants, because that term is perceived to imply a political stance 
vis-à-vis the government, as discussed in Chapter Three.  
These findings, too, reflect the role and influence of Singaporean public 
policy, as elaborated in the literature. Religion is considered part of the associational 
                                                 




sector (Tan 2008: 69), and is subject to all the usual government restrictions applied to 
that sector. Further, religion is subject to additional scrutiny because of its potential 
to inflame ethnic politics. The public is kept consistently aware of previous ethno-
religious riots involving the Malay community (e.g. Conceicao 2007), and their added 
weight given Singapore’s location in a Malay-dominated archipelago (Narayanan 
2004). Thus the protection of ethno-religious harmony is driven by an abiding 
concern for national “survival” (Tham 2008b: 19). Government policy is firmly 
secular, extending a freedom of religious belief, though not necessarily freedom of 
religious action (Tan 2008). The state intervenes in situations believed to threaten 
Singapore’s tolerance and order, using such means as mandatory registration of all 
associations addressing religion, criminal codes permitting preventative detention, 
and policies like the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act of 1990, which was 
enacted to curtail aggressive proselytism, primarily by evangelical Christians (Lai 
2008, Tan 2008). Nonetheless, certain aspects of religion have been “co-opted” 
(Narayanan 2004, Tan 2008: 41) as a source of morality, good citizenship and social 
capital, and as a means of influencing the development of minority religions, 
particularly Islam. Currently, areas of major government scrutiny and intervention 
include prevention of and resilience to Islamist terror attacks in the global wake of 
the September 11 incident, and ongoing control of proselytism (Tan 2008: 58).  
In the end, despite the dissonance around ‘conflict’ and ‘civil society’ 
terminology, there was a widely-perceived need among pilot participants to expand 
the interfaith agenda beyond the limited level of dialog between religious leaders, so 
conflict sensitivity was seen as a potential way of expanding the interfaith agenda 




often small, with limited staff capacity and limited budgets. Therefore conflict 
sensitivity tools would need to be ‘light’ – quickly learned and easily applied. The 
role of Americans is less sensitive here than in many other surrounding countries, 
particularly for foreigners with academic affiliations.  
Following the pilot phase, I identified a local partner agency in Singapore.  
The Harmony Centre at An-Nahdhah (a centrally located mosque) was launched in 
2006 by the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS).  MUIS is quasi-
governmental, an expression of the Asian state-guided civil society model (Lee 2004, 
Chong 2005, Read and Pekkanen 2009), and even an example of what Narayanan 
(2004) might call the government co-optation of Malay Muslim institutions. Thus 
Harmony Centre is well-funded and well-publicized, with a rapidly expanding 
influence. The Centre’s mandate is to promote a greater understanding of Islam in 
multifaith Singapore, and to serve as a prominent venue for interfaith events.  Thus, 
the Harmony Centre is actually an extension of government, but the vast majority of 
the participants it convenes are representatives of the associational sector. Also, like 
DMI in Mindanao, the Harmony Centre’s mandate does include the promotion of 
peace, but as a network hub it draws representatives from religious associations with 
a wide range of missions, including numerous nPCROs that are exclusively spiritual 
in nature.  The process design for both Singapore and Mindanao is described in the 







Action Research Process Design 
The action research efforts undertaken in Mindanao and Singapore in 2008 
and early 2009 were designed to produce two parallel bodies of data that could be 
compared using the conceptual frames developed in Chapters Two and Three. The 
research questions were held in common across sites, along with the phased action 
research approach and activities, and the basic methods of data collection and 
analysis.  Both partner agencies were mainly engaged with the first level inquiry on 
the applicability of conflict sensitivity to religious associations. The second level 
inquiry on the implications for associational theory, while not hidden, pertained 
mainly to secondary knowledge developed by myself as the academic partner 
(McTaggart 1997: 36) 
The project’s phased approach was based on the reflection-action-data 
gathering-reflection cycles that are central to action research. At both sites, I provided 
DNH training to religious actors, encouraged DNH application, collected data on 
participant perceptions and usage patterns, and then examined the results over the 
short and, where possible, longer term. At both sites, the methods of data collection 
were surveys, semi-structured interviews of both individuals and (focus) groups, 
participatory analysis workshops, and participant observation documented in field 
notes.32 The participatory analysis workshops yielded written documentation of 
participants’ own DNH analysis examples, in either framework or prose formats. In 
some workshops, there was also a supplementary audio or video recording, or a 
collective public documentation of the entire event. While the data collection 
instruments consistently interrogated the same research questions using the same 
                                                 




basic design, they were not identical across place and time. Some instruments were 
improved over time, applying the learnings of one research cycle to the design of the 
next.  
The data collected represent a total of 161 participants, including 143 in 
Mindanao and 18 in Singapore. Their religious composition is summarized in Figure 
4.1 below. At least 63 of the participants were female, including some of the major 
contributors, largely because the project was not limited to the clergy but also 
involved religious lay leaders and activists. Some of the participants were also 
resource people in this project, meaning those within the partner agency who shared 
responsibility for project planning or training delivery.  
Figure 4.1: Religious Composition of Participant Groups 







Mindanao Islam 14 9.8% Predominantly 
Bangsamoro 
 Christianity – Roman 
Catholic 
48 33.6% Predominantly 
migrant 
 Christianity – 
Protestant/Evangelical 
76 53.1% Predominantly 
migrant, plus 9 
Lumad, and 2 
international 
 Indigenous Beliefs 1 0.7% Lumad 
 Other (Seventh Day 
Adventist, Mormon) 
2 1.4% Migrant and 
Lumad 
 Unknown 2 1.4% Unknown 
  143 100 %  
     
Singapore Islam 12 66.7% Predominantly 
Malay 
 Christianity – Roman 
Catholic 
2 11.1% Chinese and 
immigrant 
 Christianity – 
Protestant 
3 16.7% Chinese and 
immigrant 
 Other (non-affiliated) 1 5.5% Chinese 




Many participants contributed more than once, and the multiplicity of data 
sources aided in capturing diverse aspects of their experience over time.  The surveys 
provided a broad profile of the participant group’s characteristics and their 
experience with DNH, adding a minimal quantitative component within an 
otherwise qualitative study. Early survey results were used to inform the design of 
subsequent action research cycles, and surveys in Mindanao were also used to select 
individuals for interviews. Those interviews permitted in-depth discussion of 
complex themes and stories that could only be elicited through interactive probing. 
DNH frameworks and other physical workshop outputs were often discussed 
verbally within the context of a workshop discussion, so the accompanying event 
documentation became a critical aid to data interpretation. In many cases, surveys 
could be combined with interviews and participatory workshop outputs to yield a 
well-rounded picture of the learning process of a particular individual.  
Despite the consistency in high-level design, there were also significant 
differences across the two sites.  The Mindanao project was much larger in scope and 
duration, because DMI’s five years of DNH experience made them eager to take on a 
larger task, and uniquely capable of providing data on DNH usage in individual and 
organizational practice over time.  Further, the Mindanao project involved a 
significantly higher level of local empowerment and control than the Singapore 
project, due to the emphasis on empowerment in Mindanowan civil society, and the 
sensitivity of my own role as an educated American outsider. Therefore the following 
sub-sections detail separately the key aspects of each action research cycle in 




Mindanao Process Design.  As identified during the pilot phase, the Davao 
Ministerial Interfaith Inc. (DMI) was the primary partner agency, with core research 
activities running from late 2007 to late 2008. During the preparation phase, I co-led 
with World Vision staff a Training of Trainers (ToT) to equip thirteen interfaith 
members as DNH trainers.33 This was the first known DNH ToT targeted specifically 
for religious leaders. The content was the same as ToTs held in humanitarian aid 
settings, so that the new trainers themselves could contribute to any subsequent 
contextualization of DNH for the religious sector. Though the ToT was primarily a 
preparation phase, data were collected during practice training workshops. 
Following the ToT, DMI commissioned a six-member research team34 
and one special advisor to partner with me during the project. We held a two-
day research team consultation on average every six weeks, corresponding to 
my visits from Singapore. The research team members were unpaid 
volunteers, as per DMI’s usual operating procedures. We pursued win-win 
outcomes to benefit each partner, with DMI benefiting from DNH capacity 
building, technical support for local publication of their findings, and 
organizational growth in areas of administration and finance. The team 
defined their practitioner-oriented goal as “to build on DMI’s pioneering LCP 
experience by researching how religious leaders and organizations can use 
LCP, in order to share LCP with other religious leaders in South Central 
                                                 
33  The new DNH trainers included 3 Muslims, 7 migrant Protestants, 1 Lumad Protestant and 
2 migrant Catholics. Seven were from DMI, and six from DMI’s sister interfaith groups in the 
southern Mindanao region. 




Mindanao and possibly other contexts.”35 DMI was already committed to the 
ongoing use of DNH, whereas my own stance was necessarily more critical, a 
difference managed through careful negotiation of roles as described below. 
After setting the overarching goals and methods in place, the detailed design 
was updated on a cycle-by-cycle basis, with the learnings of each cycle 
informing the next. When decision points arose between cycles, I outlined the 
options, and then the DMI research team decided on the focus of their inquiry 
during the next cycle.   
Roles and responsibilities were carefully negotiated through a memorandum 
of agreement.36 The memorandum itself was incrementally developed over a period 
of almost one year, and team consultations included regular ‘check-ups’ on the status 
of the partnership, reflecting the importance and delicacy of building the 
participatory relationship (Arieli et al. 2009, Wicks and Reason 2009). I was 
responsible for providing capacity building  (using resources such as Shallwani and 
Mohammed 2007) and for designing and facilitating the research process, subject to 
research team agreement. The team was responsible for organizing contacts and 
logistics, and collecting and analyzing data as part of the facilitated team process. 
Regarding informed consent, the team agreed that “all participants will be informed 
in an appropriate way about the research, and will have opportunity to give (or 
decline) consent for use of their information”37 This information took the form of 
verbal announcements, brief written explanations on all project documents, and an 
                                                 
35 Memorandum of Agreement: DNH/LCP for Multifaith Religious Leaders and 
Organizations, Davao, initial version 11 June 2007, final version signed 23 May 2008.  See 






additional handout describing research parameters and points of contact. We 
acknowledged all participants via a collective list of names, while avoiding the 
attribution of comments to identifiable individuals. Identity protection was essential 
in view of the potential risks faced by participants in their own communities. We 
opted not to request consent signatures, because the research team felt strongly that 
such signatures could be misunderstood in the Mindanao context as either an offer of 
payment, or an intention to use the signature for fraudulent purposes.38 All data 
collected were jointly ‘owned’ by DMI and me, but for security reasons only the 
research team leader and myself were allowed to manage the physical documents. 
All activities were conducted in mixed English and Visayan languages, unless 
otherwise noted.  
Action Research Cycle One: Within DMI. The first cycle of inquiry was focused 
on exploring DMI’s own usage of DNH, at both individual and organizational levels, 
from the time of first DNH exposure (2003) to the present (early 2008). Throughout 
this phase, we sought to explore the strengths and limitations of DNH as a tool for 
religious actors, and to identify any ways in which DNH might need to be 
contextualized for religious audiences. 
To elicit the perceptions and experiences of individual DMI members trained 
in DNH, we used written surveys and semi-structured interviews. The surveys 
gathered simple quantitative ratings of the relevance and usefulness of the DNH tool, 
and asked open-ended questions about tool usage. A short-form version of the 
survey was incorporated into DNH workshop evaluations, while a longer survey 
including application questions was administrated to people who had been trained 
                                                 




one month to four years in the past. After analyzing the survey results, the research 
team selected twelve DMI members for follow-up interviews. Eight of these were 
selected because they appeared to be using DNH in significant ways, while the other 
four were selected because it appeared that they might not be doing so. This was an 
effort to seek out nonconforming viewpoints, but in fact the only DMI member that 
the research team had perceived as truly unenthusiastic about DNH declined to be 
interviewed, and none of the other interview participants voiced dissatisfaction with 
the tool.   Nine of the twelve targeted interviews of DMI members were successfully 
completed by research team members. I supplemented this effort by interviewing the 
research team members themselves, plus two World Vision staff members who had 
trained DMI members.     
Finally, to examine DMI’s usage of DNH at the organizational level, we 
conducted an in-depth DNH analysis of DMI’s Neighborhood39 Intergenerational 
Care Group project. The Care Groups are intended to bring a holistic element to the 
community development process by providing multifaith spiritual nurture, 
relationship building and practical mutual assistance. Three of DMI’s DNH trainers 
facilitated participatory analyses of each Care Group’s weekly gatherings, involving 
the Care Group leaders and in some cases the members. In January 2008, twenty-five 
Care Group leaders gathered for a day-long DNH Forum in order to present their 
learnings and identify together the common themes across groups.  
Cycle One concluded with a team analysis of all available data to date, in 
order to identify implications for DMI’s own organizational planning, and use the 
findings to shape the focus of the next research cycle. A central conclusion of Cycle 
                                                 




One was that the aspect of DNH that differs the most in the religious sector, as 
opposed to the humanitarian aid sector, is the patterns of impact analysis that 
describe specifically how project activities impact on intergroup relations.  Thus 
DNH impact patterns require contextualization for the religious sector, and this 
became our focus during Cycle Two.  
Action Research Cycle Two: Beyond DMI. The second research cycle in 
Mindanao collected one hundred DNH impact analysis examples (from fifty 
projects). We aimed to observe the patterns in the body of examples, and compare 
them to the patterns found in the original DNH framework, to determine how DNH 
might need to be contextualized for the religious sector. In terms of my own 
theoretical work, Cycle Two provided the rich examples needed to examine the non-
structural factors influencing social impact. We broadened the scope of inquiry to 
explore DNH usage by religious actors outside of DMI, and set targets to ensure a 
balance of examples across ethnic and religious groups. Participants in Cycle Two 
included DMI’s sister interfaith organizations in Sarangani, South Cotabato, Agusan 
del Sur, and Zamboanga Provinces, whose members had been previously trained in 
DNH, as well as six external organizations in Davao City, for whom DNH was new. 
Impact analysis examples were gathered through semi-structured interviews and 
participatory analysis workshops.  
The interviews were particularly useful in the case of sister interfaith 
members who had been previously trained in DNH. Thus we attended the 
organizations’ 2008 regional interfaith conference, held in Sarangani Province, in 
order to interview delegates gathered from the various geographic zones. As in the 




participants, and then selected for follow-up interviews eleven participants who 
appeared to have examples ready to share. From those interviews we drew both 
written notes and DNH analytical frameworks.  
The participatory analysis workshops on impact analysis required an 
intermediate level of DNH knowledge. In the case of DMI’s sister interfaith 
organizations, we gathered fifteen previously trained participants for a 2.5 day 
August 2008 workshop in Davao City. We provided DNH refresher training, and 
then focused on deeper understanding of impact analysis patterns, with participants 
analyzing and sharing examples from their own experience.  Outputs were 
documented in the form of DNH analytical frameworks plus notes from explanatory 
conversations with the participants who developed the frameworks. We also audio 
recorded the post-workshop debriefs among the facilitators, in which we explained to 
each other everything we had heard from the participants about their DNH 
frameworks, thus deepening our understanding of the resulting data.    
An identical impact analysis workshop was held for external agencies in 
Davao City, since their urban context differed from the provincial settings of the 
sister interfaith members. However, these external agencies needed basic DNH 
orientation, so we provided a two-day orientation for seventeen participants in July 
2008, and then invited them back for the intermediate impact analysis workshop in 
August 2008.  This workshop was successful in terms of quality data collection, but 
data quantity targets were missed. At this time in August 2008, armed conflict in 
Mindanao had escalated to its worst level since 2003, disrupting participants from 
attending workshops. As a result the proportion of impact analysis examples drawn 




anticipated. This limitation did not hinder the identification of significant patterns in 
the data, but the research team did recognize that more external examples would be 
needed before making claims to generalizability.  
I facilitated the research team’s joint analysis of the data, using a simplified 
version of coding to identify common themes, adapted for team usage as inspired by 
the structured group processes of Bob Dick (2002b).  Data were analyzed in chunks, 
as they became available, with each round of analysis following a consistent process.  
First, the team reviewed the data to re-familiarize themselves with the content, and 
then summarized the data in a wall-sized matrix. Second, the team examined the data 
matrix in order to identify common themes.  Third, I facilitated a team discussion on 
interpretation of the common themes, to consider for example: ‘What is the meaning 
of this common theme? Why does it appear? Do we accept it at face value, or do we 
need to dig deeper to understand what might be influencing the research 
participants? How does this common theme link back to our original research 
questions?’ Finally, at the end of the cycle, we consolidated the findings and again 
considered how these findings addressed our research questions, as well as the 
design of our next steps. The research team deliberations themselves also became 
valuable sources of data, so I photographed all visual meeting outputs and made a 
number of audio recordings.  
Documentation and Dissemination of Findings. This follow-up phase 
encompasses January 2009 to the present, and focuses on writing and publication of 
DMI’s research learnings for local practitioners. The publication goal had been 
generally defined at project inception, and revisited with increasing specificity based 




booklet Transformed Together: A Journey with Local Capacities for Peace aims to reach 
“religious leaders of all faiths across the Philippines, who are now learning or have 
already learned LCP,” in order “to encourage and assist religious leaders to use LCP, 
and to use it more transformationally and more effectively”.40 The research team 
opted to publish the booklet in English, given the divergence of languages used 
among the target audience.  I was the primary writer, but the research team reviewed 
and discussed the text extensively, and they established a writing sub-team to give 
substantive guidance on shaping of appropriate terminology and examples. The key 
positioning and editorial decisions were taken by DMI, and DMI was credited with 
primary authorship. DMI is currently using Transformed Together in its DNH 
workshops for religious leaders in Mindanao, and in World Vision Area 
Development Programs around the Philippines.  
Singapore Process Design. Prior to this action research project, conflict 
sensitivity in Singapore was known only among the very small circles of 
international humanitarian agency staff based there, primarily World Vision staff, 
most of whom were foreigners. There was no awareness of conflict sensitivity in the 
religious sector, so DNH testing proceeded on a small scale and incremental pace in 
Singapore, as compared to Mindanao.  However, unlike Mindanao, the Singapore 
project provided an opportunity to observe how religious actors interact with DNH 
from the point of inception, such that practitioner goals and research goals were fully 
aligned. Further, the Singapore project permitted comparative testing of DNH in an 
alternative social context, one marked by a highly developed economy, emergent 
civil society, and latent intergroup tensions largely ignored in public discourse. Thus, 
                                                 




while significantly more narrow in scope, the Singapore findings provide a valuable 
point of comparison and contrast for the findings from Mindanao. Following the 
pilot phase, Singapore data collection activities spanned from early 2008 to early 
2009, with event funding provided by the partner agency Harmony Centre at An-
Nahdhah. 
Preparation and Positioning. From the outset, the Harmony Centre was 
interested in hosting a DNH introductory pilot workshop, by which they meant a 
first effort to introduce DNH to local participants, to determine whether they might 
find the tool useful.  Even so, it required multiple meetings over eleven months 
before the first pilot workshop came to pass.  Harmony Centre paid staff had a vision 
for DNH usefulness in the religious community service sector, including the idea of 
using DNH to expand interfaith engagement from the religious leaders’ sector into 
the broader realm of religious community service, as well as a nascent idea of the 
significance of unintended impact on intergroup relations. Yet it required some time 
to determine how best to identify and attract a voluntary audience for the pilot 
workshop.  
Indeed, the first audience approached by the Harmony Centre, a prominent 
multiethnic network of community service groups, declined the invitation stating 
simply that “the training may not be entirely applicable to our core target groups.”41  
From an outsider’s perspective, DNH would have been highly relevant to this group, 
though it would not have been a strong match for the action research project because 
it was not religiously-based.  Drawing on past experience with humanitarian aid 
workers, I assured the Harmony Centre that it was not unusual for participants to 
                                                 




overlook the value of DNH based upon a brief written or verbal introduction, yet the 
same participants commonly find DNH very useful after attending a live workshop.   
We also continuously discussed concerns of how to manage discussion of the 
themes of exclusion and proselytism during any upcoming DNH workshops, since 
these themes are racially and religiously charged, and therefore among those 
discussions most closely regulated by government (Lee 2005). Through this series of 
meetings, we redefined the audience together, and titled the proposed workshop as 
‘Promoting Social Harmony through Community Service: An Introduction to Do No 
Harm / Local Capacities for Peace’ Such positioning avoids the notion of overt social 
conflict and the use of ‘civil society’ terminology, thus aligning with the Singaporean 
outlook comprehended during the pilot phase. Issues of intergroup tensions were 
gradually surfaced during the subsequent DNH workshops, but ‘civil society’ 
terminology was not used again at the Singapore site.   
In addition to planning DNH pilot workshops through the Harmony Centre, I 
became part of their central group of interfaith practitioners, which was a rich source 
of participant observation involving over fifteen public events and ongoing relational 
networking from early 2007 to early 2009. This allowed for significant observation on 
the applicability of DNH in the Singaporean religious sector, despite the limited 
number of overt data collection activities.   
Do No Harm Workshops. After nearly one year of planning, the Harmony 
Centre hosted a DNH pilot workshop in March 2008, to introduce the tool to twelve 
Muslim and Christian leaders of religious community service organizations. 
Participants of other religious groups were invited, and some confirmed their 




a first-time exposure workshop. At a pragmatic level, the one-day schedule was also 
suitable for the participants’ busy schedule, and for me as the sole trainer on a topic 
that should preferably be team-taught. The brevity of this type of workshop is in 
contrast to the practitioner skills workshops which are typically offered over a two or 
three day period. Nonetheless, all core concepts of DNH were introduced using 
standard methodology, and were discussed by participants, albeit in less depth.  The 
day ended with a roundtable discussion on the relevance, usefulness and potential 
future uses of DNH in Singapore.  
During the March 2008 pilot workshop, data were collected through small 
and large group discussion outputs recorded on display charts, and evaluation 
surveys administered at day’s end.  Evaluation surveys used a standard Harmony 
Centre format, and were thus different from the surveys administered in Mindanao, 
yet they yielded comparable data in terms of participants’ ratings of the DNH tool. 
Most importantly, data were collected through an all-day video recording, which 
captured extensive participant interaction, including some detailed examples needed 
for analysis of patterns of unintended social impacts. Video recording was made 
possible due to funding support from the Harmony Centre and, because it was an 
invaluable source of data, I opted to use it despite the fact that no parallel technology 
was available in Mindanao.   
Negotiating informed consent of Singaporean participants to discuss issues of 
racial and religious relations is always delicate, and the use of videotape made it even 
more complex.  In preparation discussions with Harmony Centre staff, we had opted 
to include a statement describing our research objectives on all workshop invitations 




unnecessary anxiety about how the data would be used. Instead, we opened the issue 
up for discussion at the beginning of the workshop, explaining the purpose of the 
research and the participant protection guidelines, and allowing participants to 
decide as a group if they were comfortable with the videotape. The participants did 
agree to turn the cameras on, provided that we not attribute comments to individuals 
by name, and add the proviso that participants’ comments represent only themselves, 
not the religious institutions or ethnic groups from which they come, as a practical 
form of ‘member checking’ (Stringer 1999: 176-7).  
Following the March 2008 workshop, feedback from participants and staff 
was strongly positive regarding the relevance and usefulness of the DNH tool, with 
many expressions of interest in further practitioner skills training and even Training 
of Trainers. Nonetheless, over six months passed before any formal follow-up plans 
were established. In November 2008, one of the pilot workshop participants42 invited 
me to provide a twenty-five minute DNH overview to participants of a longer 
interfaith series that she was facilitating through the Harmony Centre. The invitation 
was a useful indicator of interest in DNH, and indeed the facilitator has a clearly-
developed vision of how to put DNH to use in future expansions of interfaith work 
in Singapore. However on this occasion, the time available was not enough to 
support a clear introduction of DNH, and fewer than half of the participants 
appeared in the subsequent discussion to have grasped an accurate idea of the 
purpose of the tool. When I began preparing to leave Singapore in early 2009, the 
Harmony Centre requested that we conduct another exposure workshop for new 
participants before my departure. Thus the second DNH exposure workshop was 
                                                 




held in January 2009, comprising twelve Buddhist, Sikh, Muslim and Christian 
community service workers.  
Follow-Up Interviews. Also in January 2009, I held a three-hour ‘reunion’ (focus 
group interview) at the Harmony Centre for participants of the March 2008 
workshop. Four out of the original twelve participants attended, all Muslims. The 
object of the interview was to probe participants’ post-training perceptions of the 
purpose, relevance and usefulness of the DNH tool, and to learn how they had put it 
to use. I used a semi-structured interview protocol with questions parallel to the 
Mindanao interviews. This interview was held ten months after the original event, 
with no intervening follow-up, so memories were a bit strained. Six months’ interval 
would have been ideal, but I opted to work the follow-up interviews through the 
Harmony Centre due to their important convening power, and Harmony Centre 
scheduling was not available until shortly before my departure from Singapore.  
Christian workshop participants had been unavailable to attend the group interview 
due to scheduling conflicts. I therefore sought repeatedly to re-interview two 
Christian participants who had communicated strong support for the use of DNH by 
Singaporean religious actors, and was eventually able to speak with one of them in 
May 2010.   
Ensuring external credibility. Given the highly participatory nature of this 
project, external audiences may require additional information on the steps taken to 
minimize any potential sources of potential bias or distortion. I was responsible for 
designing and facilitating the action research process, but it remains important to 
examine the advantages and disadvantages of team-based data collection and 




of my own identity as a researcher merits exploration in both Mindanao and 
Singapore.   
Team-based data collection provided a number of advantages in Mindanao. 
The DMI research team knew how to phrase questions in locally relevant ways and 
in the appropriate languages.43 Linguistic capacity is important because Mindanao is 
a poly-lingual society44 in which ethno-linguistic minorities are often politically 
marginalized. All team members spoke variants of the primary regional language of 
Visayan (or Cebuano), as well as English. Several also spoke additional languages 
such as Filipino (a Tagalog-based national language), and Maranao (used by one of 
the prominent Bangsamoro groups). Surveys were presented in Visayan and English, 
and participants could respond in either of those languages, or in the local language 
of their choice. Most interviews were conducted in a bilingual combination of English 
and Visayan. In the one interview where the participant spoke only a local language 
not available within the research team (Ilonggo),45 the team recruited an additional 
DNH-trained interfaith group member to assist with translation. The research team’s 
involvement in data collection also prepared them for analysis, by giving them a 
deep understanding of how the data had originated.  
The primary disadvantage of team-based data collection proved to be a lack 
of depth in the interview data during Cycle One.  We had given much attention to 
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the need for consistency across interviewers, by developing the interview questions 
together, and using a standard documentation protocol, including guidelines for 
distinguishing between direct quotes and paraphrases. However several research 
team members found it difficult to interactively probe the interviewee for deeper 
information, and they preferred verbal interaction to written note-taking. As a result, 
the Cycle One interview notes served to indicate clear trends in DNH usage, but did 
not yield detailed examples.  Those interviews were not audio recorded, because our 
Visayan-speaking personnel did not have time for transcription. Therefore when 
planning Cycle Two, we opted to rely only on the stronger interviewers within the 
team, and to significantly increase the proportion of interviews that I myself 
conducted and audio recorded. By the end of Cycle Two, I had personally led over 
fifty percent46 of the interviews conducted during the DMI partnership, significantly 
increasing the depth of documentation.  
Written interview and survey data often required translation prior to analysis. 
The translations were carried out by two skilled individuals, namely the research 
team leader and a former manager of Unity for Progress, supported by a limited level 
of mutual cross-checking. The translators’ first language was Visayan, and they also 
understand a substantial proportion of several other local languages when presented 
in written form. Where the translators were unable to discern meaning, they marked 
it as unclear, rather than guessing. Our data analysis included not only the translated 
written data, but also the participants’ graphical DNH frameworks and quantitative 
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usefulness ratings, whose non-linguistic elements helped to triangulate our 
interpretations.    
During data analysis, the team’s mix of religious and ethnic backgrounds 
provided the advantage of built-in triangulation, and their local knowledge enabled 
us to identify meaningful data inconsistencies that I would have missed. To preserve 
objectivity in the identification of common themes, the team members color-coded 
themes arising directly from the data as orange, and ideas emerging from their own 
minds as yellow.  The greatest disadvantage of team-based analysis was that 
approximately half of the research team members were still learning advanced DNH 
skills. This problem was largely self-correcting, because the team members who were 
stronger in DNH tended to guide group analysis. Nonetheless, I often had to re-
consider the significance of themes identified by the research team, to inquire 
whether those themes had been shaped by the team’s own learning process. This 
reality complicates data interpretation, yet it also speaks directly to the applicability 
of DNH, by illustrating the incremental nature of DNH learning, and illuminating 
how religious leaders understand DNH on their own terms.  
In terms of my identity as a researcher, the significant factors included both 
my individual characteristics and my previous affiliation with World Vision, and 
both types of factors influenced my efforts to establish participant trust and minimize 
bias in Mindanao and Singapore. In terms of participant trust, I inquired about my 
presence as an American Protestant to the pilot-phase interviewees, and also to four 
senior Asia-based conflict sensitivity practitioners.47 Their input informed my early 
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decisions to pursue multi-faith (not Christian) agencies as local partners, and to 
ensure an empowering process in Mindanao, where the role of Americans is 
particularly sensitive due to the US colonial past and military presence, and the 
capacity of the local associational sector is particularly strong. Being female was both 
a disadvantage and an advantage, making me appear less authoritative in settings 
where religious leadership was a male-dominated field, but simultaneously making 
me a less threatening audience for the discussion of highly sensitive issues.  
My identity as a former staff member of World Vision influenced the way that 
some participants interacted with me. Some Protestant participants appeared notably 
favorable towards World Vision, as a Christian agency with Protestant roots. On the 
other hand, a few Protestant participants in Mindanao expressed concern over past 
rumors of World Vision linkages to covert American political interests in the 1980s.48  
Some Muslim participants appeared to wonder if I might be biased against them or 
their faith. One Singaporean Muslim openly shared with me his perception that non-
Christians might suspect World Vision as an organization of being motivated by 
proselytism.49 On another occasion, a Mindanowan ustadz invited me to sit down 
after a workshop in order to tell me that he appreciated my work because he could 
see in my actions that I was working for Muslims and not just for Christians, as an 
“instrument of peace.”50 This conversation was very encouraging, but it is important 
to note that the expression of trust did not come quickly. In fact, the ustadz and I had 
                                                                                                                                            
Indonesia and Allen Harder of Canada continued to provide input at key points throughout 
the project, thus becoming “critical friends” (Herr and Anderson 2005: 60-61) who are cited 
elsewhere in this thesis. 
48 Prt. MG #2, pilot interview by author, North Cotabato, Philippines, 22 Apr. 2007. 
49 Prt. S #7, follow-up interview by author, Singapore, 9 Jan. 2009. 




already worked together during two previous intensive workshops, indicating that it 
takes time to overcome identity-based perceptions by building inter-personal trust. 
 With regard to minimizing bias, perhaps the most significant aspect of my 
own identity as a researcher was my previous World Vision work on conflict 
sensitivity and DNH, and the possibility that this experience might predispose 
favorable findings. Partnering with DMI, as a World Vision affiliate agency already 
engaged in DNH practice, could further compound this risk. Indeed, it was necessary 
to begin with a working hypothesis that conflict sensitivity might be applicable to the 
religious associational sector, in order to put that possibility to the test.  On the other 
hand, the fact that DMI research team members were unpaid precluded any material 
motivation towards bias. We defined our roles in a way that permitted each partner 
to draw independent conclusions if necessary, so I was not obligated to take at face 
value the enthusiasm of DMI participants. Instead, expressions of enthusiasm were 
triangulated with DMI members’ concrete examples of DNH usage, and my own 
participant observations of practitioner behavior during more than sixteen weeks of 
intensive on-site interaction. 
External triangulation came via the non-DMI participants who were not 
previously familiar with conflict sensitivity or DNH, including all of the participants 
in Singapore, and many of the pilot phase interviewees and external partner agency 
participants in Mindanao. Before project inception, I discussed with a conflict 
sensitivity expert from International Alert51 my conceptual framework for evaluating 
conflict sensitivity’s applicability, which helped to mitigate any unjustified bias on 
my part towards DNH in relation to other conflict sensitivity tools. Finally, after 
                                                 




project completion I compared my own emergent interpretations of the Mindanao 
data with relevant external findings emerging simultaneously from the humanitarian 
aid sector and from Indonesia.  In the end, both DMI and I identified certain 
difficulties that changed our critical evaluation of conflict sensitivity and DNH, and 
significantly re-shaped our views on the future usage of those approaches, as 
elaborated in Chapters Five and Six. 
 
Conclusion: A Comment on Researcher Reflexivity 
Building on the unique action research epistemology previously elaborated in 
Chapter One, this methodology chapter has served to narrow the broad field of 
action research towards the specifics of the collaborative action research approach 
used in this project, and has established validity criteria based on the standard of 
credibility with a purpose (Greenwood and Levin 2007: 67), both external and 
internal. I have narrated the cyclical data collection and analysis processes used in 
partnership with local interfaith agencies in both Mindanao and Singapore. The 
Mindanao project was significantly larger in scope, due to the greater experience and 
interest of the partner agency, yet both were focused around a common conceptual 
frame, and employed very similar methods of data collection and analysis.  
This chapter, like those that precede it, has consistently linked research 
concerns to practitioner action. Thus it is appropriate at this point to underscore the 
importance of insider and outsider roles as this project’s central theme of researcher 
reflexivity. I, as an external research facilitator, have placed myself at the crux of the 




which is central not only to research ethics but to the credibility of the findings. 
Further, the question of insider and outsider roles is central to the conflict sensitivity 
inquiry itself, since social positioning influences one’s assessment of the applicability 
of conflict sensitivity in various socio-political and organizational settings.  As 
described in Chapter Two, the key questions of empowerment in conflict sensitivity 
practice are closely linked to the definition of insider and outsider roles. With that in 
mind, I have argued that debates in conflict sensitivity practice should generally be 
resolved in favor of the practical needs of the local user, and that testing of the Do No 
Harm framework should be accompanied by special attention to issues of social 
justice, even where this may implicate powerful external partners. These themes and 
their interrelationships will be woven throughout the chapters that follow, with 








USAGE AND UPTAKE OF ‘DO NO HARM’  
AMONG RELIGIOUS ACTORS 
 
The program actually gave me a paradigm shift 
when I first saw the framework. 
- Singaporean action research participant52 
 
This chapter analyzes the empirical findings on DNH usage and uptake by 
religious associational actors participating in collaborative action research in 
Mindanao and Singapore, using the collaborative action research methodology 
elaborated in Chapter Four. These findings respond to the research questions 
elaborated in Chapter Two on conflict sensitivity’s usefulness: To what extent, and 
how, is conflict sensitivity being used? Or not used? Why? Patterns and trends in 
conflict sensitivity usage are explored according to the tri-part frame for analyzing 
Do No Harm (DNH) uptake: conceptualization, personalization and 
operationalization (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2001). The data indicates 
that participants perceive DNH as very useful, particularly for change and growth 
among individuals, but to a lesser extent for formal analysis of organizational conflict 
impacts.  
In each section, I begin with Mindanao as the primary research case. I identify 
prominent themes in the data provided by 143 participating religious actors, as 
jointly identified and analyzed with the research team.  Where necessary, I 
distinguish the Mindanao research team’s voice from my own, in order to maintain 
credibility among both internal and external audiences (Greenwood and Levin 2007: 
67).  I then compare and contrast the secondary findings emerging from Singapore, 
                                                 




based on the data provided by eighteen religious actors, which I analyzed largely 
alone. I consider where appropriate the relevant data limitations, particularly the 
nature of participant self-reporting. All participants were somewhat self-selected due 
to their varying degrees of willingness to engage in interfaith events. While their 
stories have been triangulated through alternative narratives and participant 
observation, self-reporting nonetheless influences the findings. Further, attribution of 
change to DNH is imprecise, because participants in both locations have participated 
in other trainings that shape their views on intergroup relations.  
This chapter is limited to the analysis of data provided directly by 
participants, and the interpretation of such data in light of the conflict sensitivity 
literature existing at the time of project design. In contrast, the next chapter 
elaborates my own analysis of the action research findings in light of subsequent 
developments in the conflict sensitivity literature, and analyzes additional empirical 
data which point to areas of potential dissonance between conflict sensitivity and the 
work of religious actors.  Chapter Five and Chapter Six together then lay the 
foundation for Chapters Seven and Eight, in which I draw out the implications for 
existing associational theory, particularly the relationship between structural and 
non-structural determinants of associational conflict impact, and the roles of human 
agency and religious cultures in shaping such impact.  
 
Key Themes of Participants’ ‘Do No Harm’ Analyses 
Conflict sensitivity analysis begins with analysis of the dynamics of conflict 




the workings of that organization’s intervention, in order to identify its potential 
social impacts (International Alert et al. 2004a). Therefore in considering the findings 
of the current study, it is necessary to begin by identifying what sorts of themes 
commonly arose when participating religious actors applied the DNH framework 
(Anderson 1999) to their own contexts. Such themes begin to paint a picture of the 
prominent conflict sensitivity issues found in each setting, and ways in which they 
are perceived by religious actors, as a foundation for subsequent analysis.  
Participants’ Context Analyses. In Mindanao, the participants’ DNH analyses 
of the social context illustrate a widespread recognition of deep, pervasive divisions 
along ethnic and religious lines. The ethnic divisions were found primarily between 
the three main people clusters: Migrants, Bangsamoro and Lumads. 
Correspondingly, the religious divisions were found primarily between Roman 
Catholic Christians, Protestant/Evangelical Christians, Muslims and persons holding 
indigenous beliefs. However, significant secondary divisions were also noted 
between the various denominations of Protestants.53 These findings closely reflect 
both my own pilot study and the general consensus among Mindanao analysts 
external to the project (Taco-Borja et al. 1998, Fianza 1999, Soriano 2006). 
Like numerous external analysts (Ferrer 2005a, Franco and Borras Jr 2007), 
some of the project participants, and all of the research team members, emphasized 
that while the primary lines of division are ethnic and religious, “the underlying 
conflict is due to historical governance and land disputes.”54 This was underscored by 
common themes found in the participants’ DNH analysis of intergroup Dividers and 
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Connectors. The key Dividers, or sources of tension, included disputes over land 
ownership and usage, and differing perceptions of historical events, including the 
processes of large-scale religious conversion. Key Connectors included the common 
experience of suffering during natural disasters, the bayanihan spirit of people 
working together in sad and difficult times, and shared respect for certain political 
and religious institutions.55 Context analysis themes are summarized in Figure 5.1 
below.  
As the action research process progressed, the research team slowly 
recognized another theme in the data, pointing to divisions along socio-economic 
lines.  The participant data contain consistent references to the poor as distinguished 
from the rich, or to the gap between people who have access to resources and people 
who do not.56  Interestingly, while poverty is a prominent issue in Mindanao, such 
intra-group socio-economic divisions were not noted in my pilot study, most likely 
because the pilot interview questions placed more overt emphasis on interfaith 
relations. The external literature does point to the prevalence of socio-economic gaps 
in the Philippines (Franco 2004: 21, Lee 2004), and to a linkage between socio-
economic gaps and ethnicity in Mindanao, such that the Bangsamoro and Lumads 
tend to be marginalized (Concepcion et al. 2003: e.g.). However the action research 
participants referred most explicitly to socio-economic splits among communities 
that are ethnically homogenous, particularly at the local level.  
                                                 
55 Ibid., 1. 




Figure 5.1: DNH Context Analysis Themes in Mindanao57 
Common Dividers between Groups  Common Connectors between Groups 
Attitudes of discrimination and exclusion 
towards those who are different 
(ethnically, religiously, or socio-
economically) 
Common experience of suffering in 
natural calamities 
Different religious beliefs and practices 
(including worship styles, cross symbol, 
food restrictions, styles of dress) 
Bayanihan spirit: people working together 
in sad and difficult times 
Backbiting/tsismis 58among neighbors Shared children’s facilities (day care, 
school), when all groups feel equally 
served 
Different historical perceptions and 
experiences, including the history of 
large-scale religious conversions.  
Other shared facilities (health center, 
barangay59 hall), when all groups feel 
equally served 
Land ownership and land usage Celebrating together in particular 
occasions (wake, wedding, fiesta, 
barangay festival day, eating together), 
when all groups feel equally included 
Corruption/bias in local government Shared respect for the local government 
leaders and protocols, especially the 
barangay level 
Localized youth riots, especially along 
ethnic/religious lines 
Shared respect for the role of religious 
leaders and institutions 
 Sports, especially among men and boys 
from different ethnic, religious or socio-
economic groups, when available 
 
Participants’ project impact analyses.  The participants’ own examples of 
project impact analysis in Mindanao point strongly towards exclusion as a pivotal 
issue in the religious sector. Often the central determinant of project impact is the 
question of whether people are excluded from membership, service or relationship 
on the basis of ethnicity, religion or socio-economic status, or whether they are 
included despite these differences. The prevailing mindset leans toward separation, 
                                                 
57 Summary of Learnings from Action Research Cycle One, Davao, 29 May 2008, 1. 
Consolidated Analysis from Action Research Cycle Two, Davao, 6 Dec. 2008. 
58 Tsismis is a local term for ‘gossip’ in the Philippines. 




and “different religious groups are divided automatically.”60 Inclusive attitudes and 
practices therefore tend towards being counter-cultural. Further, the issue of 
proselytism is prominent, with many Christian migrants implicitly pitching religious 
conversion as path towards inclusion in their own groups. These findings strongly 
confirm the pilot phase insights, as well as previous case studies on DNH 
applications in Southeast Asia (Riak 2006, Sihotang and Silalahi 2006). Further, there 
is a resonance here with the findings of Nan (2009), who distinguishes between social 
capital that promotes violence and that which promotes peace on the basis of 
whether networks are inclusive or exclusive. 
The research team’s analysis strongly confirmed the occurrence within the 
Mindanao data of the two primary conflict impact mechanisms found in the original 
DNH framework. The first, Resource Transfers, refer to impacts resulting from the 
provision of goods and services. The second, Implicit Ethical Messages, refer to 
impacts resulting from the ethos communicated through the actions of project 
implementers.  However, there were significant differences between the impact 
analyses of religious actors and those found in the original aid-focused DNH 
framework. Implicit Ethical Messages appeared more frequently in the religious 
sector, indicating that religious actors place more emphasis on the intangible and the 
spiritual, even when involved in delivering material services to the community. 
Further, in the religious sector, it is difficult to distinguish a project implementer 
from the service that s/he provides. Team members explained: “The religious worker 
                                                 




is the aid.” 61 This interconnection challenges certain assumptions inherent in the 
original DNH framework, namely that aid is a distinct ‘package’ being introduced by 
‘outsiders’ to the local context (Anderson 1999).   
Most importantly, in comparison to the original DNH framework, the action 
research findings evidence a number of new impact patterns that point to the 
spiritualized nature of a religious leader’s work and its relationship to questions of 
social exclusion. This confirms my speculation in Chapter Two that impact patterns 
would be the DNH component most likely to change, based on previous DNH 
adaptations across sectors (Garred 2006b, Hettiarachchi et al. 2009, Williams 2008, 
Zandvliet and Anderson 2009). These new impact patterns richly illustrate the 
distinctive aspects of conflict sensitivity in the religious sector, and illuminate the role 
of religious associations in Mindanao. As such, these impact patterns are analyzed 
more deeply in Chapter Six.  
Comparative Findings from Singapore. In Singapore workshop discussions 
of DNH social context analysis, three distinct types of intergroup division quickly 
surfaced: ethnic62 divisions, religious divisions which overlap ethnic divisions, and 
socio-economic divisions. Discussion of ethnic divisions focused on the Chinese 
(predominantly Buddhist/Taoist and Christian), the Malays (predominantly Muslim) 
and the Tamils (predominantly Hindu and Christian). However divisions between 
Singapore-born Chinese and foreign-born Chinese also figured in the discussion.63 
                                                 
61 Analysis board postings, research team consultation notes, Davao, 2-3 Apr. 2008. ‘Aid’ here 
refers to the middle column of the DNH framework, which represents analysis of a project 
and its impact on conflict. In training religious actors, the term ‘activities’ or ‘services’ is often 
substituted for ‘aid.’ 
62 In Singapore, ethnic groups are more commonly referred to as ‘racial groups’ or ‘races.’ 




When asked to identify some sources of tension and connection between these 
groups, participant discussion turned largely to the role of government policy and 
programs, ranging from education and language policy to support for neighborhood 
block parties. This strong leaning among the participants affirms the state-centric 
themes so prominent in the literature on the Singaporean polity and civil society (see 
for example Lee 2005, Tan 2008). 
The concept of project impact analysis prompted further discussion on 
government actions, and the unintended consequences that often arise due to the 
complexity of the social context. For example, education opportunities that seek to 
benefit all ethnic and religious groups on the basis of meritocracy can at the same 
time unintentionally alienate the more privileged from the less privileged socio-
economic groups.64 As the workshop progressed, government-centered examples 
gave way to more discussion of unintentional project impacts in the religious 
community service sector, including mutual concerns between both Christians and 
Muslims over proselytism and conversion.  
As in the case of Mindanao, these findings affirm the key social divisions and 
issues identified during the Singapore pilot study, and add a somewhat unexpected 
emphasis on socio-economic divisions. Importantly, religion and class are not 
unrelated, with Malay communities considered to be disproportionately affected by 
income and educational disparities. Further, among the majority Chinese ethnic 
group, Chinese Christians tend to be younger and better educated, with higher 
income, as compared to Chinese Taoists who are older, less educated, and occupy a 
                                                 





lower socio-economic bracket (Tong 2008: 28, 50). Numerous participant examples of 
DNH impact analysis pertained to projects and services that exacerbate tensions 
along socio-economic lines.  
The definitional challenges encountered during the pilot study with regard to 
‘conflict’ and ‘civil society’ did not appear to be problematic during the workshop. I 
had shifted ‘conflict’ terminology to ‘promoting social harmony,’ and ‘religious civil 
society’ language to ‘religious community service.’65 Case studies and examples given 
during the workshop were drawn from latent conflict settings. During the workshop 
itself, participants did not hesitate to apply the DNH concepts to their own context, 
as elaborated below.  
 
Conceptualization of ‘Do No Harm’ 
This section includes the only quantitative data considered in this study, 
namely the simple participant ratings of DNH usefulness, together with qualitative 
findings on how participants perceive the purpose of the DNH tool.  
DNH Usefulness Ratings. Many of the research participants directly 
communicated their views on the usefulness of DNH through survey ratings (see 
Figure 5.2).  Both long- and short-form surveys probed participants’ levels of 
disagreement or agreement on DNH usefulness in their personal lives, inside their 
own churches/mosques, and in the surrounding community. These simple ratings 
were designed to be indicative of broad usage trends, and to inform pending 
decisions on the more complex qualitative aspects of the action research process.  
                                                 
65 The complete workshop title was ‘Promoting Social Harmony through Community Service: 




In these survey ratings, the most striking finding is simply that participants 
view DNH as being highly useful.  All of the mean ratings fall consistently between 
four (indicating that participants agree with a given statement of DNH usefulness) 
and five (indicating that participants strongly agree with the same). DMI as an 
agency is known to be enthusiastic about DNH, so survey questions were framed to 
elicit personal opinion. On the long-form survey, participants were encouraged: 
“Please feel free to answer honestly, in your local dialect and/or in English.”66 It is 
possible that DMI’s pre-existing commitment to DNH may have skewed the ratings 
slightly upwards, yet these are matched by equally strong ratings from Singapore. 
Further, the lower ratings from South Cotabato (So. Cot.) Province indicate that some 
participants were uninhibited in communicating negative feelings about DNH.  
In other notable patterns, the participants rate DNH’s usefulness in their 
personal life at approximately the same level as church/mosque and community 
applications.  There is no observable difference in usefulness ratings between DMI 
members (Cycle One) and participants from other agencies (Cycle Two), despite 
DMI’s pioneering role in DNH uptake. However, there is a possible linkage between 
the number of times participants have been trained and their usefulness ratings, with 
the mean ratings from first-time participant groups falling at 4.4 or below, and the 
mean ratings from participant groups that include repeaters falling at 4.5 or above. If 
so, this would indicate that perceptions of usefulness increase slightly with repeated 
DNH exposure.  
                                                 




Figure 5.2: Mindanao Participant Ratings on DNH Usefulness 






















n=20 n=19 n=21 n=8 n=30 n=14 
 
t=1.7 t=1* t=1* t=1.5 t=1.1 t=1* 
1. LF: LCP is useful for 
helping me 
understand the context 
of the area where I am 
working. 4.6   4.4   
2. LF/SF: LCP is useful 
in my personal life. 4.5 4.6 4.3 4.6 4.5 4.3 
3a. LF: LCP is useful 
inside my church or 
mosque. 4.5   4.7   
3b: SF: LCP is useful 
inside my own 
organization/ church/ 
mosque.  4.3 4.1  4.5 4.6 
4a. LF: LCP is useful in 
relationships between 
churches or mosques 
(of the same faith). 4.5   4.9   
4b. LF: LCP is useful in 
relationships between 
churches and mosques 
(of different faiths). 4.5   4.8   
5a. LF: LCP is useful 
when working in the 
community. 4.6   4.7   
5b. SF: LCP is useful 
outside my own 
organization/ church/ 
mosque (for example, 
with other religious or 
civic groups in the 
community).  4.3 4.1  4.4** 4.4 
Mean 4.5 4.4 4.2 4.7 4.5 4.4 
Numerical scale: 1=I strongly disagree.  2=I disagree.  
 3=I neither disagree nor agree.  4=I agree.  5=I strongly agree. 
Participants: n=number of respondents.  
t=mean number of times trained (*indicates an estimate) 





Perceptions on the Purpose of DNH. While the usefulness ratings described 
above generally affirmed the applicability of conflict sensitivity, our findings on 
subsequent questions began to challenge our assumptions.  Near the beginning of 
long-form surveys and all interviews, participants were asked to comment on their 
understanding of the purpose of DNH.  Responses varied widely, and many were 
not consistent with the originally intended purpose of the DNH tool. Only thirty 
percent of long-form surveys, 67 and eight percent of interviews,68 show participants 
describing DNH purpose in a way that clearly indicates analysis of the impact of a 
project or activity on intergroup conflict. More than half of those responses 
considered ‘orthodox’ came from DNH trainers, who would naturally be more likely 
to align themselves with the originally intended purpose of the tool. Further, several 
long-form survey respondents articulated general dissonance in understanding the 
framework, for example: “no such problem that could be seen in applying LCP 
framework as long as it is being understood”69  These findings led to much lively 
discussion among the research team, with Cycle One findings concluding that “DNH 
is seen as useful, but not fully understood.”70 
Two primary ‘unorthodox’ uses of DNH are evident in the data, including the 
use of DNH for peacebuilding purposes, and the selective use of certain DNH 
components. With regard to peacebuilding, frequent comments describing the 
                                                 
67 The total number of long-form surveys referenced is 28. (Interviews of members of regional 
sister interfaith groups are not included).  
68 The total number of interviews referenced is 24. (Interviews of research team members are 
not included). 
69 Prt. MI #5, long-form survey of DMI, Davao, Jan. 2008. 




purpose of DNH as “how to solve a conflict”71 demonstrate that many participants 
perceive DNH as a tool for direct, explicit peace work, including conflict resolution 
and collaborative problem solving. Some participants go so far as to claim that the 
purpose of DNH is “to show the root cause of conflict clearly; to understand the 
causes of conflict; to give remedies on how to solve the conflict in a peaceful 
manner.”72 At first, the research team attributed this peacebuilding linkage to 
conceptual mixing the Culture of Peace, the other core training module provided 
consistently to DMI members.  However it soon became apparent that the same 
pattern was evident even among the few participants who had not been trained in 
Culture of Peace.  Such findings imply that efforts by external facilitators to introduce 
DNH as a ‘minimalist’ form of conflict sensitivity (Duffield 2001b) will not remain 
minimalist if grassroots users see in DNH an expanded foundation for active 
peacebuilding (Ruth-Heffelbower 2002, Garred 2006a: 25-6, Goddard 2009). 
In a second ‘unorthodox’ usage of DNH, the data show a pattern of 
participants selectively using certain DNH concepts, rather than systematically using 
the entire DNH framework. There is a deep emphasis on the context analysis 
components of Dividers and Connectors. At times, Dividers and Connectors alone 
are in focus, and they have a powerful influence on shaping participants’ thinking, as 
in: the purpose of DNH is simply for “understanding the context of tension/dividers 
and connectors.”73 In other cases, the understanding of Dividers and Connectors is 
used to identify implications for future action, while bypassing the analysis of the 
                                                 
71 Prt. MI #93, long-form survey of DMI, Davao, Jan. 2008, punctuation added.  
72 Prt. MI #35, long-form survey of regional sister agencies, Sarangani, Philippines, 8 July 2008, 
translated, punctuation added. 




impact of currently existing activities. For example, one participant stated that the 
purpose of DNH is to “increase the connectors, decrease the dividers.”74 Another 
explained in greater detail that the purpose of DNH is “to know the realities of the 
presence of dividers and connectors in the community that may contribute to 
promotion of peace in local place.”75  
The research team attributed this selective use of the DNH framework to 
inadequate DNH learning, emphasizing a need for ongoing ‘refresher’ trainings and 
mentoring, including coaching in project impact analysis. Indeed, there is strong 
evidence in the data for repeated exposure, with one typical participant comment 
being paraphrased as follows:  I have been trained three times. The first two times 
“my mind did not understand.” The third time was “more interesting,” and “my 
mind already opened.” I understood “not only LCP, but also Do No Harm.”76 The 
importance of repeated exposures is affirmed by DNH experience in the 
humanitarian aid sector (Garred 2006a: 30). Nonetheless, this dissonance in usage 
patterns points also to the debate on the role of ‘tools’ in conflict sensitivity, and 
particularly to Neufeldt’s (2007) style distinction between ‘frameworkers’ and 
‘circlers.’ Neufeldt is addressing impact assessment for peacebuilding projects, rather 
than the work of nPCROs whose primary focus lies elsewhere. Even so, her 
observations, in light of the current findings, suggest that it its possible for DNH to 
                                                 
74 Prt. MI #57, long-form survey of DMI, Davao, Jan. 2008, translated. 
75 Prt. MI #80, long-form survey of DMI, Davao, Jan. 2008. (Note: Participant quotes have not 
been edited for ‘errors’ in grammar or punctuation, except where noted as necessary to ensure 
the readers’ understanding). 
76 Prt. MI #30, interview by author of regional sister agencies, Sarangani, Philippines, 10 July 




be conceptualized in different ways by different users, and that ‘circling’ may be 
relatively more common at the grassroots level.  
Despite the wide variation in perceptions on the purpose of the DNH, 
participants continue to demonstrate high levels of enthusiasm.  They often request 
further training opportunities and urge expanded DNH usage. They incorporate key 
DNH terms (especially Dividers and Connectors) into their vocabulary immediately 
after receiving training. Further, when asked if they had talked about DNH to people 
outside of DMI and its sister agencies, fifty-two percent of long-form survey 
respondents indicated that they had done so more than ‘occasionally.’ A number of 
participants have taken the initiative to train others shortly after participating in their 
first DNH workshop, despite not having participated in the Training of Trainers.77  
Comparative Findings from Singapore. As in Mindanao, Singapore 
workshop participants responded to DNH with enthusiasm. In evaluation surveys, 
ninety-two percent of respondents ranked the workshop content as “very useful” in 
general, while seventy-five percent saw DNH as “very useful” in their interfaith 
work. Participants perceived the tool as very versatile, making numerous comments 
such as: “DNH can be used for any project, and any relationship.”78 One prominent 
participant has collaborated with the Harmony Centre in developing an emerging 
vision for a Singapore-based interfaith training hub, including DNH as part of the 
core curriculum.79  
                                                 
77 Prt. MI #66, long-form survey of DMI, Davao, Jan. 2008. Prt. MI #30, long-form survey and 
interview of regional sister agencies, Davao, 8 and 10 July 2008.  
78 Prt. S #11, plenary discussion, DNH workshop, Singapore, 15 Mar. 2008, video recording. 




However, Singapore findings differed significantly from Mindanao findings 
in terms of how participants perceived the primary purpose of the DNH tool. 
Singaporean workshop participants immediately picked up the idea of DNH as 
“tools for analyzing projects.”80 Typical comments included the following: “it’s 
common sense, but also formalized in a way that you can analyze your project, that’s 
really very helpful.”81 Correspondingly, there were fewer comments that isolated 
context analysis to the exclusion of the rest of the DNH framework. Discussion of 
context was directly linked to analysis of unintended social impact, including the 
negative impacts less openly acknowledged in Mindanao.  “Your good intentions 
might actually translate into something that can become negative, and might actually 
disrupt the way the community works, rather than aiding.”82 For this reason, some 
participants emphasized the importance of advance analysis and planning, e.g. 
“planning B4 framing any schemes.”83 
Nonetheless, ten months later,84 four Malay Muslim participants who 
attended a follow-up group interview did not describe DNH as a tool for detailed 
project impact analysis. They had received no interim DNH exposure since the 
original workshop, despite the fact that the original participants had requested more 
training, stating “I’m sure we only got the tip of the iceberg here.”85 Thus follow-up 
interview participants confessed with some trepidation that they did not remember 
much about the particulars of DNH. They described DNH primarily as a broad 
                                                 
80 Anonymous evaluation #5, DNH workshop, Singapore, 15 Mar. 2008. 
81 Prt. S #11, plenary discussion, DNH workshop, Singapore, 15 Mar. 2008, video recording. 
82 Prt. S #14, plenary discussion, DNH workshop, Singapore, 15 Mar. 2008, video recording. 
83 Discussion board posting, DNH workshop, Singapore, 15 Mar. 2008 
84 Six months would have been a preferable interval, but timing was subject to Harmony 
Centre availability. 




concept, rather than a planning tool. They cited several ways in which the risk of 
unintended negative impacts on other people had influenced their own thinking, in 
ways that included but also went far beyond the DNH concern for intergroup conflict 
impacts. For example, one Muslim prison chaplain expressed concern about high 
recidivism rates, and wondered if his own religious counseling might be doing harm 
to the inmates.86  
That same participant also offered a piercing anecdote that illuminates the 
conceptual confusion caused by the tool’s two names. He stated that he had read my 
edited book, A Shared Future: Local Capacities for Peace in Community Development, 
published by World Vision International (2006b). His understanding was the World 
Vision had originated DNH but, because non-Christians were suspicious that World 
Vision might be motivated by proselytism, World Vision had later changed the name 
of the tool to LCP.  This participant’s limited understanding of DNH had become 
entwined with the local intergroup tensions, highlighting in particular the local 
sensitivities around religious conversion.87 
 
Personalization of ‘Do No Harm’ 
I explained above how research participants rated application to one’s 
personal life as a primary aspect of DNH ‘usefulness,’ despite the fact that personal 
development was not the originally intended purpose of the tool. That simple 
quantitative rating was strongly underscored by participants’ subsequent examples 
describing how they have used DNH.  The findings indicate that DNH has been used 
                                                 





extensively for personal growth purposes, significantly influencing the beliefs, values 
and behaviors of participants.  The same phenomenon has been observed among 
humanitarian aid and development workers (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 
2001, Barbolet et al. 2005a, Garred 2006a: 23-4), yet it appears to receive even greater 
emphasis among religious actors. Further, among religious actors, this process is seen 
as a type of spiritual transformation, deeply entwined with their own spirituality and 
their formation as a spiritual guide to others. 
Long-form survey participants were asked if they had “observed any 
significant changes” since they began using DNH.  Eighty-one percent88 of those 
respondents said yes.89  The vast majority of those who said yes described changes of 
a personal nature, primarily in themselves, and sometimes within DMI and its sister 
agencies. Some participants articulated a far-reaching shift in mindset, such as “LCP 
transformed my mind . . . and changed my perspective”90 and “It became my 
lifestyle.”91 Others emphasized the deeply personal nature of the process, for example 
locating the change “in my very self and in my personhood, especially in my 
family.”92 Only twenty percent of those participants who had observed changes since 
using DNH described those changes as relating to their organizations or projects.    
This section draws primarily on survey and interviews to outline the key 
themes that further elaborate how participants have applied DNH to their own lives, 
                                                 
88 The total number of long-form surveys referenced here is 58. 
89 The remaining eleven respondents left the question blank, but most of these were among 
the very small cluster of participants not yet trained in DNH.  Nobody answered this question 
in the negative.  
90 Prt. MI #142, pilot interview of DMI by author, Davao, 20 Apr. 2007. 
91 Prt. MI #57, long-form survey of DMI, Davao, Jan. 2008, translated.  





and to shaping their individual roles within a broader organization or community.  
The themes are closely interrelated, and therefore their identification is somewhat 
fluid. I myself have delineated and named the themes below, based closely on the 
research team’s deliberations at three points in the action research process.93  
Awareness of context and impact. The increased awareness of intergroup 
cleavages, Dividers and Connectors in one’s own social context is perhaps the most 
frequently reported aspect of DNH personalization among the participants. For one 
resident of South Cotabato Province, the purpose of DNH is “to know the difference 
between the tribes (B’laan) and the Christians.”94 Contextual awareness is often 
linked to an increased awareness of the impact of one’s actions, e.g. “You should 
know the impact/effect of your religious activities to your constituents, group, 
members.”95 As a result, participants describe a heightened level of sensitivity and 
caution in approaching their activities in a community. “In giving something I make 
sure it will not contribute more conflict.”96 In a departure from the ‘orthodox’ 
understanding of DNH (Anderson 1999: 23-36), some participants also refer to 
themselves as becoming a Connector or Divider, for example: “I have become 
watchful about my words, not to be a divider. For example, I do not say that the 
natives are dirty and lazy. Not to hurt or discriminate any tribe.”97   
                                                 
93 Summary of Learnings from Action Research Cycle One, Davao, 29 May 2008. Research 
team consultation, Davao, 14-15, 17 Jan. 2009. Research team consultation, Davao, 22-23 Apr. 
2009.  
94 Prt. MI #26, interview by author of regional sister agencies, Sarangani, Philippines, 10 July 
2008, translated. 
95 Prt. MI #8, long-form survey of DMI, Davao, Jan. 2008. 
96 Prt. MI #25, long-form survey of leaders of regional sister agencies, Davao, 12-13 Mar. 2008, 
translated. 





One research team member interprets the significance of this change for 
religious actors as follows: “Previously, the social context was not our priority. LCP 
showed us that we need to be aware of our social context.”98 This increased 
awareness of context and impact develops relatively quickly upon undergoing DNH 
training, and it appears to precede the other aspects of personal change identified 
below. Barbolet et al. (2005a: 5) report similar results using conflict sensitivity 
frameworks other than DNH.  
Catalyst for forming intergroup relationships. The action research 
participants frequently illustrate DNH usage by pointing to the formation of 
interethnic and interfaith relationships that did not previously exist.  Many 
participants emphasize that they themselves have taken the initiative to establish 
such relationships, marking a change in their own behavior. One participant 
describes the changes in himself as follows: “Before, I do not fellowship with other 
faiths/religion. I am not equal in my dealings with people . . . (Now) equal approach 
to people and above all, see to it that connectors will prevail . . . “99 Another describes 
the changes she has observed in her church congregation: “One of our church young 
people invited a group of Muslim ladies. We welcome them. The barrier was broken 
between our church and the mosque through LCP.”100   
Importantly, some participants go on to make a specific chronological linkage 
between such actions and their first exposure to DNH.  One Protestant pastor had 
been serving in a South Cotabato Province church for several years, before 
                                                 
98 Prt. MI #85, quoted in DMI’s Transformed Together (2010: 29). 
99 Prt. MI #100, long-form survey of leaders of regional sister agencies, Davao, 12-13 Mar. 2008, 
translated. 




participating in his first DNH training in February 2008. By April 2008, he had 
invited Catholic neighbors to lunch, in an effort to overcome a tension-filled 
relational “gap.” He talked with them about cross-participation of children in church 
services, which he recognized as a source of “doubts and rumors” regarding 
potential conversions. He states that he took these actions to follow up what he 
learned in the DNH workshop.101   
Shift from exclusive to inclusive mindsets. DNH training prompts religious 
actors to recognize systemic patterns of discrimination and separation as significant 
Dividers in the Mindanao context.  Such discrimination is seen as uncomfortably 
incompatible with the ideals of equal dignity, respect and human rights for all, which 
are increasingly promoted in Mindanao. In an effort to avoid worsening systemic 
discrimination, participants begin to question and adjust their own cultural beliefs 
and values towards people of different backgrounds. For example: “I respect them 
who they are that every human being has dignity and honor.”102 Further, these 
changes in mindset contribute to changes in day-to-day behavior: “For example, if 
there are people who asked for help, strangers or not, relatives or not, we help. If in 
need, poor or rich, the same approach.”103 A similar shift from exclusive to inclusive 
mindsets has previously been observed in other DNH applications in Mindanao and 
Indonesia (Riak 2006, Sihotang and Silalahi 2006), yet the religious actors in the 
current study often describe the shift in more spiritual terms.  
                                                 
101 Prt. MI #87, interview by author of regional sister agencies, Sarangani, Philippines, 8 July 
2008, translated. 
102 Prt. MI #28, long-form survey of DMI, Davao, Jan. 2008. 





Further, as mindsets become more inclusive, research participants have begun 
to recognize in their own religious teachings an implicit principle that one should not 
mix with people who have beliefs that are different, and therefore probably inferior.  
Thus one Protestant pastor confesses that his own denomination is a “very separatist 
religion,”104 and another explains that increasingly, “emotionally I could accept 
different opinion, ideas, status, etc.”105 The emergence of an inclusive outlook is 
iteratively linked to the increased intergroup relationships identified above. One 
pastor describes the growing relational links as follows: “I have a good friend, a 
Muslim brother, for both of us to have a good relationship, we show respect, share 
ways of worship, prayer and beliefs; avoid criticizing each other.”106 These findings 
on the centrality of human mindsets challenge the associational literature’s current 
emphasis on associational structures as the primary determinants of conflict impact, 
and these theoretical implications are examined in detail in Chapter Seven. 
DNH as compatible with one’s own faith.  For religious actors in Mindanao, 
the development of inclusive mindsets is a religious issue, interpreted in spiritual 
terms. In the words of one Evangelical pastor: “One tool that the Spirit of God is 
using is LCP.”107 The issue of religious inclusivity is not integral to DNH itself, but 
rather it arises when DNH is applied to the religio-cultural context of Mindanao.  
Participants experience these changes without abandoning their primary religious 
commitments. One Protestant pastor explains: “Before, I was so critical and many 
                                                 
104 Prt. MI #59, interview by author of regional sister agencies, Sarangani, Philippines, 20 July 
2008, translated. 
105 Prt. MI #67, long-form survey of DMI, Davao, Jan. 2008. 
106 Prt. MI #30, long-form survey of leaders of regional sister agencies, Davao, 12-13 Mar. 2008, 
translated.  




times did not want to be in the presence of other religious leaders in our place – LCP 
had given me the perspective on how to have fellowship and work with other 
religious leaders w/o compromising my personal faith to my God.”108 Many feel that 
DNH and interfaith engagement are making them better followers of their own 
faiths. “I am now open to different religion. I am now a better Christian because of 
LCP.”109 Further, participants also seek to share DNH within their own communities 
of worship, for example, “in my congregation I have shared some significance points 
about LCP.”110  These findings speak directly into the ‘religion gap’ evident in current 
associational theory, so the religious aspects of mindset change are analyzed more 
fully in Chapter Eight.  
Personal character and leadership development.  Changes made in relation 
to people of other ethnic and religious groups tend to be highly visible manifestations 
of DNH personalization.  However, participants also describe less visible changes in 
terms of their own personal character and the ways in which they exercise their 
leadership roles.  Participants’ increased consciousness of social divisions is applied 
to the small-scale divisions that can exist within a relatively homogenous church, 
mosque or neighborhood setting. In the words of one Evangelical pastor: “Realities in 
the church is the same like context in the community.”111 Another participant states 
that he uses DNH as an individual “peacemaker to my church as a pastor.”112 
Participants desire to model harmonious relationships, so they begin to avoid 
behaviors that might exacerbate Dividers, and increase behaviors that enhance 
                                                 
108 Prt. MI #80, long-form survey of DMI, Davao, Jan. 2008. 
109 Prt. MI #39 long-form survey of DMI, Davao, Jan. 2008. 
110 Prt. MI #80, long-form survey of DMI, Davao, Jan. 2008.  
111 Prt. MI #38, interview by research team of DMI, Davao, 13 Feb. 2008. 




Connectors. Thus one participant has changed her style of interaction: “I know now 
how to be humble, how to understand and to let others understand. And the people I 
worked with see this in me.”113 Another has changed his approach to management: 
“The way I manage the mosque, we did not build good rapport. But now we have a 
better relationship.”114 Further, religious leaders expect that their own growth and 
development will eventually influence others. One participant stated:  “In one 
interfaith occasion, all leaders from different religion were present in that occasion – 
showing unity. The community, seeing us, had hopes in their heart that peace is 
possible.”115  
On the whole, the Mindanao data provide strong evidence of significant 
change among individuals. The change is incremental, and not everyone experiences 
it at the same level. Indeed, one participant commented frankly:  “the change was not 
that great.”116 Nonetheless DNH appears to be seen as relevant by people in various 
stages of a shift towards inclusivity, and to move them further in the same direction. 
Notably, these changes cannot be attributed exclusively to DNH, for most 
participants have also been trained in the Culture of Peace, and shaped by the 
experience of participating in interfaith activities and relationships. However DNH 
personalization has made a major contribution, as evidenced by consistent references 
to DNH concepts such as Dividers, Connectors and Impact in participants’ stories of 
personal change.   
                                                 
113 Prt. MI #7, long-form survey of DMI, Davao, Jan. 2008, translated. 
114 Prt. MI #46, interview by research team of regional sister agencies, Sarangani, Philippines, 8 
July 2008, translated.  
115 Prt. MI #80, interview by research team of DMI, Davao, 15 Feb. 2008.  
116 Prt. MI #40, interview by research team of regional sister agencies, Sarangani, Philippines, 




Comparative findings from Singapore. As in Mindanao, participants 
indicated a clear and immediate application of DNH to their personal lives and 
individual roles within the community.  Key themes similar to those encountered in 
Mindanao were the usage of DNH in relationships, the recognition of unintended 
negative impacts, and the importance of personal growth.  The Singapore data also 
include a distinct yet related theme on managing how one’s own intentions will be 
perceived by others. Participants in Singapore were notably quick to identify and 
analyze such themes appearing in their own discussions. However, most participants 
had only one exposure to DNH, so the data do not indicate any deepening of DNH 
personalization over time, as it does in Mindanao.   
The primary theme identified and labeled by the participants themselves was 
their application of DNH to relationships, not only between the major ethno-religious 
groups but also among close friends and family. 117 Discussion board postings on this 
theme referenced specific behaviors such as “be a good listener” and “maintain & 
control emotions.” 118 At the conclusion of this discussion, one participant observed 
that “the relationship part is huge!”119 Others commented on how the DNH 
workshop had contributed to relationship building among the participants 
themselves. The probing nature of DNH analysis had prompted a deeper-than-usual 
discussion on ethno-religious relations in Singapore, and the participants shared 
examples that were meaningful to each other. A Chinese Protestant participant 
explained: “We have many things to get off our chests.”120 
                                                 
117 Discussion board posting, DNH workshop, Singapore,15 Mar. 2008.  
118 Ibid. 
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Another important theme identified by the participants themselves was a 
concept which they termed “managing perceptions.”121 There was an emphasis on the 
awareness of one’s own personal intentions, and how they might be perceived, or 
misperceived by others. “For me, managing perception is very important. It reminds 
me of this quotation: ‘We tend to judge ourselves based on our intentions, but we 
judge others based on their actions.’ . . . This tool is a life skill kind of thing”122 The 
participants use of terminology shows that these insights were inspired by the DNH 
impact mechanism of Implicit Ethical Messages, for example “be aware of your 
intention: implicit & explicit” and “making (the) implicit explicit.”123  
Recognition of potential unintended negative impacts was a closely related 
theme, not labeled by participants, yet clearly present in the data. Discussion board 
postings on this theme included the following:124 “Your individual actions do affect a 
group (community);” “understand unintended consequences of good decisions;” and 
“not harming others at any cost.” Underlying each of these themes was a cross-
cutting emphasis on growth in one’s own communication and thought processes, 
which included notions of openness to new ideas, such as “listening more than 
talking,” and “have an open mind when sharing.”125 Further, this was undergirded 
by an emphasis on self-critique, as in “self-reflection and personal evaluation,” and 
“pursue the whole truth, not my observations.” 126 
                                                 
121 Discussion board posting, DNH workshop, Singapore, 15 Mar. 2008. 








Finally, as in Mindanao, several participants articulated how DNH 
contributed to changes in overall mindset. Importantly, the participants invented the 
phrase “DNA of DNH”127 to refer to the core concepts of DNH and the way in which 
they can shape one’s thinking. “Now that I have learned the DNH and the DNA 
thing . . . it has encouraged me and given me a lot of ideas on how to improvise in 
working environment with social relations“128 It is striking to note that the mindset 
shift was evident after only one day of DNH exposure training.  
In the follow-up group interview one year later, personalization patterns were 
not detectable, due to the limited number of participants (four Malay Muslims). One 
participant commented on “better relationships” between people of ethnic groups 
and generations, yet found it easier to use DNH in her own home. “I use DNH in my 
family, with siblings. But in my community work, it would be difficult to use DNH, 
because I don’t know enough about each person’s background. I am afraid of what 
might be the impact of my proposal; I am trying to get immune to that fear.”129 
Another indicated that he had been considering the relationship between DNH and 
his own religious convictions. His recommendation for future DNH training was that 
“there must be a common denomination – such as the scriptures – some things 
cannot be re-designed!”130 
 
                                                 
127 Prt. S #10, plenary discussion, DNH workshop, Singapore, 15 Mar. 2008, video recording. 
128 Prt. S #13, plenary discussion, DNH workshop, Singapore, 15 Mar. 2008, video recording. 
129 Prt. S #8, follow-up interview by author, Singapore, 9 Jan. 2009. 




Operationalization of ‘Do No Harm’ 
The ‘operationalization’ of DNH refers to the active application of the 
framework in organizational planning and implementation of activities. This is the 
originally intended purpose of the tool yet, in the aid sector, successful 
operationalization has been found to depend upon the nature of prior DNH 
conceptualization and personalization among the participating individuals (CDA 
Collaborative Learning Projects 2001).  Where individual implementers are 
concerned, there is naturally some conceptual overlap between personalization and 
operationalization. Thus I distinguish DNH application to a person’s own role from 
DNH application that directly affects actions taken by a broader organization, even if 
that organization is unaware that DNH is being used.  
Operationalization of DNH within DMI as an agency. The formation and 
development of DMI itself is an example of ongoing DNH operationalization. First, 
the precursor to DMI was an island-wide network of religious leaders partnering 
with World Vision Development Foundation. World Vision has strong historical ties 
to Protestantism, and most members of the original religious leaders’ network were 
Evangelicals. However, from the late 1990s onward, this network was gradually 
expanded to include Roman Catholic and Muslim representatives, influenced in part 
by DNH dissemination among World Vision personnel.131 Second, World Vision 
began providing DNH training to DMI members in 2003, during DMI’s formative 
stages. DNH influenced DMI’s vision from the beginning, such that: “Though we 
began with a majority Evangelical membership, LCP analysis of our multifaith 
context continually challenges us to seek out more Catholic and Muslim members” 
                                                 




(Davao Ministerial Interfaith Inc. 2010: 19).  DMI founders established an enduring 
requirement that all new members must undergo DNH training. In the early years, 
when DNH training was delayed due to limited trainer availability, prospective DMI 
members were often obliged simply to wait.  
As DMI developed, its members applied DNH to explore how to conduct 
organizational activities in ways that include and avoid offending participants of all 
religious backgrounds. The research team describes the influence of DNH on key 
organizational activities as follows:  
 
Our activities must not create tension and exclusivity so we apply LCP to our 
DMI activities in many ways:  
• We build relationships upon the things that connect us, such as 
our faith in Almighty God / Allah, service for the common good of all 
people, desire for justice and peace, and the joy of sharing meals 
together.   
• We respect each other’s doctrine, so we do not debate about 
doctrinal issues in order to avoid divisive perceptions of proselytism 
and exclusivity. At the same time, we are willing to share information 
about our beliefs for mutual learning.  
• Each member contributes according to his/her beliefs.  For 
example, if a Catholic leads prayer, s/he leads it in a Catholic way. All 
DMI members accept this, knowing that a different religious group 
will have opportunity to lead prayer the next time.  
• We try to be sensitive in choosing songs and text during spiritual 
reflections. Some Christians do not appreciate fast, active worship 
songs, and some Muslims do not use music at all, so we respect each 
other’s preferences. 
• When we eat together, the choices of food being served must be 
acceptable to all, not including any pork because it is forbidden for 
Muslims.  
• We try to select meeting venues that are neutral because they are 
common to the public, not affiliated with any particular religious 
group.  
• When we teach seminars, the content is reviewed to ensure that it 
is appropriate for interfaith audiences. The seminars are co-led by 




• Incoming DMI members must undergo both LCP and Culture of 
Peace training to help them prepare their minds and hearts for 
interfaith fellowship (Davao Ministerial Interfaith Inc. 2010: 19-20).132 
 
DNH also influenced the foundational concepts underlying DMI’s flagship 
project, the Neighborhood Intergenerational Care Group. These Care Groups were 
formed in order to integrate spiritual nurture into the community development 
programs of partner agency Unity for Progress. The members meet weekly for 
learning about “God-centered” development133 and mutual relational support, and 
they also conduct holistic bayanihan134 activities to address practical community 
needs. This group concept was originally inspired by the Protestant practice of 
conducting Bible study in home based cell-groups. However, applying DNH 
concepts, the DMI Chair realized that the cell group idea would be perceived as 
catering only to Evangelicals, or as seeking to convert others, thus repelling non-
Protestant participants and reinforcing the religious separation. He also perceived 
generational gaps in the neighborhoods between youth and elders, which he desired 
to bridge. Thus the DMI Chair shaped the Care Group model to include people of all 
religions and age groups, in formats that support their own faith traditions, and 
without pressuring them towards religious conversion.135  At the time of the action 
research project, there were seven established Care Groups.  
                                                 
132 I assisted DMI by drafting the cited publication, Transformed Together, reflecting the 
research team’s conclusions and detailed editorial guidance. This portion of text was 
considered so sensitive that the research team reviewed it several times, and shaped the 
wording with great precision.   
133 DMI Purok (Neighborhood) Intergenerational Care Group Primer, Volume 1, Davao, n.d. 
134 Bayanihan is the Visayan term for people working together in sad and difficult times. 





Most of the Care Groups were launched by Evangelical members of DMI, but 
through adapting their spiritual reflection practices and sharing communication and 
leadership with people of other faiths, they have gradually made significant progress 
towards integration of Protestants with Roman Catholics and practitioners of other 
Christian-leaning faiths. For example, the Care Group in the Marapangi 
neighborhood of Davao City is now over eighty percent Roman Catholic.136 The two 
Care Groups meeting in the Dumoy neighborhood contain significant numbers from 
the Iglesia ni Kristo, a Filipino church viewed as heretical by many local Protestants. 
The Evangelical leader of the Dumoy groups explains his approach as follows: “For 
me, LCP is good for me to communicate . . . to remove some barriers . . . many times, 
even Pastor _____ asked me what is my technique to work in that area, because many 
of my PIGCG137 members come from the Iglesia ni Kristo . . . I focus on building 
relationships . . .”138 
Despite this significant progress in creating religiously mixed structures, DMI 
members acknowledge that they have not yet met all of their goals, as there are no 
Muslim Care Group members.  The research team consultation at the conclusion of 
Cycle One provided an opportunity for team members to discuss in some depth the 
issue of Muslim participation in the Care Groups.139 The research team explained that 
Muslim participation would require Muslim Care Group leaders, since the public 
suspicions associated with Protestant group leaders could not be fully overcome. 
                                                 
136 Prt. MG #35, interview by author of Care Group members, Davao, 22. Sep. 2008, audio 
recording.  
137 Purok (Neighborhood) Intergenerational Care Group. 
138 Prt. MG #36, interview by author of Care Group members, Davao, 10 Oct. 2008, audio 
recording. The name of the Pastor has been removed to protect identity. 




“’Pastor’ leading P-IGCG gave negative impact due to general history of 
conversion.”140  Muslim Care Group leaders would of course need to be drawn from 
Muslim DMI members, whose numbers were still very limited. While DMI’s Board 
combines Evangelical, Roman Catholic and Muslim leadership, their fifty-strong 
membership consists of approximately sixty percent Protestant, thirty-five percent 
Catholic and only five percent Muslim141 (Davao Ministerial Interfaith Inc. 2010: 20). 
Further, the team discussed openly the sensitive fact that Care Group 
participation patterns were based upon previous beneficiary selection decisions made 
by Unity for Progress.  Perceptions differed as to how many Muslim children were 
actually sponsored by the Unity for Progress as a Protestant-affiliated agency. The 
Muslim team member believed that there were no Muslim sponsored children. The 
Evangelical and Catholic team members believed that Muslim children were 
sponsored wherever they were living in the targeted neighborhoods. However, 
Muslim neighborhoods are often separated from Christian neighborhoods and, 
despite queries, it was not known how many Muslim neighborhoods were served by 
Unify for Progress. Christian members pointed out that DMI’s intention was to open 
the first Muslim Care Group soon, in a particular Muslim neighborhood of Davao 
City.  
Finally, the research team also noted that although Care Group facilitation 
materials had become significantly more ecumenical, they were still largely Bible-
based. “The module is Christianized.”142 The Care Group practice of seeking 
                                                 
140 Analysis board posting, research team consultation notes, Davao, 2-3 Apr. 2008, 4. 
141 Approximately 20% of DMI members are Lumads (indigenous persons), and their religious 
affiliation is either Protestant or Roman Catholic.   




endorsement from key neighborhood leaders had advanced further among Roman 
Catholic and secular leaders than among Muslim community leaders, leaving 
significant room for doubt among Muslims about the intention of the Care Group.  In 
a revealing joke, the Muslim research team member asked: “What does PIGCG 
mean?” He was unfamiliar with the acronym PIGCG for Purok Intergenerational Care 
Group, and pointed out that PIGCG would sound to Muslims like ‘PIG Care Group,’ 
making it obviously unattractive because pork is forbidden for Muslims.143 The 
research team identified action items to address these Muslim participation issues,144  
but by the end of 2008 no progress had been made due to Care Group funding cuts.  
These DMI experiences suggest a number of complexities in operationalizing 
DNH.  The success in fostering collaboration between Catholic and Protestant 
groups, and redefining the stance of both towards Muslims, are significant 
achievements that are counter-cultural in nature. These changes are attributable 
largely, but not exclusively, to the use of DNH.  Yet conflict-sensitive change relating 
to DMI’s ethos and core operations is clearly a process ongoing over time.  Further, 
the effort to increase Muslim participation in the Care Groups has encountered a 
number of organizational barriers, including membership composition, funding 
restrictions and shortfalls, competing priorities and limited time in an organization 
comprised of busy volunteers. This reality illuminates well the increasing insistence 
among some conflict sensitivity researchers on the importance of overall 
organizational capacity and leadership (De la Haye and Moyroud 2003, Barbolet et al. 
2005b), over and above the analytical skill of individual workers.  
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Operationalization of DNH through DMI members’ own organizations. 
DMI trains its members in DNH not only to prepare them for participation in the 
interfaith network, but also with hope that DMI members will ‘operationalize’ DNH 
through their own churches, mosques or other religious organizations. Such 
applications are particularly important in addressing this study’s central inquiry on 
the social impacts of nPCROs, as associations whose mandates are not conflict-
focused, because DMI members’ own organizations are more purely non-conflict-
focused.  Therefore in considering DNH operationalization, the research team was 
looking for explicit applications of DNH in the planning of non-DMI projects and 
services. However, the data revealed that participants’ operationalization of DNH on 
those particular terms was actually somewhat unusual.   
In action research Cycle One, surveys and interviews revealed that DMI 
members were indeed using DNH through their own religious organizations, but this 
effort was focused within the organization itself, rather than on outward-looking in 
relation to the community. Even though DNH usefulness ratings were approximately 
equal across personal, church/mosque and community applications, examples of 
actual DNH application leaned strongly toward the internal. Further, DMI members’ 
usage of DNH often focused not on formal project planning, but on their own 
formation and decision-making as leaders, and their resulting influence on others.145 
Only sixteen percent of DMI survey respondents, and forty-four percent of DMI 
interview respondents, provided clear examples of using DNH to plan organizational 
projects. Most of these were DNH trainers or research team members. In contrast, 
most participant examples focused on applying DNH in their own organization by 
                                                 




changing themselves as leaders, and thirty percent further described teaching others 
to pursue the same type of change.  Further, at least forty-four percent of 
interviewees mentioned the difficulty of operationalizing DNH when there were no 
other DNH practitioners within their organization, suggesting a lack of ‘critical mass’ 
(Rogers 1995, Harder 2006).  While affirming the individual progress that such 
findings represent, the research team also suggested that DNH operationalization 
could be expanded at the organizational level through ‘refresher’ training and 
mentoring of DMI members, and DNH introductory training for the members within 
their churches and mosques.  
In Cycle Two findings, the DNH usage patterns of DMI’s sister agencies 
around southern Mindanao146 paralleled those of DMI’s own members, emphasizing 
application to the role of the individual religious leader. However, the Cycle Two 
effort to gather examples of project impact analysis resulted in another significant 
surprise to the research team. Eleven sister agency participants were selected for 
interviews because their surveys appeared to indicate that they had examples to 
share. Nonetheless, when asked directly for examples of project impact analysis, a 
central issue emphasized during DNH training, the great majority of interview 
participants was unable to answer. Approximately half did share examples of how 
DNH had helped them to identify an opportunity to improve the impact of their 
activities on intergroup relationships, so they had taken action to address it.  The 
interviewers were able, through intense conversational probing, to uncover and 
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document a form of impact analysis woven, largely unconsciously, through these 
narratives.  
Further, most of the project impact analysis examples derived from Cycle 
Two interviews were framed in terms of positive impact on conflict, rather than 
negative impact. In some cases, the religious actor simply observed an immediate 
opportunity for positive action through supporting Connectors or undermining 
Dividers. For example, an Evangelical pastor who also serves as a neighborhood 
council member147 in Sarangani Province described how DNH shaped his ideas for 
organizing community recovery in the wake of rice field flooding. He worked 
through the traditional community leaders to mobilize residents for mutual help 
work brigades,148 because he recognized the traditional leaders as Connectors who 
commanded respect and convening power.  Further, the work brigades successfully 
brought together common laborers with higher status community members, bridging 
a relational tension that existed in the community due to economic disparity.149 This 
example reveals no analysis of the impact of one’s own current projects and services, 
but rather an awareness of how existing Connectors and Dividers could interact with 
future plans, with the impacts viewed by the implementer as positive.  
In other cases, participating religious actors described their positive impact in 
ways that implied a critique of one’s own current or past activities. For example, the 
afore-mentioned Protestant pastor from South Cotabato Province described how he 
applied DNH insights in inviting Catholic neighbors to lunch, in an effort to 
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overcome a tension-filled relational “gap.” He talked with the Catholics about cross-
participation of children in church services, which he recognized as a source of 
“doubts and rumors” regarding potential conversions.150  This action implied an 
unspoken recognition that he himself had been at least partially responsible for the 
gap in relationships and communication. In DNH analysis, this could be considered a 
negative impact, reinforcing the pervasive pattern of religious exclusivism and 
separatism prominent in Mindanao. However, I was initially the only one who saw 
such examples as implying an unintended negative impact. The research team leader, 
herself a Roman Catholic, did not see it this way, possibly pointing to an important 
difference in our own perspectives.151  
By the end of Cycle Two, the research team had formulated a well-developed 
explanation of why the research participants emphasized positive impacts and rarely 
recognized the negative. This phenomenon was attributed to the lack of conceptual 
emphasis on DNH as a tool for project impact analysis, combined with the time 
required for progressive DNH personalization, which often demands the capacity to 
recognize deep Dividers from the perspective of identity groups that are opposed to 
one’s own. Further, the DMI members of the research team saw within their own 
professional culture a tendency to focus on the positive, which they recognized as 
contrasting with the culture of results-oriented self-critique common among aid 
workers. In Transformed Together, the research team described this paradigm as 
follows:  
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There are many reasons why we as religious leaders might find it difficult to 
recognize unintended negative impact. We in the religious sector naturally 
tend to: 
• Focus on the positive. 
• Focus on spiritual realities, rather than on the social, political and 
economic context of the community we are serving. 
• Judge our work based on our motives and intentions, rather than on 
outcomes. 
• Give our very best, investing our heart and soul in all that we do, 
making it painful to acknowledge any negative impact. 
• Believe that our relationship to Almighty God / Allah, or our role as 
religious leaders, prevents us from making serious mistakes (Davao 
Ministerial Interfaith Inc. 2010: 60).  
 
Significantly, the research team also observed that many participants self-
critiques appeared to be limited in depth, stating that “sometimes we don’t agree 
with their analysis.”152 The Catholic members of the research team pointed out that 
the aforementioned Evangelical pastor in South Cotabato Province had focused on 
improving his relationships with Catholic neighbors, but had not articulated any 
consideration of whether or not his church was in fact seeking to convert the Catholic 
children, a common practice in Mindanao which often exacerbates tensions owing to 
the long history of large-scale politically-influenced conversions.  
A similar example of limited self-critique came from another Protestant pastor 
in South Cotabato Province, who responded to a conflict between his church and 
another neighboring Protestant congregation by inviting the pastor to attend DNH 
training, which “opened his mind,” and led to improved mutual communication 
such that “we do not mind that problem already.”153 However, the inviting pastor did 
not waver in his analysis of the underlying source of tension, which was the disputed 
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ownership of the land on which the other church stood. He simply stated that the 
land belonged to his own denomination, even though the other church could not 
recognize or accept this reality.154 
Perhaps most concerning was the example of  a Christian lay leader,155 from a 
migrant ethnic group, who also serves as a member of his local neighborhood 
council. In his context analysis, he describes his community as being characterized by 
tension between majority migrants and minority Lumads. The primary source of 
tension is the history of settlers acquiring local lands through means considered legal 
under national law, but foreign and highly questionable to the Lumads. Some 
Lumads came to this neighborhood council member to ask for help in getting their 
lands back. He applied his DNH understanding in formulating his response, 
paraphrased as follows:  
 
I explained to the Lumads in a nice way that it’s no longer possible, because 
the lands now legally belong to the migrants. Also I explained that the 
government has a program to give lands to the tribes, but it will not be the 
original land, it will be the land where they are now located in the hills. 
Before LCP, I would have become angry with them, but now I know how to 
“talk to them in a nice manner.” Now the Lumads accept it more, it’s more 
OK. 156 
 
This land dispute described by this neighborhood council member mirrors the 
broader trends considered to be root causes of conflict across Mindanao. Further, as a 
local leader in religion and politics, and a member of the dominant migrant ethnic 
group, this council member applied his DNH analysis from a position of considerable 
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power.  The research team expressed deep concern that DNH was apparently being 
used to smooth intergroup communications in lieu of addressing the underlying 
issues of the dispossession and marginalization of Lumad and Bangsamoro 
communities.  Such findings point directly to a key limitation of the DNH tool as 
elaborated in Chapter Two, namely that DNH’s local focus and lack of explicit 
reference to social justice issues may result in DNH users overlooking the existence of 
structural violence (Galtung 1969). The team concluded that in addition to coaching 
on project impact analysis, DNH should be paired with the ‘Culture of Peace’ or 
another source of instruction on macro-level historical dynamics, to develop 
awareness of root causes of conflict. Further, they suggest facilitated opportunities for 
DNH learners of different identity groups to discuss context analysis together, to 
begin to understand Dividers from the perspective of ‘the other.’ 
Comparative Findings from Singapore. In Singapore, despite the fact that the 
participants’ first DNH discussions were focused on the role of government, a 
subsequent brainstorm on potential future uses of DNH shifted the discussion into 
the religious sector. Participants envisioned a broad range of ideas for 
operationalizing DNH, which they had not yet had opportunity to implement.  
Muslim participants envisioned using DNH to plan activities within their own 
mosques, such as to help “create mosque friendly atmosphere” and to inform 
“mosque fundraising.” The entire group hoped to use DNH to further interfaith 
engagement, both to “present the need for interfaith engagement” and to inform the 
planning of the encounters themselves, including youth interfaith events. Similarly, it 
was agreed that DNH could be used within the interfaith bodies that already exist, 




and even the Harmony Centre which hosted the DNH pilot training.157 The 
application of DNH to the Harmony Centre sparked an immediate impromptu 
impact analysis, which is examined in Chapter Six.  
In terms of religious community services (an approximate parallel to DMI’s 
community development activities), participants envisioned using DNH for planning 
“in helping the needy – DNH (is) important as their problems are multifold and 
sensitive.” This comment was meant to encompass both services offered inside 
Singapore and international service efforts led by Singaporean agencies.  Other 
related applications included organizational development, such as “visioning/values 
exercises with boards” and “volunteer welfare organisation: to examine their 
relationship with community.”158 
One year later, in the follow-up focus group discussion, one individual 
described how she had applied the DNH concept, broadly defined, to activity 
planning with in the mosque. Another described having applied the DNH concept to 
analyze the design of the prison chaplaincy program in which he was serving. None 
of the four participants present reported DNH usage beyond the individual level. 
The same participants offered further recommendations on future use of DNH in 
Singapore, again underscoring envisioned applications in both the religious and 
government sectors.  The focus group participants also mentioned several difficulties 
in using DNH. One participant emphasized that DNH tool works well only when the 
user is not biased. The user must set aside the personal, and “should not impose their 
                                                 





(own) values . . . So the tool may not be useful if it involves fanatics.”159 This caveat 
parallels the Mindanao findings on limited self-critique among some DNH 
practitioners, and persistence in analyzing social divisions from the perspective of 
one’s own identity group. Another pointed out, again paralleling Mindanao, that 
operationalizing DNH at the organizational level requires more than one person to be 
trained in DNH, so they can work on it together.160  
Most recently, fascinating insights were offered by a Protestant training 
participant who was not available at the time of the follow-up focus group 
discussion.161 She reflected on DNH applicability from her own perspective as a 
central interfaith leader in Singapore. She herself had found DNH very useful, and 
the central concept of unintended negative impact on conflict had significantly 
influenced her thinking, although she did not use the full framework. She shared her 
surprise and frustration at seeing little DNH usage among participants exposed to 
DNH, punctuated by colorful expressions such as “I just cannot understand why they 
can’t see its relevance” and “I can’t believe he didn’t get it!” She attributed the limited 
DNH uptake to two causes. First, she emphasized a lack of capacity-building follow-
up, stating that “the participants were not able to carry it back to their organizations,” 
and the pilot workshop was not soon followed by other DNH events. Harmony 
Centre discussion of additional training was very positive in tone, but staff members 
were busy, so plans proceeded slowly. They did request a subsequent DNH exposure 
workshop in January 2009, which I provided immediately before leaving Singapore.  
Limited follow-up is a known obstacle to conflict sensitivity uptake in the aid sector 
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(Lange 2004) and in the Mindanao data, so in this respect the Singapore data simply 
provide further confirmation.  
This interviewee’s162 second attributed cause of limited DNH uptake was 
significantly more unique. She pointed strongly to the question of how participants 
perceive the relevance of DNH in Singapore’s latent conflict setting. “The tool I think 
is a useful thing. The only issue is how do you present it to societies that believe they 
are relatively tolerant and harmonious? That for me has always been the issue, how 
to present it contextually.” She made no reference to the careful contextualization 
steps already taken in consultation with the Harmony Centre, including framing the 
workshop around resilience as ‘Promoting Social Harmony through Community 
Service,’ indicating that such steps were perhaps insufficient. Recognition of subtle 
conflict has been a recognized challenge in the humanitarian aid sector, but it can 
usually be addressed by incorporating models for latent conflict or structural 
violence into the training (Garred 2006a: 16-17). Nonetheless, the consistency with 
which this theme has arisen, from the pilot phase through the post-training follow-
up, points to the uniqueness of Singaporean culture’s active promotion of a peaceful 
and tolerant self-view.163 The interviewee points to the need to reconsider the 
capacity building point of entry.  
 
Conclusion: The Value of Cross-Site Comparison 
The use of two research sites is essential to this project, for in order to probe 
the broad applicability of conflict sensitivity to the religious sector, one must begin to 
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ascertain whether the approach is relevant and useful in a variety of contexts. 
Mindanao and Singapore, while both influenced by similar regional trends in ethno-
religious conflict, present sharp differences in their levels of physical violence and 
economic development, and the role of their associational sectors. Indeed, while 
DNH has been enthusiastically received in both contexts, the conflict sensitivity 
testing findings do differ significantly.   
DNH is being used extensively and productively among religious actors in 
Mindanao, but not necessarily for the project impact analysis purposes originally 
intended, due in part to a complex combination of cultural factors influencing 
cognitive style. DMI remains enthusiastic about DNH and plans to continue 
promoting DNH uptake, while working to address the concerns and adaptations 
indicated by the action research findings.  The recommendations of the research team 
center on increased DNH capacity building, follow-up and mentoring. Nevertheless, 
when faced with the intensive training required to produce skilled DNH 
practitioners, and to encourage active DNH application at the level of organizational 
planning, the DMI has begun to grapple with the reality that effective dissemination 
will not be fast.   Even DNH, as one of the simplest conflict sensitivity tools available, 
can become difficult to implement, “given shortages of staff, time and money” 
(Schmelzle 2005).  
In contrast, DNH project impact analysis is quickly grasped and appreciated 
by religious actors in Singapore. This finding suggests that the cognitive dissonance 
seen in Mindanao in relation to the analytical and planning-oriented underpinnings 
of DNH may pertain more to mainstream Mindanowan culture, or to the style 




professional culture found within the religious sector. However, despite the quick 
conceptual grasp of Singaporean participants, the DNH framework is being used 
sparingly there, due to conflicted perceptions about its relevance in a setting of latent 
conflict and restricted associational influence, as well as limited capacity building 
follow-up. The relatively small scope of the Singaporean testing effort reflects the 
difficulty of gaining a sustained audience for conflict sensitivity in Singapore, and the 
importance of contextualizing conflict sensitivity to the ‘felt needs’ of a given 
practitioner audience, as well as sustained exposure over time.  In effect, while the 
Singapore testing process alone would not be sufficient for drawing conclusions on 
conflict sensitivity applicability, it provides an essential cross-check to aid in 
interpreting Mindanao findings. The weight of the facilitation effort is a common 
theme across the two testing sites, as further considered in my Chapter Seven 





THE APPLICABILITY OF CONFLICT SENSITIVITY 
TO RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS 
 
The best way to understand something is to try to change it. 
- Popularly attributed to action research pioneer Kurt Lewin 
(Greenwood and Levin 2007: 18) 
 
This chapter builds on the empirical action research findings described in 
Chapter Five to consider the answers to the project’s first level of research questions 
regarding conflict sensitivity: Is conflict sensitivity applicable (relevant and useful) in 
helping religious associations to improve their social impact in multifaith conflict-
vulnerable contexts? If so, to what extent, and in what ways? While Chapter Five was 
focused on the analysis of participant data, this chapter represents my own 
assessment of the findings, independent of the conclusion of Mindanowan and 
Singaporean partners.  Central to this chapter is the question of how conflict 
sensitivity differs in the religious sector as compared to the aid sector. To that end, 
the chapter considers emergent conflict sensitivity literature and external data from 
both sectors, not available at the time of action research design, which necessarily 
influences my own conclusions.  
In considering the relevance and usefulness of conflict sensitivity for religious 
associations, my conclusion is a qualified ‘yes.’  The participating religious actors 
clearly see conflict sensitivity as very useful, even though some in Singapore 
perceived conflict sensitivity as less pressing in urgency due to the latent and often 
unrecognized nature of Singapore’s social cleavages. In both locations, the action 
research data link conflict sensitivity uptake to an increased awareness of the social 




interact with this social context. Among individuals, there has been noteworthy 
change in beliefs, values and behaviors, marking a spiritualized shift from 
exclusiveness to inclusiveness. Among organizations, despite various delays and 
inconsistencies, the Mindanao data reveal a progressive adjustment of associational 
practices, including the development of the intercommunal structures so lauded in 
the associational literature (Putnam 2000, Varshney 2002). 
As anticipated in Chapter Two, the introduction of conflict sensitivity to the 
new religious audience requires some adaptation of the conceptual levels of 
complexity and points of entry. More surprisingly, three areas of dissonance have 
surfaced, all of which constrain the identification and rectification of unintended 
negative impacts on conflict. These areas of dissonance arise in both the broad 
concepts of conflict sensitivity and the specific features of the Do No Harm 
(Anderson 1999) framework selected for testing. I examine here the de-emphasis of 
the practice of project impact analysis, the influence of religious beliefs regarding 
unintentional harm, and the risk of overlooking structural violence (Galtung 1969). 
These three areas of dissonance give rise to several dilemmas in determining how to 
best adapt conflict sensitivity approaches to equip practitioners in the religious 
sector.  
Finally, there is strong evidence that project impact analysis patterns are 
unique in the religious sector as compared to the humanitarian aid sector, and must 
be re-identified through field-based research. This, too, was anticipated in Chapter 
Two. Thus I return now to the empirical data to analyze in greater detail the 
preliminary patterns identified, primarily in Mindanao, and supplemented by 




significance, which underscores the importance of practitioners conducting and 
applying accurate project impact analyses. Further, these findings contribute 
significantly to what will be a longer process of identifying religious sector impact 
patterns through field-based research in multiple contexts, and lay a rich foundation 
for the theoretical implications to be elaborated in Chapters Seven and Eight on the 
associational conflict impacts of nPCROs (non-peace and conflict resolution 
organizations).  
 
The Practice of Project Impact Analysis 
In the humanitarian aid sector, the original primary purpose of the DNH 
framework was to analyze the impact of a particular project or activity on the 
surrounding context of intergroup relationships. Thus it is striking that in Mindanao, 
the participating religious actors rarely conceptualize or utilize DNH as a tool for 
project impact analysis. Instead, they tend to associate DNH with the broader 
concept of avoiding unintentional harm, usually to intergroup relations, but 
sometimes to other aspects of community life. DNH’s context analysis components 
(Dividers and Connectors) are used more frequently than its impact analysis 
components, and the widespread use of DNH for personal growth and peacebuilding 
purposes obscures DNH’s more minimalist (Duffield 2001b: 94) function of 
identifying and avoiding unintended negative impact. In Singapore, participants 
were quicker to conceptualize DNH as a tool for project impact analysis, yet follow-
up mentoring was not possible, and post-training follow-up interviews revealed that 




This lack of project impact analysis could be seen as a potential indicator of 
mismatch between conflict sensitivity and the religious sector. At the same time, it 
was previously known that repeated DNH exposure improves the consistency and 
accuracy of uptake (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2001, Garred 2006a), so one 
might deduce that the answer lies in more capacity building.  Importantly CDA 
Collaborative Learning Projects, the originator of DNH, began in early 2009 to 
disseminate the findings from a series of field-based case studies on DNH usage. 
CDA’s findings were released just as my own action research fieldwork was 
concluding, so they informed neither my project design nor my consultations with 
field-based partners. Nonetheless, CDA has provided some rather dramatic updates 
regarding DNH usage patterns in the aid sector. The CDA findings help to discern 
which aspects of my own findings reflect conflict sensitivity issues that are unique to 
the religious sector, as opposed to issues common to all conflict sensitivity 
practitioners.    
First, CDA found that a significant percentage of people exposed to DNH do 
not actually use the tool (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2009b). To a greater 
extent than was previously appreciated, it is now clear that repeated training and 
mentoring is required to bring practitioners to the point of operationalizing DNH 
(Garred and Goddard 2010)164. This prompts the question of whether the DNH tool or 
the training methods might be revised to support more efficient uptake. CDA also 
appears to be giving more attention to issues of overall organizational capacity to 
support operational mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity (Doughty 2008: 17), akin to 
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the approach advocated by Barbolet et al. (2005b, see also De la Haye and Moyroud 
2003). Significantly, these CDA findings indicate that general delays and 
inconsistencies in operational uptake are not unique to the religious sector, while at 
the same time affirming the relative usability of DNH for local and grassroots 
practitioners (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2008a). 
Second, CDA found that explicit project impact analysis was surprisingly rare 
in the aid sector, as it was in my own religious sector data. A similar ambiguity 
regarding the purpose of DNH (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2009a), and the 
frequent use of the tool for peacebuilding purposes (Goddard 2009), have been 
commonly found among aid sector practitioners. Further, CDA’s findings illustrate 
very clearly that some people use DNH as the originally intended analytical ‘tool,’ 
but many others use DNH as a ‘lens’ (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2008a, 
Garred and Goddard 2010).  Neufeldt’s (2007) typology of ‘frameworker’ and ‘circler’ 
users in peace and conflict impact analysis resonates closely here. Such differences in 
usage are often linked to personality or culture, in addition to varied levels of 
training and practice. In a revealing bit of humor, one Mindanowan female pastor 
expressed strong enthusiasm for DNH, yet her husband pointed out that “every time 
you go to that seminar, you get a headache.” 165 She is, in all likelihood, a ‘circler’ 
rather than a ‘frameworker.’ Importantly, both ‘circler’ and ‘frameworker’ styles can 
be effective in improving social impact (Neufeldt 2007, CDA Collaborative Learning 
Projects 2008a). 
Finally, CDA findings indicate that many more people use DNH’s context 
analysis components (Dividers and Connectors) than its project impact analysis 
                                                 




components. In focusing on Dividers and Connectors, the rest of the analysis often 
becomes implicit. It is rarely articulated and almost never written, yet it may be 
present in the practitioner’s thinking, leading to effective program design decisions 
(CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2008a). The strong emphasis on Dividers and 
Connectors was also very present in the Mindanao data. Again, these emerging usage 
patterns suggest that the de-emphasis of DNH project impact analysis is not 
necessarily unique to the religious sector. To a certain extent, the CDA findings 
alleviate the need to grapple with the lack of project impact analysis as a potential 
indicator of mismatch between conflict sensitivity and the religious sector.  
CDA prioritizes the preferences of the end user when emphasizing that there 
are multiple ways to make effective use of DNH. Specifically, emerging CDA 
documents propose that DNH training could focus primarily on Dividers and 
Connectors (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2008a), and they propose an 
alternative DNH framework that de-emphasizes the details of project impact analysis 
(CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2010).  If such changes serve to support 
‘circlers’ equally with ‘frameworkers,’ and if both types of users reach the stage of 
DNH operationalization, then the new training approaches hold much promise. If, 
however, such changes encourage practitioners to remain content with DNH 
conceptualization and personalization, without moving on to operationalization, then 
the de-emphasis of project impact analysis may come at a very high cost. DMI’s 
research team leader expressed the dilemma as follows: “At first, I used LCP only for 




impacts of my actions. It’s good to use LCP for our personal transformation, but we 
shouldn’t stop there. We should analyze our impact.”166  
 
Religious Culture and Unintended Negative Impact 
Closely related to the question of project impact analysis are the Mindanao 
findings indicating some reluctance in identifying unintended negative impact on 
intergroup relations. To be sure, when participants recognize that their actions might 
have undesirable side effects, this realization significantly influences mindsets and 
actions. Yet for many participating religious actors, the recognition of unintended 
negative impact was slow and/or limited in comparison to aid sector practitioners. 
Unintended negative impact sometimes went unidentified, and was often framed 
differently as an opportunity for change to achieve positive impact.167   
The DMI research team attributed this dissonance largely to differences 
between the professional culture of the aid sector, from whence conflict sensitivity 
arose, and the religious sector. Indeed, the intense scrutiny faced by international aid 
organizations from the 1990s onwards (see for example Maren 1997) has made many 
aid professionals highly conscious of unintended consequences of all kinds. On the 
other hand, Mindanowan religious actors were found to be more focused on the 
positive than the negative, more on spiritual practices than on the surrounding socio-
political context, and more on religious motives rather than service outcomes (Davao 
Ministerial Interfaith Inc. 2010: 60).168 Similarly, the aid sector also fosters a culture of 
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analysis and planning, which is not necessarily a priority for religious leaders in 
Mindanao. One key DMI leader has observed that it is a “challenge to integrate the 
LCP framework, because most of religious leaders are not oriented in planning and 
evaluation.”169 
  Even for religious actors who grasp the concept of unintended negative 
impact on intergroup relations, certain religious beliefs may prevent these actors 
from applying the concept to their own work. The DMI research team noted a 
tendency to “believe that our relationship to Almighty God / Allah, or our role as 
religious leaders, prevents us from making serious mistakes” (Davao Ministerial 
Interfaith Inc. 2010: 60). The research team understood this belief to exist among both 
Christians and Muslims.  In subsequent research, a Roman Catholic DMI member 
commented on her first DNH training as follows (Garred and Goddard 2010: 13): “I 
felt confused about Dividers and Connectors and Impacts. When your intentions are 
good, isn’t it always a good impact?  I believed that the Lord would straighten any 
crooked lines I made.  I will do my best, but God will take care of the rest.  Maybe 
negative impacts were part of God’s plan.” However after repeated training, this 
member later became an active DNH user.  
A similar reluctance to consider error has also been found in experimental 
conflict sensitivity work conducted within the religious sector in Indonesia, 
approximately concurrent with the collaborative action research process in 
Mindanao.  World Vision Indonesia has worked with academic partners to develop a 
                                                 





series of pilot trainings framed around the paradigm of ‘inclusiveness.’170 The focus 
on inclusion obviously parallels the prominent themes of inclusion and exclusion that 
emerged from Mindanao and Singapore as central to social impact in the religious 
sector. However in this case, the effort did not include Muslims, because the initial 
effort to facilitate engagement between Roman Catholic and Protestant Christians of 
various denominations was considered sufficient challenge for early phases. DNH 
formed only part of the curriculum, which was broadened to include other social 
impact issues and tools. Importantly, one of the difficulties encountered in using 
DNH was hesitancy in grasping unintended negative impact. In the experience of a 
lead facilitator, some participants held implicitly to the idea that “they are church 
leaders, they cannot be wrong.”171 Further, when the facilitator lacked status in their 
eyes, due to being female or not being an ordained member of the clergy, it was even 
more difficult to encourage participants to consider unintended negative impacts.    
In addition to reluctance to consider error, there are indications that some 
types of religious beliefs imply that certain truth claims must naturally engender 
conflict.  In the current study, this belief was found most commonly among 
Protestant Evangelical Christians. One Mindanowan pastor has embraced DNH but 
he still wonders: “Can peace be maintained if wickedness will continue to grow?”172 
More pointedly, a Singaporean lay leader in my own Anglican church responded to 
stories of my interfaith work with a blunt question about evangelism: “Whilst I 
subscribe to living peacefully among all men regardless of race, language or religion, 
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how do we reconcile that with God's Great Commission173 to make disciples of all 
nations?”174 Again, when I conducted an April 2010 DNH training in Germany, an 
Evangelical Protestant missionary became visibly agitated and stated: “Jesus said that 
he did not come to bring peace, but a sword.175 Some people don’t accept Him, and 
that will result in conflict. So sometimes isn’t it necessary for us to ‘do harm?’”176 
Thus some religious actors would argue that if one believes in universal truths, then 
it may not be right to sacrifice those truths for the sake of peace. Religious DNH 
practitioners therefore ground conflict sensitivity in scriptural reflection, providing 
their co-religionists with a scriptural rationale for the practice.177  
Where religion overlaps or conflates with the identity of groups in conflict, as 
in Mindanao, Singapore and much of Southeast Asia, religious beliefs that obscure 
unintended negative impact may indeed do significant harm to intergroup relations. 
Religious culture, specifically the learned, shared patterns of beliefs, values and 
behaviors within a particular group (Bennett 1998: 3), may be a significant 
determinant of conflict impact. The dissonance between DNH and religious culture, 
far from indicating a mismatch, may be a strong indicator that the concept of 
unintended negative impact is relevant within the religious sector.  
 
                                                 
173 In Evangelical Christian discourse, ‘the Great Commission’ refers to New Testament 
teachings on sharing one’s faith with others, particularly as expressed in Matthew 28:18-20. In 
Singapore, the Anglican Church leans towards an Evangelical interpretation of this passage.  
174 Field notes, 19 Mar. 2008.  
175 The scriptural reference here is to Matthew 10:34-36.  
176 Field notes, 14 Apr. 2010. 
177 Terry Silalahi, phone interview by author, Jakarta, Indonesia, 28 Nov. 2008. The importance 
of scriptural justification is also reflected in the use of biblical and qur’anic quotes in DMI’s 




Structural Violence and Unintended Negative Impact  
In Chapter Two, my analysis of the conflict sensitivity literature surfaced a 
key question about the place of social justice in the DNH framework. Issues of 
injustice would be expected to appear in a DNH context analysis of Dividers, which 
are framed broadly across categories that include attitudes, social systems, and 
historical experiences.178 However, DNH does not explicitly use ‘justice’ terminology, 
and its emphasis on harmonious relationships is sometimes misinterpreted as a call 
to avoid raising contentious issues.  This muted stance on justice issues contrasts with 
the conflict sensitivity work of Bush, who strongly foregrounds both justice and 
empowerment (2005, 2009). Further, DNH context analysis is primarily local, thus it 
may overlook macro-political issues of structural injustice (Leonhardt 2002: 146, 
Duffield 2001a, Macrae and Leader 2001). On the other hand, the recognized 
strengths of DNH include its adaptability (Leonhardt 2003: 55) and amenability to 
uptake by local actors (Garred 2006b , International Alert et al. 2004b: 28). I argued 
that social justice concerns must be seriously examined, yet this must be done in a 
way that considers the practical needs of the conflict sensitivity user. Local users 
should have the freedom to pitch the analysis at their own level of operational and 
ethical responsibility, without being burdened by external expectations. This, too, is 
an important form of empowerment.  
The action research findings demonstrate that the concern regarding the place 
of social justice in DNH usage is indeed justified. This issue manifests itself in the 
data in at least two ethically troubling ways. First, in terms of common themes across 
                                                 
178 The complete list of ‘dividers’ categories in the original DNH framework is as follows: 1) 
Systems and Institutions; 2) Attitudes and Actions; 3) Values and Interests; 4) Different 




all participant DNH analyses, the findings of exclusion along ethnic and religious 
lines were quicker to emerge than the findings of exclusion along socio-economic 
lines. The former appeared quickly in the pilot study, while the latter emerged only 
through detailed data analysis. To the extent that socio-economic gaps overlap ethno-
religious lines of identity, those socio-economic gaps were never completely 
overlooked. Yet the persistence with which the socio-economic theme eventually 
emerged prompts the question of whether it was initially obscured either by the 
DNH framework itself, or by the way in which that framework was being used by 
myself and/or project participants.  
Secondly, among DNH analyses conducted by individuals, the Mindanao 
data reveal that participants vary widely in their willingness and ability to direct 
critical scrutiny towards the positioning or actions of their own ethno-religious 
identity group. DNH may be applied to interpersonal communications before it is 
applied to the deeper issues of systemic injustice. Thus the aforementioned story179 of 
the ethnically dominant migrant neighborhood council member / Christian lay leader 
who informed his indigenous constituents that they could not recover their 
previously owned lands, yet took care to verbalize this statement “in a nice 
manner,”180 is now seen by the research team as an iconic example of dissonance in 
DNH usage. The team attributes this phenomenon largely to newer DNH users with 
insufficient training, mentoring and practice over time. Their conclusion bears some 
weight, for the research team itself, whose members have experienced significantly 
more DNH mentoring than other participants, shows evidence of a much stronger 
                                                 
179 See Chapter Five. 
180 Prt. MI #26, interview by author of regional sister agencies, Sarangani, Philippines, 10 July 




capacity to identify deep Dividers associated with their own ethno-religious groups 
(Davao Ministerial Interfaith Inc. 2010: 56-65).  
Solid research team conclusions notwithstanding, it is useful to probe more 
deeply the factors that contribute to the phenomenon of limited self-critique. Where 
local participants are ‘insiders’ conducting a DNH analysis of their own context, it 
requires mental and emotional effort to recognize the divisive aspects of one’s own 
ethno-religious identity. In other words, it is not easy to overcome one’s ‘blind spots.’ 
Those blind spots are likely to persist in contexts of latent conflict, where many 
citizens are unaware of the subtle divisions that exist in their communities. Where 
physical violence is not present, as in Singapore and some parts of Mindanao, 
structural violence (Galtung 1969) can be difficult to recognize, particularly if one’s 
own identity group is aligned with the perpetrators. Importantly, ‘orthodox’ DNH 
practice originally assumed that DNH users would be international NGOs, implying 
a high percentage of expatriate staff. CDA acknowledges that expatriates may have 
blind spots (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2008a), but CDA has not often 
warned of the blind spots that may exist among locals.  
Indeed, the warning was voiced most clearly by the Singaporean participant 
who cautioned that DNH users “should not impose their (own) values . . . So the tool 
may not be useful if it involves fanatics.”181 While the term ‘fanatic’ likely applies 
only to an extremely small and inflexible minority, the data do demonstrate that 
limited capacity for self-critique can prevent a DNH user from identifying 
unintended negative impact on conflict. Blind spots can prevent the recognition that 
one’s services are causing harm. Further, DNH usage patterns that consistently deal 
                                                 




lightly with issues of structural violence may unintentionally legitimize and reinforce 
this shallow analysis in the minds of the DNH users and their partners. This 
phenomenon recalls the argument that an emphasis on bridging social capital maybe 
insufficient where certain groups are suffering oppression (Arneil 2006). Thus the 
important question is how to assist DNH users to ensure that the mindset shift 
prompted by DNH remains progressive and ongoing, even to the point of critiquing 
one’s own ethno-religious heritage and its implications for current power structures.  
 
Dilemmas in Practitioner Capacity Building  
The combined weight of the areas of dissonance explored above, all of which 
constrain the identification of unintended negative impacts on conflict, prompts one 
to consider afresh whether conflict sensitivity is in fact relevant and useful to the 
religious sector. My conclusion is a qualified yes. In both Mindanao and Singapore, 
conflict sensitivity testing brought about a significant increase in religious actors’ 
awareness of the possibility of doing harm to intergroup relationships, amounting to 
a unique ‘mindset shift’ that no other known approach, indigenous or external has 
been able to produce. The fact that this awareness remains incomplete and 
inconsistent is not unique to the religious sector, and does not necessarily mean that 
the work should be stopped. The significant gains achieved, reinforced by the 
enthusiasm of the project participants themselves, indicate that conflict sensitivity 





The obvious question, then, is specifically how to address the shortcomings. 
Replacing DNH with another framework is not particularly promising, since 
consistency of operationalization has been a persistent challenge across the broad 
gamut of conflict sensitivity approaches (Lange 2004).  This project’s findings 
underscore DNH’s unique grassroots usability, and significant contributions to 
individual development, both of which would likely be compromised in switching to 
a different tool. Conflict sensitivity approaches are amenable to adaptation and re-
combination, so it appears promising to retain those aspects of the DNH framework 
that have proven advantageous, while contextualizing and adapting those aspects 
that are problematic. The primary areas requiring attention are social justice content 
and capacity building methodologies, with attention to the importance of religious 
cultures.   
With regard to social justice content, the DNH Dividers analysis does create 
an implicit ‘space’ for the identification of power imbalances and such issues can be 
drawn out in detail by a skilled facilitator. Participant perspectives do usually deepen 
over time, and DNH users can be encouraged to alternate perspectives through 
consulting ‘the other’ during DNH analysis, and through supplementary training 
such as the Culture of Peace. Such considerations do require broadening somewhat 
the scope of analysis, perhaps from the micro-level to the meso-level, though not 
necessarily to the global level advocated by Duffield (2001b). Unfortunately, these 
solutions require a great deal of training input and capacity, which may not always 
be available. As an alternative partial solution, the DNH framework itself could be 
adjusted to elicit a more explicit consideration of structural violence issues. It is 




drawing on Bush (2009) to highlight political and economic structures and issues of 
empowerment. This would provide practitioners with an initial nudge towards 
identifying structural violence issues, even in the absence of prompting by a 
facilitator.  
There are complex ethical issues involved in expanding the place of social 
justice within DNH. The vast majority of the participants finds the context analysis 
components of DNH both simple and useful, and has not expressed any interest in 
changing them. Pushing such participants to consider social justice problems, in 
which their own ethno-religious groups may be complicit, can realistically be 
expected to cause psychological discomfort. The requirements of social justice and 
the preferences of the grassroots conflict sensitivity user, two principles which are 
central to reflexive practice in relation to insider and outsider roles, appear to conflict 
with each other in the field.  Further, the politics of conflict sensitivity issues in the 
community are often distinct from the politics of conflict sensitivity process among 
project planners (Schmelzle 2005: 7). Action research strongly encourages work that 
transforms the self-view and worldview of the people involved (McTaggart 1997: 40, 
Bradbury and Reason 2001: 452), and ethical delicacy is a recognized aspect of any 
process of consciousness-raising (Blum 1955: 312, Cannella and Perez 2009: 179). 
However, I as the research facilitator am an outsider, not only in terms of 
occupational role, but in terms of cultural background. My own country, the USA, 
contributes to the conflict in ways that many Mindanowans consider unfavorable 
(Jubair 2007: 67-9). Thus it is preferable for these justice issues to be raised with local 




modifying the original DNH framework to include justice issues has not yet been 
discussed with the research team, so this remains an essential next step.   
With regard to capacity building methodologies, the Mindanao research team 
has addressed the findings on incomplete project impact analysis by recommending 
training-driven solutions, including repeated training and mentoring, coupled with 
adapted methodologies that balance the DNH emphasis on negative impact with 
positive examples more appealing in the religious sector. These recommendations are 
backed by solid evidence, and yet they point also to practical dilemmas. Most 
obviously, even after equipping a pool of DNH trainers within DMI, skill and 
availability varies widely among the trainers. Such varied ToT results are not 
unusual in the humanitarian aid sector, or in the Indonesia-based training in 
inclusive paradigms.182 There are not enough skilled trainers available to meet 
capacity building needs, and DMI still struggles to obtain training funds on a 
workshop-by-workshop basis. Therefore it seems unlikely that DNH practice will 
soon become sustainable within DMI’s networks in the absence of continued 
investment from World Vision. Similarly, the Singapore pilot phase findings 
indicated that religious community service organizations are small with limited 
capacity, so conflict sensitivity tools must be quickly learned and easily applied.  
Further, current DNH training methodologies were derived from the 
humanitarian aid sector, and still place a corresponding emphasis on the 
development of analytical skill, for the purpose of formal programmatic planning. 
Empirical results toward this end have faltered. On the other hand, shifts in 
participant mindset, including increased awareness of the social context and the 
                                                 




possibility of unintended negative impacts, have been among the most encouraging 
results of conflict sensitivity testing. For religious actors who are more focused on 
spiritual development that community-based service delivery, training for mindset 
shift may be more effective than training for analytical skill. Training for mindset 
shift may also incur lower costs, because it requires shorter workshops, although it 
does not eliminate the need for follow-up and mentoring. Training approaches could 
be adjusted accordingly, depending on the professional profile and cognitive style of 
a given participant group, in effect allowing the numerous ‘circlers’ to learn in the 
way that best meets their needs, without precluding the option of additional training 
for any ‘frameworkers’ who are interested in more rigorous applications (Neufeldt 
2007). Such changes would require testing, to ensure that the new capacity building 
approaches support the participants’ capacity to carry out project impact analysis 
implicitly, without allowing project impact analysis to fall into disuse. In effect, this 
means training for mindset shift followed by operationalization.  
Importantly, this idea of training for mindset shift plus operationalization has 
been influenced by the recent learnings from CDA and World Vision Indonesia, so it 
differs significantly from the recommendations of the DMI research team itself. The 
team has identified shortcomings to be addressed in DNH practice. In fact, the team’s 
recognition of the unexpected findings on incomplete project impact analysis, and 
their subsequent actions to feed these concerns back into the community of 
participants (Davao Ministerial Interfaith Inc. 2010: 57-65), represent a solid example 
of “double loop learning” (Argyris et al. 1985). Nonetheless, the team has not yet 
considered a major change in training approach as a means of addressing this 




decisions about what counts as a sustainable move towards improvement” 
(McTaggart 1997: 36) – at least in the context of Mindanao – must be made by the 
insiders. This implies that another face-to-face consultation with the research team is 
warranted, to discuss with them the emergent learnings from CDA and other 
sources, and support them in drawing their own conclusions.  
Lest this appear to be a simple case of tension between insider and outsider 
roles, it is noteworthy to point out that the current position of the research team does 
not necessarily represent wisdom indigenous to the local religious sector. In reality, 
DMI was trained and mentored in DNH by humanitarian aid workers, using 
approaches and methodologies derived in the humanitarian aid sector. The DMI 
trainers who gained greatest proficiency appear, not surprisingly, to be 
‘frameworkers’ by nature, implying that perhaps ‘circlers’ (Neufeldt 2007)  have 
fared less well under this system. This observation, too, will no doubt be of interest to 
the research team, as its members continue to consider what it means to adapt DNH 
to fit the unique strengths and requirements of religious culture. Future capacity 
building planning could benefit from the understanding that 
 
by using methods or processes that are scientific, verbal, logical and linear, we 
have to be aware that we are opting for one system of meaning, power, and 
culture, and not another. By opening our set of methods or processes, we may 
contribute to shifting meaning, power and culture (Schmelzle 2005: 7). 
 
Patterns in Project Impact Analysis 
As previously elaborated, the question of inclusion versus exclusion is the 
essential pivotal theme of religious sector conflict impact in Mindanao, and is also 




Singapore, the lines of exclusion are ethnically, religiously and socio-economically 
defined. The decisions of religious associations regarding whether or not to include 
‘the other’ in membership, service or relationship, and if so on what terms, are critical 
determinants of how a given project or activity will affect intergroup relationships. 
Closely related to exclusion is the prominent issue of religious proselytism, a long-
standing sensitivity in both Mindanao and Singapore, which often colors both the 
actions undertaken by religious associations, and the ways in which the public 
interprets those actions. Mindanao-based religious associations are more likely to 
engage directly in politics, while their Singaporean counterparts are limited by the 
prevailing legal restrictions to more subtle and indirect forms of influence. Even so, 
the issues in play are notably similar in both contexts, and are illustrative of 
Southeast Asian regional trends.  
Based on the fifty-nine DNH frameworks collected in Mindanao, which 
yielded more than 100 examples of project impact analysis, it is clear that the patterns 
through which associational projects and services impact on conflict differ 
significantly in the religious sector, as compared to the humanitarian aid sector in 
which conflict sensitivity originated. At the broadest level, the two primary impact 
mechanisms found in the original DNH framework are indeed present in the 
religious sector. The first, Resource Transfers, refer to conflict impacts resulting from 
the provision of goods and services both material (e.g. food, clothing) and non-
material (e.g. education, leadership opportunities).  The second, Implicit Ethical 
Messages, refer to conflict impacts resulting from the ethos communicated through 
actions and interactions of project implementers. In the Mindanao religious sector 




Transfers, suggesting a religious sector emphasis on the intangible over the tangible, 
and on the interpersonal over the material. In contrast, Implicit Ethical Messages 
usually receive secondary emphasis in the humanitarian aid sector.   
At a detailed level, the research team noted in its preliminary Cycle One 
review of participant project impact analyses some patterns that appeared foreign to 
the original DNH framework. In an example of spiraling action research practice 
(Susman and Evered 1978), the research team chose to re-focus the second research 
cycle on gathering more examples of project impact analysis, in order to analyze the 
patterns.  As a result, the team determined that several of the impact patterns found 
in the original DNH framework were not common in the Mindanao religious sector.  
Likewise, we identified a number of new impact patterns not found in the original 
DNH framework, pointing to the spiritualized nature of a religious leader’s work, 
and the role of religion in a Mindanowan community.  We also identified a new type 
of impact mechanism, called Magnifier Effects, which we considered to be distinct 
from Resource Transfers and Implicit Ethical Messages. Figure 6.1 below contains a 
comparison of impact patterns found in the Mindanao data versus the original DNH 
framework. Importantly, this preliminary identification of new patterns of project 
impact is an example of emergent theory being generated through action research 




Figure 6.1: DNH Conflict Impact Patterns in Mindanao 
Impact 
Mechanism 
Impact Pattern Original DNH 
Framework 









   
 Theft (or Diversion) X  
 Distribution Effects X X 
 Market Effects X  
 Substitution Effects X  
 Legitimization Effects X X 
Implicit Ethical 
Messages 
   
 Arms and Power X  
 Disrespect, Mistrust & 
Competition 
X X 
 Different Values for 
Different Lives 
X  
 Impunity X  
 Powerlessness X  
 Belligerence, Tension 
and Suspicion 
X  
 Publicity X  
 Different Perspectives 
on Material Aid 
 X 
 Using Aid for Purposes 
of Persuasion 
 X 






Magnifier Effects    
 Clarity of Intentions  X 
 A Religious Leader has 
Authority 
 X 
 ‘Washing my Hands’ 






In interpreting the above table, where patterns from the original DNH 
framework remain unmarked, this does not imply that they do not exist in the 
Mindanao religious sector, but only that they were not common in the action research 
data.183  Due to the limitations in data collection among Muslims and Lumads, 
particularly in the more remote areas of Mindanao, these patterns should be seen as 
indicative, but not authoritative, in describing conflict impact in the Mindanao 
religious sector. Nonetheless, the data certainly speak to the existence of unintended 
negative impacts, the relevance of conflict sensitivity for religious actors, and the 
uniqueness of conflict impact patterns in the religious sector. Further, the preliminary 
impact patterns identified serve to richly illuminate the role of religious associations, 
and their influence on peace and conflict trends. Each Mindanao pattern is analyzed 
below in detail, including both examples of unintended negative impact and positive 
change, followed by a brief comparison with the data emerging from Singapore. In 
Chapter Seven, these preliminary project impact patterns, as a source of emergent 
theory derived from action research (Schön 1995: 382), are applied to both inform and 
challenge the existing body of theory on the ambivalent impacts of religious nPCROs 
on ethnic conflict.  
Resource Transfers. In the original DNH framework, Distribution Effects refer 
to the impact of transferring resources, both material and non-material, in quantities 
that are perceived to be unequal or unfair, particularly where such discrepancies 
                                                 
183 The research team analyzed three factors to determine which impact patterns were 
common in the data: 1) Direct participant voting on the relevance of the original DNH 
Resource Transfers and Implicit Ethical Messages during two advanced DNH workshops 
held in Aug. 2008. 2) Team analysis and categorization of the project impact examples found 
in the participants’ DNH frameworks. 3) Team observation of participant discourse during 
DNH workshops and assessments, with subsequent team deliberations captured in discussion 




overlap the existing lines of conflict (Anderson 1999: 46).  Unequal benefit may be 
justified by humanitarian criteria, such as targeting the people in most need, while 
nevertheless damaging intergroup relationships.  In the Mindanao religious sector, 
Distribution Effects manifest themselves particularly prominently in the exclusion of 
beneficiaries and members along ethno-religious lines, in an ingrained pattern of 
relational ‘homophily’ (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954). Portes and Landolt further refer 
to the practice of “granting resources to others out of solidarity with members of the 
same territorial, ethnic or religious community“ as “bounded solidarity” (2000: 533, 
see also Chaturvedi 2009). The local manifestation of this pattern, through which 
religious associations tend to “give the benefits to people that we perceive are similar 
to ourselves” (Davao Ministerial Interfaith Inc. 2010: 32), is profoundly structural in 
nature, affirming the problematic significance of monocommunality in associational 
structure (Putnam 2000, Varshney 2002).  Molenaers (2005) has highlighted similar 
concerns, although exclusion from benefit in her Nicaragua-based study runs largely 
along lines of political affiliation.  
In terms of projects involving material aid, a clear example of unintended 
negative impact comes from an Evangelical community development agency that 
serves Lumads in the semi-rural areas surrounding Davao City. In one village 
comprised of approximately eighty-five families of converted Lumads, seventy of 
those families attend the local Evangelical church, while fifteen families attend the 
newer Seventh Day Adventist church.  Religion is a significant cleavage in the 
village, with the two groups divided over grassroots politics and differing beliefs on 
pork consumption during public events. In the agency-supported banana-growing 




Adventists represented on the governing board of officers. The agency staff members 
are all Evangelicals. When the staff members bring food and other project materials 
into the community, they store those goods with the help of Evangelical church 
members in the home of the Evangelical pastor.  This unequal distribution of 
resources, and of the power to influence resource allocation decisions, leads to the 
perception that the agency favors Evangelicals. Upon learning DNH, two agency staff 
realized that this unconscious bias was likely exacerbating the existing tensions 
between Evangelicals and Adventists. They began to envision new ways to publicly 
affirm the participation and feedback of the minority Adventist families, without 
violating the right of the cooperative members to elect their own officers.184 
The negative impacts of unequal resource allocation are widespread across 
Mindanao, but religious actors who become conscious of this pattern may choose to 
challenge and change it.  One of the DMI research team members, an Islamic 
religious teacher and part-time chaplain to Muslim detainees in the Davao City Jail, 
described his effort to organize medical professionals to offer voluntary clinic 
services inside the jail.  Recognizing the initiative of the Muslim chaplain, the jail 
authorities offered to prioritize Muslim detainees for medical services. The chaplain 
declined, recognizing that such preferential treatment would exacerbate the already 
significant tensions between Muslim, Catholic and Evangelical detainees. Instead, he 
insisted that medical assistance be offered equally to all. He arranged to have the 
temporary clinic placed inside the Catholic chapel, and he staffed the clinic with 
Christian doctors, to make it clear that detainees of all faith backgrounds were 
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participants, Davao, 16-17 July 2008. Supplemented with audio recorded analysis by DNH 




welcome. This story is told often by DMI members,185 indicating that they see it as 
highly significant.   
In terms of activities that do not involve material aid, such as the provision of 
spiritual and educational services, the dominant concern of action research 
participants is how to overcome the prevailing pattern of separation and exclusion. 
Religious actors who come to view this pattern as negative may seek to change it, by 
ensuring that all relevant groups are invited to and represented at a given event. This 
emphasis on inclusion counters the cultural pattern of exclusion, and it also reflects 
the cultural prominence of protocol, role/status recognition, and emphasis on 
interpersonal relationships.186  A Lumad Evangelical pastor described in detail how 
he sent invitation letters for an ecumenical interchurch Bible study in South Cotabato 
Province, resulting in a group comprised of twenty percent Catholic, ten percent 
Seventh Day Adventist, and seventy percent Evangelical. He describes how “it 
increase the connectors coz they relay the message that this foundation is open to 
every religious sector . . . everyone is invited but they are not obliged to attend . . . 
everyone is invited to participate and make dialogue.”187 Nonetheless the positive 
emphasis on inclusion did not guarantee the absence of other unintended negative 
impacts, for a significant dispute did arise among the Bible study participants when a 
film shown about Jesus Christ conflicted with the theology of the Adventist 
participants. The structural integration of associational efforts must be complemented 
by the quality of the relationships developed among the participants.  
                                                 
185 Team discussion, research team consultation, Davao, 15 Jan. 2009, audio recording. 
186 Consolidated Analysis from Action Research Cycle Two, Davao, 6 Dec. 2008. 
187 Prt. MI #56, DNH framework created during advanced DNH workshop for internal 
participants, Davao, 19-21 Aug. 2008, translated and assisted by a DNH trainer and research 




Further, when efforts at inclusion fail, the resulting impact can be negative. 
An Adventist lay leader in Agusan del Sur Province explains how he intended to 
invite the elders of a Lumad group, still practicing their indigenous faith, to a 
seminar at his church. However the invitation did not reach them. The Christian 
invitees received the invitation directly from the church, but the Lumads' invitation 
was entrusted to a local politician, a candidate for an upcoming barangay council 
election. That candidate gave the invitation away to a different party, in order to 
boost his own electoral popularity. As a result, the relationship between Adventists 
and Lumads remained at best unchanged, and at worse strained.188 Further, the 
Adventist church inadvertently contributed to dishonest election practices, an impact 
illustrative of the Legitimization Effects pattern described below.   
In the original DNH framework, Legitimization Effects refer to the social impact 
of aid agencies’ collaboration with local leaders, including both governmental and 
non-governmental actors (such as para-militaries or warlords) (Anderson 1999: 50). 
Recognition of local leaders is often viewed as a public endorsement, which can be 
positive if the role of the local leader is conducive to peace and justice, but negative if 
he or she uses authority in ways that exacerbate conflict. Molenaers similarly 
demonstrates how resources channeled through local leaders are likely to reinforce, 
rather than challenge, existing patterns of inequity (Molenaers 2005: 155). 
Legitimization Effects appear consistently in the Mindanao data, illustrating the 
intensive and complex interactions between religious and political actors and 
institutions in that setting. Further, the analysis of Legitimization Effects also points 
                                                 
188 Prt. MI #25, DNH framework created during advanced DNH workshop for internal 
participants, Davao, 19-21 Aug. 2008. Supplemented with event documentation of small and 




to a degree of overlap between religious and political roles. At least five of the project 
participants189 themselves contested a local election, held an office, or were married to 
an office holder, during the course of the project. 
Legitimization Effects are apparent in the above example of the banana-
growing cooperative supported by an Evangelical community development agency. 
This Lumad community is divided between Evangelicals and Adventists. In the 
recent past, tensions resulted when the Sitio190 Leader (an elected local government 
executive) gave permission for outside Adventist missionaries to construct an 
Adventist church inside the village without consulting the Sitio Council, which was 
comprised of the Evangelical pastor and several of his Evangelical church members. 
The Sitio Leader later became a member of the new Adventist church. Thus the 
religious cleavage now parallels a political conflict, and the agency’s bias towards 
Evangelicals now implies an endorsement of one of the parties to political conflict. 
Further, when agency staff members visit the community, they stay in the home of 
the Evangelical pastor (and Sitio Council member). The staff are not allowed to stay 
in the home of the Sitio Leader (and Adventist church member), despite the fact that 
it is centrally located at the entrance to the village. This agency management decision 
is security-based, because the Sitio Leader is considered to be a drunkard. The close 
                                                 
189 The five known to occupy these roles include M-I #56, M-I #26, M-I #40, M-I #8, and one 
Muslim ‘Sultan’ attending the DNH workshop of 28-29 Nov. 2008. The actual number is 
probably significantly higher. Roman Catholic priests in active service are not permitted to 
contest elections, but Catholic lay leaders may do so, along with Evangelical and Muslim 
leaders.   




collaboration of the agency staff strongly endorses the Evangelical pastor, and in so 
doing it also publicly endorses the Sitio Council in its conflict with the Sitio Leader.191   
On the whole, Mindanao religious actors considered local governance, and 
their own engagement with it, to be a conflict sensitivity issue of primary importance. 
In their framework examples, many participants considered local government leaders 
to be actual or potential Connectors, thus implying that religious actors should 
consult or ‘tap’ the local leaders in order to strengthen peace.192 Cooperation with 
local leaders is also considered a key to ‘protocol,’ the unwritten rules of respectful 
engagement in community affairs, further contributing to stability and order.193  By 
the same logic, failing to ‘tap’ local leaders is considered to undermine valuable 
Connectors. For example, a Visayan Catholic lay leader commenting on educational 
support to Lumad children identified several positive social impacts, yet lamented 
the fact that he had not consulted the Barangay Captain, a man known to be “fair in 
all his dealings between Lumad and Visaya.”194 Importantly, less prominent in the 
participant examples, but consistently present in the discourse at action research 
events, was a concern over power abuse by local officials. The DMI Chair has 
emphasized that religious leaders must support local authorities, but must not 
tolerate evil or corruption, and must not be afraid of confrontation. He urges his 
                                                 
191 Prt. MG #26, DNH framework created during introductory DNH workshop for external 
participants, Davao, 16-17 July 2008. Supplemented with audio recorded analysis by DNH 
trainer Herminegilda Presibitero-Carrillo, Davao, 18 July 2008. 
192 Consolidated Analysis from Action Research Cycle Two, Davao, 6 Dec. 2008, 13. 
193 Ibid., 13. 
194 Prt. MI #81, DNH framework created during introductory DNH workshop for external 





colleagues to strengthen Connectors by upholding the law of the land, even where it 
conflicts with the practice of local government leaders.195  
Implicit Ethical Messages. The work of religious leaders emphasizes ethical 
teaching, delivered intentionally and explicitly. When religious leaders learn DNH, 
much self-discovery revolves around the impact of ethical messages sent 
unintentionally and implicitly, through unconscious words and actions that position 
one’s own identity group vis-à-vis ‘the other.’  The pattern of Disrespect, Mistrust and 
Competition, found in the original DNH framework (Anderson 1999: 56), was 
particularly prominent in the Mindanao action research data.  This phenomenon is 
driven by widespread, unspoken beliefs that “it’s hard for groups with different 
beliefs to work together” (Davao Ministerial Interfaith Inc. 2010: 36), and that one 
should not mix with people who have religious beliefs that are different and 
probably inferior. Disrespect, Mistrust and Competition describes the human 
attitudes and behaviors that complement the structurally-oriented Distribution 
Effects described above, such that structural and non-structural elements work 
together to create a far-reaching system of ethno-religious separation and exclusion. 
This finding echoes the comments of external analysts regarding “sectarian 
tendencies” (Ferrer 1997: 8) in civil society and intense competition among Filipino 
NGOs (Clarke 1998: 209). When religious actors come to view this pattern as 
negative, and seek to change it, they consistently advocate change in both resource 
distribution patterns and behaviors.   
When the prominence of Disrespect, Mistrust and Competition became 
apparent in the data, the research team discussed how to break down more 
                                                 




specifically the perceptions that fuel exclusion between each dyad within Mindanao’s 
complex multigroup society.  First, between Muslims and Christians, the team 
articulated fears and mistrust borne of historical conflict dynamics, with Muslims 
anticipating exploitation and oppression from Christians, and Christians anticipating 
violence from Muslims. Muslims simultaneously anticipate that Christians, both 
Catholic and Evangelical, will seek to convert them to Christianity. Secondarily, 
between Catholic and Evangelical Christians, the team articulated strong mutual 
feelings of superiority based on religious beliefs and practices. Evangelicals also have 
a strong feeling of ‘being right,’ pertaining mainly to their ‘born again’ doctrines of 
individual salvation, while Catholics anticipate a corresponding pressure to convert. 
Finally, among Evangelicals the research team observed a thriving competition 
between Evangelical denominations and churches, undergirded by feelings of 
superiority in the details of religious belief and practice, and by the drive to increase 
the number of church participants and members.196  
Given the prominence of the conversion issue, an example is useful in 
illustrating the dynamics encountered by DMI in the field. The DMI Care Group197 
that meets in the Marapangi neighborhood in the periphery of Davao City has made 
significant progress in integrating Evangelicals and Catholics. Like other DMI Care 
Groups, this effort was launched by Evangelical pastors, but the majority of the 
community members were Catholics. The suspicion of a conversion agenda was 
strong, and overcoming this obstacle required significant time, effort and openness to 
change on both sides. One of the original Evangelical leaders explains how the 
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process started:  “There is a tension, because they are Catholic, and the one who gave 
their Bible Study is a pastor. So they could not understand, why like this, and why 
like that. In their mind, we will have to bring them in our church.” 198 A Catholic 
member concurs: “Before they can’t understand . . . Because at the first place, the 
pastor is the one who made the Bible study, they might be converted to their own 
church, because some of the members are Catholic. Now they understand that even if 
we have different religion or denomination, still Bible study is continuing.”199 
When asked how such change was achieved, Care Group members describe a 
process based on implicit DNH thinking, without articulating any formal project 
impact analysis. Their strategy included elements of developing shared leadership, 
flexibility in religious practice, and building on spiritual common ground.  An early 
step was to respect local ‘protocol’ by making a courtesy call to the Catholic Parish 
Priest, to explain the purpose of the Care Group, and clarify the Group’s intention to 
respect and uphold the different faith backgrounds of its members.  Care Group 
leaders coordinated their activity plans with the Parish Priest and Council of Elders, 
and the resulting public approval of these Catholic leaders made it possible for 
Catholic community members to consider attending the Care Group. Soon, the 
original Evangelical leaders joined together with a Catholic lay leader200 who become 
the Group convener, and partnered with the Evangelicals in visiting Care Group 
members in their homes. This visibly unique leadership team drew the attention of 
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local Catholics.  “They changed their paradigm . . . If even the pastors and the PSL 
are for peace and are going together, how much more for them.”201  
In its early stages, the Marapangi Care Group also featured an Evangelical-
style time of singing and personal testimonies called ‘worship.’ However some 
Catholic participants were uncomfortable with the style of this activity, and Group 
discussion revealed that the term ‘worship’ did not fully reflect the conversational 
nature of what was taking place. The Group worked together to find a term 
acceptable to both Catholics and Evangelicals, and decided to change the name of 
this activity to ‘group sharing.’ Similarly, prayer for the practical needs of Group 
members, conducted in a mutually acceptable format, is described as a feature that 
attracts both Catholic and Evangelical members. PIGCG Marapangi is now over 
eighty percent Catholic, and also includes a few families from alternative churches, 
such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, Iglesia ni Kristo and Seventh Day Adventists. 
Despite this success in Marapangi, it is important to reiterate that there is no Muslim 
participation in the DMI Care Groups, due in large part to the perception that Care 
Groups are a venue for encouraging conversion to Christianity. In fact, the 
Marapangi group attributes part of its success to building on shared aspects of 
Christian identity (“We have the same Christ, why not to join together?”),202 and on 
the biblical scriptures shared by Catholics and Evangelicals, a strategy unlikely to 
appeal to Muslims.  DMI is working towards including Muslims in the Care Groups, 
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but progress is admittedly slow.203  Disrespect, mistrust and competition run deep 
between Evangelicals and Catholics in Mindanao, but even more deeply between 
Christians and Muslims.  
In a closely related pattern, the action research data also point to the 
importance of Implicit Ethical Messages involving Material Aid. Many religious actors in 
Mindanao, including the members of DMI, are involved in aid work. Some 
distributions are organized through churches or mosques, or through faith-based aid 
agencies formally linked to those religious institutions. External aid agencies, both 
secular and faith-based, also seek to partner with religious leaders due to their high 
levels of community influence. Religious actors often see material aid in spiritual 
terms, as a holistic part of a process of spiritual transformation.  One Catholic lay 
leader explains: “It’s not only the physical essence of the aid, but also it imparts a 
message, a religious message, God’s message.”204 On the other hand, beneficiary 
community members may be focused on the material donation itself as a way of 
meeting their practical needs. In some cases, these differing perceptions cause 
religious leaders to overlook implementation details that impact the relationships 
within a community, such as failing to ensure that the quantity and targeting of aid is 
sufficient to avoid competition amongst beneficiaries, bringing about negative 
Distribution Effects as described above.205  
Perhaps more seriously, the aid is sometimes given with the implicit 
expectation that the recipients will listen to the donors’ teachings, or consider 
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converting to the donors’ religion or denomination. Such incentive to convert is not 
limited to the realm of perception. There is a long history of religious pressure in the 
Philippines (McKenna 1998: 82, Gomez Jr. 2000: 18, Tan 2003a: 5), and the practice of 
linking aid to conversion, though decreased in recent years, does still exist.  
Awareness of conflict impact does not fully resolve the issue, because religious 
convictions are strong. For example, an Evangelical church from Davao City visited a 
Lumad village in Davao del Sur Province to donate goods, in partnership with the 
Evangelical church located in that village. “It was our intention really to conversion. 
And we are just using the tools, the ukay-ukay,206 food, and whatever that we have 
brought over there, in order for those people, the Lumads there, whom we do not 
know, will come to receive us because of those things.” 207 The visiting church was 
aware of the history of abuse of aid, so they did not impose any obligations on the 
beneficiaries. Nonetheless, “through the good work that we are presenting to the 
people, we are trying to tell them that we are Christian. That way, indirectly, they 
will search:  ‘What is Christianity?’ So, maybe we will come again and have a 
teaching or a seminar.”208 Many of the Lumad villagers were not pleased as the 
quantity of aid was considered insufficient. Further, existing tensions between the 
local Evangelical church and other village residents were intensified over the issue of 
proselytism.  Such material incentives to conversion are currently attributed mainly 
to Evangelicals, but also broadly attributed to Catholics until the mid-twentieth 
century, and occasionally to Muslims. Where aid is conditional, the conditions are 
usually religious, but may also point to the involvement of religious actors in political 
                                                 
206 Used clothing. 





vote buying.209 This behavior contributes to the broader atmosphere of exclusion by 
communicating, in effect, that the price of inclusion is to change one’s identity.  DMI 
seeks to counter this trend by encouraging religious leaders to be clear and 
transparent about their own motivations when giving aid, and establish a clear 
separation between a material gift and a spiritual message (Davao Ministerial 
Interfaith Inc. 2010: 44).  
The spiritualization of material ministries points also to the emphasis among 
religious actors on the pursuit of Spiritual Transformation. Mindanao participants 
demonstrate a clear and consistent belief that spiritual activities, such as preaching, 
teaching, and prayer can impact individuals in ways that change their relational 
positioning vis-à-vis other people and other social groups. There is an emphasis on 
values formation, both explicit and implicit, drawing on Christian and Islamic 
scriptures to promote the concept that one’s quality of relationship to God is directly 
linked to the nature of his or her relationships with fellow human beings. For 
instance, a DMI Care Group meeting in a coastal neighborhood of peri-urban Davao 
City is concerned about socio-economic cleavages, especially land conflicts between 
the poor and the wealthy. The Care Group leaders have attempted to impact this 
reality by teaching patience, humility and justice. Care Group members feel that after 
several years of teaching, “the weekly gathering has decreased discrimination against 
the poor in the area.”210 In other cases, prayer and worship activities that facilitate 
contact with the divine are believed to mold personal character. Islamic Eid-al-Adha 
and Eid-al-Fitr celebrations are said to enhance Connectors among Muslims: 
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“Because of the spiritual sanctity of the activity, no matter what the conflicts are, we 
can still unite because of that activity.”211 
As an Implicit Ethical Message, Spiritual Transformation is difficult to 
conceptualize and categorize. Some religious actors may feel that it is actually a 
Resource Transfer, because they consider spiritual power to be a resource. On the 
other hand, non-religious audiences may be skeptical about whether religious ritual 
has any sort of verifiable impact on intergroup relations. In any case, the data 
indicate that many people in the Mindanao context do believe in and pursue spiritual 
transformation, and that this worldview influences their actions. Their actions, in 
turn, do have verifiable impacts on the surrounding context. An obvious case in point 
is the process of individual and collective change within DMI itself, and the fact that 
DMI members consider this transformation to be spiritual in nature. Whether viewed 
as a perception or as a reality, spiritual transformation does have a real impact on the 
dynamics of peace and conflict.  
Of course, if the impact of spiritual transformation activities is deemed to be 
real, then it follows that such impact can be either positive or negative.212 Further, it 
can be difficult for religious actors themselves to accurately assess how their spiritual 
transformation activities impact on conflict, and there is evidence of a persistent 
undercurrent of wishful thinking. DMI has noted that religious leaders often expect 
character change to occur quickly, when in fact it may take a lifetime. Individual 
transformation cannot effect community-wide change if local power brokers choose 
not to participate (Davao Ministerial Interfaith Inc. 2010: 46). Finally, questionable 
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social analysis can lead to false hopes. One beginning DNH learner has described 
how he envisions his Evangelical home Bible study reducing criminality, and conflict 
between criminals and law-abiding citizens, through the promotion of spiritual 
conversion and Christian values. However there is no specific effort in place to attract 
participants who are at risk for criminality, and no evidence that the Bible study is 
penetrating criminal networks.213 No doubt the Bible study does have a social impact, 
but it may be significantly different than what this Evangelical lay leader hopes for. 
In terms of the negative conflict impacts of religious activity, another pattern 
identified is Blaming the Other Group. Blaming implies holding ‘the other’ responsible 
for the prevailing state of conflict, without taking responsibility for destructive 
actions taken by one’s own group. Among the participating Mindanowan religious 
actors, blame toward ‘the other’ is spiritualized, at least by Christians (both Catholics 
and Evangelicals) toward Muslims. Christians, fearing both local history and the 
global discourse on terrorism, tend to believe that Muslims are violent and 
“treacherous”214 (as also noted in Gowing 1964: 12, Presbitero-Carrillo 2004: 2) and 
attribute these presumed traits to Islamic culture and religion. For example, 
Christians in informal conversation may endorse the idea of peace training for 
Muslims in a way that implies that Muslims need such training more than Christians 
do.  During one meeting, I observed an Evangelical delegate who said that “the 
Muslims have a different approach, to kill all the Christians.”215 This comment was 
followed by casual banter on the use of suicide attacks, held while the Muslim 
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delegates were out of the room. DMI has become more aware of this Implicit Ethical 
Message through action research, and is beginning to educate Christian leaders on 
the risks of stereotyping Muslims (Davao Ministerial Interfaith Inc. 2010: 47). In 
contrast, the Muslim member of the research team feels that this implicit belief is not 
held or communicated in the same way by Muslims. He states that Muslims may 
distrust Christians, but they do not tend to hold Christian people or their beliefs 
directly responsible for the conflict. Rather, Muslims are more likely to blame the 
Philippine government and the media, as affirmed by both the action research data216 
and external analysts (Tolibas-Nuñez 1997: 49, 79-80, Mastura 2006: 8). 
Magnifier Effects. The research team analysis discerned the presence of 
certain project impact patterns that do not function in isolation, but rather intensify a 
conflict impact that is already taking place. Such dynamics make a positive impact 
more positive, and a negative impact more negative. We chose to call these patterns 
‘Magnifier Effects,’ adding a new type of impact mechanism not found in the original 
DNH framework. DNH experts would differ on how these patterns should be 
categorized, yet their true significance lies in the illumination of the conflict impact 
dynamics of Mindanowan religious associations. The below descriptions of Magnifier 
Effects are brief, because they refer to concepts that are interwoven throughout this 
and the surrounding chapters.  
First, Clarity of Intentions refers to a recurring problem of ambiguity or 
misperception in the way that beneficiaries and members of the general public 
interpret the motivations behind religious community services. Due to the history of 
ethno-religious exclusivity and proselytism in community service, the public often 
                                                 




assumes such intentions even where they do not exist, thus worsening tensions 
between local ethnic and religious groups. Religious institutions that purposefully 
clarify their intentions, for both their own members and the general public, can 
significantly improve their conflict impact. One church in Davao City pursues such 
clarity by communicating both in conversation and in written project agreements that 
their long-term support program for poor urban children carries no obligation of 
church membership.217 The fact that this is necessary serves to underscore the degree 
to which the Mindanowan religious associational sector has been beholden to 
exclusive values, beliefs and practices.  
Action research data also highlight the importance of the Authority of the 
Religious Leader in influencing conflict impact. When an ordained religious leader, 
such as a pastor, priest, nun, imam or ustadz is the implementer of a particular 
activity, the social impact of that activity is magnified. In Mindanao, when a religious 
leader is serving members of his/her own religious group, the followers have a 
tendency to view the religious leader as “credible, trustworthy and influential”  
(Davao Ministerial Interfaith Inc. 2010: 51). Further, followers often assume that the 
religious leader has divine authority, “like a representative of God.”218 Thus when the 
religious leader reveals his or her own stance towards ‘the other,’ the followers are 
likely to absorb similar views. In contrast, when a religious leader approaches people 
of other religious groups, they are likely to view that leader as embodying past 
experiences of negativity and conflict, thus fearing violence, proselytism or 
exploitation for material gain. It must be acknowledged that that this research team 
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analysis represents a self-assessment by religious leaders of their own status. Even so, 
it aligns with themes in the available literature (Mabunga 1997, Torres 1997), and 
with the observable signs of the respect afforded to religious leaders in the 
Mindanowan context, such as the prominence of the Bishops-Ulama Forum in the 
Mindanowan peace process (Palm-Dalupan 2005). The impact of the religious leader 
would likely be less authoritative in cultural contexts that feature less religiosity.  
I described in Chapter Five how some project participants were reluctant to 
consider the possibility that their work could worsen social tensions, due to the 
assumption that they as religious leaders were unlikely to err, or the belief that 
universal religious truths necessarily engender conflict. The final Magnifier Effect 
further addresses that theme, by highlighting some beliefs about God that lead to 
Washing the Hands of Social Impact. ‘Washing the hands’ is used as a common idiom 
for declining responsibility for one’s actions, and attributing responsibility instead to 
another party, in this case, God. Religious leaders often focus more on the divine call 
to serve than they do on the surrounding social context, assuming that the 
circumstances and outcomes are God’s responsibility. “Sometimes we believe that if 
we have good intentions, God will prevent or fix any unintended negative impacts 
that might result from our efforts. We often say ‘I have done my best, so God will do 
the rest,’ or ‘I cannot influence those events that are beyond my control’” (Davao 
Ministerial Interfaith Inc. 2010: 54). DMI, while acknowledging some truth in those 
statements, has begun to use these action research findings in urging their fellow 
religious leaders to avoid extremes by practicing responsible planning.  
Comparative Findings from Singapore.  Examples of project impact were 




and their lack of prior DNH experience. Nevertheless, as in Mindanao, the examples 
surfaced during the one-day introductory workshop reveal the prominence of 
Distribution Effects and Disrespect, Mistrust and Competition, both relating to the 
pivotal question of exclusion versus inclusion. For example, Disrespect is seen in a 
neighborhood block party that does not serve any halal food, thus implicitly 
disregarding Muslims, or a ‘mother tongue’ language preservation campaign that 
reminds people to ‘speak Mandarin,’ implicitly ignoring Singaporeans who are 
ethnically Malay or Tamil, not Chinese.219 Distribution Effects are seen in a 
scholarship program that makes awards based on merit, in which children from 
privileged families are much more likely to qualify, thereby retaining the socio-
economic advantage in the next generation.220 Further, the aforementioned emphasis 
placed by Singaporean participants on misperceived intentions clearly relates to the 
Clarity of Intentions Magnifier Effect discovered in Mindanao, although the 
underlying impacts being magnified are likely to differ. Importantly, all of the above 
examples were inspired by government programs, suggesting an initial reluctance on 
the part of participants to recognize that one’s own associational activities could also 
have unintended negative impacts. This phenomenon displays some similarity to 
Washing the Hands of Social Impact, but responsibility is attributed to the government, 
as the body deemed responsible for ensuring social cohesion in Singapore, rather 
than to God as in Mindanao. Participant examples did become more focused on 
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religious associations as the workshop continued, but the associations in view were 
largely funded and guided by the government.  
As a case in point, the workshop participants began spontaneously conducted 
an impromptu DNH analysis of the event’s host agency, the Harmony Centre at An-
Nahdhah. They identified several unintended impacts of the Harmony Centre’s 
interfaith activities, voicing the perception that Harmony Centre efforts were 
important and successful, but were reaching only a limited and rather elite audience. 
All Harmony Centre activities are conducted in English, which is Singapore’s 
common language for bridging across ethnic groups, but is not always understood by 
the less educated and the elderly. Further, participants were acutely aware that many 
non-Muslim people, particularly conservative Protestant Christians, did not feel 
comfortable attending events at Harmony Centre, because it is located in the same 
building as a mosque. One suggested that: “The Harmony Centre should be freed 
from any attachment to any particular religion, so that people from any races, any 
religion, can come freely without feeling . . . uh . . . the sensitivities . . .”221 Other 
participants countered that removing the Harmony Centre from the mosque would 
damage its core ethos, but a similar purpose could be achieved by organizing a 
network through which other religious communities could host similar interfaith 
events in their own facilities. Finally, participants intimated that the Harmony 
Centre’s rapid government-supported rise to prominence, with a high level of 
attendant media coverage, had created tensions and jealousies with other pre-existing 
entities in the Muslim community. Harmony Centre staff welcomed these insights to 
help inform future planning.  
                                                 




Importantly, in terms of the environment currently facing Islamic religious 
associations in Singapore, the intra-Muslim tensions mentioned above parallel 
another participant example. One small group of workshop participants explored the 
impact of a recent policy change in an island-wide Islamic benevolence fund, which 
expanded from supporting only Muslims to accepting applications from 
Singaporeans of all backgrounds. The change was well received by other groups, 
improving interethnic and interfaith relations, yet it created role confusion and 
tension within the Muslim community itself.222 In fact, the Malay Muslim community 
in Singapore has gone to great lengths since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and 
the related local terror arrests, to allay suspicion and mistrust among other ethnic 
groups (Tan 2008: 60), particularly the majority Chinese.  Some of these efforts are 
undertaken partially in response to government encouragement, via the 
government’s stake in the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS). Action 
research data indicate that the post-September 11 associational effort to improve 
outward interfaith relations is exerting some strain upon intrafaith ties, and shifting 
the landscape of internal cohesion among Malay Muslims.  
 
Conclusion: Beyond Associational Structure  
The range of impact patterns identified in the action research data, including 
Resource Transfers, Implicit Ethical Messages and Magnifier Effects, illustrate that 
the activities of religious associations have a broad influence on the trajectory of 
intergroup relations. This evidence of conflict impact, coupled with the strong 
                                                 





affirmation of participating religious actors, indicates that the core concept of conflict 
sensitivity is highly relevant to this new audience. Further, the far-reaching socio-
political implications of these conflict impacts illustrate the importance of facing 
squarely the challenges to the usefulness of the tools, in order to obtain accurate 
project impact analysis, followed by operationalization of the learnings. The DNH 
framework can be extensively adapted to foreground issues of structural injustice, 
and to identify clearly the impact patterns that are unique to the religious sector. 
Capacity building methodologies can be changed to de-emphasize formal impact 
analysis among audiences that are unlikely to use it, and to focus instead on mindset 
shift and implicit impact analysis, followed by operationalization. Follow-up training 
and mentoring will continue to be necessary, albeit in different and potentially lighter 
forms.  
In light of the conflict impact patterns in the empirical data, the emphasis of 
Putnam (2000) and Varshney (2002) on intercommunal structures as the sole 
determinants of conflict impact would appear oversimplified. Indeed, in the 
Mindanao religious sector, the Distribution Effects are profoundly structural in 
nature, as they reinforce a system of separation and exclusion along ethic, religious 
and socio-economic lines. Nonetheless, in terms of social identity theory (Tajfel and 
Turner 1986), the unequal distribution of resources would appear to be a clear 
example of in-group favoritism. Further, those distribution effects are shaped by and 
entwined non-structural patterns of impact, such as Disrespect, Mistrust and 
Competition, which reify boundaries through the promotion of one’s own group at 
the expense of others. Even the language used by the research team to describe the 




(Davao Ministerial Interfaith Inc. 2010: 40) - resonates with Tajfel and Turner’s 
description of social one-ups-manship.  Ultimately, when religious actors recognize 
and seek to change systemic exclusion in the associational sector, they do so by 
addressing both structural and non-structural factors, exhibiting in the process a level 
of human agency that is not considered in the current body of structure-centric 
theories. For these reasons, Chapters Eight and Nine apply my empirical findings to 
inform and challenge existing theory on the ambivalent impacts by religious nPCROs 






RE-THEORIZING THE DETERMINANTS 
OF CONFLICT IMPACT 
 
If conflict begins in the minds of men, 
that is where solutions should first be aimed. 
- Rosalita Tolibas-Nuñez (1997: 89), 
former mayor of General Santos City, Mindanao 
 
This chapter begins to apply the empirical data collected among religious 
associations in Mindanao and Singapore to address the study’s second level of 
inquiry: How do the findings arising from conflict sensitivity testing inform existing 
associational theory?  As elaborated in Chapter Three, Robert Putnam (2000, 2002, 
Putnam and Feldstein 2003) and Ashutosh Varshney (2001, 2002) stand at the center 
of the theoretical debate informed by this study, which engages the nature and causes 
of conflict impacts by nPCROs, or associations whose mission is not directly focused 
on issues of peace and conflict resolution.  For such associations, impact on conflict is 
an externality (Morris 2000: 27-8), created unintentionally and often unconsciously in 
the process of pursuing their other goals. The body of theory on this topic is small but 
expanding, reflecting a growing recognition that associational impact on social 
cohesion goes far beyond the small subset of associations that are concerned 
primarily with matters of conflict and peace.  
Within this project’s core literature, Putnam and Varshney identify 
heterogeneous associational structure, in which participation crosses key lines of 
social division, as the primary determinant of associational impact in settings of 
intergroup conflict. Both scholars have expressed strong optimism about the 




divided along lines of ethnicity or identity. Such optimism is challenged in works by 
Uvin (1998) and Cochrane (2005), who point to recent cases in which the associational 
sector itself was so deeply divided in its structure, and divisive in its effects, that it 
provokes significant skepticism about intercommunality. Another cluster of works, 
including Pickering (2006, 2007), Weisinger and Salipante (2005, 2007), Jha (2009), 
MacLean (2004), Molenaers (2003, 2005, 2006), Karner and Parker (2008), Titeca and 
Vervisch (2008) and Pinchotti and Verwimp (2007), explore both positive and 
negative associational impacts, and consider the conditions that influence such 
outcomes.  These moderate works provide valuable nuance, but they have not yet 
reshaped the predominantly structural terms of debate as framed by the optimism of 
Putnam and Varshney and the skepticism that they provoke.  
The current study, by providing a localized examination of two interfaith 
network agencies and their individual members in settings of ethno-religious conflict, 
speaks to the imbalance in the core literature by contributing evidence that the nature 
and determinants of associational conflict impact are complex, and they are dynamic. 
In contrast to the uniformity that is implied in much of the literature, the data from 
Mindanao and Singapore depict a multifaceted web of conflict impacts that vary 
across organization, activity, and time, resulting in a simultaneous mixture of the 
positive and the negative. It is true that both partner agencies were formed as a 
response to predominant local patterns of separation and exclusion along ethno-
religious lines. In other words, practitioners perceived that certain aspects of the 
associational sector were reflecting and contributing to the surrounding climate of 
ethno-religious division in negative ways, very similar to what Uvin and Cochrane 




Mindanao, the Harmony Centre in Singapore, and other interethnic, interfaith 
associations like them, has begun to establish positive impacts of the type envisioned 
by Putnam and Varshney.  As works-in-progress, the impact of these organizations is 
promising, but mixed. Further, when individual network members apply conflict 
sensitivity analysis to their own churches, mosques and religious service 
organizations, they identify, despite some instances of ‘wishful thinking,’ a 
combination of positive and negative influences on conflict. Such mixed impacts can 
arise within the same association, and even within the same project, at the same time. 
It is the recognition of this dualistic potential that enables practitioners to develop 
ideas for improvement, working for change at the level and scope of their own 
influence. 
These findings do not contradict the project’s core literature on the conflict 
impacts of nPCROs, but they do reveal the existing theory in this relatively new body 
of theory to be emergent and incomplete.  “In the spirit of cumulative inquiry” 
(Varshney 2002: 24),  I draw on the Mindanao and Singapore data to suggest specific 
ways in which the determinants of conflict impact could be elaborated with greater 
nuance and accuracy.  Pursuing conceptual nuance naturally makes theory less 
parsimonious. Yet parsimony of explanation should not necessarily be the theorist’s 
ultimate aim. I argued in Chapter One that the purpose and measure of theory lies in 
its applicability to successfully address real human problems.  This prioritization of 
human wellbeing implies a cautious integration of values into the social sciences. The 
assumed value on peace as a component of human wellbeing is implicit in much of 
this study’s core literature. For example, Putnam has become a rather passionate 




and Salipante (2005) actively seek to assist practitioners in fostering 
intercommunality.  Thus without venturing too far into the actual exercise of 
application, I assume that my findings must be believable enough to act upon 
(Greenwood and Levin 2007: 67). Good theory must capture accurately the dynamics 
of peace and conflict in the real world, and the empirical clues as to how such 
dynamics might change for the better. 
This chapter addresses two of the three main thematic contributions of this 
study to theory on the determinants of conflict impact among nPCRO. The 
relationship between structural and non-structural factors is central, and it leads in 
turn to a consideration of the place of human agency in pursuing change. The next 
chapter addresses the third thematic contribution, by exploring the extent to which 
the questions of associational structure and human agency are infused and shaped by 
religion in the Southeast Asian context. The majority of the data are drawn from 
Mindanao’s DMI, because their lengthy exposure to conflict sensitivity provides the 
opportunity to trace the relevant dynamics over time. This is supplemented where 
appropriate with data from Singapore and other sources. 
 
Cycles of Structure and Mindset  
This section explores more deeply the balance and interaction between 
structural and non-structural determinants of associational conflict impacts. The core 
literature as a whole displays a tendency towards monocausal explanation, with a 
heavy emphasis on the degree of intercommunality present in associational structure. 




intercommunal associational forms. Both DMI and the Harmony Centre derive their 
public significance from their efforts to bring ethno-religious groups together across 
the lines of major social cleavage. Bridging those structural and relational gaps is the 
reason for the organizations’ existence, so intercommunal participation is a necessary 
precursor to relational development, and is widely perceived by fellow citizens as the 
most visible indicator of progress. Organizational members and participants are well 
aware of this reality, as evidenced by their consistent attention to the numbers and 
proportions of the various ethnic and religious groups represented in every meeting, 
activity and process.  
Nonetheless, the same organizational members give an equally consistent 
emphasis to factors that are decidedly non-structural in nature. The participants’ 
experiences and their own conflict sensitivity analyses point to the influence of non-
structural factors, including perceptions, values, beliefs, and attitudes, which can be 
collectively termed ‘mindsets.’ As described in Chapters Five and Six, mindset factors 
in the Mindanowan and Singaporean contexts of ethno-religious conflict pertain 
largely to identity, specifically the formation and re-formation of how the identity of 
one’s own group is defined, and how that group relates to those perceived as ‘other.’ 
These findings on the centrality of mindset are affirmed by external analysts 
including Tolibas-Nuñez (1997), who argues strongly that the psychological 
dynamics of intergroup relations are just as important as economics and politics in 
the Mindanao conflict, and Bück (2007: 99, 104), who states that any solution to this 
conflict must include attention to its microdynamics.  
Particularly strong in Mindanao is the mindset issue of exclusion along ethnic, 




Southeast Asia, and Uvin claims that similar exclusion affects large portions of Africa 
(Uvin 1998: 118). Social capital theorists have similarly cautioned that in-group 
bonding may have exclusionary effects on outsiders (Portes and Landolt 1996, Portes 
1998, Putnam and Feldstein 2003: 206-24, 241-68).  Thus the action research findings 
on exclusion address an issue of immense significance within the broader theoretical 
debate. Further, the Mindanao data portray the exclusionary mindset as inextricably 
linked to exclusionary associational structures. The linkages are evident in 
participant accounts of how associations interact with the life and decision-making of 
individuals, and the dynamics that take place when individuals join together in 
collective action. To borrow a familiar computer metaphor, there is interaction 
between ‘hardware’ (organizational structures) and ‘software’ (human mindsets).  
In order to focus on the relationship of individual mindset to associational 
structure, I de-emphasize certain issues of associational functionality that are present 
in the data. I have already described in Chapter Five how factors such as availability 
of funds, member time limitations and competing priorities have influenced DMI’s 
progress in operationalizing conflict sensitivity through furtherance of their 
intercommunal structure. MacLean (2004) has pointed out the significance of 
associational effectiveness in reaching goals, frequency and participation in meetings, 
and decision-making processes. International Alert has focused attention on how 
organizational leadership and capacity influences conflict sensitivity mainstreaming 
(Lange 2004, Barbolet et al. 2005a). Thus without denying the importance of such 
issues, I set aside most questions of associational functioning, except those that 




The dual focus on ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ factors, and the relationship 
between them, leads naturally to the question of whether one predominates over the 
other in determining associational impact. In fact, this interaction appears to be 
cyclical, implying little value in arguing the existence of a definitive beginning or 
end. Even so, it is significant that DMI members begin their analysis at a different 
point than many of the scholars in my literary core.  When surveyed as a collective 
research cluster, the literature emphasizes associational structure as determinative, 
implying that any improvement of social impact should begin with structural change. 
Though Putnam once framed the relative roles of structure and culture as a “chicken 
and egg debate” (1993: 181), he has also positioned associational structure as a cause, 
and individual mindset as its effect (2000: 23). Varshney positions associational 
structure as the primary determinant of positive social impact, however he qualifies 
his argument by clarifying that associational structure is the central proximate  cause, 
with political factors underlying it, and a relevant influence attributed to identity-
based “master narratives”  (2002: 132).  Cochrane hints implicitly at mindset as a 
cause when he explains that the polarization of civil society in Northern Ireland is 
driven by people’s differing concepts of ‘community,’ yet his overall argument 
remains structurally-driven (2005: 60). Mindset formation is addressed by Pickering 
(2007: 51-84) as it relates to identity, and by Uvin (1998: 109-140) as it relates to the 
internalization of structural violence.  However, only Jha (2009), Karner and Parker 
(2008), and Weisinger and Salipante (2005, 2007) position mindset factors as central 
and emphasize them as a causational factor explaining associational structures.  
The fact that DMI members often begin their analysis with non-structural 




may describe their organization by highlighting its interfaith composition, their 
frequent stories of member involvement begin with accounts of individual mindset 
change.223 Significantly, mindset change addresses the question of how the negative 
impacts of exclusionary social capital might be overcome, a theme that is overlooked 
in the core literature’s rush to develop social capital in more positive forms.  
Mindset-Structure Cycles that Enable Intercommunality. As analyzed 
extensively in Chapters Five and Six, individual mindset change within DMI is 
closely linked to training in Do No Harm (DNH), and the Culture of Peace module 
which introduces diverse perspectives on the history of Mindanao. In surveys and 
interviews, DMI members describe an increased awareness of their own influence on 
the surrounding socio-political context, and a progressive shift from exclusive to 
inclusive mindsets. The exclusive mindset is characterized by separation and 
discrimination towards ‘the other.’ Many of the specific beliefs and behaviors that 
maintain exclusion are detailed in DMI’s preliminary identification of the negative 
Implicit Ethical Messages that circulate within the Mindanowan religious sector. The 
inclusive mindset emphasizes acceptance and respect towards people who are 
different, and links to Implicit Ethical Messages that are in the process of being 
changed for the better. The change process often begins with a significant shift 
experienced during the first DNH training event, followed by an ongoing deepening 
of the changing mindset over time. The emergent inclusive mindset prompts 
members to take initiative in forming interpersonal relationships with people of 
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differing backgrounds. A chronological causal link between training and relationship 
formation is almost always implied, and sometimes forthrightly stated.224   
Similarly, at the collective level, the 2003 participation of DMI founders in 
DNH training is credited with contributing the organization’s launch during that 
same calendar year. DMI’s policy requiring DNH and Culture of Peace training for 
all new members provides further evidence of their belief that the process of bridging 
ethno-religious gaps must start with individual change. This policy was encouraged 
by the staff of World Vision Development Foundation, and adopted by the 
leadership of DMI. The policy is so firm that, despite DMI’s desire to grow in 
membership, during times when DNH and Culture of Peace trainers were not 
available to conduct workshops, the prospective new members were simply obliged 
to wait.  In this way, the DMI case study implies a sequence of change in individual 
mindset, followed by a change in behavior, and then contributing to the formation of 
organizational structures. Like Weisinger and Salipante (2005: 45-6), DMI’s leaders 
view individual cross-cultural motivation and skill as a prerequisite to successful 
intercommunal bridging. This logic relates also to theories that position education as 
a key success factor in reducing intolerance (see for example Helliwell and Putnam 
2007, Cote and Erickson 2009), with the caveat that DMI’s efforts represent vocational 
learning rather than formal classroom education. 
While DMI members tend to view individual mindset change as a 
prerequisite to the development of intercommunal structures, the DMI case also 
reveals a flow of causation in the opposite direction, through which their 
                                                 





organizational structure both enables and limits member mindset development. In 
terms of enabling factors, the simple fact that the DMI brings people of different 
religious groups into proximity with each other has far-reaching influence. For many 
of the Christian leaders, the Muslim leaders present within DMI and its sister 
agencies represent their first Muslim friends. Muslim leaders are more likely to have 
had previous contact with Christians, given the Christians’ much larger numbers, yet 
this did not necessarily mean contact with other leaders, nor was it necessarily a 
positive experience.  Thus it is common to see interfaith members smile with pride 
and pleasure when they explain “I have a good friend, a Muslim brother…”225 As 
Blau and Schwartz (1984) emphasize, bridging relationships can only form where 
different social groups have the opportunity for consistent contact.   
Nonetheless, while contact with the ‘other’ is clearly necessary, it is not 
automatically sufficient to maximize organizational intercommunality and positive 
impact on conflict. Diverse representation does not necessarily guarantee pluralism 
based on mutual respect (Weisinger and Salipante 2005). Allport ([1954] 1979: 261-84), 
the originator of the contact hypothesis, posited that intergroup contact would 
reduce prejudice, if and only if it was conducted in a manner that featured equal 
status between groups and cooperation in pursuit of common goals. The reduction of 
prejudice would be further enhanced if such intergroup activity was sanctioned by 
local institutions or atmosphere. Subsequent research has largely affirmed this 
hypothesis, with the important caveat that the requisite success factors may be more 
numerous than those originally identified by Allport, and may vary somewhat 
                                                 





according to context (Pettigrew and Tropp 2005, Kenworthy et al. 2005). Putnam, too, 
has supported this qualified version of the contact hypothesis (Putnam and Campbell 
2010: 526-34, Clark et al. 2010: 75). Within the contact opportunities that the DMI 
structure provides, relationship development processes can be observed, many of 
which correspond to the intergroup contact success factors identified by post-Allport 
researchers, and are reflected in some of this study’s core literature. These findings 
speak into the debate on the determinants of positive conflict impacts among 
nPCROs, by suggesting that intercommunal associational structures can exist and 
promote peace in divided societies only when accompanied and supported by non-
structural processes of change in human mindsets and relationships.    
Most obviously, DMI’s focus on jointly facilitating community development 
activities provides an overarching common goal , and a series of tasks that require 
interdependent cooperation among Catholic, Evangelical and Muslim members 
(Allport [1954] 1979). The ongoing nature of the effort provides for “sustained, 
periodic interactions” (Weisinger and Jr. 2007: 169, see also Pickering 2007: 111-138), 
and the development of an important sense of shared space (Putnam and Feldstein 
2003, Jha 2009: 291). The shared space is first and foremost relational, because DMI 
does not have its own building, but the three local hotels that host DMI functions 
have also come to represent to members a symbolic space for interfaith interaction. 
At the deeper level of identity formation, DMI members intentionally emphasize 
their shared belief in God and their common role as religious leaders as the basis for 
shared, overarching identity (Putnam and Feldstein 2003: 279-82, Weisinger and Jr. 
2007), which also implicitly helps to equalize status among members (Allport [1954] 




religious group within DMI firmly maintains its own distinctions, thus posing no 
threat of ignoring the salience of their differences (Kenworthy et al. 2005). 
Social network theory’s insights on ‘weak ties’ (Granovetter 1973, Pickering 
2006, Pickering 2007) also describe DMI’s contact opportunities, but only in part. The 
more active members meet frequently for DMI events, as described above.  Yet those 
of differing faiths rarely meet together outside of DMI functions, except to honor 
important life passages such as the death of a family member. Thus their interaction 
is deeply meaningful, yet often sustained by a single strand of associational 
connectedness. This reality reflects the importance and fragility of “weak ties,” which 
link people from different identity groups, as distinct from the “strong ties” and 
multistranded connections that form more easily among people of similar 
backgrounds. However, in social network theory, social capital is often defined as 
“the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or 
other social structures” (Portes 1998: 6). Social capital, in this Bourdieu-inspired view, 
is about gaining access to resources that enhance one’s own security and socio-
economic well-being (Bordieu 1986, see also Anthias 2007).  Weak ties are desirable 
because they expand one’s network connections, making it possible to access 
resources not available within one’s own identity group. 
Importantly, there is no evidence of this type of motivation within DMI. 
Instead, DMI members are motivated by a genuine desire to address needs in the 
community, often bearing the cost of disapproval from conservative co-religionists 
who oppose interfaith action. The motivation of DMI members is better reflected in 
Karner and Parker’s (2008) identification of religion as a motivation for social 




generating “outward looking social capital.” Bruni, too, points to a form of 
reciprocity that is both altruistic and unconditional (2008). These DMI findings 
highlight a subtle distinction between social network theory and other variations of 
the social capital concept, significant because differing individual motivations may 
result in very different decisions about whether and how to engage with people of 
other identity groups.   
When DMI members have the contact opportunity to become familiar with 
individuals of differing backgrounds, their disposition towards ‘the other’ often 
undergoes a process of change.  Group-based stereotypes are weakened when 
members get to know each other as unique individuals, who cannot be wholly 
defined by their religious label (Kenworthy et al. 2005). The growing levels of trust, 
combined with sustained interaction over time, also permit contentious issues to be 
opened for discussion and potential re-evaluation. For example, DMI’s Muslim 
members, when invited to share from their own tradition, often take the opportunity 
to explain to Christian colleagues that most streams of Islamic teaching do not 
support terrorism, and that the Qur’an contains much guidance toward peace. When 
disputed issues arise, the occasion sometimes permits clarification and correction of 
one’s own position. For example, the following discussion took place within the DMI 
research team, while clarifying DMI’s approach to doctrinal disagreements for their 
practitioner publication. The significance of this exchange lies in the fact that an 
extremely sensitive issue was discussed with openness and good humor, based on 
the camaraderie that had developed over time within the team.226  
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Michelle: “What do we mean when we say ‘doctrinal issues?’” 
Catholic member:  “Church doctrines, traditions . . . “ 
Evangelical member A: “I do believe when we say doctrinal issues, (it means) 
the difference between someone else’s religious belief. We do not talk on 
the same issues; we talk on the different issues. Let’s say, like the 
Catholics, they are serving, or having, idols – “ 
Catholic member (smiling): “Oye, it’s not!” 
(Team laughter) 
Catholic member (smiling): “It’s not! We are not serving idols!” 
(Team laughter) 
Other evangelical member B: “Sister, be careful, you (should) listen, you 
should not debate . . .” 
Catholic member (smiling): “It’s not, I did not debate!” 
Evangelical member A: “For the evangelicals, we usually focus on no picture, 
no picture227 . . . “ 
 
Similarly, among DMI’s core leaders, the Christians have demonstrated 
sufficient respect for Islamic dietary restrictions by consistently foregoing pork 
during interfaith functions that the Muslim Vice-Chair no longer objects to pork 
being eaten discretely in his presence, provided that it does not appear on his own 
plate. DMI’s overall ban on pork remains firmly in place, but the Vice-Chair’s elective 
loosening of his own pork preferences reflects an increasing depth of mutual 
understanding with particular Christian individuals. Again, the significance of these 
exchanges is that they could not have taken place in the absence of consistent contact 
over time, as mediated through the existence and activities of DMI. The associations’ 
intercommunal structure provides opportunity for relationship development and 
dispositional change, contributing to the mindset shift which is so central to the DMI 
narrative. The mindset shift, in turn, prompts actions that further encourage 
intercommunality, forming a cycle that moves in a positive direction. This cyclical 
interaction between associational structure and human mindsets stands in contrast to 
                                                 




the structure-focused imbalance present in the core body of literature on the conflict 
impacts of nPCROs.   
Mindset-Structure Cycles that Limit Intercommunality. The above examples 
are encouraging, yet if the cyclical interaction of associational structures with human 
mindsets can serve to support intercommunality, it can also serve to limit 
intercommunality.  A negative cycle can slow or block progress towards intergroup 
bridging. Such limiting dynamics are visible in various aspects of the DMI case, and 
particularly poignant when considering the question of Muslim participation in DMI 
and its sister interfaith organizations.  
Geographic location and demography are structural factors that play a 
significant role in shaping structures of opportunity (Blau and Schwartz 1984), with 
the obvious macro-level observation being that the significant presence of Muslims in 
Mindanao makes Christian-Muslim engagement more important, and more feasible, 
than in other parts of the Philippines. However, at a more localized level, location 
and demographics can also pose limitations. While DMI and its sister agencies all 
appear to be equally motivated towards interfaith engagement, they have thus far 
obtained differing results. DMI has a lower proportion of Muslims among its 
members, because Davao City has a more modest Muslim population than certain 
areas in South Cotabato, Sarangani and Zamboanga Provinces, where the sister 
interfaith organizations are based. At the same time, DMI is generally considered 
more mature that its sister agencies in terms of interfaith capacity and ethos, due 
largely to the fact that their urban Davao City location has provided consistent 




housed DMI’s original trainers and mentors. The sister interfaith networks are in 
outlying areas, so mentoring support is limited to periodic visits.   
Despite the importance of location and demography, which would appear to 
lie beyond an association’s control, an over-emphasis on these factors can obscure 
important organizational decisions, which are shaped by human mindsets. DMI and 
its sister interfaith networks still work primarily in the geographic areas chosen by 
World Vision, as their mentor and ongoing partner. While World Vision works in 
many multiethnic areas, they currently have no long-term development programs in 
Mindanao’s predominantly Muslim provinces such as Maguindanao or Lanao. 228 
Therefore, DMI has no sister interfaith associations, nor formal linkages to other 
related bodies, in those Muslim-dominated zones. Further, within Davao City, DMI 
drew its first members from the neighborhoods targeted for long-term development 
programming through local partner Unity for Progress and funding partner World 
Vision.  DMI has subsequently expanded its membership to draw from other areas of 
the city, but its flagship project of Neighborhood Intergenerational Care Groups, still 
operates only in neighborhoods served by Unity for Progress and World Vision.  
While demographic statistics are not available, it is generally recognized among 
everyone involved that those areas do not include many neighborhoods that are 
predominantly Muslim. World Vision in the Philippines has extensively expanded its 
engagement with Muslims over the past decade, yet geographic expansion into 
Muslim zones is still subject to constraints of organizational policy, logistics and 
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funding. To transcend this cycle, DMI may require not only an independent source of 
funding, but also a consistent effort towards recruitment of Muslims.  
Discussion on how to increase Muslim participation has in fact been ongoing 
for several years, but the proportional involvement of Muslims in DMI has not yet 
changed significantly.  This stasis appears to be perpetuated by differing perceptions 
between DMI’s Christians and Muslims regarding the nature of the obstacles to 
Muslim participation, and how such obstacles might be overcome. In addressing 
these challenges, DMI’s Christians, both Catholic and Protestant, refer often to the 
way that interfaith engagement is viewed and regulated by the leadership of the 
Muslim hierarchy. Christians make occasional but persistent allusions to the belief 
that certain Muslim leaders who are not comfortable with interfaith engagement may 
forbid their followers to attend interfaith events, including DMI’s DNH training.229 
More concretely, there are frequent references to how Muslim leaders are selected for 
public representation, even at endorsed interfaith events, in limited numbers. This is 
a potential case of vertical social capital ties constraining horizontal bridging 
(Pinchotti and Verwimp 2007), and of the intrafaith dissonance that often holds back 
interfaith practitioners from all religious traditions (Eck 1993). As one Catholic DMI 
member explained:  
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In our membership of the Muslims in DMI, we had difficulty on inviting new 
members because when imams and ustadz will know that there is already on 
one or two Muslim leaders in the organization, they will refrain themselves 
from attending. . . That’s their ruling, I think . . . We approached their (top 
leader) one time and asked him of membership in the DMI of Muslim leaders, 
he said that “Oh, (Leader A) is there? (Leader B) is there? I could recommend . 
. . “So you see, there is this recommendation of membership, so it must be 
coming from their leader.230 
 
Additionally, in addressing the Care Groups, some DMI leaders recognize 
that despite the intention to welcome members of all ethno-religious backgrounds, 
the Care Group modules and group activities are “Christianized.”231 As elaborated in 
Chapter Five, the Care Groups were launched with a heavy Evangelical influence. 
Key operational aspects such as worship practices and leadership selection have been 
adapted to the satisfaction of Catholic members, leading to a vibrant Catholic-
Protestant mix among the members. However, in terms of attracting Muslim 
members, some promising changes have been identified through DNH analysis, but 
not yet implemented. The DMI Chair describes the stillborn effort to launch the first 
Muslim-area Care Group in terms of paradigms of the mind, touching first on his 
perception of how Muslim hierarchy affects participation, and secondly on the issue 
of Christian persistence in Evangelical practices: 
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(It was) supposed to be in (neighborhood) with Pastor _____.  Because when 
we conducted Effective Parenthood seminar there . . . some Muslims said 
“Pastor, when will you come back here in our place?” Because they are very 
happy with the seminar. So that’s why I said to Pastor _____: “Open the 
Muslim area.” But until now, maybe, he did not open in that purok. Maybe 
because of the views in the community, it’s hard. It’s hard . . . the paradigm 
shift of our Muslim leaders, because they are more on hierarchy . . . and also 
the issue the system of their worship, it’s different. . . DMI members are 
instructed how to contextualize the worship, they are more on evangelical 
approach . . . That’s also a problem, it takes time. The struggle of adapting, 
change the paradigm . . . it takes time.232 
 
The pastor who was asked to open the Muslim-area Care Group has shared 
his own analysis of another Care Group that he successfully launched and led in the 
Christian neighborhood immediately adjacent to the Muslim area in question.  In a 
group interview together with several of that Care Group’s Christian members, he 
described the obstacles to Muslim participation in terms of both mindset and 
structure. First, when asked about DNH analysis of the Care Group effort, he 
responded that: “The fear of conversion …the weekly gathering, Muslims fear that 
they will be converted because of this activity . . . It’s mostly Christians attending, so 
they fear that they will be converted to Christianity.”233 The pastor then went on to 
explain that there had previously been one Muslim member, but she quit when her 
child withdrew for unknown reasons from the child sponsorship program, which is a 
primary mechanism for World Vision funding. The Care Group is intended to be 
open to all regardless of sponsorship status, but in this case, “The majority of the 
PIGCG participants are sponsored families.”234 At the time of the interview, there 
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were 16 sponsored families living in the Muslim area, and 90 sponsored families 
living in the Christian area immediately adjacent to it.235 Again, the Care Group had 
used DNH to identify a number of promising options for establishing Muslim 
participation in this context, but those options had not yet been tried. These accounts 
demonstrate that DMI’s Christian members sometimes recognize the ‘software’ of 
human mindsets, including lingering tendencies towards exclusivism and 
proselytism, as factors limiting progress towards the intercommunal participation of 
Muslims. These local actors portray the determinants of intercommunality as 
multicausal and dynamic, in contrast to the heavy ‘hardware’ emphasis on 
associational structure that is found in the core literature.    
The perspective of Muslim community members regarding the Care Groups 
is more difficult to ascertain, precisely because of the lack of Muslim participation in 
that program. However, one Muslim DMI member has provided his own analysis of 
the Care Group situation, which for him had become a matter of personal concern.  
He shared in informal conversation that until very recently, he had thought that the 
Care Group purpose was about Christian doctrine, implying a perceived risk of 
pressure towards conversion. However, he had recently been told that such was not 
the case, so his own opinions were changing. He increasingly felt that it would be a 
good idea to have Muslim Care Group members and Muslim sponsored children.236 
His observation implies a perception that Muslims had previously been excluded 
from both the Care Group and the underlying development program and its funding 
mechanisms. While this Muslim leader’s comments echo certain aspects of the 
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Evangelicals’ own self-critique, there are subtle differences. DMI’s Evangelicals 
attribute the blockage in Muslim participation to both hierarchy by Muslims and 
exclusive practices by the Care Group’s Evangelicals, whereas Muslims appear to 
attribute the blockage to Evangelical exclusivism alone. The attribution of the 
problem to Muslim hierarchy may prevent DMI’s Evangelicals from maximizing 
their own efforts to make Muslims feel welcome. Thus a complex interaction of 
mindset with associational structure has served to limit Muslim participation in the 
DMI Care Groups.  
Finally, returning again to the pastor implementing the Care Group in 
question, in addition to his transparent description of the above factors discouraging 
Muslim participation, his comments reveal that he himself lives near the 
neighborhood in question, making him an ‘insider’ to the Christian-Muslim tensions 
in that place. He describes the ethno-religious tensions in an industrial plant located 
in the Care Group neighborhood as a case of a Muslim contractor favoring Muslim 
workers over their harder-working Christian colleagues. He then goes on to describe 
how a Christian-Muslim riot in the 1980s or 1990s resulted in a number of injuries, 
with one of his own children among the wounded.237  As explored in Chapter Five, it 
is understandably challenging for such ‘insiders’ to overcome their own ‘blind spots.’ 
Implementer biases, too, become aspects of mindset that can hamper the effort to 
develop intercommunal associational structures.  
To the extent that it is possible to objectively analyze the relative importance 
of the obstacles hindering Muslim participation in DMI, it is no doubt the case that 
                                                 





both Muslims and Christians perceive a great deal of truth. Their mindsets on this 
critical issue are not mutually exclusive, but neither do they appear to align. 
Christians give relatively more weight to the cultural practices of representation 
within the Muslim hierarchy, while Muslims focus on the issues of programmatic 
inclusion and religious proselytism. To a certain extent, each group may delay action 
while focusing on the shortcomings of the other. However it may be the Christians, 
as those holding majority power within Mindanowan society and within DMI, who 
are called upon to take the initiative in further transforming their own mindsets, 
deepening what Jha calls “their critical reflection on the self” (Jha 2009: 316) in 
relation to socio-political power structures of which they are a part. The national 
context reminds us that Christians, particularly Catholics, represent the central power 
of majority, while Muslims are a marginalized minority. Tolibas-Nuñez (1997) argues 
from survey data that Christians’ biases run more deeply than those of Muslims in 
Mindanao, which is particularly meaningful when linked to Karner’s (2007) portrayal 
of identity construction by ethnic group members as inextricably linked to the 
exercise of power. Thus the power disparity between Christians and Muslims likely 
contributes to both the need for, and the complexity of achieving, a mindset shift 
towards inclusivity.   
Theorizing in Cycles. The DMI case study suggests that while 
intercommunal associational structure is necessary for improved associational impact 
in divided societies, it is not sufficient. DMI’s existence is indeed defined by its 
desirable intercommunal structure, but its existence within Mindanao’s deeply 
divided associational sector has been made possible through changes taking place 




exist, and would not progress towards its goals. Conflict sensitivity training has been 
employed as a starting point towards transformation, and it has promoted 
intercommunality to the extent that it resets the participants’ ‘software.’  At the same 
time, progress towards greater intercommunality, particularly in terms of increased 
Muslim participation, has been partially blocked by mindsets that retain the legacy of 
exclusive thinking.  
The Singapore data, too, point to the power of mindsets, particularly the 
assumption that Singaporean society is peaceful, and that the government will 
maintain that peace. A Protestant interfaith activist shares her own reflection on how 
these perceptions keep mainstream religious actors away from interfaith 
engagement: 
 
Actually I don’t think any of them are concerned with social harmony . . . 
Because it’s not their business. Because it’s the business of government, and 
the rule of law. And I think that they believe that they are all harmonious and 
tolerant, so what are you talking about? How can my actions affect social 
harmony?… I think there is this kind of mindset that’s like that . . . We don’t 
want to talk about religion, so that’s the other big ‘elephant’ in the room, 
because it’s dangerous . . . We are not talking about the less violent things that 
are happening under the water, because we are looking at the top and saying, 
“Well, since our independence we have been, you know, since after 1967, or 
whatever, we are fine” . . . The tragedy of it is that we are a very educated 
society . . . But yet the more educated is blind. We have these blind spots now 
to the fractures within the society . . . We don’t want to recognize that we are 
racist, in our thinking and in our stereotypes . . . So, that kind, there’s all this 
denial stuff, you know? 238 
 
Clearly, the prevalence of such human ‘software’ underscores the importance 
of mindsets. Thus theories that consider organizational structure as a primary 
determinant of conflict impact must not overlook the key intangible elements that 
                                                 




give those structures power. Decades ago, Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954: 25) argued 
against an overemphasis on structural patterns in the study of friendship formation 
across identity groups, stating that “the observed patterns can in turn be conceived as 
the resultants of social interaction, as process, rather than product.” Nonetheless, it 
would not be useful to shift the theoretical pendulum completely from structure to 
non-structural factors, because both are essential explanatory elements.  Instead, it is 
necessary to consider multiple causational factors and the interaction between them. 
Cote and Erickson (2009: 1673), in addressing the effects of social capital on 
intolerance, describe the complexity of causation follows: “Each kind of factor . . .  
may have real but indirect effects through one or both of the others.”  
Complex causation of associational conflict impact is a theme thus far 
underdeveloped in the emergent body of core literature on the conflict impacts of 
nPCROs. Only Weisinger and Salipante (2005, 2007) position as central the interaction 
between structure and mindset. They view intercommunality as highly desirable, but 
their grounded theory investigation of Girl Scouts USA demonstrates that true 
intercommunality cannot be sustained without motivation and ability (drawing on 
Adler and Kwon 2002) among the participants. Weisinger and Salipante develop, and 
subsequently test, methods for helping participants to acquire the human ‘software’ 
necessary for successful intergroup bridging. Some of those methods, in turn, 
emphasize intercommunally structured learning opportunities as a necessary 
condition for the development of individual motivation and ability. Weisinger and 
Salipante are among the most application-oriented researchers in the core cluster, so 
it is perhaps not surprising that they push for the development of theory that can 




Positioned somewhat differently, Varshney does offer a complex analysis of 
causation, but he pitches this analysis at a broader level, focusing not on the 
interaction between individual mindset and associational structure, but on the 
interaction between associational structure and local politics. He concludes that “civic 
life and electoral politics have fed into each other in both cities, in a violent direction 
in Aligargh, and toward peace in Calicut” (2002: 150). He also links electoral politics 
to the development of identity-based “master narratives” (Varshney 2002: 132), yet he 
describes these electoral forces as rooted in demographic, political and economic 
structures, with limited reference to any ‘software’ factors such as culture or 
psychology  (2002: 119-148). Interestingly, MacLean (2010) has provided a 
comparable account of how macro-level state formation shapes reciprocity among 
grassroots citizens, which in turn influences patterns of political behavior. Such 
analyses are relevant and complementary to the Mindanao findings, yet distinct in 
that only the Mindanao study illuminates the role of ‘soft’ individual mindsets in the 
development of intercommunal associational structures. Similarly, Putnam offers a 
noteworthy description of social capital as progressing in path-dependent “vicious” 
and “virtuous” cycles (Putnam and Feldstein 2003: 287), a useful lens for grappling 
with complex causation, but he does not make any overt linkage of this concept to the 
development of bridging social capital. 
Thus within the core literature as a whole, there is a need for greater balance 
and interactivity in examining the ‘hardware’ and the ‘software’ involved in shaping 
the conflict impacts of nPCROs. As a challenge to models that simply emphasize the 
importance of intercommunal associational structures, the action research data 




each other in a cyclical fashion. Such cycles may move either toward 
intercommunality or away from it. Both realities can occur simultaneously within the 
same association, just as DMI’s intentional development of inclusive mindsets 
through DNH training leads the organization towards intercommunality, while the 
incomplete reflection of Evangelical members on their own power simultaneously 
sustains a partial blockage of increased Muslim participation.  Adding the dimension 
of time to this cycle yields a spiral-shaped model, indicative of continuous evolution 




Human Agency, Intentionality and Associational Change 
The conceptualization of this spiral-shaped model emphasizing change over 
time leads naturally to considering the influence of individuals and groups in taking 
action towards intercommunality. We are thus forced to grapple with the role of 




conflict impact among nPCROs, the action research findings challenge the extremes 
of the debate. Most researchers tend to give predominant emphasis either to human 
agency or socio-political context, thus setting up a conceptual tension between the 
two forces. Putnam (2000, Putnam and Feldstein 2003) and Varshney (2002) both tend 
towards a tempered confidence in agency, implying that it is within the power of 
human beings to form intercommunal associational structures. Jha (2009) and 
Weisinger and Salipante (2005, 2007) imply a strong belief in agency via their 
discussions of how individual practitioners might be capacitated for action. On the 
other hand, Uvin and Cochrane argue that a divisive socio-political context leads to 
monocommunality of associational structure and action (Uvin 1998, Cochrane 2005).  
Both mention certain conditions under which negative effects might be mitigated, but 
such considerations are brief. Uvin and Cochrane do not state that intercommunal 
associational forms are impossible, but they do imply that the central variable 
determining this possibility is the degree of polarization in the surrounding socio-
political context.  
In contrast, the action research findings reinforce the importance of both 
context and agency, and their mutual interaction, again suggesting the need for 
theories that can accommodate multiple causation and sensitivity to the possibility of 
change. In Mindanao and Singapore, contextual pressures yield a powerful influence, 
and the associational sector has long been deeply divided along ethno-religious lines. 
At first glance, the pervasive nature of such divisions might appear to prove the 
skeptics right. Nonetheless, upon closer examination, both DMI and the Harmony 
Centre provide clear examples of practitioners taking action to challenge the socio-




intentional counter-cultural decisions to promote inclusion. One cannot deny that 
DMI and the Harmony Centre exist, against the odds, which calls into question the 
proposition that contextual pressures must always dictate an organization’s course of 
action. One can, however, debate the significance of their level of influence within the 
broader context. The question of macro-level impact, while obviously important, 
should not be permitted to obscure the significance of local-level patterns, so I 
consider associational existence separately from associational impact below. With 
local developments kept solidly in view, the action research data point towards the 
theoretical significance of individual actors.   
The Existence of Intercommunal Associational Structures. DMI and the 
Harmony Centre exist in spite of polarization in the surrounding socio-political 
context and, while relatively few in number, they are not alone. In Mindanao, in 
particular, the growing vibrancy of other intercommunal associations, including the 
regional Bishops-Ulama Conference, demonstrates a degree of movement toward 
change in the associational sector. The emergence of the Tri-People ethos (as 
recognized  by Palm-Dalupan 2005: 251) has given a conceptual support and public 
sanction for efforts at inclusivity. The increasing visibility of intercommunal 
associations, and of public support for their efforts, encourages more practitioners to 
follow a similar path. The launch of DMI was made possible by earlier changes 
within its mentor agency World Vision, and DMI is subsequently expanding and 
replicating its influence among other religious actors in Davao City.  Thus the DMI 
case suggests an interactive mutual influence between context and agency, not unlike 




The development of intercommunal associational structures is difficult, fragile 
and usually slow. The fact that both DMI and the Harmony Centre are ‘works in 
progress,’ with their outcomes not yet guaranteed, points naturally to the question of 
what conditions would be most conducive to their effectiveness. In fact, for theory to 
hold any applicable relevance, it must address more broadly the conditions that 
contribute to the development of intercommunal associations that can successfully 
transcend societal divisions.  The core literature addresses this question rather 
sparingly and sporadically, but themes can be identified around the degree of 
polarization (Varshney 2002, Cochrane 2005), the availability of ‘political space’ (Uvin 
1998: 168), the intentionality of the association toward intercommunality (Uvin 1998: 
168), the level of formality with which the association is organized (Varshney 2002), 
the quality of organizational functioning (MacLean 2004, Pickering 2006), the 
motivation and capacity of the participants (Weisinger and Jr. 2007, Weisinger and 
Salipante 2005, Jha 2009), and the identification of outstanding champions for change 
(Jha 2009). Amongst this preliminary list of conditions for achieving 
intercommunality, what emerges as most central to the Mindanao and Singapore is 
the issue of intentionality.  
For both DMI and the Harmony Centre, the intentionality in choosing, and 
then persisting in, a path toward intercommunality has indeed proven essential. Both 
organizations are pursuing a counter-cultural strategy that meets with resistance. 
Much of this resistance does come from the divisive pressure of the surrounding 
socio-political context. However this contextual influence does not necessarily 
manifest itself in the ways that might be predicted based on the existing literature. 




contexts that authors despair of, such as Unionist-Nationalist relations in Northern 
Ireland (Cochrane 2005) and black-white relations the United States (Varshney 2002: 
299). Without any doubt, Mindanao has been significantly more polarized than 
Singapore. Yet in some respects, DMI has made greater progress than the Harmony 
Centre towards intercommunality. DMI of course has a longer history, so it is 
difficult to make a direct comparison. Nonetheless, DMI has a committed core of 
diverse members who implement voluntary activities together on a regular basis, and 
their influence in the community is slowly but steadily expanding. The consistent 
core of the Harmony Centre is limited to three paid staff and one or two highly 
committed external volunteers. Though significantly influential, the Harmony 
Centre’s participant pool draws consistently on the same loose network of 
individuals who have an open mind toward interfaith engagement, while a deeper 
reach into other segments of the community has thus far been elusive.239 Further, the 
Mindanowan associational sector as a whole has arguably made more progress 
toward intercommunality than its Singaporean counterpart. Thus the degree of 
contextual socio-political polarization, while certainly wielding a formidable 
influence, cannot be the sole determinant of associational intercommunality. There 
must be other factors at play.  
In terms of other contextual constraints, ‘political space’ appears to be a more 
significant limiting factor for Singaporean participants. All interfaith initiatives are 
closely monitored by the government, to ensure that the desired pursuit of religious 
harmony, does not veer into the closely related politics of race (Tan 2008). The 
Singaporean restrictions contrast sharply with government policy in the Philippines, 
                                                 




which has often afforded the Catholic Church more freedom than many of its secular 
civil society counterparts, particularly under Marcos’ martial law (Barry 2006: 157, 
Bück 2007: 106). Across Singapore, participants in interfaith activities feel compelled 
to engage in continuous self-censorship, which contributes to the common feeling 
that current interfaith dialog efforts are shallow.240 Further, the common perception 
that social harmony is first and foremost a government responsibility appears to limit 
the pool of interested participants and their levels of commitment to progressive 
interfaith activity. Would-be activists in Singapore often content themselves with a 
service-delivery role, a phenomenon also noted by Uvin with regard to the limited 
political space of pre-genocide Rwanda (Uvin 1998: 172-9) .  
Further, for Singaporean Muslims, participation is always situated within the 
government-defined agenda of interfaith activities as a tool for resilience against the 
divisive effects of any potential Islamist terror attack.  Muslims who choose to 
participate in interfaith activities appear to accept this resilience agenda, with varying 
degrees of discomfort.  Resentment of the resilience agenda may also prevent some 
Muslims from participating at all, but this remains a point of speculation, because 
participants would be naturally reluctant to comment on this issue.  Importantly, 
Singaporean government policy does not prohibit interfaith engagement; in fact, such 
intercommunal associational forms are encouraged. Even so the legal and conceptual 
constraints on the nature of interfaith activities do limit some forms of participation, 
and discourage some potential activists. In other words, the limited scope and shape 
of available political space hinders individual and associational intentionality.  
                                                 




Organizational functioning also relates closely to an association’s degree of 
intentionality in developing intercommunal structures.  In the case of DMI, 
operationalizing conflict sensitivity has been roughly equivalent to increasing the 
intercommunality of membership. As analyzed in Chapter Five, important 
organizational variables have included the role of leadership in visioning and 
championing intercommunal change, the functionality of decision-making 
mechanisms in making intercommunality a priority, and the consistency of follow-up 
to ensure that such decisions get implemented. When such organizational variables 
have functioned well, intercommunality has advanced; when these organizational 
variables have faltered, progress toward intercommunality has slowed. Intentionality 
here does not refer to nebulous positive feelings, or to a one-time affirmation of 
intercommunality as a laudable goal, but rather to a persistent, action-oriented 
prioritization of intercommunality over time, in spite of contextual pressures, 
competing tasks and limited resources. Such organizational factors are de-
emphasized here, in order to devote greater attention to the interaction between 
structure and mindset, but their importance is well elaborated in the conflict 
sensitivity literature (e.g. Lange 2004).  
Paradoxically, this emerging emphasis on intentionality aligns to some extent 
with the argument of Uvin regarding Rwanda, that intercommunal associations are 
unlikely to exist in a deeply divided society, unless they acquire both intentionality 
and political space (1998: 168). The data suggest that the more polarized the context 
of intergroup relations, and the less available the political space, the more 
intentionality is required. What distinguishes my perspective from Uvin’s is 




conflict impacts of nPCROs, the exercise of associational agency is worthy of much 
greater attention, because such associations do in fact have the potential to challenge 
the divisive pressures of the surrounding socio-political context. Importantly, the act 
of intentionally choosing intercommunality may lead associations towards the 
promotion of peace as a part of their mandate, thus moving away from the pure 
definition of a non-peace and conflict resolution organization (nPCRO). Their 
primary purpose would probably remain unchanged, but the effort to contribute to 
peace through intentional intergroup collaboration would become an important 
secondary emphasis, which may or may not be explicitly articulated. The practice of 
conflict sensitivity would appear to catalyze this type of associational change, 
because it encourages mindful, purposive action. In the words of one Singaporean 
participant, “you become aware of the consequence of your actions, and then you 
make a conscious decision whether you are going for it or not.”241  Thus it may 
become necessary to further refine the conceptual frame by making a distinction 
between nPCROs that become intentional about intercommunality, and those that do 
not.  
The Influence of Intercommunal Associational Structures. While the 
existence of DMI and the Harmony Centre cannot be denied, their level of influence 
on the socio-political context is of course debatable. In comparison to macro-level 
assessments of ethno-political division in the associational sector (e.g. Uvin 1998, 
Varshney 2002, Cochrane 2005), the changes that DMI and the Harmony Centre 
demonstrate are localized in nature. Some scholar-practitioners leading the 
development of conflict sensitivity theory have likewise questioned the significance 
                                                 




of localized change. Anderson and Olson (2003) point out that change among 
individuals or small groups will not add up to “peace writ large,” unless it reaches 
the socio-political level by involving either more people or key people capable of 
effecting political change. Writing on local civil society in Rwanda, Unsworth and 
Uvin (2002: 2) caution that 
 
much of this is worthwhile . . . But it has high administrative costs; it is 
difficult to move from local level empowerment to collective action which 
would have an impact on the national policy process; and it often has overly 
ambitious higher level objectives, aspiring to achieve significant macro-level 
aims – democracy, civil society, through actions that are disproportionately 
small (2002: 2). 
 
In this regard, it must be noted that while DMI and the Harmony Centre are 
localized, they are not limited to the grassroots level. Significant numbers of their 
participants and members do operate at the grassroots level, but by coming together 
in a city-wide network, they acquire broader scope and potential influence. Even the 
participating grassroots members are, in fact, leaders, who exercise moral authority 
over numerous followers in churches, mosques and service organizations. In effect, 
they are mobilizing the power of vertical forms of social capital (Woolcock 1998) to 
influence their constituents. Further, the Harmony Centre is government-supported, 
making it a proverbial ‘big fish in a small pond,’ and many of DMI’s members serve 
in the city government’s unique chaplaincy program. Both DMI and the Harmony 
Centre can be considered mid-level networks, strategically positioned in the sense 
pointed out by Lederach (1997: 41-2), having linkages and exercising influence at 
both the micro and macro levels. Further, these networks function in ways that 




topic of considerable interest among social network theorists (Frank and Yasumoto 
1998, Burt 2004, Baldassarri and Diani 2007).  
To the extent that ‘peace writ large’ is considered desirable, it is important to 
recognize the diversity of forms in which such macro-level impact might manifest 
itself. There is often a tendency to assume that impact on government policy-making 
is the primary indicator of associational impact. Unsworth and Uvin (2002: 2) lean 
this direction in the aforementioned quote (“…collective action which would have an 
impact on the national policy process…”).  This assumption must be critically 
weighed against the proposition that associations can impact peace and conflict in 
many ways, including but not limited to shaping public policy. For example, Gidron 
et al. (2002b)  in examining the efficacy of peace and conflict resolution organizations, 
do give central emphasis to their impact on formal peace negotiations and processes. 
However the authors also consider how associations influence intergroup relations at 
the cultural level, including changing public perceptions and opinions about the 
conflict, and introducing new norms, activities and skills for citizen engagement. 
Varshney (2002: 9-10) similarly argues that associations have their impact not 
through shaping policy, but through building intergroup horizontal networks among 
citizens that can resist the polarizing effects of “exogenous shocks.” Thus, while the 
importance of macro-level policy influence cannot be underestimated, it is too 
narrow a criterion to capture the various forms and levels of associational impact. 
Re-thinking the Individual. Associations are made up of individuals, and 
intentionality with an organization is naturally rooted in its members. The empirical 
data gathered through action research, as examined through the lenses of conflict 




thought and behavior. Voluntary associations typically do not display the needed 
discipline to pursue intercommunality, especially in contexts that model and reward 
monocommunality, unless the people within those associations are committed and 
capable.  
In conceptual terms, a macro-level perspective would often see the individual 
as the smallest possible entity in the social context, so diminutive that his or her 
actions rarely become significant at the broader level. Alternatively, it is also possible 
to view the individual as a component unit that has potential to combine with others 
to create social patterns and trends. In this view, the individual is a core building 
block of collective action, and therefore worthy of researcher attention. This 
perspective is taken by theorists who consider individual identity formation as a 
contributing factor in the macro-level dynamics of ethnic conflict (see for example 
Brown 1994: 7-19, Paribatra and Samudavanija 1984: 33). Similarly, Ramakrishna 
(2007) has called for more attention to factors of religious psychology in identity-
based conflict, and Hann (1996) has encouraged a greater focus on interpersonal 
interaction between individuals.  
Within much this project’s core literature, the simplified emphasis on 
associational structure tends to obscure the role of the practitioner. Pickering is an 
exception in that she foregrounds individual decision making, albeit by private 
citizens, only some of whom are participants in associational life (2007). Varshney, 
too, has argued for an understanding of conflict’s ‘microfoundations,’ and has 
explored the individual-level perspective in his writing on the impulse toward risk-
taking among ethnic partisans (2003), but he has not linked these insights to his 




2007) come closer to addressing this linkage in their exploration of individual 
capability for intergroup interaction. The practitioners of DMI and the Harmony 
Centre clearly agree with the importance of individual capacity, and they place a 
large emphasis on the provision of training services. Perhaps even more relevant for 
deeply divided contexts is Weisinger and Salipante’s emphasis on individual 
‘motivation,’ pointing squarely to the issues of personal commitment and 
intentionality.  What good would it do to train a voluntary participant, thus 
increasing their capacity, to pursue a costly course of action towards which they are 
indifferent, or even opposed?  
The action research findings serve well to illuminate this issue because 
conflict sensitivity, while originally intended primarily for organizational capacity 
building, has been seen to have profound effects on individual motivation. The DMI 
case study points to the pivotal importance of both awareness-raising and mindset 
shift. Awareness-raising refers to the process of individuals within an association 
becoming conscious of how their actions impact the surrounding context, and 
conscious in particular of the significance of intercommunality or monocommunality. 
Such consciousness-raising is particularly important among nPCROs, which make up 
the bulk of the associational sector, because these actors by definition focus their 
attention on matters other than conflict and peace.  The painful fact is that negative 
conflict impacts can be unintentional, but positive impacts usually require awareness 
leading to purposive intentionality.  
The related shift from exclusive to inclusive mindsets has been extensively 
analyzed above, but in relation to divisive contextual pressures there is one more 




precisely because those individuals had previously internalized the polarized and 
structurally violent paradigms (Uvin 1998) around which Mindanowan society is 
organized. The identity-based cleavages and structural violence (Galtung 1969) that 
shape Mindanao’s socio-political reality have been, to varying extents, reflected and 
reinforced in the minds of the research participants.   In the case of DMI members, it 
has been necessary to challenge those divisive structures within the minds of 
individuals, before those individuals could choose to join others in challenging the 
manifestations of division at the community level. It is likely that the more polarized 
the socio-political context, the more necessary and challenging the mindset work 
required to bring individuals to the point of choosing intentional intergroup 
engagement.   
Importantly, we again encounter here a distinction between intentional 
linking behaviors and social network theory. Pickering, in her Bosnia-based study of 
minority engagement in intergroup networks, concludes that the best sites for 
creating bridging social capital are those in which the diversity is unintentional, such 
as integrated workplaces, because participants have minimal freedom of choice 
regarding their interaction partners (2007: 113). In this case, social capital is seen as a 
means to access personal security and socio-economic well-being (Portes 1998: 6). 
People are not motivated by a desire for intergroup engagement so, given the choice, 
many would opt to avoid it. Situations of limited choice thus become a favorable 
circumstance for bringing different groups together. Without disputing the validity 
of such findings among people who are motivated by personal needs, the current 




people who become favorably and intentionally disposed towards intergroup 
engagement, often through a process of mindset change.  
Thus the issue of personal motivation becomes prominent, and calls for 
greater theoretical attention within the core literature on the conflict impacts of 
nPCROs. Individuals are indeed small units of action but, if theory is to be usefully 
applied to real-world problems, it must include within its view the small seeds that 
carry the potential for broader change, and it must help to identify the conditions that 
enable those seeds to grow. The perceptions, values, beliefs, and attitudes of 
associational members do matter, for “it is in the sphere of the mores, and the 
climates of opinion they express, that we are apt to discern incipient changes of 
vision” (Bellah et al. 1986: 275).  
 
Conclusion: Structural ‘Hardware’ Requires Mindset ‘Software’ 
This study’s in-depth examination of two local intercommunal network 
agencies in Mindanao and Singapore has illuminated several under-theorized aspects 
of the determinants of the conflict impact among nPCROs in settings of ethnic 
conflict. Moving beyond the simple distinction between intercommunal and 
monocommunal associational structures, I have identified several factors that 
influence how such intercommunal associations come into being, and how they 
continue to develop. These factors include human mindsets and human agency, both 
of which are nonstructural in nature, thereby challenging the structural emphasis in 
the emergent core literature on this theme, as centered around Putnam (2000) and 




This foregrounding of non-structural factors does not imply that the non-
structural should become the sole focal point in theorizing the determinants of 
conflict impact among nPCROs. On the contrary, the non-structural or ‘software’ 
factors need to be considered in tandem with the structural or ‘hardware’ factors. 
This would enable the relevant theories on the determinants of conflict impact to 
accommodate multiple causation, interaction between sources of causation, and 
sensitivity to the possibility of change. In effect, this is an argument favoring 
theoretical nuance over parsimony, if such nuance is needed to provide social 
explanations that are believable enough to act upon (Greenwood and Levin 2007: 67) 
in policy and practice.    
To the extent that the current core literature, taken as a body, points to the 
assumption that the conflict impacts of nPCROs can be improved simply by making 
them structurally intercommunal, then this theory is misleading in its 
incompleteness. I suggest that such theory could be re-conceptualized as a cycle of 
mutual influence between associational structure and individual mindsets. This cycle 
can create momentum either towards intercommunality or away from it, with the 
possibility of both phenomena occurring simultaneously within the same association. 
Adding the dimension of time to this cycle yields a spiral-shaped model, indicative of 
change in progress. Such change may originate with either the structure of an 
association, or the mindsets of its members.  
The findings elaborated in this chapter have responded to two of my three 
research questions on the determinants of associational conflict impacts among 
nPCROs. The theme of the third research question, on the role and influence of 




empirical data are thoroughly infused with references to religion. For religious actors 
in Mindanao and Singapore, the mindset factors that influence both associational 
structure and human agency are in fact deeply religious in nature. Further, given the 
extensive influence of religion in the public square in Southeast Asia, the factors that 
shape the behavior of religious leaders and activists hold much significance for the 
associational sector in that region. Thus the next chapter provides an explicit analysis 
of the religious content and meaning of this project’s findings, as a further 





RELIGIOUS CULTURE, IDENTITY, AND CHANGE  
 
To doubt God’s existence would be to doubt one’s own self-awareness,  
and consequently everything else. 
- Jose Rizal, Filipino nationalist leader (Bonoan 1994: 58) 
 
This chapter continues application of the empirical data from Mindanao and 
Singapore to address the study’s second level of research inquiry: How do the 
findings arising from conflict sensitivity testing inform existing associational theory?  
The preceding chapter established the mutual cyclical influence between 
intercommunal associational structures and human mindsets, and the role of human 
agency in pursuing change.  This chapter explores the extent to which both of those 
themes have been shaped by the central role of religion, particularly religion’s 
mindset-influencing yet oft-neglected cultural intangibles (Wood 1999, Blanchard et 
al. 2008). While this chapter draws significantly on Chapter Seven, it represents a 
somewhat stronger critique of this project’s core literature on the social impacts of 
associations whose primary mandate is not conflict-related, or nPCROs. The non-
structural determinants of impact elaborated in the previous chapter are 
acknowledged in current associational theory, despite the need for a greater balance 
and emphasis in future research. However the role of religion as an important non-
structural determinant of impact is more conspicuously absent in the existing body of 
theory, suggesting a ‘religion gap’ in need of more urgent scholarly attention.   
Admittedly the role of religion in associational life is context-driven, and in 
this sense the religious content of this chapter is uniquely reflective of the Southeast 




Asia. Other regions of significance include Africa and the United States and, as Wood 
points out, “the global trend in this regard is up, not down” (1999: 329). Thus it is 
concerning that religion receives very little attention within this project’s core 
literature, despite the fact that nPCROs actually comprise the bulk of the 
associational sector. As detailed in Chapter Three, perhaps the most surprising near-
omission of religious intangibles comes from Varshney, in his extensive research on 
conflict between religiously-defined ethnic groups in both India (2002) and Indonesia 
(2010).  Putnam’s treatment of religious culture (2000, 2002, Putnam and Feldstein 
2003) was for many years limited and sporadic, until his recent expansive publication 
on the divisive and unifying factors in American religion (Putnam and Campbell 
2010). Some of the other core works do address religion, but they either limit their 
analysis to religious institutions as opposed to religious intangibles (Uvin 1998, 
MacLean 2004, Cochrane 2005, Weisinger and Salipante 2005), or they do not link 
religious intangibles as major contributors to associational conflict impact (Pickering 
2007, Titeca and Vervisch 2008, Jha 2009). Only Karner and Parker (2008) position 
religious culture as central, finding religious beliefs to be a key motivation for 
engagement in progressive change, including the development of both bridging and 
bonding social capital.  
Looking beyond the conflict impacts of nPCROs, the broader literature on 
associations and democratization shows a consideration of religion that is growing 
but very inconsistent. Research employing civil society concepts demonstrates 
perhaps the most problematic neglect of religion (Muukkonen 2009: 689), due in large 
part to Western-influenced assumptions that modernization will relegate religion to 




strongly reinforce the recommendation of Karner and Parker that "discussions about 
ethnicity, social capital and community cohesion need to engage with religion as a 
resource for making sense of complex experiences and attachments" (2008: 520). 
This chapter, after briefly considering the institutional aspects of religious 
impact, devotes greater attention to religious cultures, including empirical findings 
on such matters as religious compromise, proselytism and theological resources for 
peace. Each of these themes is shown to contribute to group identity development, 
and to be subject to change.  These elements of religious culture are examined with 
emphasis on the relatively extensive changes taking place among the Mindanowan 
participants, and supplemented by the insights of participants from Singapore. Due 
to the composition of the participant group, Protestant and Evangelical experiences 
are more strongly represented than those of Catholics or Muslims, and the 
experiences of Buddhists and other non-monotheistic faiths important in Southeast 
Asia are not addressed. Therefore without claiming an even-handed coverage of the 
region, this project’s empirical evidence provides a revealing look at certain 
prominent conflict-related themes, including the particularly contentious issue of 
proselytism. Finally, in light of the core literature’s relative silence on the religious 
themes so prominent in the data, I return to iteratively deepen the consideration of 
the religious studies and theological literature that was briefly mentioned in Chapter 
Three (Davis 2004: 157, Fisher and Phelps 2006: 156-8). This selective sampling of 
theological literature demonstrates how the explanatory power of associational 
theory could be greatly enhanced through linkage and integration with religious 
studies, particularly with reference to religiously-influenced societies such as those 




The Influence of Religious Institutions 
The overall emphasis in this chapter is on religious culture, because of its 
underrepresentation in the existing literature (Wood 1999, Blanchard et al. 2008).  
Nevertheless, before proceeding to culture, it must be acknowledged that the more 
familiar theme of religious institutions does indeed play a significant role in shaping 
the overall conflict dynamics, and the social impacts of religious associations, in 
Mindanao and Singapore. Religious institutions can and do influence politics, though 
the scope and mechanisms differ significantly across contexts. In the Philippines, the 
Roman Catholic Church regularly issues influential policy statements on peace 
processes, mining regulations, etc.  Further, some of the larger non-Catholic 
denominations, and Catholic organizations operating outside the Church hierarchy, 
exercise an overt influence in electoral politics. Media coverage of the 2010 
presidential election reports numerous endorsement-seeking meetings between 
political candidates and leaders of mega-churches (for example Legaspi 2010). A 
Catholic interviewee described his own observations as follows:  
  
It is true that there is a clear link. You can tell it during election time . . .  The 
politicians try to get to the leader of huge denominations. .. because they 
know that when they get the vote of the leader, then the leader says that this 
is the line-up of politicians we are going to vote for . . . and they do, we call it 
block voting, especially in the Iglesia ni Kristo for example . . . The Iglesia ni 
Kristo in the national politics really is a crucial block or group of people . . . 
because they have around three or five or six million . . . A politician really 
can get support, and everybody knows it. 242 
 
In Singapore, religious institutions are legally barred from attempting to 
influence politics, and encouraged to focus on a limited service-delivery role. The 
                                                 




government does seek feedback from religious leaders on certain policy issues such 
as bio-ethics and casino expansion, but many religious actors privately question the 
extent to which such feedback is used in decision-making. Even so, religious actors 
provoke the government into action whenever they overstep the ‘out-of-bounds’ 
markers in ways that might inflame ethno-religious tensions. Further, as a Protestant 
interfaith activist has observed, religious associations influence social policy in subtle, 
indirect ways through the placement of their members in government roles. Chinese 
Protestants, in particular, are considered influential despite their religious minority 
status.  For example, the Boy’s Brigade, a children’s club known for its evangelistic 
content, has been approved by the Ministry of Education to operate in schools. A 
Catholic educator reportedly voiced his frustration by saying: “This must have been 
done by one of the Christians in the ministry, and then they slipped it in.” 243 Though 
probably catalyzed by an individual, this legal decision served to institutionalize the 
Boy’s Brigade in the public square, and to expand the church’s assigned service 
delivery role in order to serve its own purposes.   
Further, religious doctrines bolstered by formal high-level endorsement can 
significantly shape interactions between local associational actors, as seen in the 
Roman Catholic Church’s Vatican II statements which delineated a more affirming 
and multifaceted relationship between Christianity and other religions (e.g. Pope 
Paul VI 1965). In Singapore, three of the five pilot interviewees pointed to Vatican II 
as having prompted a pivotal conceptual shift in how local Catholics engage 
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interfaith relations.244 One of them, a Muslim interfaith activist, commented that he 
found Catholics much easier to work with than Protestants, precisely because of the 
reforms initiated by Vatican II.245 The literature also indicates that Vatican II had a 
significant impact in the Philippines on the Catholic Church’s teachings on interfaith 
engagement (Abubakar 1997, Larousse 2001), but the Filipino participants did not 
mention it during the action research.  
Given the dynamics described above, there is no doubt that religion’s 
institutional aspects wield much influence in the Mindanowan and Singaporean 
public spheres. Yet even institutional actions are often mediated through the 
mindsets and resulting decisions of small groups and individual followers. The 
teachings of Vatican II would have no local influence if not adopted by grassroots 
actors. Denominational block voting would not be possible in the absence of a 
mindset that assumes strong compliance with pastoral directives. These mindset 
factors, illustrative of religious cultures, receive scant consideration in the core 
literature, so I give ample attention below to elaborating the themes and examples 
identified in the action research data.  
 
The Influence of Religious Cultures 
Despite the neglect of religious culture in the associational literature (Wood 
1999, Blanchard et al. 2008), it is a dominant theme in the empirical data emerging 
from Mindanao and Singapore. ‘Culture’ here refers to the learned and shared 
patterns of beliefs, values and behaviors within a particular group (Bennett 1998). In 
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this study certain aspects of religious culture have been laid bare to a greater extent 
than originally anticipated, owing to a somewhat unforeseen resonance between 
conflict sensitivity and religion, as experienced by the participating religious actors. 
First, it appears that conflict sensitivity’s emphasis on dualistic social impacts, which 
may be either positive or negative, provides religious actors with a way to 
conceptualize and verbalize what they already know about religion’s potential for 
both help and harm. In other words, conflict sensitivity helps religious actors to 
confront religion’s “Janus face” (Casanova 1994: 4). This dualistic religious potential 
is also reflected in the literature, perhaps most notably in the work of Appleby (2000), 
who calls all religions “ambivalent,” meaning that the concept of the sacred itself 
embodies “the authority to kill and to heal, to unleash savagery, or to bless 
humankind with healing and wholeness” (2000: 29). Similarly, Juergensmayer (2000) 
sees within religion a cosmic warfare between order and chaos. When conflict 
sensitivity raises awareness of religion’s ambivalent impacts, this new consciousness 
taps into a deep well of religious ethics around personal responsibility and individual 
change, in the context of one’s duty to help others. Conflict sensitivity has become a 
way of unlocking religious change among individuals, who form the building blocks 
of associations, and influence the intercommunality or monocommunality of their 
structures.  
Among the participating religious actors, several interrelated elements of 
religious culture have undergone change, including the fear of compromising one’s 
faith, the practice of proselytism, and the discovery of theological resources for peace. 
Each of these elements has shaped the pivotal question of whether associational 




Further, each of these elements relates closely to the theme of identity, meaning the 
ways in which each ethno-religious group defines itself vis-à-vis other groups. The 
centrality of identity in this study was well expressed by a Singaporean participant 
who stated that a prominent barrier to local interfaith engagement is that “they fear 
losing their identity to the other.”246   
Alagappa has stated that identity formation is one of civil society’s basic 
functions (2004b: 53), and this thesis has referred at various points to the question of 
social identity development and intergroup boundaries (Tajfel and Turner 1986). 
Indeed, I have defined ‘ethnic conflict’ as referring to conflict based in group identity 
(Horowitz 2000, Kanbur et al. 2010), so it should come as no surprise that where 
religious affiliation overlaps with ethnicity, religion can play a role in identity 
formation. Marty (1997: 14) further claims that intense forms of religion are more 
useful for identity formation.  Nonetheless, religion has often been treated as a simple 
‘identity marker,’ with little attention given to religious content and meaning (Ganiel 
and Dixon 2008: 422). The empirical data call such assumptions into question by 
illuminating Southeast Asian contexts in which religion has indeed been an identity 
marker in ethnic conflicts over governance and resources, yet religion has also 
acquired over time a political significance of its own that reaches far beyond the 
confines of the identity-marker role. The data, in fact, align with the argument of 
Wellman that religion interacts with politics and violence largely through its identity-
shaping power, and that it "creates symbolic and social boundaries that include and 
exclude" (2007a: 5). For these reasons, the religious themes in the data merit a deeper 
look in relation to identity, ambivalence and change.  
                                                 




Compromise. As elaborated in Chapter Five, different religious beliefs are often 
assumed in Mindanao to be a natural cause for separation. Among members of DMI, 
the shift towards inclusive mindsets has involved questioning the implicit notion that 
one should not mix with people whose beliefs are different, and therefore probably 
inferior. Conflict sensitivity and Culture of Peace training have prompted DMI 
members to recognize the divisive effects of such notions within Mindanowan 
communities. Thus, without abandoning their own religious convictions, they have 
begun to de-link religious belief from their criteria for entering interpersonal 
relationships. They have made a conscious decision to build on their commonalities 
and, to a significant extent, set aside religious doctrine as an area in which it is 
acceptable to ‘agree to disagree.’ Thus one participant explains that he uses conflict 
sensitivity as an aid “…to stand where we are, no discussion of belief; let a 
humankinds prevails from the heart as human.”247 Another participant states that: 
“We give importance to our commonalities, to what is common to our beliefs and 
practice.”248  
The significance of this shift is highlighted by the fact that it is particularly 
difficult for Evangelicals in Mindanao, due to the fear of ‘compromising’ their own 
faith commitment. It is commonly perceived that being in relationship with a person 
implies that you approve of his or her religious beliefs, unless the primary purpose of 
the relationship is evangelism.  Evangelical members of the research team feel that 
concerns of religious compromise are the primary barrier for their co-religionists in 
accepting the interfaith content of DMI’s publication, and in considering the 
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possibility of interfaith relationships in their own lives.  One pastor states that “We 
are really afraid of the word ‘compromising’ our faith.”249 Another elaborates as 
follows: 
 
It’s the idea of compromising their faith. It will give us the idea that we need 
to compromise our faith in order to join with the other groups. That idea is 
really to be questioned for most religious leaders. So let’s be careful how to 
really present LCP in that way, without compromising the faith.250 
 
Over time, the Evangelicals in DMI have developed important alternative 
ways of conceptualizing, and avoiding, religious compromise.  In the process of 
building relationships with people of other faiths, they continue to articulate their 
own unchanged identity.  One pastor explains that: “Personally, I could mingle now 
with ease with people from different religions. I could make friends now with 
Muslims & Catholics by letting them know that I am still an ‘Assemblies of God.’”251 
Further, it is understood within DMI that each member still holds to the universal 
truth claims of his or her own faith. They advocate inclusivity in relationships and in 
service, but not necessarily in matters of doctrine, particularly doctrines of personal 
salvation.252  Thus each member continues to believe that his or her own faith 
represents the highest truth, and they would be very happy if others decided to 
embrace it. However, they respect the others’ right to chose. They view others as 
whole people, rather than just souls in need of salvation, and as people with whom 
they have many other characteristics and goals in common. Further, they use conflict 
                                                 
249 Prt. MI #93, during research team consultation, Davao, 17 Jan. 2009, audio recording. 
250 Prt. MI #85, during research team consultation, Davao, 17 Jan. 2009, audio recording. 
251 Prt. MI #85, long-form survey of DMI, Davao, Jan. 2008. 




sensitivity as a catalyst to identify and reform the pervasively negative religious 
impact patterns identified in Chapter Six, such as Disrespect, Mistrust and Competition. 
The data suggest that DMI members are actively engaged in re-shaping the 
boundaries between religious groups. The exclusive mindsets among Mindanowan 
religious actors can be seen as a manifestation of group efforts at positive self-
differentiation (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Proselytism in particular differentiates 
through distinctions in doctrine and worship – i.e. defining oneself in opposition to 
what one is not - and self-elevates by positioning the adoption of one’s own practices 
as the standard of acceptability. With this in mind, the shift towards inclusive 
mindsets is an example of how religiously-influenced boundaries can be changed, in 
effect re-constructed through the agency of common people. Importantly, the 
boundaries are not being erased, an approach which DMI members would find 
unacceptable (as in Ganiel and Dixon 2008: 428), but the contour and nature of the 
boundaries is being significantly re-defined.  
Such findings appear to reinforce the work of Yukich (2010), who indicates 
that some inclusive religious groups manage the tension between boundaries and 
inclusion by developing their boundaries at the level of abstract conceptualization, 
while practicing inclusion in their concrete interpersonal interactions. DMI members 
have also begun to distinguish boundaries and inclusion along different planes. 
Whereas DMI’s Evangelicals previously held up doctrinal standards of shared belief 
as a broad criterion for acceptability, they now distinguish between social and 
spiritual aspects of acceptability. In the social realm, shared beliefs are no longer the 
criterion for acceptability among humans; instead, welcoming friendships with 




other hand, most of DMI’s Evangelicals have not re-evaluated their standards of 
spiritual acceptability. Specific doctrinal beliefs are still seen as the as the key to 
relationship with God, or salvation. A powerful catalyst for this redefinition of 
boundaries appears to be ongoing interpersonal relationships with persons of other 
faiths, in what Yukich considers a manifestation of Buber’s (1958) classic “I-Thou” 
encounter.  
Thus without compromising their core religious commitments, DMI’s 
Evangelicals have adopted a stance that is more conducive to intercommunal 
association.  Compromise as an issue of religious identity pertains particularly to 
Evangelicals. However, if the fear of compromise is the primary barrier for 
Evangelicals in considering interfaith engagement, then a corresponding barrier for 
non-Evangelicals, particularly Muslims, is the avoidance of religious proselytism. In 
Mindanao, the research team judged proselytism to be the primary concern of 
Muslims in relating to Christian religious groups.253  
Proselytism. As emphasized from the pilot phase findings onwards, the 
phenomenon of religious proselytism is an important determinant of social impact 
among religious associations in Mindanao and Singapore. ‘Proselytism’ implies 
communication of a religious salvation message in ways that are aggressive, 
manipulative or forceful. This is a difficult term to use with precision, because the 
distinction is vague between proselytism and other forms of religious 
communication. The communicators themselves rarely use this term, with the 
identification of ‘proselytism’ often being subject to the views of recipients and 
observers. Nonetheless, the perceptions of aggression, manipulation and force are 
                                                 




what make this phenomenon problematic for intergroup relations in Southeast Asia, 
so I use the term, with caution, where it is needed.  
Any religion can engage in proselytism, and the monotheistic faiths are 
considered particularly prone to such activity. During the Spanish colonial era in the 
Philippines, the primary source of conversion, including pressurized conversion, was 
the Roman Catholic Church. Further, in the Mindanao action research, one 
participant described a current situation in which Muslims oblige Christians 
intermarried with Muslims to convert to Islam.254 Singaporean interviewees have 
mentioned forthright Islamic efforts at “telling of the beauty of Islam” during the 
1970s and 1980s Da’wah movement and renewal.255 The Da’wah movement had 
similar ripple effects in Mindanao, including an increased public observance of 
conservative Muslim approaches to food, dress, etc. (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 172-3). 
Proselytism-related activities continue in the present within some Singaporean 
Islamic community service organizations, albeit in a more subtle manner (Mansor 
and Ibrahim 2008: 466). However, despite the engagement of multiple faith groups in 
encouraging religious conversion, in the current context of Mindanao and Singapore, 
the greatest proselytizing force is found among Protestant Christians who are 
Evangelical in their orientation.   
For Evangelicals, their proselytizing efforts stem from a strong biblically-
inspired belief in universal truth, a salvation message centering on one’s ‘personal 
relationship with Jesus Christ,’ and in their own responsibility to share this message 
with others as an expression of caring. Further, for many Evangelicals, their beliefs 
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about their own spiritual salvation, and their relationship to others who either share 
or do not share those beliefs, are central to their own identity. The overlap between 
religious and ethnic identities brings proselytism into the public square. Among the 
target audience, proselytizing activity often triggers anxiety and resistance, due to the 
historical linkage between conflict and religious conversion in the Southeast Asian 
region.  As Putnam has observed, “proselytizing religions are better at creating 
bonding social capital than bridging social capital” (Putnam 2000: 410).  
In the Philippines, conversion is the primary reason for the somewhat 
counter-intuitive cleavage between Protestant and Catholic Christians. When Spanish 
colonialism gave way to American colonialism at the turn of the twentieth century, 
this opened the door for large numbers of American and American-inspired 
Evangelical missionaries. The Catholic Church has been steadily losing members as 
the Evangelical churches expand. Though both churches are drawn from the same 
ethnic groups (migrant Visayans and indigenous Lumads), Catholics perceive 
Evangelicals as very aggressive and closed-minded in their doctrine, while 
Evangelicals see Catholics as not being ‘real Christians.’256  
In Singapore, proselytism by Chinese Evangelicals continues to be such a 
potent inflamer of ethnic and religious tensions that the Prime Minister periodically 
issues strong public warnings. In his 2009 National Day speech, “racial and religious 
harmony” was one of the four primary topics addressed. He commented on 
proselytism as follows: 
 
                                                 




Aggressive preaching or proselytisation. You push your own religion on 
others, and cause nuisance and offence. You have read in the papers recently, 
one couple who surreptitiously distributed Christian tracts which were 
offensive to other faiths, not just to non-Christians but even to Catholics 
because they said Catholics are not Christians. They were charged and 
sentenced to jail. But there are less extreme cases too which can cause 
problems. For example, we hear from time to time complaints of groups 
trying to convert very ill patients in our hospitals who do not want to be 
converted and who do not want to have the private difficult moments in their 
lives intruded upon. But sometimes it happens. So aggressive preaching is 
one problem (Lee 2009). 
 
During DNH testing and application in Mindanao, some of the underlying 
mindset factors relating to Evangelical proselytism were undergoing change, and 
therefore they became more visible than usual, and a subject of frequent 
conversation. The core religious beliefs of DMI’s Evangelical actors, centered on their 
message of salvation, remain unchanged. The vast majority have not decreased their 
evangelism, which they view as a God-given responsibility. However, there is 
evidence for an ongoing Evangelical re-interpretation of how one’s faith should be 
lived out in community with others. As described above, many Evangelicals using 
DNH have de-linked perceived salvation status from their implicit criteria for 
entering into some types of relationships. Such Evangelicals are now willing to enter 
into a collegial relationship or friendship with an ‘unbeliever,’ for purposes that are 
not solely defined by evangelism.  Close associations such as intermarriage would 
still be frowned upon, but many other aspects of public life can be shared.  
Further, Evangelicals have begun to use DNH to revise and contextualize the 
way they conduct evangelism, with a view towards both mitigating tensions within 
the target communities, and making their spiritual message more attractive to their 




must naturally engender conflict. A Catholic DMI leader tells the story of an 
Evangelical pastor who used DNH to modify his strategy for planting Evangelical 
churches among Catholics: 
 
When you go to the community, and you’re a pastor and you are starting a 
church planting there’s really this rejection. But he said that:  “I’m not going 
to stop my church planting . . .that’s still my ministry . . . but now I am more 
careful . . . I should know the connectors and dividers of that community, and 
my church planting strategy should be redesigned to fit the connectors and 
the dividers, (to have a) good impact on that.” 257 
 
The Catholic who shared this example viewed it through the lens of her interfaith 
experience. She interpreted it as positive, because the pastor was seeking to behave 
respectfully and avoid stirring up conflict.  Nonetheless, the evangelism continued, a 
fact that might remain displeasing to other Catholics, as well as Muslims.   
DMI’s Evangelicals themselves underscore the same theme of using DNH to 
contextualize their evangelism, thus making it more effective within a given socio-
cultural context. Some refer to the New Testament scripture that says: “To the Jews I 
became as a Jew, that I might win Jews…To those who are without law, as without 
law … that I might win those who are without law … I have become all things to all 
men, that I might by all means save some.”258 Others share their own experiences of 
contextualization, as illustrated in the quotes below: 
The motive of persuasion, to conversion, it’s mostly behind all religious 
activities. Mostly. Even if we will not accept it or not. It’s really there. For me 
as Evangelical, it’s always the motive of persuasion, to conversion. We just 
want to have an option that it will not be threatening.259  
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For me I want to share the example of life for being LCP in my area, different 
people & different culture only to establish a good relationship and 
understand their attitudes in order to win them.260 
 
Perhaps most significantly, some of the Evangelicals using DNH have begun 
to adapt their understanding of the message of evangelism itself.  DMI’s Catholics 
also empathize with this effort, based on the Christian beliefs and experiences that 
they hold in common with Evangelicals. However, this change is not yet widespread. 
It is being advocated among the DMI leadership, research team, and some other 
members who are particularly committed and experienced in their DNH uptake. The 
DMI Chair has described refining the concept of conversion through emphasizing the 
inclination of the heart towards Christ more than particular doctrines and external 
rituals. Practices such as baptism would still be strongly encouraged, but they 
become voluntary and subsequent, rather than rigid entry points for salvation. 
Further, the entire process is mediated through an emphasis on interpersonal 
relationship:  
 
Also the mindset of conversion needs to refine . . . the first conversion is the 
heart, and if their heart is fully convinced, then they will volunteer their self 
to . . . for example, the water baptism. In traditional way, the teaching of 
water baptism is part of salvation. So, if we will impose that immediately, it’s 
very hard to accept. So, that’s why in their community . . . we will first pick 
up our relationship, and then they will see our deeds, not only in our words. I 
think that’s Jesus’ principle. Trust must be built. 261 
 
When the DMI research team was preparing its practitioner publication, the 
word ‘conversion,’ which is very commonly used in the Mindanowan religious 
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sector, was correspondingly prominent in the draft text. However, this word was 
considered so sensitive that, if used indiscriminately, it would likely alienate the non-
Evangelical audience. Thus the team distinguished the different meanings of 
‘conversion,’ and then eliminated that word from the text. The first meaning of 
‘conversion’ was re-phrased as “spiritual transformation,” meaning the improvement 
of one’s relationship to God (e.g. Davao Ministerial Interfaith Inc. 2010: 44-7).262 This 
aspiration is held in common by Evangelicals, Catholics and Muslims in Mindanao. It 
is the focal point of the ministry effort of all DMI members, a stance for which they 
do not apologize. Importantly, spiritual transformation differs significantly from the 
second meaning of ‘conversion,’ which was re-phrased as “a change of religious 
affiliation” (Davao Ministerial Interfaith Inc. 2010: 29-55). This change of religious 
affiliation implied pressure and manipulation imposed by people of other identity 
groups, accompanied by anxiety or anger in the recipient.   
DMI has distanced itself from this practice of publicly advocating changes in 
religious affiliation, emphasizing that while people can and do change their religious 
affiliation, their personal choices must be respected, and such issues should not be 
the focal point when undertaking interfaith engagement for purposes of the common 
good. The distinctions being made are immensely significant, because they challenge 
the mainstream Mindanowan assumption that improving one’s relationship to God is 
equivalent to affiliating oneself to a particular religious group and sometimes even to 
a particular sub-group or denomination. This explicit exploration of the concepts and 
motivations behind religious proselytism serves to strongly reinforce the influence of 
                                                 





mindsets, particularly religious mindsets, in shaping individual identity and 
associational social impact. Further, this intentional change of belief systems is clearly 
an exercise of human agency, of choosing between alternative theological 
interpretations, as further elaborated in the next sub-section.  
Theological resources for peace.  Finally, interwoven in the above-described 
changes in religious culture, as well as the earlier findings on DNH uptake, there is a 
consistent theme of religious actors drawing upon peace-promoting resources found 
within their own scriptures. In DMI circles, Muslim leaders share qur’anic verses on 
peace, and statements from Islamic teachers that denounce indiscriminate violence.  
Catholic and Evangelical leaders weave into their theology such biblical themes as 
Christ as a model of inclusion, or believers’ call from God to serve as “ambassadors 
of reconciliation.”263 Such thinking is reinforced by the Do No Harm framework’s 
concept of ‘local capacities for peace’, which encourages religious actors to look 
inwards towards the discovery of the peace-promoting teachings and practices that 
they already possess (see also Furbey et al. 2006: 8) 
Significantly, the use of peace themes in the participants’ theology in many 
cases represents a change of self-identity, either in terms of a departure from what 
the individual in question previously thought, or a departure from their co-
religionists’ mainstream. For example, one DMI member shared during the pilot 
consultations: “My denomination is separatist, but based on the Bible I see Matthew 
5:9, ‘Blessed are the peacemakers.’ After attending the LCP and fellowshipping other 
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religious groups it opened my mind. I found it is religion is not to debate but to 
share.”264 
That same participant, when later interviewed individually, provided the 
interviewer with a copy of his own biblical theology of peace, because he viewed it as 
closely linked to DNH. He described how he had an emergent interest in themes of 
peace, and after learning DNH he had broadened their application. “Before LCP, I 
already have some application about concepts of peace. Application of peace was just 
offering solution (biblical perspectives) of peace to exclusive members of my church. 
Now, with LCP, I share to all, basically all kinds of people as long as they are open to 
peace.”265 
The limited awareness of peace themes in mainstream Mindanowan religious 
circles is underscored by DMI’s recognition that their promotion of peace must be 
pointedly based in scripture, or else religious actors will not accept it. Thus biblical 
and qur’anic scripture references were interspersed throughout DMI’s practitioner 
publication (Davao Ministerial Interfaith Inc. 2010). Within DMI circles, the members 
take turns using a ‘reflection’ time at the beginning of each meeting to further explore 
scriptural peace themes, and teach them to each other.  DMI members carry such 
themes into the teachings presented to their own followers in the churches, mosques 
and religious service organizations that they lead.  
Further, the increasing awareness of peace themes in scriptures is often 
accompanied by recognition of how scriptural resources can be used to promote 
conflict, through either unconscious error or intentional provocation:  
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Preaching must be careful, not to deliver increased tension. The message of 
reconciliation must be properly delivered. Not to condemn people but to lead 
them into reconciliation. Reconciliation message, to reconcile the people, is 
very important. Because we can preach, but the dangerous of our preaching, 
is our preaching can divide . . . without the contextualization of the scripture. 
The verses in the Qur’an or the Bible, how can you contextualize it? ... And 
then we can also use the Bible to discriminate others, no?266 
 
This DMI pattern of increasing awareness of theological alternatives, followed 
by selection among them, strongly reinforces the concept of religious ambivalence 
and the role of human agency in religious decision-making.  As highlighted by 
Appleby (2000), there is much theological pluralism and disagreement within many 
faiths on matters pertaining to violence and exclusion. If and when religious actors 
recognize the ambivalence within their own faith traditions, and become aware of the 
theological alternatives, they must, in effect, choose whether to maintain the status 
quo or to embrace change. DMI’s experience further illustrates the extent to which 
such changes are selective, meaning that some aspects of religious culture may 
change significantly, while others remain largely intact. Theological changes are not 
necessarily uniform from one DMI member or one interfaith network node to 
another, thus underscoring the importance of the intentional decision-making taking 
place at both individual and associational levels. While globalization has increased 
the variety of intrafaith interpretations available to believers (Appleby 2009), 
religious leaders still play a key role in informing their theological choices (Appleby 
2000: 31), particularly in Mindanowan communities that are geographically, 
culturally or linguistically isolated. DMI’s religious leaders are acutely aware of the 
power they wield, as seen in their identification of numerous conflict impact patterns 
                                                 




pertaining to the authority of the religious leader.267 Thus DMI members have not 
only begun to incorporate peace-promoting theologies when they teach their own 
followers, but have also become particularly conscious of the behavior that they 
model in public, multifaith settings. “When we go to the community, we should not 
bring our doctrine with us, but bring the peace there, bring what is for the common 
good there.”268 
The deep reflection of DMI’s religious leaders on their own understanding of 
scripture, and on the nature of their interaction with people who believe differently, 
indicates that they themselves view religious culture as an important determinant of 
associational conflict impact. There is strong evidence that religious culture is not 
static but constantly evolving, shaped in part by human decision-making and agency. 
Such changes in religious beliefs, values and behaviors, while probably not sufficient 
in and of themselves to effect broad change, can interact cyclically with associational 
structures in ways that help to shape society’s patterns of ethno-political relations, 
either for good or for ill. Nonetheless, while recognized by religiously-oriented 
researchers such as Appleby (2000) , factors of religious culture are largely absent in 
this project’s core literature on the conflict impacts of nPCROs. While possibly 
tenable in secularized societies, the neglect of religious cultures and institutions as a 
political force is not sound in relation to Southeast Asia, or other societies in which 
religion plays a prominent role in the public sphere.  
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Addressing the ‘Religion Gap’  
In light of the prominence of religion in Mindanowan and Singaporean 
associational life, it is striking that the bulk of the core literature cannot explain the 
central religious aspects of this study’s empirical findings.  Only Karner and Parker 
(2008), along with the most recent work of Putnam (2010: 419-42), have given 
substantial attention to religious culture as a factor that motivates and shapes 
associational engagement. The data make it clear that there is a ‘religion gap’ at the 
heart of this project’s core literature. For this reason, I now reach beyond the social 
sciences to consider more deeply the religious studies and theological literature that 
was mentioned briefly in Chapter Three, for a selective exploration of how such 
literature may help to address this ‘religion gap’ in the existing body of theory on the 
conflict impacts of nPCROs. This iterative use of the literature is characteristic of 
action research, and helps to ensure that theory development is continuously 
responsive to emergent data  (Davis 2004: 157, Fisher and Phelps 2006: 156-8).  
In view of the empirically-driven themes of religious ambivalence, identity 
and change, it is particularly relevant to consider the contributions of theologians 
who write from a religious ‘insider’ perspective. Illustrative examples include 
Croatian Protestant scholar Miroslav Volf (1996) and Ugandan Catholic priest 
Emanuel Katongole (2005), both of whom were provoked by civil wars in their own 
regions to reflect on religion and identity, particularly the question of how 
Christianity influenced social identity through boundary development and boundary 
change. Both lament the Church’s failure to challenge the divisive conceptions of 




Without directly invoking social identity theory, Volf acknowledges that the 
Church’s accommodation to local culture can cause or exacerbate social conflict, and 
then goes on to develop an in-depth theology of faith-based identity formation. 
Katongole describes as pivotal the ways in which the Catholic Church, as one of the 
largest and most influential non-state actors in Rwanda, both accepted and 
propagated the colonially-defined distinction between Hutu and Tutsi. Interestingly, 
within this project’s core literature, Uvin (1998) supports to some extent Katongole’s 
analysis, but Pinchotti and Verwimp (2007) differ markedly by writing about social 
capital in Rwanda with only minimal mention of the Church. Katongole writes, 
 
Looking back at the history of Rwanda, it is striking to see how the church 
could name the injustice of the colonial system without fundamentally 
questioning its power to determine who people are . . .  Once this imagination 
and identity had fomented, Christianity made little difference in Rwanda. 
Christianity seemed little more than an add-on—an inconsequential relish 
that did not radically affect peoples’ so-called natural identities (2009: 33).  
 
Volf and Katongole dare to raise such controversial issues because they have 
developed theologies of how Christianity can and should work differently. Volf 
(1996) centers his thought around the crucifixion of Christ as an act of divine 
reconciliation, and Katongole (2005) focuses on the Eucharist as a shared sacrament 
referring to that same crucifixion. Building on the hope of spiritual transformation, 
both authors emphasize that in order to set aside the identity categories defined by 
mainstream society, a person needs to embrace an alternative spiritual identity that 
transcends the old paradigms. This does not mean that one ceases to belong to a 
certain ethnic group, but that one’s self-understanding as a person of faith becomes 




faith contains teachings that expressly value persons of all ethnic groups, as DMI 
members have encountered in their own discovery of the biblical and qur’anic 
theologies of peace, then the faith-based identity can promote inclusion. The 
development of this transcendent identity must be accompanied by a degree of 
intentional detachment from the surrounding culture, which Volf calls “distance” 
(1996: 35-56), and Katongole describes as being “located outside or at the margins of 
the dominant political imagination” (2005: 82).  
The process of establishing a critical distance from the religious culture that 
one has been taught, and drawing on one’s faith to construct an alternative, more 
inclusive identity, is clearly visible among the action research participants in 
Mindanao.  Yet there remains the persistent question of how religiously-influenced 
boundaries are changed when the groups in question represent different faith 
traditions, as they do in Mindanao. Katongole’s Eucharist-based concept emphasizes 
unity within the Body of Christ (2005: 87), meaning Christians, and thus leaning 
implicitly toward majority Christian contexts like that of Rwanda. He does point out 
that the minority Muslim community in Rwanda was admirably able to transcend the 
tensions between Hutu and Tutsi, but he does not address how his notion of unity 
applies to Christian-Muslim relations. On the other hand, Volf’s theological model 
focuses more on the stance of the individual Christian toward others, whether 
inclusive or exclusive, leaving open the possibility of interfaith engagement. 
Interfaith issues are not emphasized in his seminal Exclusion and Embrace (1996), but 
Volf has been visibly active in the scholarly interfaith exchange catalyzed by A 




2007). Thus Volf’s approach appears more relevant to engagement in multifaith 
contexts.  
Woven throughout this discussion on identity reconstruction and boundary 
change there is an implicit thread of logic supporting the significance of human 
agency. To state that a person in a deeply divided society can choose to change their 
identity is to argue that he or she, if equipped and empowered, is capable of 
transcending the pressures of a divisive social context. The Mindanao data are 
particularly rich in examples of DMI members re-evaluating the implicit belief that 
affirming universal truth requires a conflicted relationship with people who believe 
otherwise, thus marking a theological shift from exclusivism to inclusivism (Eck 
1993). This change has led them to engage ‘the other’ on relational terms, with 
intentionality and sometimes at significant personal cost. It is significant that Volf 
positions his own inquiry as a contribution to understanding the role of the 
individual. “Instead of reflecting on what kind of society we ought to create in order 
to accommodate individual or communal heterogeneity, I will explore what kinds of 
selves we need to be in order to live in harmony with others” (Volf 1996: 20-1). Volf 
does not deny that the surrounding context is important, for “social arrangements 
condition social agents; and social agents fashion social arrangements” (1996: 22). 
Nonetheless, he sees the contribution of theology as pertaining primarily to agency. 
This suggests that religion’s natural focus on human development and moral 
responsibility serve to illuminate agency, and that the inconsistency of the agency 
theme in this project’s core literature may be due in part to its neglect of religion as a 




These selective samples of religious literature serve to explain and amplify the 
meaning of the action research findings in ways that the secular-leaning literature on 
nPCROs clearly does not.  Wherever religion influences identity-based conflict, 
religious culture must be considered as one of the key forces shaping the conflict 
impacts of nPCROs.  Admittedly, some level of insight can be obtained by simply 
using the two bodies of theory alongside each other, and transposing important 
concepts back and forth between them. However, given the extensive influence of 
religion in many conflicted societies around the world, it would be preferable if such 
linkages did not depend on the initiative of the user. An integrated theory should 
include religion in associational theory in a way that cannot be overlooked or 
bracketed out, and would explain more adequately the mechanisms by which 
religious associations impact conflict through their influence on individual mindsets, 
including individual identity formation. Perhaps most importantly, an integrated 
theory would help address the pivotal and much-neglected question of how the 
social impact of religious associations might be improved, and how desirable 
intercommunal structures might come into being in the most deeply divided 
societies.  
 
Conclusion: Religion as Central to Associational Theory 
Regarding the role of religion, the action research data make it clear that 
religion, in both its institutional and intangible aspects, is critically important as a 
determinant of associational conflict impact in Mindanao and Singapore. Focusing on 




values and behaviors are a central component of mindset formation. Among the 
action research participants in this study, the religious themes of compromise, 
proselytism and theological resources for peace are closely intertwined with the 
shaping of individual identity, a phenomenon which directly influences a person’s 
willingness and ability to form intercommunal associational structures. Proselytism 
further directly shapes conflict impact on its own terms, because a perceived intent to 
proselytize can quickly inflame ethno-religious tensions.  Proselytism and the fear of 
religious compromise have been illuminated from a largely Evangelical perspective, 
due to the high proportion of Evangelicals among the Mindanao participants.  It is 
significant that the bulk of the reported mindset shift has taken place among DMI’s 
Evangelical members, because Evangelicals are often portrayed as particularly 
intransigent toward out-groups. The empirical data assert, along with Ganiel and 
Dixon, that even conservative Evangelicals can change, thus suggesting the utility of 
further research on how religious actors can transform their identities (2008: 432). 
This evidence of change further underscores the relevance of human choice 
and agency in the face of divisive contextual pressures, as established in the previous 
chapter, and deepens the understanding of what such agency may mean for religious 
actors. Exposure to conflict sensitivity brings to the fore an awareness of religion’s 
ambivalent effects on conflict and violence (Appleby 2000), and religion’s related 
encouragement towards responsibility for personal ethics. Weisinger and Salipante 
(2005) have argued that individual motivation is important for achieving 
associational intercommunality. The empirical data, affirming Karner and Parker 
(2008), clearly show religion as one such source of motivation for interfaith 




such engagement is counter-cultural, coming at the cost of uncomfortable personal 
dissonance and disapproval from co-religionists. In the words of Karner: “Such 
exercises of human agency are particularly revealing and important when they 
involve ethical choices that recognize the other’s needs and, in the process, override 
self-interest” (2007: 168). Without denying that personal gain can also be a relevant 
source of motivation, this study’s findings suggest that religious convictions can in 
some cases prompt people to act for the common good, again distinguishing these 
findings from the self-interest assumptions underlying much of social network 
theory (as seen in Pickering 2007).   
Finally, the Southeast Asian setting has brought religious culture to the fore in 
a manner that exposes a ‘religion gap’ in much of the associational literature. This 
gap is relevant only to settings in which religion plays a significant role in the public 
sphere, yet such settings are in fact quite numerous. This project’s core literature on 
the conflict impacts of nPCROs cannot explain the prominent religious themes seen 
in the empirical data, yet selected theological writings serve to interpret and amplify 
the action research findings in ways that are highly applicable to real-world 
problems. Given the increasing recognition of religion’s influence in the associational 
sector, a much more consistent integration of religious content would be desirable in 





CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS   
 
Confronted with a problem as complex as racism, we cannot afford to let 
ourselves be constrained by the boundaries of specific disciplines. 
- Philomena Essed (1991: 1) 
 
This chapter synthesizes the contribution of the action research study towards 
the understanding of how the religious associational sector influences the dynamics 
of peace and conflict. Building on the influential work of Robert Putnam (2000, 2002, 
Putnam and Feldstein 2003) and Ashutosh Varshney (2001, 2002) with its immensely 
important yet somewhat simplified emphasis on intercommunal associational 
structures, the current study has suggested a more complex and dynamic 
understanding of how associational impacts on peace and conflict come about, and 
how they might be improved. The key findings are summarized below, together with 
an assessment of their generalizability to other socio-political contexts. On the basis 
of these findings, I consider the broader contributions of this thesis towards 
theoretical integration, reaffirming an inclusive non-Western definition of civil 
society, pointing towards an interdisciplinary integration of religion into the 
associational literature, and building on conflict sensitivity and action research to 
enhance linkages between theory and practice. I conclude with a brief reflection on 
the methodology of collaborative action research, underscoring my intent to work 
towards theory that not only stands up firmly under academic analysis, but also 
demonstrates applicability to real-world problems by being believable enough into 





Summary of Findings and Generalizability  
This study has explored both conceptually and empirically how associations 
interact with social conflict.  Within a rather expansive field of theory, the positioning 
of this study has been unique in several ways. First, the study has taken conflict 
sensitivity theory (International Alert et al. 2004a, Bush 2009, Anderson 1999, 
Paffenholz and Reychler 2007), originally developed as a programmatic planning tool 
for the humanitarian aid sector, as the point of departure for exploring several 
important themes that are underdeveloped in the literature.  This positioning 
underscores the growing recognition that associational impacts are not uniformly 
positive, and some impacts may in fact be negative. Further, while this study has 
narrowed its focus to conflict impacts, its scope has not been limited to conflict-
focused associations. On the contrary, associations whose mandates do not focus 
primarily on either peace or conflict, which I have termed non-peace and conflict 
resolution organizations (non-PCROs, adapted from Gidron et al. 2002c), may 
generate significant externalities (Morris 2000: 27-8) in the form of unintended 
impacts on conflict.  The existing peace-themed literature gravitates toward peace-
focused associations, but I have argued that nPCROs, whose far greater numbers 
make up the bulk of the associational sector, also influence peace and conflict in ways 
that must not be taken lightly.  Situating this study in Southeast Asia has allowed for 
the exploration of nPCRO conflict impacts in contexts characterized by identity-based 
ethno-political conflict, where the parameters of the associational sector, and the role 




To investigate these themes, I have carried out two parallel action research 
projects, the larger in partnership with the Davao Ministerial Interfaith (DMI) of 
Mindanao, Philippines, and the smaller with the Harmony Centre at An-Nahdhah of 
Singapore. The Singapore data have provided an essential comparative cross-check to 
aid in interpreting the Mindanao findings, particularly in light of the significant 
differences in their levels of physical violence and economic development, and the 
nature of associational life across the two sites. At this point in time, neither agency 
can be considered a ‘pure’ example of a non-peace and conflict resolution 
organization.  In fact, both agencies have their roots as nPCROs in the religious 
sector, comprised of religious leaders and activists who focus their work on 
traditional matters of faith. However, their increasing awareness of the externalities 
of religious activities, particularly their potential for exacerbating ethno-religious 
tensions, has led over time to a measure of intentional engagement with 
peacebuilding concerns. Whereas ‘pure’ nPCROs would probably have been 
reluctant to participate in this study, DMI and the Harmony Centre still have more 
than enough members whose primary work is not peacebuilding to indicate the rich 
potential of this line of inquiry.  
The action research in Mindanao and Singapore was designed to yield data 
supporting a two-level research inquiry.  At the first level, I conducted field-testing to 
investigate the need observed by both practitioners (Garred 2006b) and researchers 
(Hadiwinata 2007) to address the pivotal and sometimes unhelpful role of religious 
associations in Southeast Asian settings of ethno-religious conflict. I have explored 
the promising yet largely untried approach of applying conflict sensitivity theory and 




been: Is conflict sensitivity applicable (relevant and useful) in helping religious 
associations to improve their social impact in multifaith conflict-vulnerable contexts? 
More specifically, is there a need for conflict sensitivity? To what extent, and how, is 
conflict sensitivity being used, or not used, and why? What are the implications for 
enhancing practitioner capacity? In analyzing the relevance and usefulness of conflict 
sensitivity for religious associations, my conclusion is a qualified ‘yes,’ pertaining not 
only to Mindanao and Singapore, but also to other contexts.  
In terms of relevance, conflict sensitivity analysis has laid bare numerous 
patterns of unintended negative impact, as well as some patterns through which 
religious activities can contribute positively to social cohesion. Such dynamics are 
likely to be present wherever religion is an aspect of prevailing social tensions and 
religious associations are active in the public sphere. This socio-political reality, 
combined with the fact that conflict sensitivity analysis is elicitive rather than 
presumptive or prescriptive, implies that the conflict sensitivity approach is broadly 
applicable within the worldwide religious sector. Importantly, however, the 
predominant issues identified through conflict sensitivity analysis will vary across 
socio-political contexts. Around Southeast Asia, ethno-religious exclusion and 
proselytism are prominent issues, but some societies experience such issues more 
intensely than others. In other regions, the predominant issues may be quite 
different, such as possibly the use of religious ideology to justify nationalist violence 
in the Balkans, or to fuel partisan ‘culture wars’ in the United States. Further, 
outsiders tend to recognize such dynamics as relevant more quickly than insiders. 
Insiders usually receive the conflict sensitivity concept with enthusiasm, but the pace 




social tensions are publicly acknowledged, and the degree to which one’s own 
identity group is implicated in causing unintentional harm. For this reason, 
facilitation techniques and ethical considerations may vary across socio-political 
contexts.   
With regard to conflict sensitivity’s usefulness, the organizational planning 
benefits of this approach are significant, as its developers originally intended. 
However those organizational benefits are also dependent on investments in capacity 
building and management over time. What actually makes conflict sensitivity 
consistently useful, particularly the Do No Harm (DNH; Anderson 1999) framework 
used in field testing, is its capacity to catalyze progressive change among individuals. 
Action research participants showed a remarkable tendency towards changed 
mindsets, including an increased awareness of their own influence on the social 
context, and a shift towards inclusive perceptions, values, beliefs, and attitudes. 
These individual changes are relatively easy to achieve, and contain the potential 
seeds of future programmatic and organizational change. Importantly, some 
dissonance has been seen in participants’ use of DNH for the identification of 
unintended negative impacts, including the de-emphasis of formal impact analysis, 
the influence of religious beliefs regarding unintentional harm, and the risk of 
overlooking structural violence (Galtung 1969). Such weaknesses could be improved 
by adjusting the DNH framework to foreground issues of injustice, and by adapting 
capacity building methodologies to support informality in project impact analysis 
and consistency in DNH application. While Greenwood and Levin (2007: 66) advise 
caution in generalizing the findings of action research, it is evident that very similar 




2006b, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2008a, CDA Collaborative Learning 
Projects 2009a, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2009b), and those aid sector 
patterns were global in their distribution. Thus it is reasonable to propose that my 
conclusions on DNH in the religious sector are also broadly generalizable to other 
contexts in which religion plays a prominent role in public life.  
Perhaps most significantly, the DNH project impact analysis mechanisms that 
describe the specific patterns through which associational activities influence social 
conflict differ significantly from the humanitarian aid sector to the religious sector. In 
the religious sector, those patterns tend comparatively toward the intangible, 
highlighting the influence of religious cultures and beliefs, and the pivotal role of 
religious leaders. The Mindanao action research has made a significant start towards 
contextualizing these patterns for the religious sector, resulting in emergent findings 
that are already being applied by local practitioners, and informing academic theory 
on the determinants of religious associations’ conflict impacts, as discussed below. 
Nevertheless, data have been drawn thus far primarily from Christians and Muslims 
in significant swathes of Mindanao and in Singapore. More research is needed among 
other Southeast Asian religions, including Buddhism and other non-monotheistic 
faiths whose religious cultures may differ in important ways, in addition to research 
in other geographic regions, to ensure that the impact patterns identified will 
accurately reflect the experiences of the international religious sector.  
Building on the conflict sensitivity analysis, the second level of my research 
inquiry has approached theory development in more traditional ways, by responding 
to some important tensions, imbalances and gaps in the existing theory on the 




Putnam and Feldstein 2003) and Varshney (2001, 2002) have elevated the 
understanding of the importance of associational structure, particularly the 
heterogeneity or homogeneity of their composition in relation to the major cleavages 
between identity groups in a given society. Their optimism about the potential of 
intercommunal structures has generated a range of responses from other researchers 
in this project’s ‘core literature’ on the conflict impacts of nPCROs, many of whom 
suggest the need for greater theoretical nuance (including MacLean 2004, Molenaers 
2005, Weisinger and Salipante 2005, Pickering 2006). Nonetheless, Putnam’s and 
Varshney’s structural focus on intercommunality has been highly influential, and it 
remains thus far the defining emphasis of this emergent line of inquiry.  The 
emphasis on intercommunality is often associated with a macro-level effort to assess 
associational impact on a sector-wide basis, diagnosing it as either broadly positive or 
broadly negative, on the basis on mono-causal explanations.  
The contribution of these structurally-focused generalizations has been to 
establish a much-needed appreciation of the dualistic potential of associations in 
settings of identity-based conflict. However, in terms of applicability, such 
generalizations become misleading when they encourage the assumption that conflict 
impacts can be improved by simply ‘making associations intercommunal.’  As a 
contribution towards further theoretical development, I have pitched my inquiry at a 
more localized level, to pursue a nuanced understanding of the causes and processes 
through which associational conflict impact actually comes about, and how such 
impact might be changed or improved.  In this light I have explored three 
interrelated sets of questions: First, are the conflict impacts of associational activity 




between the two? Secondly, does the socio-political context shape the association, or 
can the association influence its context? What conditions, if any might allow an 
association to transcend divisive social pressures in order to become an agent of 
unity? Thirdly, among the potential non-structural determinants of impact, what is 
the role of religion in shaping an association’s effects on conflict? The first two sets of 
questions lead to conclusions that are believed to be broadly generalizable to other 
contexts of identity-based conflict, while the third question on religion pertains to 
societies where religion holds importance in the public sphere.  
Regarding the relationship between structural and non-structural 
determinants of impact, the nature of the mindset shifts among action research 
participants, and the ways in which those changing individuals shape the conflict 
impacts of their organizations, are clearly non-structural. Thus it is evident that a 
singular focus on associational structure as the sole determinant of impact is likely to 
miss the mark.  Intercommunal structures are indeed very significant in settings of 
identity-based conflict. However, the existence of intercommunal structures is 
predicated on the willingness and ability of individual participants to engage with 
‘the other.’  Further, one of the primary ways that such intercommunal structures 
promote social cohesion is through facilitating the relational contact opportunities 
that help to shape individuals, and their roles within the association and the broader 
society.  For this reason, I have proposed replacing the implicitly mono-causal focus 
on structure with an alternative theoretical model that illustrates the interaction 
between associational structure and individual mindsets. Individual mindsets 
influence (and are influenced by) collective behavior, which in turn shape (and are 




and individual mindset can therefore be depicted as a cycle, which has the potential 
to move either towards or away from intercommunality. This cycle is a dynamic one, 
with its movement open-ended and spiraling to highlight the nature of change over 
time. This model269  assists in capturing complexity and nuance among the 
determinants of associational conflict impacts, which may render theory less 
parsimonious, but more relevant in application to real-world problems. 
The proposed theoretical model of a structure-mindset cycle brings squarely 
into focus the role of the individual, and the research questions on the exercise of 
human agency. There is a tension in the core literature between context and agency, 
which manifests itself in a difference of opinion on how easily people in deeply 
conflicted societies can overcome the divisive pressures of the social context that 
surrounds them, in order to form intercommunal associational structures. The cases 
of DMI and the Harmony Centre both demonstrate associations making choices to 
progress towards intercommunality, albeit slowly, counter-culturally and against the 
odds. Their experience suggests that the forces of context and agency, far from being 
an either/or dichotomy, are both important and mutually influence each other. 
Among the various factors and conditions that might contribute to success, what 
stands out in these cases is intentionality, at both individual and organizational 
levels. The deep identity-based divisions in Mindanao and Singapore have their own 
inertia, which people can redirect only through deliberate and persistent choices to 
act in ways that engage ‘the other.’  Individual consciousness-raising and mindset 
shift can become a catalyst for such choices, possibly leading to collective action 
amongst like-minded colleagues, and ultimately to associational change. Whilst 
                                                 




acknowledging the vast distance between localized actions and large-scale impact, 
these findings point to intentional human agency as a necessary starting point. In the 
words of Karner (2007: 166): “We are capable of reflection and resistance, of solidarity 
with the ‘other’ and of cultural innovation.” 
The preceding analyses of the importance of human mindsets and agency, as 
seen through the experiences of interfaith actors in Mindanao and Singapore, have 
been thoroughly infused and permeated with religious meaning. Indeed, one cannot 
understand the trajectory of DMI and the Harmony Centre towards intercommunal 
structures without engaging the role and influence of religion. In these contexts of 
ethno-religious conflict, religious culture is a major source informing the 
development of group identities and their resulting influence on individuals. 
Religiously-informed boundaries have a dualistic potential to either exclude or 
include, as Allport ([1954] 1979: 444) states succinctly:  “The role of religion is 
paradoxical. It makes prejudice and it unmakes prejudice.” The empirical data are 
particularly rich in examples from Protestant Evangelical Christianity, and as such 
they illustrate important manifestations of identity development as it relates to the 
fear of compromising one’s religious commitments, the pursuit and avoidance of the 
proselytism practices so sensitive in the region, and the discovery of theological 
resources promoting peace. In each of these areas, it is evident that religion’s 
potential is ambivalent (Appleby 2000), and that some religious actors are making 
choices for change. Specifically, where those actors had previously held religious 
perceptions, beliefs and values that promoted exclusion, they are becoming aware of, 




inclusion. Such changes are selective, and the conservative actors in this study choose 
theological alternatives that they feel are compatible with their own faith traditions.  
In sum, the empirical data affirm that “most religions are multivoiced; their 
doctrines could be and have been interpreted in ways that permit, if not encourage, 
political action for the cause of democracy” (Cheng and Brown 2006: 5). However, 
with the notable exception of the work of Karner and Parker (2008), those religious 
voices are not heard in the core literature on nPCRO social impact, and they are 
heard only inconsistently in the broader body of theory on associations and 
democratization. In fact, the literature that best explains and illuminates the religious 
content of the action research findings comes not from the social sciences, but from a 
selective sampling of the work of theologians. Both Volf (1996) and Katongole (2005) 
examine the question of how Christianity influences social identity through 
boundary construction and boundary change, in settings of identity-based conflict. 
The strong relevance of their analysis to the realities of DMI and the Harmony Centre 
serves to underscore the problematic nature of the ‘religion gap’ found in this 
project’s core literature on the conflict impacts of nPCROs. Indeed, the problem of 
theoretical disconnectedness has been a common theme throughout this thesis 
project, as briefly highlighted below.  
 
Towards Theoretical Integration 
The prominence of religion in this study, and indeed in Southeast Asian 
associational life, stands in sharp contrast to the past predictions of secularization 




of conflict in the region are often political and economic struggles defined along 
ethnic lines, but the demographic overlap of religion with ethnicity has made religion 
a highly influential secondary factor (Fox 2004). An increasing number of Western 
social scientists are recognizing the linkages between religion and civil society 
(Juergensmeyer 2005, James 2007a, Dinham 2009), and the discourse currently reflects 
a state of flux as old assumptions are disproved and religion gradually moves closer 
to the academic mainstream. This process of collective re-thinking could be greatly 
helped by consistently positioning religious institutions and cultures as a part of the 
civil society or associational sector, and by pursuing interdisciplinarity in 
interpreting ethno-religious phenomena. Interestingly, Varshney with Kanbur et al. 
(2010) has recently pointed out how interdisciplinarity could aid in understanding 
conflict that is identity-based, including religious aspects of identity.  Nonetheless, 
their call for interdisciplinarity refers only to better communication within the social 
sciences; it does not extend to other relevant fields such as religious studies.  
On the basis of the current study, I would argue that wherever religion plays 
a prominent role in the public sphere, religious studies should be integrated with 
associational theory, including theories of civil society, social capital and all other 
concepts united by the associational “family resemblance” (Rossteutscher 2005a, 
Muukkonen 2009). Admittedly, some level of insight can be obtained by simply 
holding associational theory and religious theory alongside each other, and 
transposing key concepts back and forth between them. However, given the 
extensive influence of religion in many conflicted societies, it would be preferable if 
such linkages did not depend on the initiative of the user. An integrated theory 




adequately the mechanisms by which religious associations impact conflict through 
their influence on individual mindsets. Perhaps most importantly, an integrated 
theory would help address the pivotal and much-neglected question of how the 
social impact of religious associations might be improved, and how desirable 
intercommunal structures might come into being in the most deeply divided 
societies. Wherever religion influences identity-based conflict, religious culture must 
be considered as one of the forces shaping the conflict impacts of nPCROs.   
The positioning of religion is foremost in this study, yet it is inextricably 
linked to the broader question of how the associational sector is defined.  ‘Civil 
society,’ as a dominant concept within the broader realm of associational theory, is 
particularly problematic to define. My decision to define civil society broadly, 
moving away from Western-influenced definitions that exclude ethnic- and religious-
based organizations (Orvis 2001, Varshney 2002, Lee 2004), has proved essential for 
examining the extensive ethno-religious dynamics at play in the associational sectors 
of both Mindanao and Singapore. Further, it has been equally essential not to limit 
the notion of civil society to organizations that position themselves as a 
counterweight to the state (Hann 1996, Kasfir 1998).  Such limitations would have 
excluded the Harmony Centre which, like many Singaporean associations, is state-
guided and state-funded (Lee 2004, Lyons and Gomez 2005), yet extends its impact 
through associational activists and organizations. Further, in both Mindanao and 
Singapore, a focus on opposition toward government would have overlooked the 
numerous other ways in which associations impact politics and the public sphere 
(Unsworth and Uvin 2002: 8).  In the end, the use of a narrow Westernized definition 




therefore add my voice to the growing minority of associational researchers who 
argue that "the point is to start with the context as it actually is, not with 
preconceived ideas which derive from a very different (Western) context" (Unsworth 
and Uvin 2002: 3).  
It is fitting that such field-driven challenges to theory should take center stage 
within an action research study, given the focus of action research on linking theory 
and practice, and integrating thought with action. In this study, I have drawn on 
conflict sensitivity as a form of practitioner-derived theory, to critique the simplified 
causation analysis that undergirds the current understanding of nPCRO conflict 
impact in much of the theoretical core literature.  Conflict sensitivity’s complex view 
of causation permits the analyst to examine multiple determinants of impact, 
including non-structural determinants, without neglecting the importance of 
intercommunal associational structures.  Conflict sensitivity also emphasizes the 
dynamic possibility of human action leading to change, in contrast to the typical view 
of associational structure as static, thereby opening up the question of how social 
impact might be improved. This juxtaposition of practitioner-derived theory with 
academic theory has resulted in a more balanced and nuanced assessment of social 
impact among nPCROs, making this body of theory a more believable guide for 
decision-making and action. Further, this study has employed action research not 
only to inform existing theory, but in some instances to develop new theory, as seen 
in the emergent conflict impact patterns identified in Chapter Six. This line of 
argument makes a modest contribution towards turning the traditional scientific 




Given such methodological advantages, it is surprising that action research, 
despite its gains in the fields of education and management, is uncommon in the 
social sciences, and conspicuously absent in Peace Studies. A need has been 
recognized by leaders in the field, as Galtung has pointed out the researcher’s 
unfortunate choice between “the world of books” and “the world of reality” (1985: 
143), and Alger has lamented that “much that has been learned is rarely applied” 
(2006: 3, see also Alger 2000).  Reychler has called for a broadening of research 
practice, expanding the possibilities beyond the well-known empirical-analytical and 
interpretive methodologies, to include also what he calls “participatory peace action 
research” (2006: 9-10). I would echo Reychler to argue that Peace Studies, as a field 
founded to further the understanding of pressing real-world problems, greatly needs 
the linkages to practice that action research can provide. Embracing action research 
methodology would move the entire field progressively closer to the change-oriented 
standard of credibility with a purpose (Greenwood and Levin 2007: 67).  
 
Collaborative Action Research and Internal Credibility  
As previously discussed, credibility has both external and internal 
dimensions. A lack of attention to internal credibility compromises the human 
integrity of the research agenda, as highlighted in Galtung’s (1975) provocative 
framing of traditional social science methodologies as ‘structural violence’ towards 
the people being researched. Thus while the bulk of this thesis has been devoted to 
establishing credibility among external academic audiences, it is appropriate to close 




conducted with practitioners, using the methodology of collaborative action research, 
so quality and ethics demand an assessment of internal credibility from the 
perspective of participants and partners. I cannot speak on behalf of those 
individuals, but I do offer my own brief comments on how the project has addressed 
the more participant-oriented dimensions of validity developed in Chapter Four.   
A foundational emphasis on appropriate theories and concepts (adapted from 
Bradbury and Reason 2001: p. 451) implies the development of a conceptual frame 
that reflects the lived experience of the participants. First and foremost, the conflict 
sensitivity testing effort has served to illuminate several concepts pertaining to 
impact analysis in the humanitarian aid sector that can be adapted for greater 
relevance to the work of religious actors. At a broader level, even as it was important 
for this study to establish an inclusive concept of civil society, it paradoxically 
became equally important to leave the term ‘civil society’ behind. The Westernized 
connotations of this term, and the ways in which Southeast Asian practitioners 
respond to those connotations, render conflicted and inconsistent meanings ‘on the 
ground.’  Many Singaporeans are of the opinion that ‘civil society’ does not exist in 
their country, because citizen groupings are not permitted to oppose the state. On the 
other hand, ‘community service organizations’ are considered common, and 
Singaporean practitioners respond to this alternative terminology by openly sharing 
their experiences.  In Mindanao, the term ‘civil society’ is unknown to many at the 
grassroots level, and its implication of confrontation toward the state leaves religious 
actors uncertain about whether or not this term applies to churches and mosques.  
Thus the shift towards broader terminology – ‘organizations’ in the field, and 




analyzing “what is,” rather than what Western-influenced theorists believe “ought to 
be” (Hann 1996: 18). Further, the use of associational terminology has also helped to 
unify the closely related but fragmented theories on civil society and social capital 
(Rossteutscher 2005a), and expose unnecessary assumptions about favorable linkages 
between the associational sector and liberal democratization  (Ndegwa 1996, Portes 
1998). 
Another dimension of action research validity, transformative significance 
(adapted from McTaggart 1997: 40, Bradbury and Reason 2001: 452, Herr and 
Anderson 2005: 56), points to the desirability of progressive change in the 
worldviews and self-views of everyone involved. At the most obvious level, the 
changes experienced by religious leaders and activists exposed to conflict sensitivity 
clearly evidence this sort of change, which DMI members have referred to as 
“spiritual transformation” (Davao Ministerial Interfaith Inc. 2010), and I have called a 
shift in mindset. At a deeper level, the discovery in Mindanao of problems with DNH 
project impact analysis exemplifies how action research’s multiphase spiraling 
process can result in the re-examination of a study’s underlying assumptions 
(Argyris et al. 1985, Herr and Anderson 2005: 55), which is an important component 
of appropriate process design. The DMI research team members and trainers entered the 
project with very positive perceptions and optimistic expectations of DNH, and a 
strong desire to expand DNH usage to others. The slow, iterative unearthing of 
missing or biased impact analyses appeared as a troubling surprise, and a mystery to 
be solved. Once the research team developed an understanding of the reasons for 
such difficulties, they began to incorporate into their training certain exhortations 




pace of expansion to accommodate more post-training follow-up and mentoring. 
Finally, while my personal reflections lie beyond the scope of this thesis, it must be 
said that this project has transformed my own experience of identity and power, as 
an external facilitator privileged to witness local struggle and change, and as an 
American citizen facing the US colonial legacy and ongoing military presence in 
Mindanao. The emphasis on Protestant Evangelical Christianity, while representing a 
demographic minority in Southeast Asia, is perhaps appropriate for a foreign 
Protestant researcher, allowing me to grapple reflexively with the influence of my 
own co-religionists before treading the ethically delicate terrain of analyzing others.  
Collaborative process has been of the utmost importance throughout the study, 
holding numerous implications for insider and outsider roles. In Singapore, this 
collaboration took primarily the form of mutual negotiation and agreement with the 
staff of the Harmony Centre at each phase of the project. In Mindanao, where the 
action research partnership was more extensive, and the involvement of outsiders 
more sensitive, the process was marked by progressive, intentional movement along 
the “continuum of positionality” (Herr and Anderson 2005: 31).  That is, despite the 
fact that I initiated and facilitated the action research effort, DMI has taken on 
increasing ownership throughout the process.  Action research design decisions were 
made jointly. The research team has been responsible for deciding how to position 
the project among local participants, and how to interpret and apply the findings to 
inform DMI policy and practice. Where post-project possibilities arise with regard to 
adding an explicit treatment of structural violence issues to the original DNH 
framework, or training for mindset development rather than analytical capacity, I 




Finally, DMI has also been responsible for determining how to disseminate 
their findings to other Filipino religious leaders through the publication Transformed 
Together (2010). At this point in time, useful local outcomes (adapted from Herr and 
Anderson 2005: 55, Greenwood and Levin 2007: 68, Bradbury and Reason 2001: 451) 
are taking place with little or no support from me, such as an expansion of DNH 
capacity building to include multifaith detainees inside the Davao City Jail, and 
Evangelical leaders enrolled in the emergent ‘Miracle Training Institute.’  Three of the 
DMI members trained as DNH trainers have recently gone on to become master 
trainers, developing new cadres of facilitators. We are also beginning to communicate 
action research learnings to the international audience, including the practitioners 
who originally inspired the application of DNH to the religious sector. Wherever 





Appendix A:   
A Brief Analysis of Conflict in Mindanao 
 
The people of Mindanao are closely related to the surrounding peoples of 
Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and their history reflects a strong continuity of 
regional linkages. The pre-colonial economy was based on localized fishing and 
agriculture, plus some regional trade linkages with the Chinese; traditional spiritual 
practices were animist. The arrival of Sunni Islam in Southeast Asia is believed to 
have come about relatively peacefully, through the arrival of Arab-Muslim traders 
and religious teachers.  In the islands now known as the Philippines, Islamic 
influence reached as far north as Manila, but the strongest sultanate governments 
were found on the southern island of Mindanao (e.g. the Sultanate of Maguindanao) 
and on other nearby islands within the Mindanao region (e.g. the Sultanate of Sulu). 
The indigenous groups that chose to convert to Islam eventually became known as 
the Bangsamoro.270 Those who retained traditional animist beliefs began to move 
away from the sultanates and into more isolated geographic areas; those groups are 
now referred to as Lumads, or Indigenous Peoples.271  
 The Spanish claimed the Philippine islands in 1521, just a few decades after 
the reconquista of Spain from the North African Moors, an experience that had 
disposed the Spanish towards Christian-Muslim conflict.  Spanish colonialism was 
marked not only by political and economic control, but also by an overt goal of 
converting the population to Roman Catholic Christianity. The sultanates resisted 
                                                 
270 The term Bangsamoro means ‘Moro nation.’ The Spanish originally applied the term Moros 
in a pejorative sense, based on their antipathy towards North African Moors. Nonetheless, 
Mindanowan Muslims have adopted the term Moros as neutral or positive in their own usage. 
271 The Lumads are comprised of eighteen distinct ethno-linguistic groups, and the 




and, even after three centuries of combat and negotiation, the southern territories 
were still under dispute when Spain ceded the Philippine islands to the United States 
in 1898 as a result of the Spanish-American war. The Americans came closer than the 
Spaniards to subduing the Bangsamoro, through both military means and civil 
administration. Bangsamoro resistance to US rule was strong, but their vision of 
independence did not include integration into a Philippines polity. In the 1920s and 
1930s, Bangsamoro leaders issued several declarations requesting that their territories 
not be included in a future Philippines state, even if this meant accepting an 
extension of interim US rule (Lingga 2007, see also Majul 1988: 899).  
Beginning in the 1920s, US-inspired resettlement policies granted homesteads 
to encourage migration from the northern and central regions (particularly the 
Visayas) towards the south, with the goal of developing and further subduing 
resource-rich Mindanao. Within a few decades, the predominantly Christian 
migrants became demographically, politically and economically dominant, while the 
Bangsamoro and Lumads were increasingly marginalized from the land. Following 
Japanese occupation and World War II, the Philippines gained full independence in 
1946. Mindanao was included in the new Philippines state, and the resettlement 
policies continued. By the late 1960s, local clashes were emerging between 
Bangsamoro and migrant militias. The 1968 Jabidah Massacre further inflamed public 
opinion among the Bangsamoro. In this incident, more than twenty Moro military 
recruits, in training for a Philippine invasion of the disputed Malaysia-held territory 
of Sabah, were allegedly executed by fellow members of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines. In 1972, shortly after President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law 




National Liberation Front (MNLF), led by Nur Misuari, emerged to consolidate the 
Moro rebellion in Mindanao. 
Peace talks under Marcos resulted in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, the first in a 
series of autonomy pacts that appeared promising but proved difficult to put into 
effect. By 1977, divisions were apparent in the MNLF leadership, and Salamat 
Hashim initiated a breakaway faction that eventually became the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF). Cyclical clashes and negotiations continued between the 
government and the MNLF until the ‘final’ Manila Agreement of 1996. The 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was established in 1989 to 
include the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu; in 2001 
Basilan Province and the Islamic City of Marawi were added. ARMM 
implementation processes have been contested, and talks continue under the 
auspices of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.  
Most MNLF units laid down their weapons in 1996, but cyclical armed 
conflict and negotiation continued between the MILF and the government, including 
a key ceasefire in 1997 followed by peaks of violence in 2000 and 2003. The most 
recent flare-up, following a failed agreement on expanded autonomy, left nearly one 
million people displaced in August 2008 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
2009: 4). The MILF is thought to draw more deeply on Islamist ideologies than did 
the MNLF, and to foster linkages with Abu-Sayyaf (a local militant-cum-crime 
organization), Jemaah Islamiyah (a regional network with pan-Islamist aspirations 
for archipelagic Southeast Asia), and Al-Qaeda. Such perceptions have drawn the 
attention and controversial military presence of the US as part of its ‘Global War on 




and ceasefire monitoring by both local and international teams of civilians. The 
points of contention center on the geographic boundaries and governance 
mechanisms for future autonomous areas, and on the constitutionality of self-
government. Other complicating factors include widespread poverty (UNDP 
Philippines 2009), splintering Bangsamoro leadership, violent clan conflict or rido,272 
extrajudicial killings (e.g. Human Rights Watch 2009), and the perception of poor 
governance and Manila-linked cronyism in the ARMM, contributing to the 2009 
election-related massacre of over 50 civilians. The current phase of peace talks 
commenced in February 2011 in Kuala Lumpur. 
In addition to insurgencies among the Bangsamoro, Mindanao is strongly 
impacted by the forty-year-old nationwide conflict between the government and the 
New People’s Army (NPA), the armed wing of the Communist Party of the 
Philippines (CPP).  The NPA is particularly active in the provinces surrounding 
Davao City, and in the Caraga region to the north. Protesting the opening of 
Mindanao to multinational corporations in mining, agriculture and logging, and the 
resulting marginalization of local ‘peasants,’ most NPA operations are based in the 
remote mountainous areas occupied by Lumads.   The NPA does not challenge the 
territorial integrity of the Philippines as the Bangsamoro-based insurgencies do, yet 
some in government consider the NPA to be a greater threat (International Crisis 
Group 2011: 1). Peace talks between the government and the National Democratic 
Front, the coalition which represents the NPA and CPP in public negotiations, 
resumed in early February 2011, with facilitation by Norway. 
                                                 
272 Clan conflict presents an important local security risk in many settings around the 
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Appendix C:  
Summary of Data Collected 
 
 
Pilot Phase Interviews  
February – May 2007 
 
1. Participant #03,273 by phone from Singapore to Cambodia, 22 February 2007, 
notes. 
2. S1, Singapore, 29 March 2007, notes. 
3. S2, Singapore, 4 April 2007, notes. 
4. S3, Singapore, 9 April 2007, notes. 
5. O1, by phone from Singapore to Cambodia, 9 April 2007, notes. 
6. S4, Singapore, 11 April 2007, notes. 
7. MI-63, Davao City, Mindanao,274 18 April 2007, notes. 
8. MI-73, Davao, 20 April 2007, notes. 
9. MG-1, Davao, 20 April 2007, notes.  
10. MI-62, Pikit, North Cotabato, Mindanao, 22 April 2007, notes. 
11. MG-2, Midsayap, North Cotabato, Mindanao, 22 April 2007, notes. 
12. MG-3, Davao, 23 April 2007, notes. 
13. MI-57, Davao, 23 April 2007, notes. 
14. MG04, Davao, 24 April 2007, notes. 
15. S5, Singapore, 15 May 2007, notes. 
16. O2, by email from Singapore to Indonesia, 21 May 2007, notes. 
17. MG-5, Zamboanga City, Mindanao, 22 May 2007, notes. 
18. MG-6, Zamboanga City, Mindanao, 22 May 2007, notes. 
19. MG-7, Zamboanga City, Mindanao, 23 May 2007, notes.  
 
 
Mindanao Action Research, in partnership the Davao Ministerial Interfaith, 
Inc.  
 
Preparation Phase (October – December 2007) 
1. Training of Trainers in DNH, Davao, 15-19 October and 26-30 November 2007, 
meeting documentation and DNH frameworks (7). (Including MG-7, MG-8, MG-
9, MG-10, MG-11, MG-12, MG-13). 
 
                                                 
273 Participant numbers include the following abbreviations: S=Singapore; MI=Mindanao 
individual; MG=Mindanao group; O=other location. Participant identities are protected to 
ensure their security.  A detailed participant list is provided in a Special Appendix, available 
only to thesis examiners. 




Action Research Cycle One – DNH Usage within DMI (January – May 2008)275 
2. DMI members’ long-form survey (20), Davao, administered by research team276 in 
January 2008.  
3. DMI members’ interviews (9) by research team: 
a. MI-38, Davao, 13 February 2008, notes. 
b. MI-5, Davao, 15 February 2008, notes. 
c. MI-80, Davao, 15 February 2008, notes. 
d. MI-22, Davao, 16 February 2008, notes. 
e. MI-101, Davao, 17 February 2008, notes. 
f. MI-61, Davao, 18 February 2008, notes. 
g. MI-93, Davao, 18 February 2008, notes. 
h. MI-28, Davao, 19 February 2008, notes. 
i. MI-7, Davao, 22 February 2008, notes. 
4. DMI Care Group DNH Assessment Forum, Davao, 24 January 2008, meeting 
documentation and DNH frameworks (6). (Including MG-14, MG-15, MG-16, 
MG-17, MG-18, MG-19, MG-20).  
5. DMI Care Group Movers (leaders) DNH Workshop, Davao, 25-26 March 2008, 
meeting documentation, short-form workshop evaluation surveys (19) and DNH 
frameworks (4). (Including MG-20, MG-21, MG22, MG23).  
6. Interviews of DMI Care Groups (4) 
a. MG-33, Davao, 12 September 2008, notes and audio recording. 
b. MG-34, Davao, 19 September 2008, notes and audio recording. 
c. MG-35, Davao, 22 September 2008, notes and audio recording. 
d. MG-36, Davao, 10 October 2008, notes and audio recording.  
7. Interviews of Project Resource People (DMI research team) (5): 
a. MI-106, Davao, 1 March 2008, notes and audio recording. 
b. MI-39, Davao, 31 March 2008, notes and audio recording. 
c. MI-85, Davao, 25 May 2008, notes and audio recording. 
d. MI-8, Davao, 26 May 2008, notes and audio recording. 
e. MI-57, Davao, 24 October 2008, notes and audio recording. 
8. Interviews of World Vision staff involved in training DMI members (2): 
a. Herminegilda Presbitero-Carrillo, Davao, 17 January 2008, notes. 
b. Bonifacio Belonio, Davao, 21 July 2008, audio recording. 
 
Action Research Cycle Two – DNH Usage beyond DMI (June – October 2008) 
9. Regional Sister Agency Leaders’ Long-form Surveys (8), Davao, administered by 
research team on 12-13 March 2008. 
10. Regional Sister Agency Members’ Long-form Surveys (30), Isla Parrilla, 
Sarangani, Mindanao, 8 July 2008.  
11. Regional Sister Agency Members’ Interviews (11): 
a. MI-46, Isla Parrilla, Sarangani, Mindanao, by research team 8 July 2008, 
notes and DNH framework. 
                                                 
275 Some data collection activities that pertained conceptually to Cycle One (DNH usage 
within DMI) were conducted within the timeframe generally pertaining to Cycle Two.  Thus 
there is some chronological overlap.  




b. MI-30, Isla Parrilla, Sarangani, Mindanao, 10 July 2008, notes. 
c. MI-50, Isla Parrilla, Sarangani, Mindanao, 9 July 2008, notes 
d. MI-83, Isla Parrilla, Sarangani, Mindanao, by research team 10 July 2008, 
notes.  
e. MI-26, Isla Parrilla, Sarangani, Mindanao, 10 July 2008, notes. 
f. MI-56, Isla Parrilla, Sarangani, Mindanao, by research team 10 July 2008, 
notes and DNH framework. 
g. MI-87, Isla Parrilla, Sarangani, Mindanao, 8 July 2008, notes and DNH 
framework. 
h. MI-40, Isla Parrilla, Sarangani, Mindanao, by research team 10 July 2008, 
notes and DNH framework. 
i. MI-59, Isla Parrilla, Sarangani, Mindanao, 10 July 2008, notes and DNH 
framework. 
j. MI-1, Isla Parrilla, Sarangani, Mindanao, by research team 9 July 2008, 
notes and DNH framework. 
k. MI-88, Isla Parrilla, Sarangani, Mindanao, by research team 10 July 2008, 
notes and personal writings of interviewee.  
12. Regional Sister Agency DNH Workshop, Surallah, South Cotabato, Mindanao, 11-
12 February 2008, short-form workshop evaluation surveys (21) administered by 
research team. 
13. External Agency DNH Workshop, Davao, 16-17 July 2008, short-form workshop 
survey evaluation (14), audio recording of trainers’ debrief, and DNH 
frameworks (5). (Including MI-81, MG-24, MG-25, MG-26, MG-27). 
14. DMI & Regional Sister Agency Advanced DNH Workshop (on Resource 
Transfers & Implicit Ethical Messages), Davao, 19-21 August 2008, event 
documentation, audio recording of trainers’ debrief, DNH frameworks (19), and 
notes on discussions with framework contributors.  (Including MG-29, MG-30, 
MG-31, MG-32, MI-26, MI-7, MI-104, MI-94, MI-25, MI-30, MI-61, MI-22, MI-10, 
MI-56, MI-4, MI-85, MI-I, MI-8, MI-100).  
15. External Agency Advanced DNH Workshop (on Resource Transfers & Implicit 
Ethical Messages), Davao, 27-28 August 2008, audio recording of trainers’ debrief, 
DNH frameworks (8), notes on discussion with framework contributors. 
(Including MI-70, MI-37, MI-52, MI-77, MI-2, MI-92, MI-106, MI-54). 
 
Research Team Consultations as follows: 
16. Davao, 22 October 2007, meeting documentation. 
17. Davao, 3 December 2007, meeting documentation. 
18. Davao, 14-15, 21 January 2008, meeting documentation. 
19. Davao, 26-27 February 2008, meeting documentation. 
20. Davao, 2-3 April 2008, meeting documentation. 
21. Davao, 22-23, 25 May 2008, meeting documentation. 
22. Davao, 3-4 July 2008, meeting documentation and DNH frameworks (4). 
23. Davao, 13-14 August 2008, meeting documentation. 
24. Davao, 17-18 September 2008, meeting documentation and audio recording. 
25. Davao, 15-16, 23 October 2008, meeting documentation and audio recording. 
26. Davao, 14-15, 17 January 2009, meeting documentation and audio recording. 




Singapore Action Research, in partnership with the Harmony Centre at An-
Nahdhah  
 
1. One-day DNH Workshop, Singapore, small group poster outputs, workshop 
evaluation surveys (short-form), and all-day video recording, 15 March 2008. 
(Included S-6, S-7, S-8, S-9, S-10, S-11, S-12, S-13, S-14, S-15, S-16, S-17, S-18).  
2. Follow-up interview, Singapore, 9 January 2009, meeting documentation. 
(Included S-6, S-7, S-8, S-9).  












Question Protocol for Pilot Phase Interviews  
(semi-structured; all sites) 
 
1. What kind of civil society organizations are most common in your area?  
• Community service, advocacy, education, communities of worship, etc? 
• Are any of them faith-based or religious in nature?  Which ones? 
• Has the size/influence of the religious civil society organizations changed over time? 
How? 
 
2. How would you describe relations between religious groups in your area?   
• Positive aspects? Negative aspects?  
• Local, national, international in origin? 
• Attitudes, behaviors, structures?  
• Do you feel the relationships are getting better, or getting worse? Why? 
 
3. Do interfaith tensions ever make it difficult for the religious civil society 
organizations to operate? 
• If so, how? Would you feel comfortable sharing an example? (It is not necessary to give 
the name of the organization). 
• If not, what do you think could be done to maintain this existing operational harmony? 
Are there any factors which might disrupt this harmony in the future? 
 
4. Do the religious civil society organizations ever influence the interfaith tensions?  
• If so, how? Would you feel comfortable sharing an example? (It is not necessary to give 
the name of the organization). 
• If not, why not?  Is it because the religious civil society organizations are not interested 
in influencing such issues?  Or would some of them wish to influence if they could?  
• When tensions flare, do the organizations ever get taken by surprise?  
 
5. Do you think that it would help religious civil society organizations to have a 
simple tool for systematically analyzing their own context? 
• For analyzing how their interventions interact with the context? 
• For planning how their interventions might have a more positive impact on the 
context? 
 
6. What types of organizations are most likely to find such tools useful? 
• Organizations working in a particular sector? If so, why? 
• Organizations working in particular geographic area? If so, why? 
• Organizations with particular types of religious beliefs and practices?  If so, why?  
• Conversely, if certain types of organizations are not likely to find such tools useful, 
why?  
 
                                                 
277 For thesis purposes, the content of Appendices C-G has been reformatted as follows: 
spacing has been reduced, local language translations have been removed, and ‘Local 
Capacities for Peace’ (LCP) terminology has been standardized to ‘Do No Harm’ (DNH). 




7. Do you know of any organizations that might be interested in testing such tools?  
• Would it be appropriate to contact them for discussion? 
 
8. If you were planning to test such new tools in a (given type of) organization, how 
would you do it? 
• What kind of people would be the most appropriate trainers?  
• What would be the most appropriate role for foreigners in contributing to this process? 
What would be the most useful role for me as a foreigner to adopt? 









1. How did you first come to know about DNH?  
 
2. How many times have you attended a DNH training event? (Check only one 
answer:  0, 1, 2, 3 or more times). 
• If you have attended a DNH training event, who was the trainer? Approximate date? 
 
3. Please refer to the DNH framework (provided). In your opinion, what is the 
purpose of DNH? 
 
For questions 4-9 below, please share your opinions about the usefulness of DNH.  
• Check only one answer: 5=I strongly disagree; 4=I disagree; 3=I neither disagree nor 
agree; 4=I agree; 5=I strongly agree.  
• Can you share an example of how you have used DNH in this way? 
4. DNH is useful for helping me understand the context of the area where I am 
working.  
5. DNH is useful in my personal life.  
6. DNH is useful inside my own church or mosque.  
7. DNH is useful in improving relationships between churches or mosques (of the 
same faith).  
8. DNH is useful in improving relationships between churches and mosques (of 
different faiths).  
9. DNH is useful when working in the community.  
 
10. Have you observed any significant changes since you began using DNH? 
• If yes, please describe one of the changes that you have observed.  
 
11. In your daily activities, how many times have you talked to people outside 
DMI/Mindanao II Interfaith278 about DNH, from the time you attended DNH 
training until now?  
• What was the people’s response?  
 
12. Have you encountered any difficulties in using DNH?   
• If yes, please describe your difficulties. 
 
13. Do you want any further clarification about DNH? 
• If yes, please write your question here. 
 
14. Any recommendation for how DMI and Mindanao II Interfaith should use DNH 
in the future?  
• If yes, please write your recommendation here. 
                                                 









1. Based on what you have learned about DNH, what do you think is its purpose? 
 
2. Could you share with me an example of have applied DNH in your own 
individual capacity (as a church/mosque leader, lay leader, parent, or person, etc.)? 
• Can you tell me more about the context of this example? Who where the people 
involved? When did it take place? 
• Specifically, what changes did you make as a result of your DNH 
understanding/analysis? 
• What was the impact of those changes? 
• Were you aware of some DNH principles in the past, even before attending DNH 
training? If so, how has DNH training influenced your understanding of these 
principles? 
 
3. Could you share with me an example of how you have applied DNH in planning 
organizational services or projects? 
• Can you tell me more about the context of this example? Who where the 
organizations/people involved? When did it take place? 
• Specifically, what changes did you make as a result of your DNH 
understanding/analysis? 
• What was the impact of those changes? 
 
4. Have you encountered any problems or difficulties in using DNH? Could you 
please describe? 
• Where did you experience problems in using DNH? (family, church/mosque, 
associates/friends, community, others, etc.) 
• What was the nature of the problems? (unclear terminology, it is difficult to conduct 
DNH analysis, not enough time, forget about DNH, others, etc.) 
• Have other religious leaders encountered the same type of problems in using DNH?  If 
so, can you tell me more about it? 
 
5. Do you think that any aspect of DNH should be adapted, to make it easier for 
religious leaders to understand and apply?  
• For any aspects that you feel should be changed . . . what is your suggested alternative? 
Why?  
• What kinds of perceptions / concerns might prevent a religious leader from 
understanding and applying DNH?  
 
6. Do you have any recommendations/ideas for how religious leaders could use DNH 
in the future? 
• Can you tell me more about why you make this recommendation? 










1. Based on what you have learned about DNH, what do you think is its purpose? 
 
2. Could you share with me an example of how you use or apply DNH? 
• Can you tell me more about the context of this example? Who where the people 
involved? When does it take place? 
• Specifically, what changes did you make or experience as a result of your DNH 
understanding? 
• What is the impact of those changes? 
 
3. As I mentioned, we are doing action research in order to share DNH with other 
religious leaders. We would like to collect many, many examples of how religious 
projects and services impact on the relationships between social groups, both 
positively and negatively. Have you seen or experienced any examples that you 
could share with me? 
• Can you tell me more about the context of this example? When and where did it take 
place? 
• Who are the social groups involved? 
• What are the Dividers and Connectors between these social groups? 
• What was the purpose/nature of the religious project or service? 
• How did the religious project or service impact on the intergroup relationships (the 
Dividers and Connectors)? 
• Which aspect (detail) of the project/service has caused the impact on conflict?  If more 
than one aspect causes the impact . . . which aspect do you think is the most important? 
Which aspect is the root that influences all the others? 
• Do you have any ideas for how to do the project or service differently, in order to 
improve impact on relationships?  
 
4. Do you have any recommendations/ideas for how we as religious leaders could 
use DNH in the future? 
• Do you have any suggestions on how we should share DNH to other religious leaders? 
• Do you think that any aspect of DNH should be adapted, to make it easier for religious 
leaders to apply? 
 
5. If we need further insights from your experience when we prepare our DNH 





Memorandum of Agreement with Davao Ministerial Interfaith 
 
Signed 23 May 2008 by: Davao Ministerial Interfaith, Inc. (DMI), Michelle Garred, Hugpong sa 
Kalambuan-Dabaw (HKDI), World Vision Development Foundation (WVDF). 
 
Purpose 
To build on DMI’s pioneering DNH experience by researching how religious leaders 
and organizations can use DNH, in order to share DNH with other religious leaders 
in South Central Mindanao and possibly other contexts. 
1. Undertake collaborative action research on the use of DNH by religious leaders 
and organizations.  
2. Document and disseminate the lessons learned for both practitioner and 
academic audiences.  
3. Equip and support up to 13 members of Davao Ministerial Interfaith Inc (DMI) as 
new DNH trainers. 
4. Provide an opportunity for DMI to grow in areas of organizational capacity, 
networking and exposure, and/or establishing a financial track record. 
 
Partners and Responsibilities 
1. The main project partners are: 
• Davao Ministerial Interfaith, Inc. (DMI) [with the support of its partner organizations 
Hugpong sa Kalambuan-Dabaw (HKDI) and World Vision Development Foundation] 
• Michelle Garred, PhD Research Student (Richardson Institute for Peace and Conflict 
Resolution, Lancaster University, UK) and Independent Consultant. 
2. DMI has appointed an DNH Core Team to work consistently throughout the 
project, including: Sister Joan Castro (Team Leader), Brother Salvador Veloso, 
Pastor Ereberto Gopo, Ustadz Ahmad Ampuan, Pastora Shirley Papio, Pastor 
Rueland Badoy, and Pastor Alan Richa. DNH Core Team agreements are as 
follows: 
• Each Core Team member will commit 2 days per month, preferably Thursday/Friday 
of the third week of the month. (There may be an additional commitment for DNH 
Trainers). 
• If a Core Team member experiences a schedule conflict, s/he will prioritize the 
number one schedule first. S/he will inform the internal Team Leader as soon as 
possible, for emergency cases only. 
• In case of 2 consecutive unexplained absences, the internal Team Leader must talk to 
the Core Team member for the commitment to continue. 
3. Michelle Garred will visit approximately 8-10 times during FY08, at mutually 
agreed times. She may also make a follow-up visit during FY09 if this is 
appropriate and helpful.  
4. Michelle Garred will keep DMI fully informed about parallel action research 





Sample Research Phases & Activities 
1. Training of Trainers in DNH 
• Master trainers included Hermie Carrillo, Ruel Fegarido & Michelle Garred 
• The new trainers were equipped to train the standard interagency DNH module, 
which they themselves will contextualize during the course of this project.  
• The new trainers delivered a 2-day DNH workshop during Mindanao Week of Peace. 
• Participants’ sharing examples of DNH applications in their own contexts were 
captured in event documentation.   
2. Action Research Phase 1: DNH usage within DMI  
• DNH assessment with 6 Purok (Neighborhood) Intergenerational Care Groups, 
followed by an intergroup forum for discussion of learnings. 
• Learning evaluation on previous DNH training in DMI: written survey of all DMI 
members, followed by selected in-depth interviews. 
3. Action Research Phase 2: DNH usage beyond DMI 
• Proposed: DNH training in 4 ADPs and/or local religious bodies with event 
documentation and written survey of participants. Followed by selected in-depth 
interviews and possibly DNH assessment with partner organizations. 
• Proposed: Written surveys and in-depth interviews among members of the Mindanao 
II Interfaith Network.  
• Proposed: Consultation among new DNH trainers to identify emerging learning and 
provide ongoing mentoring / technical support.  
4. Identification of Lessons Learned 
5. Action Research Phase 3: Dissemination and Testing of Lessons Learned 
• Proposed: Preliminary documentation of Lessons Learned by December 2008. 
• Proposed: Testing and feedback in DNH training contexts January – June 2008. 
• Proposed: Documentation finalized and published by September 2008.  
• Core Team composition and agreements can be revised as needed, as Phase 3 Core 
Team workload is anticipated to be significantly lighter than Phase 2.  
 
Documents and Publications 
1. Lessons learned publication for practitioner audiences: 
• The publication will focus on contextualizing the DNH Framework’s Resource 
Transfers and Implicit Ethical Messages for use by religious leaders and religious 
organizations.  
• DMI will be the primary author and decision maker on this publication. This implies 
that in case of any differences of opinion on the content, DMI has the right of decision. 
Michelle Garred will contribute time for writing and technical assistance.  
• The estimated completion date is end of calendar year 2008.  
2. PhD thesis for academic audiences: 
• Michelle Garred will be the primary author and decision maker on this document. 
This implies that in case of any differences of opinion on the content, Michelle Garred 
has the right of decision. DMI will provide consultation on identifying lessons 
learned.  
• The estimated completion date is late 2009. 
3. Regarding other publication opportunities, it is generally agreed that authorship 
and decision making rights will be shared. The details will be mutually decided 






HKDI has agreed to fund the DNH ToT and DNH training for P-IGCG Movers 
through the FY08 budget of Area Development Program Davao.  
• As of this writing, DMI is also requesting HKDI to consider allocating a temporary 
workspace to DMI for duration of the DNH Project.  
1. WVDF has agreed to provide technical support in DNH, organizational 
development and/or financial services coordination.  
• As of this writing, DMI is also requesting WVDF to consider FY09 funding support 
for the Lessons learned publication for practitioner audiences. 
2. Michelle Garred has agreed to contribute in PHP 22,000 in research funds for 
DNH Core Team meetings and fora between October 2007 – January 2008. 
Michelle Garred agrees to take responsibility for her own travel costs.  She also 
agrees to search for grant opportunities to provide supplementary funds.  
• For example, the Peace and Justice Studies Association has awarded a Grassroots 
Grant in the amount of $US 750 in 2008.  
• As of this writing, other applications currently in progress include the International 
Peace Research Association Foundation and the Religious Research Association.  
3. External grant funds may be either granted directly to DMI or sub-granted 
through HKDI, depending on donor requirements. Grant fund allocation will be 
mutually agreed between DMI, HKDI and Michelle Garred, in alignment with the 
donor guidelines. HKDI will support development of DMI accounting and 
financial management skills through capacity building and oversight (periodic 
audit).  
4. It is understood that availability of funds will affect the types of activities planned 
during the course of the project, and might also affect estimated completion dates.  
 
Research Ethics 
1. All participants will be informed in an appropriate way about the research, and 
will have opportunity to give (or decline) consent for use of their information. All 
participants will be acknowledged in project reports (unless they request to 
remain anonymous). However they will not be quoted by name (unless by special 
agreement).  
2. DNH Core Team members, and possibly also DMI DNH Trainers, will be 
considered ‘researchers’ rather than ‘participants.’  Thus in project reports they 
may be quoted by name (unless they request not to be).  
3. The information collected will be accessible for verification and analysis by all 
project partners. DMI has rights to any information collected by Michelle Garred, 
and Michelle Garred has rights to any information collected by DMI, during this 
project.  
4. The interpretation of data and the identification of lessons learned will be a 
collaborative process open to all project partners. 
5. Michelle Garred’s use of information is also subject to review by Lancaster 
University’s Ethics Committee.  
6. This project is designed as a ‘win-win,’ meaning it will be mutually beneficial for 
all partners. The collaborative process will be reviewed periodically by the Core 
Team. Also, all partners are encouraged voice questions / opinions for open 
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